2559 lines
146 KiB
Markdown
2559 lines
146 KiB
Markdown
# Felis Troubleshooting Checklist
|
||
|
||
This file is the spec §28 #23 deliverable: a故障排查清单 (troubleshooting
|
||
checklist) for the failure modes the platform actually produces. Every symptom
|
||
below is traced to a concrete signal — a `status.conditions` reason, an HTTP
|
||
error code, a log string, or a manifest name — so an operator can map what they
|
||
see to the code path that emitted it.
|
||
|
||
## How to read this document
|
||
|
||
Each entry is **symptom → likely cause → where to look → fix**. The `kubectl`
|
||
commands run as root on the node (`sudo -i`, or `sudo k3s kubectl …`): the admin
|
||
kubeconfig `/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml` is readable by root only (§13c). Signals are
|
||
graded for how far the in-repo Go test suite proves the behaviour:
|
||
|
||
- **[GO-TESTED]** — a hermetic `*_test.go` exercises this exact path; the
|
||
string/code is asserted in CI.
|
||
- **[PG-TESTED]** — a `-tags pgint` test in `internal/pgint` drives it against a
|
||
real Postgres with the shipped migrations (CONTRIBUTING.md has the command).
|
||
- **[CODE-ONLY]** — the code path and string exist and are real, but no unit
|
||
test drives them (notably the Velocity Java plugin, which is not compiled or
|
||
tested in this repo).
|
||
- **[INTEGRATION-ONLY]** — the symptom is produced by the kubelet, kaniko,
|
||
containerd, Postgres, or the network, not by Felis Go code; you will see it in
|
||
`kubectl describe` / pod logs, never in `MinecraftServer.status`.
|
||
- **[INERT]** — the configuration field exists in the CRD but no controller
|
||
reads it. Tuning it does nothing. **No CRD field carries this status today**;
|
||
the last one, `spec.storage.retainOnDelete`, was removed rather than
|
||
implemented (§13 records why). A field whose change seems ignored is almost
|
||
always a condition instead — §12 lists the fields that *are* read and the
|
||
condition each depends on.
|
||
|
||
The operator never invents the parent domain; routing identity is
|
||
`spec.subdomain` under the deployment zone. Examples below use
|
||
`<root-domain>` / `registry.<ns>.svc:<port>` placeholders rather than any
|
||
concrete host.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 1. Server is stuck in `Starting` and never becomes `Running`
|
||
|
||
`MinecraftServer.status.phase` stays `Starting`. A start that never succeeds is
|
||
requeued every 2s until one of the two startup budgets expires, then escalated
|
||
to `Failed` — `StartupTimeout` if the pod never passed TCP readiness,
|
||
`ReadinessTimeout` if the RCON probe never succeeded. Both default to **300s**
|
||
when `spec.startup.timeoutSeconds` / `spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds` are
|
||
unset or `0`, and both are measured from `status.startRequestedAt`.
|
||
[GO-TESTED: `TestReconcileRunning_StartupTimeoutConvertsToFailed`,
|
||
`TestReconcileRunning_ReadinessTimeoutConvertsToFailed`.]
|
||
|
||
So `Starting` seen *once* is normal and
|
||
`TestReconcileRunning_RconProbeFailureStaysStarting` asserts exactly that — a
|
||
single failed probe must not flap the phase. `Starting` seen for longer than the
|
||
budget means the reconcile loop is not running at all; check the operator's own
|
||
logs before tuning anything. Either way the underlying cause is diagnosed from
|
||
pod state, not from `MinecraftServer.status`.
|
||
|
||
First, read the condition reason:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`markStarting` writes the same reason to both `Ready=False` and
|
||
`RconReached=False`. The reason is one of:
|
||
|
||
| `status.conditions[].reason` | Meaning | Requeue |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `PodNotReady` | Pod not TCP-ready yet (`status.readyReplicas < 1`) | 2s |
|
||
| `SpecChanged` | The spec changed while the pod was not ready; the operator recreated the pod from the new template (§1a) | 2s |
|
||
| `AutoRestart` / `StartRetried` | A timed-out start was retried, automatically or from the panel, by recreating the pod | 2s |
|
||
| `ServiceAddressPending` | The client Service has no ClusterIP yet | 2s |
|
||
| `RconSecretUnavailable` | RCON secret missing or malformed | 10s |
|
||
| `RconNotReachable` | RCON dial/auth failed | 2s |
|
||
|
||
[GO-TESTED for the reason set.]
|
||
|
||
### 1a. `PodNotReady` — pod never goes ready
|
||
|
||
The operator cannot tell *why* the pod is not ready; **a broken image, an
|
||
unbound PVC, and a backend that simply has not finished booting all surface as
|
||
the identical `PodNotReady` signal.** [GO-TESTED that the reason is emitted;
|
||
[INTEGRATION-ONLY] for the underlying pod cause.] You must drop to the pod:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>
|
||
kubectl describe pod <pod> # look at Events + container State
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- **`ImagePullBackOff` / `ErrImagePull`** → `spec.image` is wrong, the tag does
|
||
not exist, or the registry is unreachable. `spec.image` is copied verbatim into
|
||
the container with **zero validation** by the operator. Fix the image
|
||
reference, or see §7 (registry reachability) and §6 (build push target).
|
||
Editing the spec is enough, even once the server is `Failed` with its retries
|
||
spent: the StatefulSet (OrderedReady) never rolls a pod that is not ready, so
|
||
the operator deletes a not-ready `<name>-0` made from an older template itself
|
||
and the StatefulSet recreates it from the new one. The server goes back to
|
||
`Starting` with reason `SpecChanged`, a fresh start timeout and its restart
|
||
budget at zero, and the MinecraftServer gets a `PodReplaced` Event.
|
||
[GO-TESTED: `TestSpecChangeReplacesAPodThatGaveUp`, `TestStalePodReplacement`.]
|
||
- **PVC `Pending`** → `kubectl get pvc -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>`. A
|
||
nonexistent `spec.storage.storageClassName`, or a request larger than any class
|
||
can satisfy, leaves the PVC unbound. The operator does **not** error on this
|
||
(only a malformed *quantity* errors — §2); it waits in `Starting` indefinitely.
|
||
Fix the StorageClass name or capacity. [INTEGRATION-ONLY.]
|
||
- **Container crash-looping before the readiness port opens** → check container
|
||
logs; this is a backend/entrypoint problem, not a Felis problem.
|
||
- **Stuck in `Init:` or `AccessDeniedException` / `Permission denied` in the
|
||
log** → the pod runs as uid/gid **1000** (`naming.GameUID`) with every
|
||
capability dropped, whatever `USER` the image declares. Before the server
|
||
starts, the `prepare-data` initContainer (`felis init-volume`, root with only
|
||
`CHOWN` + `DAC_OVERRIDE`) hands every world entry not yet owned by 1000:1000
|
||
to that uid, so a world written by an older root-run release or extracted by a
|
||
restore Job is fixed on its next start:
|
||
`kubectl logs <pod> -c prepare-data` prints how many entries it changed and
|
||
lists up to 20 it could not. An image that writes outside `/data` and `/tmp`
|
||
(a directory baked into the image as root) cannot run as uid 1000; rebuild it
|
||
to keep its state under `/data`. [GO-TESTED: `TestBuildStatefulSetRunsGameAsNonRoot`,
|
||
`TestChownTreeHandsOverMismatchedEntries`; INTEGRATION-ONLY for the walk on a
|
||
live volume.]
|
||
- **`FailedCreate … violates PodSecurity "baseline"`** on the StatefulSet or a
|
||
Job → the minecraft namespace enforces the PodSecurity `baseline` profile
|
||
(`pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline`, set by the install bundle).
|
||
Everything Felis renders there fits it; a pod that is refused was edited or
|
||
created outside Felis (hostPath, hostPort, privileged, extra capabilities).
|
||
`kubectl get events -n minecraft --field-selector reason=FailedCreate` names
|
||
the field. [GO-TESTED: `TestObjects_MinecraftNamespaceEnforcesBaseline`.]
|
||
|
||
### 1b. `RconSecretUnavailable` — RCON secret missing or malformed
|
||
|
||
The probe needs the RCON password from `spec.rcon.secretRef`. The message is the
|
||
verbatim error: [CODE-ONLY for these branches]
|
||
|
||
- `rcon.secretRef.name and .key are required when rcon is enabled` — you enabled
|
||
`spec.rcon.enabled` but left `secretRef.name` or `secretRef.key` empty.
|
||
- `secret "<name>" has no key "<key>"` — the Secret exists but lacks the named
|
||
key.
|
||
|
||
Fix: create the Secret with the referenced key, or correct `secretRef`. Verify:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl get secret <secretRef.name> -o jsonpath='{.data.<key>}' | base64 -d | wc -c
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### 1c. `RconNotReachable` — RCON dial or auth failed
|
||
|
||
The probe is a TCP connect **plus** RCON auth handshake, then immediate close —
|
||
**no command is ever run; a successful auth IS the entire readiness gate.** The
|
||
message is the verbatim dial error:
|
||
|
||
- `rcon: authentication failed` → the password in the Secret does not match the
|
||
backend's `rcon.password`. Reconcile the two. [GO-TESTED that this maps to
|
||
`RconNotReachable`.]
|
||
- `connection refused` / `i/o timeout` → the backend has not opened the RCON
|
||
port yet, RCON is disabled in `server.properties`, or the image listens on a
|
||
port other than 25575 (the CRD accepts only that one for `spec.rcon.port`,
|
||
operations.md §4). [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live handshake.]
|
||
|
||
The per-probe timeout is a fixed 5s in code (`prober.go:45`, shortened further if
|
||
the reconcile context has a nearer deadline). It is **not** derived from
|
||
`spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds`, which is the deadline for the whole
|
||
start, not for one probe — see §12.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 2. Server is in `Failed`
|
||
|
||
There is exactly **one** path to `PhaseFailed`: `markFailed(server,
|
||
"InvalidSpec", err)`, reached only when the StatefulSet cannot be built. In
|
||
practice this means **a malformed `spec.storage.size`** (an unparseable resource
|
||
quantity), surfaced as:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
invalid storage size "<value>": <parse error>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`status.conditions` will show `Ready=False` and `Provisioned=False`, both with
|
||
reason `InvalidSpec`. Fix the quantity (e.g. `10Gi`, not `10 GB`) and the server
|
||
leaves `Failed` on the next reconcile. [GO path is real; the specific branch is
|
||
[CODE-ONLY] — the reconciler test fixture uses a valid size.]
|
||
|
||
Two caveats when a server has been in `Failed`:
|
||
|
||
- A pod-not-ready or unreachable-RCON server is **never** `Failed`; it is
|
||
`Starting` (§1). If you see `Failed`, it is a spec problem, not a runtime one.
