Provisioning is create-if-absent, so a field the desired spec gained after an
install (spec.rcon, spec.startup.healthHTTPPort, a derived env key) never
reaches the existing login/lobby CR while every re-run of setup reports
success — the reported 'configuration updates never reach an installed
deployment' symptom. converge is the explicit pass: it fills exactly the
zero-valued whitelist fields and the derived env (including a missing key,
which refreshDerivedEnv deliberately never adds), and never overwrites a
non-zero value. The timing stays with the operator because enabling RCON or
the HTTP readiness gate on a pre-listener image would wedge that server in
Starting until it was marked Failed.
Tests: fills predated fields while operator edits survive / non-zero values
left alone / absent + foreign + unset-image guards. usage table updated so the
router-parity test passes; troubleshooting gains §12b.
A logged-in user could file submissions without bound and stream a 1 GiB
context per submission. The only limits were the single-blob size cap and the
5 GiB uploads PVC (platform/workloads.go); nothing counted a user's rows or
bytes, so one account could fill the volume and every other user's upload
would start failing.
- Create: per-user pending_review cap (default 5) — the review queue cannot
be parked full of one account's rows. Check-then-insert, documented soft.
- UploadContext: per-user stored-context budget (default 2 GiB) charged
against the blob store's REAL sizes (new Blobs.Size on local/S3 stores), so
the sum cannot drift from the volume; the write is capped at the remaining
budget, so the excess is refused before it is persisted, and a re-upload is
charged only for its new bytes.
- API: per-user create/upload throttles (30s/15s, cmd/felis-wired) on a
dedicated cooldown keyspace, reserve→release so a failed attempt never
burns the window and a burst collapses to one winner; ErrQuotaExceeded →
403 submission_quota_exceeded (distinct from the 400 an oversize blob
gets), 429 submission_cooldown for the throttles.
- Panel: zh/en copy for both codes; openapi documents 403/429 on the two
user routes; pgint covers the pending-queue count.
Unit tests: submit package (cap, budget boundary/exact-fit/replacement,
oversize-vs-quota split) and api handlers (quota 403 both paths, throttle
429 + recovery + failure-release). go vet/go test/gofmt clean; panel
vitest 118 + typecheck green.
On a completed install 'felis setup' never re-runs the installer: its host-bootstrap phase only runs while an install marker is missing, so it opens the config console and moves no component. Live on the audit box, a clean 'felis setup' run left /opt/felis/velocity/velocity.jar's mtime and hash untouched while an installer re-run logged 'resolving the newest Velocity 3.5.1 build'. The 'felis update' guidance was wrong three ways accordingly: 'run: sudo felis setup' for panel/velocity/plugins, the 'felis setup is idempotent and re-runs the installer' trailer, and the felis-api-only exception block, whose scoping taught the same false model for velocity.
Point every planner-backed selector at the tested path -- re-running the installer (the README's install one-liner) -- and replace the scoped caveat with one trailer: the channel is not persisted (pass FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev on a host that tracks main), the private repo's one-liner needs the README's token'd form, and 'felis setup is not this path'. troubleshooting.md SS15 drops the same false alternative and gains the channel caveat.
Gates: gofmt, go vet, go test ./..., deploy/bootstrap_test.sh all clean. Green live (v0.0.0+fix54 installed to /usr/local/bin over the fix52 backup, sha 0bd49467...): --panel and --velocity print the installer one-liner plus the single trailer, --mc stays command-free, --all prints the trailer once.
felis setup's in-TUI applies (storage / connection / edge) refreshed only the
control-namespace felis-config Secret; the workload-namespace mirror kept the
render from the previous run's startup pass until the next setup or installer
run. Found live: after 's -> Local' the minecraft copy still carried
user_uploads_context = s3://felis-wizard-uploads while the control copy and
both tomls were local. The 'configure email' path already overwrote both
mirrors, so storage/connection were the odd ones out.
Move the mirror refresh into applyFelisConfigSecret — the single choke point
every apply path calls — best-effort with a warning, since a control-plane
default install may not have the workload namespace at all. The smtp helper
drops its now-duplicate felis-config block.
The felis-paper/felis-limbo jars are baked into the lobby/limbo images; with
the images hosted in the in-cluster registry, the extra step is pushing the
rebuilt image there (which is also what survives an image GC), not a bare
containerd import. The installer re-run does both.
Two defects from the live Sync drill:
- The picker listed the system servers (login/lobby), which the backup API can
never accept (reserved names, no servers row): the pick died in name
validation with a raw "server name is reserved" error. backupPickable now
filters them out; the halt picker keeps them on purpose (break-glass retains
full power over system servers).
- backupErrorFromResponse mapped every 409 to the stopped gate, so the new
world-volume refusal would have displayed the wrong reason. The 409 arm now
keys on the body's error code; a code-less body still reads as the stopped
gate.
Live (auditfix38): the picker shows only user servers; a world-less pick shows
the API's own "no world volume yet — start it once" text; the not_stopped text
is unchanged.
Two defects live-drilled in the break-glass staff provisioning:
- An Owner reset that typed any username other than the occupied seat took
UpsertOwner's insert arm and silently minted a SECOND owner row, leaving the
existing seat — possibly the compromised account the reset was meant to
replace — live; every owner row is undeletable through the panel, so the tier
could never converge back to one. provisionOwner now refuses with
ownerSeatTakenError naming the seat (recoverable: the TUI routes back to the
form); bootstrap still mints, and the seat's own username still resets in
place. PGRepo gains OwnerUsername for the guard.
- InsertOperator returned the raw driver error on a taken username while the
console keys its rename prompt off api.ErrConflict — the "choose another
name" leg died with SQLSTATE 23505 against real Postgres (the fake encoded
the contract; PGRepo had drifted). Map the unique violation to ErrConflict
and pin it in pgint.
Live (auditfix37): fresh username refused naming the seat; seat reset kept the
id/email with still exactly one owner; taken operator name returned to the form
with the retry note, and the retyped name succeeded (drill rows cleaned).
Two things in the same surface. --reaper-node is the supported multi-node
answer: the rendered CronJob's pod gets a kubernetes.io/hostname selector, so
it reads the hostPath on the node that actually holds the worlds instead of
possibly scheduling where it is empty (naming a node without
--worlds-host-path is fail-loud). And the render note still told operators to
grant uid-1000 traverse / setfacl after #35 moved every world executor to
root+DAC_OVERRIDE — it now states that fact instead of the obsolete ritual.
'smtpSecretManifest' hardcoded namespace=felis, so the 'configure email'
refresh of the minecraft-namespace copies failed before it began: kubectl
refuses a manifest whose namespace conflicts with -n (found live: 'the
namespace from the provided object "felis" does not match the namespace
"minecraft"'), and the felis-config mirror never ran at all because the
smtp apply returned early. A later SMTP change could therefore never reach
the reaper's pre-reap warnings — the exact failure the refresh was added to
close.
Render the Secret with the caller's namespace (felis for the control-plane
apply, the workload namespace for the mirror). Regression test pins both.
The §18 warning path had no delivery channel at all: no Warner implementation
existed, `felis reaper` passed nil, and maybeWarn still stamped warned_3d_at/
warned_1d_at and counted `warned=N`. So every owned server was silently reaped
15 days after its last join with no notice, and the operator's only feedback
said warnings were sent. Two changes close that:
- Honest stamps: warned_* now records a DELIVERED notice. A nil Warner logs
`warning suppressed — no warner wired` and does NOT stamp; a delivery error
logs and retries on the next daily run (bounded by the warning window). The
stamps are no longer burned by notices nobody received.
- A real channel: mail.SendNotice (the second and last message shape the mail
package sends) plus a mailWarner that resolves the owner's VERIFIED email
and mails the notice through the configured [smtp] relay. `felis reaper`
wires it when [smtp] is set (same password_ref convention as felis-api) and
prints exactly what happens when it is not.
Plumbing so the in-cluster CronJob can actually reach the relay: the reaper
pod gets the optional FELIS_SMTP_PASSWORD env (same Secret as felis-api), and
the "configure email" screen now refreshes the minecraft-namespace mirrors of
felis-smtp AND felis-config (a secretKeyRef is namespace-local, and the config
mirror is what carries [smtp] into the reaper's own config). `felis setup`'s
replica list gains felis-smtp for fresh installs.
Tests: the delivered/retried/suppressed matrix in internal/reaper (the old
"stamp advances on failure" contract is deliberately replaced), the notice
message shape, the warner's resolve/send/failure paths, and the CronJob's
optional-secret env. docs/troubleshooting.md §10 now states the real semantics.
Found live while verifying the admin email-edit fix: the Owner account could
not load /api/v1/users at all. Root cause: migration 0011 adds the 'owner'
role and gates every user-administration route on it, but NOTHING ever wrote
it. break-glass (UpsertOwner), the setup MC-bind (CompleteOwnerSetup), and the
re-provision path all forced 'admin', so in a fresh install the entire
owner tier — list/create/edit/disable/delete users, quotas, sessions — was
unreachable. The role was a dead letter in the other direction too: staff
predicates that predate the role did not know it.
- UpsertOwner and CompleteOwnerSetup now write role='owner'; the username-
conflict arm re-asserts it, which is also the documented pre-0011 promotion
path ("re-provision via break-glass"). InsertOperator stays plain 'admin'.
- Staff doors learn the role: op-login start/finish admit the Owner; the
player email door refuses it like any staff account; the in-game approver
check already used staffRole.
- Reclaim protection: IsProtectedAdminLink (and the break-glass bootstrap
switch AdminExists) count admin OR owner — the Owner must never be displaced
by a Mojang-priority reclaim.