|
||
- `markFailed` does **not** reset `status.endpoint`. A server that fails after
|
||
having been `Running` keeps a stale `endpoint.mode=direct`. The proxy should
|
||
treat any non-`Running` phase as "do not route direct" rather than trusting a
|
||
lingering `direct` endpoint (§4).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 3. Players can't join / get sent to the wrong place
|
||
|
||
Routing is driven by `status.endpoint`:
|
||
|
||
- `markRunningReady` is the **only** writer of `endpoint.mode=direct`
|
||
(`address=<game address>`), and only while `phase=Running` and RCON-ready.
|
||
- `markStarting`, `markStopping`, `markStopped` all write
|
||
`endpoint.mode=fallback`, `address=spec.fallbackServer`.
|
||
|
||
So the proxy should route `direct` **only** when `phase=Running`; otherwise it
|
||
gets a `fallback` endpoint. [GO-TESTED for the direct/fallback toggle via
|
||
`markRunningReady`/`markStopped`.]
|
||
|
||
Two pitfalls:
|
||
|
||
1. **`spec.fallbackServer` is empty** → the fallback endpoint `address` is `""`,
|
||
so during `Starting`/`Stopping`/`Stopped` the proxy has no lobby to park the
|
||
player in. Set `spec.fallbackServer` to a registered Velocity server name.
|
||
2. **Stale `direct` after `Failed`** → see §2; the proxy must not honour a
|
||
`direct` endpoint unless `phase=Running`.
|
||
|
||
### 3a. Wake-on-join is refused, slow, or rate-limited
|
||
|
||
When a player joins a stopped server, the proxy parks them in the fallback and
|
||
calls the internal wake API. The authorization gate order is **autostartPolicy →
|
||
per-server cooldown → global running cap**. Map the API result:
|
||
|
||
| HTTP | Code | Cause | Fix |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| `403` | `forbidden` | `autostartPolicy=allowlist` and UUID not allowlisted, or `ownerOnly` and caller is not owner | Add the UUID / claim the server / set `autostartPolicy=public` |
|
||
| `409` | `maintenance_in_progress` | A restore, backup or file write holds the server's world volume (§3b) | Wait for the Job to finish |
|
||
| `429` | (cooldown) | Wake retried within the 30s per-server `WakeCooldown` | Wait out the cooldown |
|
||
| `503` | `at_capacity` | Global `MaxRunningServers` cap reached | Stop another server or raise the cap |
|
||
|
||
[GO-TESTED: `handlers_internal_wake_test.go`, cooldown, running-cap shape.] The
|
||
operator's RCON probe — **not** the wake call — is the authoritative readiness
|
||
gate; the proxy polls `GET /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/status` every ~2s and
|
||
teleports when `ready=true`.
|
||
|
||
The Velocity-side consumption of these codes (`403` → "You're not allowed to
|
||
start «server»"; `409 maintenance_in_progress` → "«server» is under
|
||
maintenance", not queued; `429` → re-queue; other → "Couldn't start … Try again
|
||
shortly.") lives in the Java plugin and is **[CODE-ONLY]** — the codes it reacts
|
||
to are produced by the Go-tested `authorizeWakeByUUID` / cooldown limiter, so
|
||
grade the two halves separately.
|
||
|
||
### 3b. Wake, restore, backup or file save refused with `maintenance_in_progress`
|
||
|
||
A server's world volume is ReadWriteOnce, and on a single node RWO lets a game
|
||
pod and a restore Job mount it side by side. So felis-api serialises them per
|
||
server: a restore, a backup, or a file write takes the world, and until its Job
|
||
finishes every wake (panel or join) and every other world operation on that
|
||
server gets `409 maintenance_in_progress`. File reads and listings never hold
|
||
it. The operator applies the same rule when `desiredState` is flipped to
|
||
`Running` by anything other than felis-api: the StatefulSet is not scaled up,
|
||
and the `Ready` condition reads `MaintenanceInProgress` until the Job ends.
|
||
|
||
What holds the world, in order:
|
||
|
||
1. An unfinished Job labelled `felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>` with
|
||
`app.kubernetes.io/managed-by` `felis-restore`, `felis-backup`, or
|
||
`felis-files` plus `felis.lolicon.best/files-mode=write`:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft get jobs -l felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A Job that is genuinely wedged is ended by its own `activeDeadlineSeconds`;
|
||
deleting it by hand releases the world at once (`kubectl -n minecraft delete
|
||
job <job>`), at the cost of whatever it was writing.
|
||
|
||
2. The admission lock `felis.lolicon.best/maintenance=<kind>@<RFC3339>` on the
|
||
MinecraftServer. felis-api sets it for the milliseconds between admitting an
|
||
operation and creating its Job; it holds for at most two minutes if felis-api
|
||
died in between, and the next wake clears a stale one. To drop it by hand:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft annotate minecraftserver <name> felis.lolicon.best/maintenance-
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
3. The idle-world reaper (§10), which has no Job of its own: it writes the same
|
||
annotation as `reap@<RFC3339>` while it archives and deletes an idle world,
|
||
and rewrites it every 30 seconds, so the lock stays fresh however long the
|
||
archive takes. The refusal names `the idle-world reaper`. A reaper pod that
|
||
dies mid-archive stops rewriting it, and the lock lapses two minutes after
|
||
the last write. Dropping it by hand also ends the reap: the reaper checks
|
||
the lock before it deletes the world volume, keeps the world and retries the
|
||
next day.
|
||
|
||
A restore, backup or file write refused with `409 not_stopped` although the
|
||
panel shows `Stopped` means the game pod is still terminating (its shutdown save
|
||
can take a while); retry once `kubectl -n minecraft get pods -l
|
||
felis.lolicon.best/server=<name>` shows nothing.
|
||
|
||
[GO-TESTED: `internal/maintenance`, `k8scluster_maintenance_test.go`,
|
||
`handlers_maintenance_test.go`, operator `maintenance_test.go`.]
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 4. Routing is disabled even though servers are up (online-mode coupling)
|
||
|
||
Wake/claim/allowlist semantics trust **Mojang-verified online-mode UUIDs**. If
|
||
the proxy runs `online-mode=false`, those identities are spoofable, so the
|
||
Velocity plugin **refuses to activate routing**:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Felis routing DISABLED: the proxy is in offline mode (online-mode=false).
|
||
Domain autostart and the allowlist trust Mojang-verified UUIDs; refusing to
|
||
route on spoofable identities. /link remains available. Set online-mode=true to
|
||
enable routing.
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
[CODE-ONLY — `FelisVelocityPlugin.onProxyInitialize`.] `/link` still works
|
||
(account binding does not depend on routing), but no domain autostart happens.
|
||
The summary line prints `routing: disabled (offline mode)` or
|
||
`(no root-domain set)`. Fix: set `online-mode=true` on the proxy, or configure
|
||
the root domain if the log says `no root-domain set`.
|
||
|
||
On the server side, `spec.autostartPolicy` and `spec.onlineMode` are documented
|
||
as only meaningful when the proxy enforces `online-mode=true`. Setting them does
|
||
not by itself make an offline proxy safe — the proxy guard is the enforcement
|
||
point.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 5. Web panel returns 401 / 403 (Zero-Trust / Cloudflare Access)
|
||
|
||
The external face has one credential: the `felis_session` cookie the sign-in
|
||
doors mint. Cloudflare Access, when the install sits behind it, is enforced at
|
||
the Cloudflare edge only — felis-api does not read the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`
|
||
header, so a request that reaches the origin some other way still has to sign in,
|
||
and the account and its role always come from the `users` table. The edge setup
|
||
fences the panel NodePort to loopback (the `felis_edge` nftables table), so every
|
||
request reaches the API through cloudflared and Access stays in front of the
|
||
operator console; check `nft list table inet felis_edge` if you doubt it. The error envelope is always
|
||
`{"error":{"code","message","request_id"}}`. [GO-TESTED.]
|
||
|
||
- **`401 unauthorized`** — no valid session cookie. [GO-TESTED.]
|
||
- **`403 forbidden`** — authenticated but not permitted (e.g. a non-admin
|
||
principal hitting an admin route; `IsAdmin()` requires a staff role **and** a
|
||
request on the operator console host). [GO-TESTED.]
|
||
|
||
### 5a. Staff routes 403 on a local IP URL
|
||
|
||
The operator console is recognised by the request's host: `admin_hostname`
|
||
(default `op.console.<root_domain>`). A bare IP counts only when the install
|
||
names it — the address a `<ip>.nip.io` / `<ip>.sslip.io` root domain embeds
|
||
(the local panel URL `felis setup` prints), or an `admin_hostname` set to that
|
||
IP. Any other address, loopback included, is served as the player console, so a
|
||
staff account signed in at `https://127.0.0.1:30443` through an SSH tunnel gets
|
||
403 on admin routes. Open the console by its hostname instead (an `/etc/hosts`
|
||
entry or `curl --resolve` pointing it at the tunnel), or set
|
||
`[auth] admin_hostname` to the IP you use. [GO-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
### 5c. Local-password login fails or is silently rejected
|
||
|
||
Local sessions use the `felis_session` cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax,
|
||
12h TTL, host-only). They are gated by the `local_auth_enabled` row in
|
||
`platform_settings`, read live per request and **fail-closed** (missing or
|
||
unparseable → treated as disabled). Symptoms:
|
||
|
||
- Cookie present but login rejected with `local auth disabled` → the
|
||
`local_auth_enabled` setting is false/absent. A present cookie under disabled
|
||
local-auth is **rejected outright**.
|
||
- `invalid session: …` → bad/forged session hash.
|
||
|
||
Fix: set `local_auth_enabled=true` in `platform_settings` if local password auth
|
||
is intended. [GO-TESTED for the session/QR-login logic.]