- Panel guards make migration 0011's claim true now that owner rows exist: an
owner can never be demoted, deleted, or disabled through the API (only the
local break-glass console resets the identity); username/email edits still
work.
Tests: pgint pins both provisioning paths, the protected-link predicate and
the reset/promote semantics; hermetic suites cover the owner-admitting staff
door, the owner-refusing player door, the three panel guards, and break-glass
attribution.
The first live build (Kaniko v1.24, 4 vCPU / 5.5 GiB node) walked the new
transport end to end and hit three real defects, each invisible to unit tests:
- The Job requested its FULL limits (2 CPU / 4Gi per container), so the build
Pod never scheduled on the platform's own starter node: FailedScheduling /
Insufficient memory, Pending forever. Requests are now a small floor
(250m / 512Mi, never above a configured cap) while the limits stay the
safety caps.
- Kaniko re-copies the Dockerfile out of the context and chowns/chmods it to
the source owner; a 65532-owned context (the distroless felis image uid)
fails that under the pod's dropped capabilities ('copying dockerfile:
chown /kaniko/Dockerfile: operation not permitted'). The fetch container
now extracts as root — the uid Kaniko already runs as — so the copy
succeeds; the pod was root by necessity regardless.
- Trivy's DB fetch is exactly what the build egress lock denies: the scan
step failed closed on mirror.gcr.io. New [registry] trivy_db_repository
renders --db-repository, and docs/troubleshooting.md §8e now carries the
verified mirror recipe (docker pull/tag/push of aquasec/trivy-db:2 into the
internal registry; --insecure already covers its plain HTTP).
Verified live after this batch: fetch initContainer streamed the blob through
the API + netpol + token, Kaniko built and pushed registry.felis.svc:5000/
user-uploads/sub-<id>:latest, and Trivy scanned against the mirrored DB.
A submitted modpack was durable but unreadable: the uploads PVC cannot cross
namespaces (felis-api mounts it; Kaniko runs in felis-build) and the s3 lane
handed the sandboxed build Pod no credentials, so NO user build could ever
consume its context. The transport is now the API itself:
- submit: derived context refs become the internal-face URL
/api/v1/internal/submissions/{id}/context (service-token gated), and Blobs
gains Open (local + s3) with an ErrBlobNotFound sentinel for the route's 404.
- api: serves that route on the internal face only (openapi.yaml updated; the
route-coverage test enforces it).
- build: an http(s) context renders a context-fetch initContainer (the felis
image's new fetch-context entrypoint) that streams the blob with the
namespace-local service-token Secret — never mounted into Kaniko — and
extracts it under a zip-slip guard into a size-limited emptyDir that Kaniko
reads read-only as --context=/context.
- platform/install: the api Deployment carries its own internal base URL; the
build namespace gets the token Secret through the existing replica mechanism
(bootstrap.sh + felis setup); the build egress lock opens exactly the control
namespace on the internal port.
- cmd/felis: fetch-context entrypoint (registered, documented, unit-tested for
escapes/symlinks/non-gzip).
Tests cover rendering, hardening, the s3/local Open paths, and the route's
404/503 mapping. Verified next on the real single-node cluster with Kaniko.
The api, operator and registry Deployments shipped with no liveness/readiness
probes at all: a wedged process stayed 'Running' forever, and the operator had
no health listener to probe in the first place. Kaniko build evidence on a
fresh install showed the only cluster-wide red after a disk-pressure pass was
Deployment status that never reflected health.
- felis-api: readiness /readyz (DB + K8s API round-trip) and liveness /healthz
on the internal face (:8081), the only listener that serves both endpoints;
liveness deliberately avoids /readyz so a DB blip cannot restart the api.
- felis-operator: new --health-probe-bind-address (:8081) with controller-
runtime's /healthz + /readyz (registered ping checks; an unregistered handler
map would 404), plus the matching container port and probes.
- registry: /v2/ probes on the pinned port, so a broken storage backend stops
reading as 'Running'.
Tests pin paths, ports, and that each probe targets a declared container port.
- [registry] gains kaniko_image / trivy_image / build_cpu_limit /
build_mem_limit overrides; empty keeps the compiled-in defaults. An
air-gapped or mirrored install has no route to gcr.io/aquasec (the
build egress policy allows only DNS + registry + package mirrors), so
builds previously could not even start their executors.
- deferred-seams: the uploads-context entry now records WHY a mount is
impossible (PVCs cannot cross namespaces) and that the s3 lane also
lacks credentials in the build Pod — options captured for the real fix.
- troubleshooting 8e (executor ImagePullBackOff + the overrides),
13b rewritten (verified eviction refusal, 5m pressure-transition,
image-GC recovery), 15 (upgrade/rollback runbook for Recreate).
- Backup semantics decided and documented: a backup is the whole /data
volume (worlds + config + plugins + cache) and a restore rolls all of
it back — OpenAPI/README wording updated to match (same-tag images are
still watched for regressions by the openapi parity gate).
Lemon-miaow