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 6. Internal API rejects Velocity / proxy callers (service-token)
|
||
|
||
The internal face (`--internal-addr :8081`, routes under
|
||
`/api/v1/internal/...`) is **never** Zero-Trust; it authenticates a bearer token
|
||
(`Authorization: Bearer <token>`, compared in constant time). Each internal caller
|
||
has its own token, and each route serves only the callers listed for it
|
||
(`x-felis-callers` in `docs/openapi.yaml`):
|
||
|
||
| Caller | Secret (key `token`) | API env | Where the caller reads it | Routes |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| `velocity` (proxy felis-link) | `felis/felis-service-token` | `FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN` | `service-token` in the host's `felis-link.properties` | server list, wake/claim/ready/status, join events, menu, op-login, migrate, reclaim, link codes, blacklist |
|
||
| `limbo` (login gate) | `felis/felis-limbo-token`, replica in `minecraft` | `FELIS_LIMBO_TOKEN` | login pod env `FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN` | link codes, link status, blacklist |
|
||
| `build` (build Job fetch) | `felis/felis-build-token`, replica in `felis-build` | `FELIS_BUILD_TOKEN` | fetch initContainer env | submission build context |
|
||
| `ops` (`felis backup-now`) | `felis/felis-ops-token` | `FELIS_OPS_TOKEN` | read from the Secret on each run | break-glass backup |
|
||
|
||
The installer generates all four into `/etc/felis/secrets.env` (`SERVICE_TOKEN`,
|
||
`LIMBO_TOKEN`, `BUILD_TOKEN`, `OPS_TOKEN`) and applies them on every run. The audit
|
||
log records internal actions with the source `internal:<caller>`. [GO-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
In-cluster it is reached through the ClusterIP Service `felis-api-internal` (port
|
||
8081), which is separate from the external NodePort `felis-api` (443) precisely so
|
||
the no-Zero-Trust face is never exposed on a node. On the control-plane node the
|
||
break-glass console reaches it by resolving that Service's ClusterIP and dialing
|
||
`:8081`.
|
||
|
||
The face speaks plain HTTP, and the tokens cross it in the clear. That holds up because
|
||
no hop leaves the node: the proxy runs on the node and dials the ClusterIP, and the
|
||
login pod and the build Job are pods on the same node, so reading the traffic takes root
|
||
there, which also reads the tokens from disk. Pods reach the face only where a policy
|
||
opens it: `felis-login-to-internal-api` for the login pod and `felis-build-egress` for
|
||
the build Job; `felis-server-egress` keeps every other game server (lobby included) off
|
||
all private ranges, 8081 among them. A Velocity on another host would put the `velocity`
|
||
token on the wire, which is one more reason the proxy belongs on the node (§1 of
|
||
`docs/operations.md`); a multi-node shape would need TLS on this face first.
|
||
|
||
- **Internal calls fail to *connect* (not 401)** → the `felis-api-internal` Service
|
||
is missing or its selector no longer matches the api pods. `kubectl -n felis get
|
||
svc felis-api-internal` must show a ClusterIP with 8081; a bare `felis-api` name
|
||
serves only 443 and every internal call would hang/refuse.
|
||
|
||
- **One caller's calls all 401** → its token is unset or differs from the api's
|
||
copy. The api logs one line per unset token at startup:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
felis api: warning: FELIS_LIMBO_TOKEN unset — the internal face turns the limbo caller away
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
An unset token never matches anything (no bypass). Compare the caller's value
|
||
with its Secret, e.g. for the proxy:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n felis get secret felis-service-token -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- **`403 wrong_caller`** → the token is valid but belongs to a caller that route
|
||
does not serve, e.g. the build token calling a proxy route. Configure the caller
|
||
with its own token from the table above.
|
||
|
||
- **api pods stuck in `CreateContainerConfigError`** → one of the four Secrets is
|
||
missing in `felis`. Re-run the installer; it applies them before the bundle.
|
||
|
||
- **Two tokens with the same value** → `felis api` refuses to start with
|
||
`the X and Y tokens are the same value; each caller needs its own`, since a shared
|
||
value would make the caller ambiguous. Rotate one of them.
|
||
|
||
### Rotating a token
|
||
|
||
`sudo felis rotate-token <velocity|limbo|build|ops>` replaces one caller's token:
|
||
it writes the new value to `secrets.env` (so a later installer run keeps it), the
|
||
Secret and its replica, rolls felis-api so only the new value is accepted, then
|
||
restarts the caller — the `felis-velocity` unit when the proxy runs on this host,
|
||
or the login pod. Build Jobs and `felis backup-now` pick the new value up on their
|
||
next run. The old value stops working as soon as felis-api has rolled; the caller
|
||
is turned away for the few seconds until it restarts. For a proxy on another host,
|
||
the command leaves the host alone and tells you to copy the new value from the
|
||
Secret into that proxy's `felis-link.properties` and restart it. [GO-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 7. Account-link and claim API errors
|
||
|
||
Codes from `handlers_account.go` / `handlers_internal.go`. [GO-TESTED.]
|
||
|
||
| HTTP | Code | When |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `400` | `bad_request` | Missing `mc_uuid`, empty code, or invalid `auth_source` (must be `mojang`/`thirdparty`) |
|
||
| `400` | `invalid_code` | Link code unknown or expired (10-min TTL, 8-symbol code) |
|
||
| `409` | `already_linked` | That MC UUID is already linked to **another** user |
|
||
| `412` | `not_linked` | Claim/owner op by a caller with no verified account link |
|
||
| `403` | `quota_exceeded` | Claim would exceed the user's server quota |
|
||
| `409` | `already_claimed` | Atomic `UPDATE … WHERE owner_id IS NULL` affected 0 rows |
|
||
| `404` | `not_found` | Unknown server/resource |
|
||
|
||
Flow reminder: the **code is minted in-game** on the internal face
|
||
(`POST /api/v1/internal/account/link/code`, proves the UUID) and **verified on
|
||
the web** external face (`POST /api/v1/account/link/verify`, proves the user).
|
||
A `409 already_linked` rolls the transaction back and **preserves** the code so a
|
||
different user can still use it. The claim's race-safety is the single
|
||
conditional `UPDATE` under READ COMMITTED — `1` row → `200`, `0` rows → `409`.
|
||
The real SQL execution is [INTEGRATION-ONLY] (no sqlmock/dockertest in repo); the
|
||
handler logic is [GO-TESTED] via an in-memory fake repo.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 8. Image build fails (Kaniko, spec §14/§16)
|
||
|
||
### 8a. Build push rejected at submission with `400`
|
||
|
||
Pre-build validation rejects any push target that is not the internal registry:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
must target the internal registry "<registry.<ns>.svc:<port>>", not "<your-target>"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
[GO-TESTED via the `validate` gate.] Fix the image reference to push to
|
||
`cfg.Registry.URL` (the internal registry — §9).
|
||
|
||
### 8b. Build Job's ServiceAccount can do nothing (RBAC "denial" by design)
|
||
|
||
The build/restore Job SAs (`felis-build`, `felis-restore`, namespace
|
||
`felis-build`) have **no Role and no RoleBinding anywhere** — isolation is the
|
||
*absence* of permissions (spec §16/§21). If you see the build SA denied a
|
||
namespaced API operation, **that is correct, not a misconfiguration.** [GO-TESTED
|
||
that the rendered manifests give these SAs no Role.] Do not "fix" it by granting
|
||
the build SA permissions.
|
||
|
||
### 8c. Build hangs then fails fetching base image / packages
|
||
|
||
The build namespace runs a default-deny egress NetworkPolicy
|
||
(`felis-build-egress`); the **only** allowed egress is the package-mirror CIDRs
|
||
from `--package-cidr`, which **defaults to none** (fail-closed, no internet).
|
||
[GO-TESTED for the netpol shape.] A kaniko run that hangs pulling a base image or
|
||
OS package from a non-allowlisted host is the egress policy doing its job — the
|
||
hang/failure text comes from kaniko/containerd and is [INTEGRATION-ONLY]. Fix:
|
||
add the mirror CIDR via `--package-cidr`, or pre-stage the base image in the
|
||
internal registry.
|
||
|
||
### 8d. Build reaches `Failed` phase
|
||
|
||
`reconcileBuilds` polls the Job; a Job reaching `Failed` is surfaced via
|
||
`writeBuildError` (JobPhase→Failed). [GO-TESTED for the mapping.] The
|
||
build's error names the cause: the step that failed with the last lines of its
|
||
output, the deadline, or the scan verdict (spec §16). The pod runs `egress-gate`
|
||
(§8f), `context-fetch`, `kaniko` (builds a tarball, never pushes), `trivy`
|
||
(writes the full JSON report of that tarball), `sbom` (converts the report to a
|
||
CycloneDX SBOM) and `scan-gate` (applies the scan policy) as init containers,
|
||
then `push` — so an image the scan blocks never reaches the registry. Inspect
|
||
every step:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl logs -n felis-build job/<build-job> --all-containers --prefix
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A `push` that fails with `403` means the target repository is under `felis/` or
|
||
`mirror/` — the registry gate reserves those for the platform (§9); `401` means
|
||
the `felis-registry-push` Secret in `felis-build` is missing or stale (re-run the
|
||
installer).
|
||
|
||
**The scan gate.** `scan-gate` blocks the image when a vulnerability or a
|
||
leaked secret has a severity listed in `[registry] scan_fail_on` (§8e; default
|
||
`CRITICAL`). A vulnerability with no fixed release is listed without
|
||
blocking unless `scan_fail_unfixed = true`, since nothing can be upgraded to
|
||
clear it. A blocked build ends with an error such as:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
the scan blocked the image: 1 CRITICAL, 1 HIGH (CVE-2026-12345, CVE-2025-24813)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`HIGH` is opt-in because the platform's own `felis/paper` image carries five
|
||
fixable HIGH findings inside upstream `paper.jar` (its bundled commons-compress
|
||
1.5 and plexus-utils 3.5.1). Adding `HIGH` to `scan_fail_on` blocks every build
|
||
`FROM` it until those ids are accepted as known risks in `scan_accept`:
|
||
|
||
```toml
|
||
scan_fail_on = ["CRITICAL", "HIGH"]
|
||
scan_accept = ["CVE-2021-35515", "CVE-2021-35516", "CVE-2021-35517", "CVE-2021-36090", "CVE-2025-67030"]
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
An accepted id (a CVE, GHSA or similar advisory id, or a secret rule id such as
|
||
`aws-access-key-id`) never blocks; its findings are still counted, listed and
|
||
marked **Accepted** on the panel, and scan-gate's log names the accepted ids.
|
||
Review the list whenever the base image is upgraded.
|
||
|
||
felis-api keeps each finished build's scan: the verdict, up to 100 findings with
|
||
the blocking ones first, the full Trivy report and the SBOM. On the panel,
|
||
**Build Pipeline → Scan & logs** on a finished build shows them, with both files to download. The
|
||
API serves the same data (admin only):
|
||
|
||
| Endpoint | Returns |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| `GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/scan` | the verdict and findings; `404 scan_not_found` for a build that stopped before the scan or ran before builds kept scans |
|
||
| `GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/scan/report` | the Trivy JSON report as `<id>-trivy.json` |
|
||
| `GET /api/v1/images/build/{id}/sbom` | the CycloneDX SBOM as `<id>.cdx.json` |
|
||
|
||
The report and SBOM travel to felis-api inside the scan-gate container's log, so
|
||
one image gets at most 6 MiB of them compressed. Past that the gate drops the
|
||
SBOM first, then the report, says so in its log, and the download answers
|
||
`404 scan_document_not_kept`; the verdict and findings are always kept. A
|
||
`scan-gate` exit 2 means the report was missing or unreadable; the build fails
|
||
closed and the error says why.
|
||
|
||
A scan reflects the vulnerability DB on the day of the build. An admitted image
|
||
is not scanned again when the DB learns of a new CVE; to rescan it, start a new
|
||
build of the same context (`POST /api/v1/images/build`), after
|
||
`felis mirror-build-tools -only trivy-db` if the DB copy is old (§8e).
|
||
|
||
### 8e. Build Pods never start: executor images and the scan DBs
|
||
|
||
A build Job runs Kaniko and Trivy, and Trivy reads two databases: the
|
||
vulnerability DB and, for any image with Java artifacts (every real modpack),
|
||
the Java DB. The build namespace has no internet egress, so all four come from
|
||
the internal registry, under `mirror/`:
|
||
|
||
| Tool | Upstream | Copy |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| kaniko | `gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.24.0@sha256:4e7a52dd…` | `mirror/kaniko-executor:v1.24.0` |
|
||
| trivy | `ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:0.74.0@sha256:62b1e65e…` | `mirror/trivy:0.74.0` |
|
||
| vulnerability DB | `mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db:2` | `mirror/trivy-db:2` |
|
||
| Java DB | `mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-java-db:1` | `mirror/trivy-java-db:1` |
|
||
|
||
The executor images are pinned by digest (`internal/build/tools.go`), so a moved
|
||
upstream tag never changes what a build runs; the DBs follow their tag. The
|
||
installer copies all four with `felis mirror-build-tools`, and
|
||
`felis-build-tools.timer` repeats the copy at 04:00 and 16:00, which is what
|
||
keeps the DBs current. The watchdog mails a warning when three days pass without
|
||
a clean run: scans still gate, but against old advisories.
|
||
|
||
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| Build Pods in `ImagePullBackOff` on `mirror/kaniko-executor` or `mirror/trivy` | the first copy has not finished, or the node had no internet during install | `journalctl -u felis-build-tools -n 50`; `sudo felis mirror-build-tools` once the node can reach gcr.io, ghcr.io and mirror.gcr.io |
|
||
| Scan fails with `failed to download vulnerability DB` | `mirror/trivy-db:2` is missing | same |
|
||
| Watchdog: `the vulnerability DB was last refreshed … ago` | the timer's runs fail (network, registry down, disk) | read the error in the mail or in `/var/lib/felis/build-tools/status.json`; `sudo felis mirror-build-tools` to retry now |
|
||
|
||
`sudo felis mirror-build-tools -only trivy-db` refreshes one tool. The copy is
|
||
single-platform (the node's architecture), written as the `platform` principal
|
||
through the loopback hostPort with the token from `/etc/felis/secrets.env`.
|
||
|
||
**An air-gapped node** cannot fetch anything. Copy the four references above
|
||
into the registry from a machine that can (`kubectl -n felis port-forward
|
||
svc/registry 5000:5000`, then push to `localhost:5000/mirror/...` as `platform`,
|
||
password `kubectl -n felis get secret felis-registry-auth -o
|
||
jsonpath='{.data.platform}' | base64 -d`), and repeat that for the DBs as often
|
||
as advisories matter to you. The watchdog warning stays until the timer can
|
||
reach upstream; that is accurate.
|
||
|
||
**The platform's own images on an air-gapped node.** The registry pod and the database
|
||
pod run images from Docker Hub by digest (`REGISTRY_IMAGE` and `POSTGRES_IMAGE` in
|
||
`bootstrap.sh`), which the installer imports into k3s's containerd from the release's
|
||
`felis-image-base-linux-<arch>.tar` (or, without one, pulls) and pins there so the
|
||
kubelet's image GC never collects them. On an air-gapped node the simplest way is to
|
||
install from the release's assets copied to the node (`FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR`, operations
|
||
§1). When the pull fails (`could not pull …`) and no release assets are at hand, fetch
|
||
the same digest on a machine that can, for the node's architecture, keeping the manifest
|
||
as it is, and import it on the node:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
# elsewhere: the reference as bootstrap.sh names it, e.g. docker.io/library/postgres:18.6-trixie@sha256:…
|
||
sudo ctr images pull --platform linux/arm64 "$ref"
|
||
sudo ctr images export --platform linux/arm64 image.tar "$ref"
|
||
# on the node:
|
||
sudo k3s ctr images import image.tar
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A `docker save` of the image rewrites its manifest, so its copy never matches the digest
|
||
the Deployment names. Rerun the installer afterwards; it finds the image and pins it.
|
||
[CODE-ONLY]
|
||
|
||
**Kaniko is archived upstream** (June 2025); v1.24.0 is its last release and
|
||
gets no security fixes. To run a maintained fork, copy it under `mirror/` and
|
||
point the override at it. The other `[registry]` keys in `felis.toml`:
|
||
|
||
```toml
|
||
[registry]
|
||
url = "registry.felis.svc:5000"
|
||
build_namespace = "felis-build"
|
||
kaniko_image = "" # empty: the mirror/ copy above
|
||
trivy_image = ""
|
||
trivy_db_repository = ""
|
||
trivy_java_db_repository = ""
|
||
scan_fail_on = ["CRITICAL"] # §8d: severities that block; any case; empty = CRITICAL
|
||
scan_fail_unfixed = false # §8d: true blocks on vulnerabilities with no fixed release too
|
||
scan_accept = [] # §8d: vulnerability or secret rule ids accepted as known risks; never block
|
||
build_cpu_limit = "2"
|
||
build_mem_limit = "4Gi"
|
||
build_disk_limit = "12Gi" # §8f
|
||
build_user_namespaces = "auto" # §8f: auto | on | off
|
||
build_runtime_class = "" # §8f: e.g. "gvisor"
|
||
max_concurrent_builds = 2 # §8f: 1-6; later builds queue
|
||
user_uploads_max_bytes = "4Gi" # every user's uploaded contexts together; 507 uploads_full past it
|
||
context_max_bytes = "1Gi" # one uploaded context; empty = 1Gi (sent in 32 MiB parts, so the Cloudflare edge's 100 MB body cap does not bind)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Put them in **both** `/etc/felis/felis.host.toml` (host-side CLI) and
|
||
`/etc/felis/felis.pod.toml` (the file rendered into the API's `felis-config`
|
||
Secret — the two differ only in the database URL; the setup screens re-render
|
||
the Secret from the pod file, so edits made only through `kubectl` on the live
|
||
Secret are lost at the next reconfigure). A Deployment restart alone is NOT
|
||
enough — the API Pod mounts the Secret, never the host file. Re-render the
|
||
Secret from the pod file, then roll `felis-api`:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl -n felis create secret generic felis-config \
|
||
--from-file=felis.toml=/etc/felis/felis.pod.toml --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
|
||
kubectl -n felis rollout restart deployment/felis-api
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Unset fields keep the defaults. The Job's Trivy container runs with
|
||
`--insecure`, so the internal registry's plain HTTP works for the DB pulls;
|
||
reads need no credential. The registry pruner keeps every tool reference the
|
||
api resolves (§9).
|
||
|
||
### 8f. Build isolation model and residual risk
|
||
|
||
A Dockerfile's `RUN` steps execute inside the kaniko container, as root. Kaniko
|
||
is a daemonless image builder; it is **not** a sandbox. What stands between an
|
||
approved-but-hostile Dockerfile and the node is the pod around it:
|
||
|
||
| Layer | What it does | Where |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| Admin approval | Nothing builds until an administrator approves the submission | submit lane |
|
||
| Reviewed bytes | the approval names the context's sha256; a re-upload after review fails the approval, and the build refuses any other bytes | submit lane, `felis fetch-context` |
|
||
| Weak identity | `felis-build` SA, no Role anywhere, no token mounted | §8b |
|
||
| Egress lock | `felis-build-egress`: cluster DNS, the registry, the api internal face, nothing else | §8c |
|
||
| Egress gate | first init container; holds the pod until the lock is enforced for it | `felis egress-gate` |
|
||
| Capabilities | every container drops ALL; kaniko gets back only CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER to unpack base images | jobspec |
|
||
| seccomp | the whole pod runs under the runtime's default profile (no `unshare`, `mount`, `keyctl`, `bpf`, …) | jobspec |
|
||
| User namespace | with `build_user_namespaces` on, root in the pod is an unprivileged uid on the node | below |
|
||
| Sandbox runtime | optional `build_runtime_class` (gVisor, Kata) | below |
|
||
| Credentials | the registry credential lives only in the `push` container; the service token only in `context-fetch` | jobspec |
|
||
| Scan gate | the image's Trivy report is judged under `scan_fail_on` before `push` runs; a blocked or unreadable scan keeps the image out of the registry | `felis scan-gate`, §8d |
|
||
| Resources | CPU, memory and ephemeral-storage limits per container; `activeDeadlineSeconds`; the context extraction stops at 4 GiB or 200 000 entries | jobspec, `felis fetch-context` |
|
||
| Namespace backstop | `felis-build-limits` LimitRange gives any container without limits 1 CPU / 1 GiB / 1 GiB disk; `felis-build-quota` allows 8 running pods and no PVCs | bundle |
|
||
| Concurrency | at most `[registry] max_concurrent_builds` (default 2, at most 6) builds run; later ones wait as `pending` (Queued) and start oldest first | `build.Builder` |
|
||
|
||
**Reviewed bytes.** Every upload records the sha256 of the archive, and the
|
||
review page shows it. The context download carries the same value in the
|
||
`X-Felis-Context-Sha256` header; the API cuts the transfer off if the stored
|
||
bytes no longer match it. Approving sends that digest back as
|
||
`expected_digest`, and the approval fails with `409 context_changed` when the
|
||
submitter has uploaded again since: download and review the new upload. The
|
||
approved digest is pinned on the build, and `felis fetch-context --sha256`
|
||
hashes every byte it receives; a mismatch fails the build before Kaniko starts:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
felis fetch-context: the context's sha256 is 3f…, the approved digest is 9a…: it changed after approval; refusing to build
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The panel approves with the digest of the file it downloaded in the same
|
||
session. When the review happened elsewhere (a CLI download, another browser),
|
||
it approves with the digest the list shows, so compare that value with
|
||
`sha256sum` of the file you actually read. A submission uploaded before digests
|
||
were recorded cannot be approved until the submitter uploads it again.
|
||
|
||
**Egress gate.** The CNI programs a new pod's NetworkPolicy a moment after the
|
||
pod starts. On k3s (kube-router), a pod in `felis-build` could reach the internet
|
||
and the Kubernetes API for its first ~0.7 s. `egress-gate` dials the Kubernetes
|
||
API Service, which the build policy never admits, and exits once it stops
|
||
answering. The build pod log shows the wait:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
felis egress-gate: 10.43.0.1:443 is unreachable after 612ms (...); the egress lock is in effect
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If the probe still answers after two minutes the gate exits 1 and the build
|
||
fails: `the build namespace's NetworkPolicy is not enforced`. The cluster is
|
||
running without NetworkPolicy enforcement (a CNI without it, or k3s started with
|
||
`--disable-network-policy`); fix the cluster, not the gate.
|
||
|
||
**User namespaces (`build_user_namespaces`).** With `hostUsers: false`, uid 0
|
||
in the build pod maps to an unprivileged uid range on the node, so a container
|
||
escape lands as nobody. It needs Kubernetes ≥ 1.33, containerd 2.x, and a kernel
|
||
with idmapped mounts on the node filesystem (5.19+ upstream; the RHEL/CentOS
|
||
Stream 9 kernels carry the backport). `auto`, the default, lets felis-api decide
|
||
at startup: it runs one `userns-probe-*` Job in `felis-build` and turns the
|
||
feature on only when that pod ran. The api log says which way it went:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
felis api: build pods run in a user namespace (hostUsers: false)
|
||
felis api: build pods run without a user namespace: this node cannot start a pod with hostUsers: false
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`on` forces it (builds then fail to start on a node that cannot do it), `off`
|
||
never uses it.
|
||
|
||
**Sandbox runtime (`build_runtime_class`).** Naming a RuntimeClass runs build
|
||
pods under it, for example gVisor (`runsc`) or Kata. The class must exist
|
||
(`kubectl get runtimeclass`), and kaniko must work under it: gVisor needs its
|
||
default `overlay2` rootfs, and Kata needs nested virtualization on a VM node.
|
||
Leave it empty unless you have installed and tested one.
|
||
|
||
**Disk (`build_disk_limit`, default `12Gi`).** This caps kaniko's writable layer
|
||
(the unpacked base image) and, as the largest limit in the pod, the pod's total
|
||
disk: extracted context, unpacked base image and image tarball together. The
|
||
kubelet enforces it by eviction on its housekeeping sweep, so a build that runs
|
||
past it is killed within seconds. The build then fails with `Evicted` in
|
||
`kubectl -n felis-build describe pod`. Raise it for very large modpacks, and
|
||
keep the node's free disk above it.
|
||
|
||
**Residual risk.** Without a user namespace or a sandbox runtime, the build runs
|
||
as root in a container on the same kernel as the game servers and the control
|
||
plane. Seccomp and the dropped capabilities remove the common escape primitives.
|
||
A kernel vulnerability reachable through the remaining syscalls still reaches
|
||
the node, and on a single-node install the node is the whole platform. Admin
|
||
approval is the control that remains: read the Dockerfile and download the
|
||
context before approving. On a node
|
||
where the probe comes back negative, a kernel upgrade that brings idmapped
|
||
mounts is the cheapest hardening available.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 9. Registry push/pull failures (spec §15)
|
||
|
||
The in-cluster registry is Deployment/Service/PVC named `registry` in the
|
||
control namespace (or `--registry-namespace`):
|
||
|
||
- **Push/pull target (the exact string to match):**
|
||
`registry.<ns>.svc:<port>` (port from `--registry-port`, default `5000`;
|
||
e.g. `--felis-image registry.felis.svc:5000/felis:v1`). A *wrong* push URL is
|
||
caught at build time by the validate gate (§8a, `400`). An *unreachable*
|
||
registry at runtime (wrong DNS/port, PVC unbound, missing default StorageClass)
|
||
surfaces as kaniko push or kubelet pull errors — [INTEGRATION-ONLY], **not** a
|
||
Felis-emitted string.
|
||
- **Storage:** PVC is RWO, `10Gi` by default (`FELIS_REGISTRY_STORAGE` on the
|
||
first install, `--registry-storage` for `felis manifests`), mounted at
|
||
`/var/lib/registry`, **no `storageClassName`** → binds the cluster default
|
||
class. If the cluster has no default StorageClass the PVC stays `Pending` and
|
||
the registry never starts. On k3s local-path the size is a label: the volume
|
||
is a directory on the node disk and can outgrow it. What bounds the registry
|
||
there is the pruner and the garbage collector below. The uploads PVC
|
||
(`FELIS_UPLOADS_STORAGE`, 5Gi) and the world-archive PVC
|
||
(`FELIS_BACKUP_STORAGE`, 10Gi) work the same way; re-running the installer
|
||
keeps an existing claim's size and warns when the variable asks for another.
|
||
One uploaded context is capped by `context_max_bytes` (1Gi; the panel checks
|
||
the file against it before uploading). The panel sends a context in parts of
|
||
at most 32 MiB, staged under `.parts/` on the uploads volume, so the
|
||
Cloudflare edge, which answers its own 413 page for request bodies over
|
||
100 MB, never sees a body that large; a dropped connection resumes from the
|
||
staged length, and a staged upload untouched for 24 hours is deleted. The
|
||
staged bytes count toward the budgets below. A script can still POST a whole
|
||
context in one body, which the edge caps at 100 MB. With an `s3://`
|
||
`user_uploads_context`, felis-api sends the finished context on to the bucket
|
||
in 8 MiB parts, so an upload of any size holds 8 MiB of its memory; S3's
|
||
10,000 parts put the ceiling at about 78 GiB.
|
||
Uploaded build contexts are bounded by `user_uploads_max_bytes` (4Gi for all
|
||
users together, §8e), 2 GiB per user, and 10% free space on the volume; past
|
||
any of them an upload answers `507 uploads_full` or `403 submission_quota_exceeded`. A
|
||
rejected submission's upload is deleted 7 days after the verdict; an approved
|
||
one stays as the source for a rebuild.
|
||
- **Unused images are deleted, in two steps.** Every 6 hours felis-api deletes
|
||
the manifests nothing uses (the log says `registry prune finished … deleted=N`).
|
||
It keeps: every whitelist entry (tag, `:*` wildcard, digest), every server's
|
||
pinned image, running builds, the control-plane, Kaniko and Trivy images, the
|
||
Trivy DB copies, anything pushed in the last 24 hours, and the 5 newest tagged
|
||
builds of each `felis/` and `mirror/` repository. To keep an older game build,
|
||
whitelist its versioned tag (§15b). Once a day the `registry-gc` sidecar then
|
||
frees the layers no remaining manifest names: it asks the gate for a read-only
|
||
window after 2 minutes without writes, runs `registry garbage-collect`, and
|
||
hands the window back (`kubectl -n felis logs deploy/registry -c registry-gc`).
|
||
During the window pulls work and every write answers `503` with
|
||
`Retry-After`; the installer and build pushes wait it out. A gate restarted
|
||
mid-sweep comes back read-only until the lease ends. To sweep now:
|
||
`kubectl -n felis exec deploy/registry -c registry-gc -- rm -f /var/lib/registry/.felis-last-gc`
|
||
and restart the pod.
|
||
- **The registry volume is lost:** re-run the installer; it pushes every
|
||
platform image again. With the off-site copy on (§16),
|
||
`sudo felis offsite fetch-images` pushes the user images back at their old
|
||
digests, so servers pinned to them pull again; it pushes only what the
|
||
registry lacks, so a second run after an interruption is cheap. Without an
|
||
off-site copy of the images, user images come back from their approved
|
||
submissions (whose uploads the off-site copy also carries):
|
||
the uploaded context of an approved submission stays on the uploads PVC
|
||
(`GET /api/v1/submissions/{id}/context`, its `context_ref` and `image_ref`
|
||
are in `GET /api/v1/submissions`), so an admin can build it again through
|
||
`POST /api/v1/images/build`. Servers pinned to a digest the new registry
|
||
lacks fail to pull until an admin picks a current image for them (§15b).
|
||
- **Node-side pulls:** containerd cannot dial the Service VIP (the live stack
|
||
answered "Empty reply"), so the registry Deployment binds a loopback hostPort
|
||
(`127.0.0.1:<port>`) and the installer writes a `/etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml`
|
||
mirror relaying `registry.<ns>.svc:<port>` onto it. That pair is what lets
|
||
kubelet re-pull a garbage-collected image; both halves must survive together
|
||
(remove either and every pull after an image GC fails).
|
||
- **Memory:** the registry's limit is 2Gi, deliberately larger than the other
|
||
control-plane pods' 256Mi — a live 475MB-layer push OOM-killed the 256Mi
|
||
template mid-upload (audit #46). Very large layers need headroom here, not
|
||
more CPU.
|
||
- **Write authorization:** registry:2 listens on the pod's loopback only; the
|
||
`registry-gate` sidecar (`felis registry-gate`, the felis image) owns the port and
|
||
the hostPort. Reads are anonymous — containerd, Kaniko and Trivy pull without a
|
||
credential — but an anonymous `GET /v2/` answers `401 Basic` so docker knows to
|
||
send the credential on a push. Every write needs HTTP basic auth against a token
|
||
in the `felis-registry-auth` Secret: `platform` may write anything (the
|
||
installer's own images, the `mirror/` DB copies); `build` (a build Job's `push`
|
||
container, via `felis-registry-push` in `felis-build`) may write anything outside
|
||
`felis/` and `mirror/` and may never delete. A missing Secret leaves the registry
|
||
read-only rather than down. The tokens persist in `/etc/felis/secrets.env`;
|
||
rotating one means editing it there and re-running the installer, then
|
||
`kubectl -n felis rollout restart deployment/registry` (the gate reads its tokens
|
||
at start).
|
||
- **Who can connect:** `felis-registry-ingress` admits only the `felis-build`
|
||
namespace to the registry pod. Node-local traffic (containerd pulls, the
|
||
installer's pushes through the hostPort) is always allowed by Kubernetes; game
|
||
servers cannot reach it at all (`felis-server-egress`).
|
||
- **GC pinning:** the registry pod's own images (registry:2 and the felis image
|
||
its gate runs) cannot be pulled from the registry they make up, so the installer
|
||
labels both `io.cri-containerd.pinned=pinned` in containerd and kubelet's image
|
||
GC never collects them. Check with `k3s ctr images ls | grep pinned`.
|
||
- **The registry image is pinned by digest**
|
||
(`docker.io/library/registry:2.8.3@sha256:a3d8aaa6…`), and the installer
|
||
caches it with `k3s crictl pull`. On an air-gapped node, carry it over with
|
||
containerd's own export, which keeps the digest ref. On a connected machine
|
||
with k3s or containerd (`R` is the full `docker.io/library/registry@sha256:…`
|
||
ref from `internal/platform/identities.go`):
|
||
`ctr images pull --all-platforms $R && ctr images export --all-platforms
|
||
registry.tar $R`; on the node: `k3s ctr images import --all-platforms
|
||
registry.tar`, then re-run the installer to pin it. A `docker save` round trip
|
||
rewrites the manifest, and kubelet will not match it to the digest.
|
||
- **Selector quirk worth knowing:** the registry Service selector is only
|
||
`name + component=registry` — it deliberately lacks the
|
||
`part-of=felis-control-plane` label, so the registry is *invisible* to the
|
||
RCON-peer NetworkPolicy selector. This is intended isolation, not a bug; do not
|
||
"fix" it by adding the label.
|
||
|
||
Registry manifest rendering is [GO-TESTED]; actual serving is
|
||
[CODE-ONLY/INTEGRATION-ONLY].
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 10. World reaper: false-deletes and skipped backups (spec §18)
|
||
|
||
The reaper is a **run-once daily CronJob batch**, not an operator controller.
|
||
Every install with an archive store gets it. Without `FELIS_WORLDS_HOST_PATH`
|
||
it runs `felis reaper --retention-only`: it deletes backups past their expiry,
|
||
reads archives back and sweeps the store (the second half of "A failed reaper
|
||
Job" below), never looks at a server, and its summary shows `evaluated=0`. The
|
||
installer says so (`idle-world retention is off`). Setting the worlds root on a
|
||
re-run turns world reaping on. [GO-TESTED: `TestRunRetentionTouchesNoWorld`,
|
||
`TestReaperCronJob_Gating`, `TestReaperCronJob_RetentionOnlyShape`.]
|
||
|
||
With a worlds root the reaper
|
||
reaps a world only when `now - last_active_at > 15d` (`inactive_15d`); the 15-day
|
||
deadline is **hard-fixed in code** (only `warn_before` / `retention` /
|
||
`max_local_bytes`, the on-demand backup keys `manual_retention` /
|
||
`manual_keep` / `manual_cooldown` and the scheduled backup keys
|
||
`scheduled_every` / `scheduled_keep` / `scheduled_retention` are configurable
|
||
from `felis.toml [archive]`).
|
||
|
||
### What a "backup" contains
|
||
|
||
A backup tars the server's ENTIRE data volume — the same volume the server mounts
|
||
at `/data`: world folders, `server.properties`, plugins/mods, configs, jars,
|
||
libraries, logs and cache, not just the `world/` directory. A restore replaces the
|
||
volume's contents with the archive (files added since the backup are pruned), so a
|
||
restore also rolls config/plugin changes back. Sizes are dominated by
|
||
libraries/cache on stock Paper servers (~170MB for a fresh instance before any
|
||
world growth) — do not size the archive PVC as if only world data were stored.
|
||
|
||
### The backup-before-delete invariant
|
||
|
||
The reap sequence (all [GO-TESTED] hermetically) preserves the world unless a
|
||
**confirmed, DB-recorded backup exists**:
|
||
|
||
0. The world must be at rest before it is archived. A server still meant to
|
||
run is told to stop (`desiredState: Stopped`) and left for the next run; one
|
||
still stopping, whose game pod still exists, or whose world a restore,
|
||
backup or file write holds is left too. Each of these counts in
|
||
`awaiting_stop=` and does not fail the run. Once the server is down, the
|
||
reaper takes the world's maintenance lock (§3b) and holds it through the
|
||
archive and the volume delete: nothing can start the server or touch its
|
||
world in between. A lock the reaper can no longer rewrite, or one someone
|
||
else removed, ends the reap before `DeletePVC`. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestHoldWorldStopsARunningServer`, `TestHoldWorldWaitsUntilQuiet`,
|
||
`TestReapLostHoldKeepsWorld`; live-drilled: a running server was told to
|
||
stop on the first run and archived and deleted under `reap@…` on the next.]
|
||
1. `ensureCapacity` (only if `max_local_bytes > 0`) frees room by evicting
|
||
owners' on-demand backups first, oldest first, then reaper archives whose
|
||
off-site copy is confirmed. The only copy of a reaped world is never
|
||
evicted: it stays until `retention` expires it. Still full ⇒ world
|
||
**preserved** (not deleted), counted in `store_full=`. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestCapacityEvictionOrderSparesSoleCopies`; PG-TESTED:
|
||
`TestManualBackupRationing`]
|
||
2. `Archiver.Archive` fails ⇒ world **preserved**, PVC untouched.
|
||
3. `InsertBackup` (DB) fails ⇒ the orphan archive is deleted, PVC **untouched**.
|
||
4. With an `[offsite]` bucket configured (§16), the archive must also be in the
|
||
bucket: until `felis offsite sync` has copied it and set `offsite_at` on its
|
||
`world_backups` row, the run logs `world archived, kept until the archive's
|
||
off-site copy is confirmed`, counts it in `awaiting_offsite=` and leaves the
|
||
PVC alone. The next daily run after the copy reuses the same archive and
|
||
deletes. [GO-TESTED: `TestReapWaitsForOffsiteCopy`]
|
||
5. **Only then**, with the lock still held, `DeletePVC` → `ReleaseWorld` →
|
||
audit → `felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total++`, and the lock is dropped.
|
||
|
||
An archive the run reuses (step 4's second run, or a reap interrupted after
|
||
its archive) is read back end to end and checked against the sha256 recorded
|
||
when it was written before the world goes. One that does not match is marked
|
||
corrupt, never offered for restore, and replaced by a fresh archive; one that
|
||
cannot be read at all keeps the world until the next run. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestReapReadsBackReusedArchive`, `TestReapReplacesCorruptArchive`,
|
||
`TestReapKeepsWorldWhenReadBackFails`.]
|
||
|
||
So a missing backup never results in a deleted world, and with a bucket
|
||
configured neither does a backup that exists on this disk only. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestReapArchiveFailurePreservesWorld`,
|
||
`TestReapInsertBackupFailurePreservesWorld`, `TestReapIdleWorldFullSequence`.]
|
||
|
||
`awaiting_offsite` that stays above zero for more than a day means the copy is
|
||
failing: `sudo felis offsite status` (§16).
|
||
|
||
### A failed reaper Job
|
||
|
||
Each run ends with one line:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
felis reaper: evaluated=12 reaped=1 released=0 deleted=0 awaiting_offsite=0 awaiting_stop=0 warned=2 skipped=0 store_full=0 evicted=0 expired=3 expire_failed=0 verified=6 corrupt=0 verify_failed=0 swept=0 orphan_archives=0
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`released` and `deleted` count retirements carried out: servers their owner gave
|
||
up (or an admin released) and servers an admin deleted, each world archived
|
||
first as a `released` backup. `skipped` counts servers the run failed on (steps
|
||
1–3 above, or the cluster or the database answering with an error; exempt
|
||
servers and rows whose CRD is gone are not counted, except a deletion whose
|
||
MinecraftServer is gone while its world volume remains), `store_full` the subset kept because the backup store is full,
|
||
and `expire_failed` expired backups it could not remove. `awaiting_stop` counts
|
||
idle servers left for the next run because they were not yet down (step 0); it
|
||
does not fail the run, but a server that stays there for days is being started
|
||
again by something, or a Job keeps holding its world.
|
||
|
||
After the servers, every run looks after the archive store itself:
|
||
|
||
- `verified` archives were read back and matched their recorded sha256; each
|
||
run reads back up to ten archives not checked in the past week, oldest check
|
||
first. `corrupt` ones did
|
||
not match (or are gone from the volume) and are marked so: the backup page
|
||
shows them as damaged and refuses to restore them. `verify_failed` ones could
|
||
not be read at all and are retried the next run.
|
||
- `swept` counts leftovers of an interrupted archive (`*.partial` files older
|
||
than six hours) the run removed. `orphan_archives` counts finished archives
|
||
no backup record points to; they are kept until they are older than
|
||
`retention`, then removed, and each run lists the first few by path.
|
||
|
||
`skipped`, `expire_failed`, `corrupt`, `verify_failed` above zero, or a sweep
|
||
that could not finish, make the process exit 1: the worlds are safe, but the
|
||
Job fails so the watchdog mails `world reaper Job … failed` and
|
||
`FelisWorldJobFailed` fires. The Job retries
|
||
twice (`backoffLimit`), each retry re-running the whole batch, which is safe
|
||
because every step is idempotent. Read the error above the summary:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft logs job/<the failed felis-reaper-… Job>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A server that fails every day keeps its world and is retried every day, so the
|
||
Job fails every day until the cause is fixed; after 26 hours the watchdog also
|
||
reports `the world reaper has not succeeded for …`. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestReportReaperRunFailsTheJob`, `TestExpiryFailureFailsTheRun`,
|
||
`TestCapacityStillFullSkipsReap`.]
|
||
|
||
### On-demand backups ("Back up now")
|
||
|
||
An owner's "Back up now" writes a `manual` backup into the same store and onto
|
||
the same disk as the worlds and the database, so it is rationed:
|
||
|
||
| Key | Default | Effect |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `manual_retention` | `30d` | when a manual backup expires (reaper archives use `retention`) |
|
||
| `manual_keep` | `5` | manual backups kept per server; after each backup the Job removes older ones and prints `removed older backup …` |
|
||
| `manual_cooldown` | `10m` | one owner-started backup per server per window; the next one gets `429 backup_cooldown` with `Retry-After` (`0s` disables) |
|
||
|
||
While the present backups add up to `max_local_bytes` or more, owners get
|
||
`507 backup_store_full`. Admins and the break-glass console are exempt from the
|
||
cooldown and the cap. Whoever starts it, the backup Job refuses to write an
|
||
archive that would leave less than 10% of the archive filesystem free: it fails
|
||
with `not enough free disk for the archive`. A failed backup or restore shows
|
||
the error its container exited on under Recent operations on the server's
|
||
backup page. [GO-TESTED: `TestBackupNow`, `TestCheckRoom`,
|
||
`TestReaperConfigManualKeys`, `TestLatestJobsExplainsFailures`]
|
||
|
||
### Scheduled backups (daily restore points)
|
||
|
||
A world played every day never idles 15 days, so the reaper never archives it.
|
||
felis-api therefore takes a `scheduled` backup of every owned world that
|
||
somebody joined since its owner's last intact scheduled backup, once that
|
||
backup is `scheduled_every` old. This works without a worlds root: it is the
|
||
same backup Job "Back up now" starts, so it needs only `FELIS_IMAGE` and
|
||
`FELIS_BACKUP_PVC` (felis-api logs `scheduled backups off` at start when
|
||
either is missing or `scheduled_every` is `0s`).
|
||
|
||
| Key | Default | Effect |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `scheduled_every` | `1d` | how old a world's newest scheduled backup must be before it gets the next one (`0s` turns scheduled backups off) |
|
||
| `scheduled_keep` | `7` | scheduled backups kept per server and owner; the Job removes older ones like `manual_keep` |
|
||
| `scheduled_retention` | `90d` | when a scheduled backup expires |
|
||
|
||
How it behaves:
|
||
|
||
- **Only a stopped server is backed up.** The Job mounts the world volume,
|
||
which a running server holds. Idle auto-stop brings a played world down
|
||
minutes after its last player leaves, so the point normally lands the same
|
||
day. A server with auto-stop turned off gets its point the next time it
|
||
stops; one that never stops never gets one.
|
||
- **One Job at a time, cluster-wide.** felis-api checks every 2 minutes and
|
||
starts one scheduled backup only while no backup or restore Job is running,
|
||
worlds without a point first. It holds the world like any backup, so a player
|
||
who wakes the server during those minutes sees the maintenance message and can
|
||
retry once it finishes.
|
||
- **Paused while the store is full.** While the present backups add up to
|
||
`max_local_bytes`, no scheduled backup starts (felis-api logs
|
||
`scheduled backups paused` and `resumed` once each). The backup Job's 10%
|
||
free-disk check applies too.
|
||
- **A failed backup is retried** after a quarter of `scheduled_every` (6 hours
|
||
by default); the failure shows under Recent operations as "Scheduled backup".
|
||
- **Counted per owner.** A backup the world's previous owner took before it was
|
||
reaped and claimed again is no restore point of the new owner's world, and the
|
||
new owner's backups never prune it. The keep-N prune of every reason is scoped
|
||
to the backup's owner the same way.
|
||
- Scheduled backups write the audit action `backup.scheduled` (actor
|
||
`scheduler`) and never start the owner's `manual_cooldown`. They are copied
|
||
offsite and evicted by `max_local_bytes` like manual backups.
|
||
|
||
[GO-TESTED: `TestBackupScheduler`, `TestK8sScheduledBackupJobs`,
|
||
`TestBackupJobRecordsAScheduledBackup`, `TestBackupPolicyPerReason`,
|
||
`TestReaperConfigScheduledKeys`; PG-TESTED: `TestScheduledBackupCandidates`,
|
||
`TestExcessBackupsPerOwner`]
|
||
|
||
### Exemptions (world never reaped)
|
||
|
||
- `spec.reaperExempt=true` → skipped entirely (system servers). [GO-TESTED
|
||
`TestReapExemptServerNeverTouched`.]
|
||
- CRD missing → logs `reaper: CRD missing, skipping`, skipped.
|
||
- Idle `≤ 15d` → not yet eligible.
|
||
|
||
### Pre-reap warnings (the `warn_before` offsets)
|
||
|
||
An OWNED server inside a warning window gets an email notice (`3d`/`1d` before
|
||
the deadline, `warn_before` from `[archive]`) to the owner's **verified** email —
|
||
the same `[smtp]` relay felis-api uses. The `warned_3d_at` / `warned_1d_at`
|
||
stamps record a **delivered** notice:
|
||
|
||
- No `[smtp]` configured (or owner has no verified address): the run logs
|
||
`reaper: warning suppressed — no warner wired` / a delivery error and does
|
||
NOT stamp. Nothing is falsely recorded as sent, and the day SMTP is
|
||
configured the pending warning can still go out.
|
||
- Delivery failure (relay down): logged and retried on the next daily run —
|
||
bounded by the warning window, since the reap removes the candidate anyway.
|
||
- `warned=` in the run output counts DELIVERED notices, not attempts.
|
||
|
||
The reaper runs in the minecraft namespace and reads the **mirrors** of
|
||
`felis-smtp` and `felis-config` there (a `secretKeyRef` is namespace-local). The
|
||
installed `felis setup`'s "configure email" screen refreshes both mirrors when it
|
||
applies, so configuring SMTP after install is enough; a manual edit of the
|
||
control-namespace Secret alone is not. [GO-TESTED: the delivered/retried/
|
||
suppressed matrix in `internal/reaper`; live-drilled end to end against a local
|
||
SMTP sink.]
|
||
|
||
The screen also keeps the password in `/etc/felis/smtp-password` (mode 0600),
|
||
and the uploads screen keeps the bucket keys in `/etc/felis/uploads-s3-access-key`
|
||
and `uploads-s3-secret-key`. Secrets live in k3s's datastore, which a reinstall
|
||
or a host rebuilt from a bundle's `state/` starts empty, so **every installer
|
||
run applies `felis-smtp` (both namespaces) and `felis-uploads-s3` from these
|
||
files**. The files win: a hand edit of either Secret lasts until the next
|
||
installer run, so change a credential through `felis setup`. An install from
|
||
before these files gets them from the Secrets on its first re-run. When
|
||
`[smtp]` has a `username` but no password is on either side, or uploads go to
|
||
`s3://` without both keys, the installer says so and names the `felis setup`
|
||
screen that takes them again. [SH-TESTED: `deploy/bootstrap_test.sh`, the move
|
||
from the Secrets, the host copy winning, both warnings, no value in kubectl's
|
||
argv. GO-TESTED: the host copy's mode and replacement.]
|
||
|
||
### Genuine false-delete risk vectors
|
||
|
||
- **Stale `last_active_at`.** The keep-alive is `RecordJoin`, called from the
|
||
internal `join-event` handler. **If join events are not delivered to the API,
|
||
the activity clock never resets** and an actively-played world becomes
|
||
reap-eligible after 15 days. Verify join events are flowing (§3a) — this is the
|
||
most important reaper check. [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live Postgres write.]
|
||
A claim also resets it: `ClaimServer` sets `last_active_at` to the claim and
|
||
clears `warned_*`, so a world reaped long ago and claimed again gets a full 15
|
||
days, and a later reap archives the new owner's world rather than reusing the
|
||
previous owner's archive (`FreshBackup` counts only `inactive_15d` archives
|
||
taken since the claim). [PG-TESTED `TestReclaimRestartsReaperClock`.]
|
||
- **Unowned servers are still reaped.** A server with `owner_id=""` gets **no
|
||
pre-deletion warning** (`maybeWarn` skips unowned), but is still reaped at 15d.
|
||
[GO-TESTED `TestReapUnownedServerStillReaped`.] Claim or exempt servers you
|
||
want to keep.
|
||
- `DeletePVC` is idempotent (missing PVC is not an error), so a re-run will not
|
||
fail on already-reaped worlds.
|
||
- **An idle server whose world volume is already gone.** With a fresh reaper
|
||
archive taken since the last activity, the run takes it as a reap that was
|
||
interrupted after the delete and finishes it (release, audit, count). An
|
||
unowned server with no such archive only has its idle clock restarted, so it
|
||
is neither counted nor audited again every day. An owned one is released and
|
||
audited once, since there is no world to archive. [GO-TESTED:
|
||
`TestReapFinishesInterruptedReap`, `TestReapUnownedWithoutWorldRestartsClock`,
|
||
`TestReapOwnedWithoutWorldReleases`.]
|
||
|
||
Only `TarLocal` (tar+gzip) archiving is implemented; VolumeSnapshot/Longhorn
|
||
backends return `not implemented in this build`. The live PVC delete / Postgres
|
||
store paths are [INTEGRATION-ONLY].
|
||
|
||
### Where worlds are read from (hostPath resolution)
|
||
|
||
The CronJob mounts `--worlds-host-path` read-only at `/worlds` through a static
|
||
PersistentVolume (`felis-worlds-root-<digest>`, hostPath type `Directory`,
|
||
`Retain`, pre-bound to the same-named PVC in the minecraft namespace), since the
|
||
namespace's PodSecurity baseline refuses an inline hostPath in any pod. A
|
||
re-install with a different worlds root or `--reaper-node` renders a new pair
|
||
under a new digest; the old PV/PVC pair is left behind unused and can be
|
||
deleted by hand (Retain: deleting it never touches the directory). The resolver
|
||
runs `cmd/felis/reaper.resolveWorldDir`: it looks for `<root>/<pvc>`, then for
|
||
the stock local-path directory `<root>/<pv-name>_<ns>_<pvc-name>` derived from
|
||
the live PVC's `spec.volumeName` (never a glob — a leftover directory of a
|
||
deleted PV must not stand in for the world the PVC currently binds). Pointing
|
||
the flag at k3s's storage root (`/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage`) is therefore the
|
||
supported way to enable retention on a stock install. Two deployment facts the
|
||
resolver cannot fix:
|
||
|
||
- **Permissions.** The reaper Pod runs as **root** and carries `DAC_OVERRIDE`:
|
||
k3s's storage root is `0700 root:root`, worlds are written by the game uid
|
||
(1000) — or by root, for a world an older release wrote — and Paper saves
|
||
`level.dat` mode-0600, so a fixed non-root identity (the previous uid-1000
|
||
convention, and the ACL setup that went with it) could neither walk the tree
|
||
nor read the files — every archive failed `open …/level.dat: permission
|
||
denied`. The installer no longer grants uid 1000 any access to the storage
|
||
root: that uid is now the game servers'. If a world is still **preserved**
|
||
while a reap was expected, it is a different cause: check the run's ERROR
|
||
logs for the resolver's `lstat` messages before suspecting permissions.
|
||
- **Node placement.** Multi-node clusters: the world's directory exists only on
|
||
the node holding its volume, so pass `--reaper-node`; it pins both the
|
||
CronJob's pod and the PV (single-node starters are pinned implicitly).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 11. Idle auto-stop never fires; player count always shows 0
|
||
|
||
Every server created from the panel or `felis apply` stops itself after 600 s
|
||
with nobody online (`spec.idle`), and the next join wakes it. An admin changes
|
||
or turns it off under **Edit server → Idle auto-stop**. A server created before
|
||
this default has no `spec.idle` and never stops; `sudo felis converge` gives it
|
||
the default (§12b). The login gate and the lobby never idle out, whatever their
|
||
spec says.
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.spec.idle}'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Both idle stop and the player count also hang off **`spec.rcon.enabled`**.
|
||
Check it next.
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.spec.rcon.enabled}'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The player tally is a by-product of the RCON readiness probe: `prober.go` runs
|
||
`list` on the same connection that just authenticated, and `parseListReply`
|
||
reads the tally from the vanilla/Paper/Fabric/Forge reply (`There are 3 of a
|
||
max of 20 players online`), the 1.12/Bukkit reply (`There are 3/20 players
|
||
online`) or the EssentialsX reply (`There are 3 out of maximum 20 players
|
||
online`, vanished players included), with `§` color codes stripped. With RCON
|
||
disabled the probe never runs and no tally is ever read, so a permanent 0 means
|
||
"never sampled", not "nobody online".
|
||
|
||
A tally that could not be read counts as **unknown**, never as zero. Idle
|
||
auto-stop only acts on a count it actually read:
|
||
|
||
```go
|
||
if players.Known && server.Spec.Idle.AutoStopEnabled && server.Spec.Idle.EmptySecondsBeforeStop > 0 {
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
An unknown tally leaves `status.players` at the last real count, neither starts
|
||
nor clears the empty countdown, and sets the `PlayersCounted` condition to
|
||
`False` with reason `ListUnreadable`. So enabling `spec.idle.*` without RCON is
|
||
a no-op by design, and a server whose `list` reply is in a format Felis does
|
||
not know (a plugin that rewrites `/list`, a translated reply) never idles out:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[?(@.type=="PlayersCounted")]}'
|
||
# Reason ListUnreadable: run `list` in the server's panel console to see
|
||
# what the server actually answers.
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Fix it by restoring a supported `/list` (for example, drop the plugin's
|
||
override or its translation of that one message). The server keeps running
|
||
either way; only the idle stop waits.
|
||
|
||
Both fields set and still nothing happens? Then the probe is failing rather than
|
||
disabled: the server would be stuck in `Starting` with `RconNotReachable`
|
||
(`reconciler.go:156`), which is §1's symptom, not this one.
|
||
|
||
This path used to fail even with everything configured correctly, through three
|
||
stacked defects proven and fixed on a live cluster (auditfix21/22): the
|
||
`emptySince` stamp was pruned by a missing CRD status field, a quiescent empty
|
||
server produced no watch events to re-check the timer, and the Role lacked the
|
||
`minecraftservers:patch` grant the stop write needs. If auto-stop ever looks
|
||
dead again, check these three in order (each is now pinned by a test):
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
# ① The stamp must persist — should print a timestamp, not an empty string,
|
||
# a few seconds after a server goes Ready with zero players.
|
||
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.emptySince}'
|
||
|
||
# ② The operator must be able to write spec.desiredState (403 in the operator
|
||
# log = missing patch grant on Role felis-operator).
|
||
kubectl auth can-i patch minecraftservers -n <ns> --as=system:serviceaccount:<ctl-ns>:felis-operator
|
||
|
||
# ③ A wake-up must be scheduled: while empty, expect whatever you set
|
||
# as emptySecondsBeforeStop to elapse and the box to flip to Stopped without
|
||
# any external action.
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
While players are online the operator re-probes on a 30s cadence so it notices
|
||
the moment the last one leaves; while empty it schedules a wake-up exactly at
|
||
the deadline. Quiet operator logs on an idle server are normal — the action is
|
||
the scheduled wake-up, not a stream of reconciles.
|
||
|
||
Note the reaper's `last_active_at` (§10) is a *different* subsystem (Postgres
|
||
business layer, bumped by join events) — it keeps worlds alive against the
|
||
reaper, but it does **not** auto-stop empty running servers.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 12. A configuration field seems to be ignored
|
||
|
||
Every field below is read by a controller. What varies is the condition that
|
||
decides whether setting it does anything.
|
||
|
||
| Field | What you might expect | Reality |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `spec.startup.timeoutSeconds` | Start budget before `Failed` | Read by `startupTimedOut` (`reconciler.go:479`), called at `:126`. `0` or unset falls back to **300s**, then `markFailed("StartupTimeout")` |
|
||
| `spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds` | First-probe budget | Read by `readinessTimedOut` (`reconciler.go:490`), called at `:157`. `0` or unset falls back to **300s**, then `markFailed("ReadinessTimeout")`. Not to be confused with the prober's own 5s dial timeout (`prober.go:45`) |
|
||
| `spec.idle.autoStopEnabled` | Auto-stop empty servers | Read at `reconciler.go:175` — but gated on `spec.rcon.enabled`, since the player tally comes from the RCON probe (§11) |
|
||
| `spec.idle.emptySecondsBeforeStop` | Empty grace period | Same branch. Must be `> 0`; the guard treats `0` as "off", not "stop immediately" |
|
||
|
||
Both startup budgets are measured from the same `status.startRequestedAt`, so
|
||
`readinessTimeoutSeconds` is not a budget *after* pod readiness — it is a
|
||
deadline for the whole start, applied on the RCON-probe branch.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 12b. A newer field never reaches an already-installed system server (`felis converge`)
|
||
|
||
Provisioning is create-if-absent: `felis setup` never rewrites an existing
|
||
`login`/`lobby` `MinecraftServer` beyond the config-derived env it owns, so a
|
||
field the desired spec gained after your install sits absent forever — this is
|
||
how a deployment ends up with a lobby that has no `spec.rcon` (a dead console
|
||
and an online-player count that is always 0) and a login gate without
|
||
`spec.startup.healthHTTPPort`. `felis converge` is the explicit pass that fills
|
||
exactly those zero-valued fields (and re-adds a derived env key that is
|
||
missing). It never overwrites a value that already holds one — an operator's
|
||
RCON secretRef or tuning survives.
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis converge
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Run it **after the images are in place**. Enabling RCON, or the HTTP readiness
|
||
gate, on a server whose image predates the listener would hold that server in
|
||
`Starting` until the operator marks it `Failed` — that ordering is the reason
|
||
this is a command you run rather than something setup does on every re-run.
|
||
System servers that are already current report `already converged`.
|
||
|
||
The same pass gives every **user** server whose `spec.idle` was never set (one
|
||
created before idle stop became the default) the default: stop after 600 s
|
||
empty. A server whose idle stop an admin turned off keeps a duration on its
|
||
spec (`autoStopEnabled: false`, `emptySecondsBeforeStop` set), so converge
|
||
leaves it off; only servers it actually filled get a line.
|
||
|
||
A **user** server created before every new server got RCON (`spec.rcon` wholly
|
||
unset) has a dead console, always shows 0 online, and never idles out, since all
|
||
three ride RCON. Plain `felis converge` lists each such server and changes
|
||
nothing; `-user-rcon` turns RCON on for them with the block a server created
|
||
today gets (the `<name>-rcon` Secret the operator provisions):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis converge -user-rcon
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftserver -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,RCON:.spec.rcon.enabled
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It is opt-in for the reason above: the new start waits on the RCON probe, and a
|
||
server whose image does not open the listener that `RCON_PASSWORD` asks for
|
||
stays in `Starting` until it is marked `Failed`. Felis's own paper and lobby
|
||
images open it; check a server running an image a user brought before filling
|
||
it. A server whose RCON someone set, on or off, is never touched. The change
|
||
applies at the server's next start.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 13. World PVC survives after I deleted the MinecraftServer
|
||
|
||
This is expected. The world PVC is a StatefulSet `VolumeClaimTemplate`, and the
|
||
operator sets the StatefulSet's `persistentVolumeClaimRetentionPolicy` to
|
||
`Retain` on delete and on scale, explicitly rather than by the API default.
|
||
There is no finalizer. Deleting the `MinecraftServer` garbage-collects the
|
||
StatefulSet and keeps the claim, so a `MinecraftServer` that comes back under
|
||
the same name mounts the same world. The **only** code that deletes a world PVC
|
||
is the reaper, and only after a verified backup (§10).
|
||
|
||
A kept claim holds the name: creating a new server with it answers
|
||
`409 world_volume_exists`, since the new server would otherwise mount the old
|
||
world and hand it to its new owner. List the world claims whose server is gone:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
comm -23 \
|
||
<(kubectl -n minecraft get pvc -l felis.lolicon.best/server -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.labels.felis\.lolicon\.best/server}{"\n"}{end}' | sort) \
|
||
<(kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftservers -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' | sort)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
To reclaim one (take a backup first if the world may still matter):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft delete pvc world-<name>-0 # irreversible — the world is gone
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`spec.storage.retainOnDelete` sat in the CRD and reached no controller. Spec
|
||
v4.1 §5 asks for it — 「删除:finalizer 清 Service/STS/ConfigMap,PVC 按
|
||
`retainOnDelete`」 — and neither half was ever built: there is no finalizer, and
|
||
nothing read the field. It was removed rather than implemented, which is a
|
||
deliberate departure from that line, recorded here because the spec is a frozen
|
||
document and still says otherwise.
|
||
|
||
The reasoning is that implementing it buys a second path that deletes a world —
|
||
one that skips the reaper's verified-backup check — in order to restore a
|
||
finalizer whose other listed duties (Service, StatefulSet, ConfigMap)
|
||
ownerReference GC already performs. A CR still carrying the field keeps working:
|
||
the API server prunes the unknown key on its next write, and nothing above
|
||
changes, because retention was never conditional in the first place.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 13b. Node runs out of disk: what survives, and how to recover
|
||
|
||
A full disk is the most destructive failure this stack sees: kubelet evicts game
|
||
pods (the control plane is protected below), and its image GC then collects
|
||
images nothing is running. The images have a pull source now — the in-cluster
|
||
registry — so they come back without an operator re-import; freeing space is
|
||
what completes the recovery.
|
||
|
||
**Eviction.** Every control-plane pod (api, operator, reaper, registry) runs
|
||
under the BUILT-IN `system-cluster-critical` PriorityClass (value 2e9). Kubelet's
|
||
node-pressure eviction refuses to touch those pods — the log shows
|
||
*"Eviction manager: cannot evict a critical pod"* for each of them — while
|
||
game-server pods at the default priority 0 are evicted first. A drill that filled
|
||
the disk to 1.7G free saw exactly this: login/lobby evicted, the whole control
|
||
plane still Running (before the fix the same drill evicted the api, operator and
|
||
registry too, and the image-GC stage below followed). User-defined
|
||
PriorityClasses cannot substitute: the API caps them at 1e9, below kubelet's
|
||
critical threshold. The built-in class allows preemption (its policy is fixed),
|
||
so a control-plane pod that cannot fit may preempt a game pod — deliberate: the
|
||
management plane must be placeable.
|
||
|
||
**The pressure condition clears slowly.** After you free space, the node can stay
|
||
`DiskPressure:True` for up to ~5 minutes
|
||
(`--eviction-pressure-transition-period` defaults to 5m, to stop the condition
|
||
flapping); pods that need scheduling wait for it. This is the bulk of the
|
||
"recovery takes minutes" observation, not a stuck node.
|
||
|
||
**The images may be gone — they come back on their own.** If pods were evicted,
|
||
the kubelet can garbage-collect their images (unused > 2 minutes under imagefs
|
||
pressure). Every image this platform runs is ALSO hosted in the in-cluster
|
||
registry: the installer builds each one as `registry.<ns>.svc:5000/felis/…`
|
||
and mirrors it there, and the node's containerd is configured (a registries.yaml
|
||
mirror onto the registry's loopback hostPort) to relay those refs back through
|
||
it. So a GC'd image is re-pulled on the next attempt with no operator action —
|
||
delete the stuck pod to force an immediate retry (or wait out the backoff), and
|
||
the workload converges.
|
||
|
||
If a pull does NOT come back:
|
||
|
||
1. Free disk on the node (`df -h /var/lib/rancher`; the biggest consumers are
|
||
`k3s ctr images ls -q` and the world/backup PVCs under
|
||
`/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage`).
|
||
2. Check the registry: `kubectl -n felis get pods -l
|
||
app.kubernetes.io/component=registry` and, on the node,
|
||
`curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5000/healthz`
|
||
(expect `200`: the registry gate answers it only while registry:2 behind it
|
||
does). An anonymous `GET /v2/` answers `401` by design — see §9.
|
||
3. Check the mirror file: `/etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml` must map
|
||
`registry.felis.svc:5000` to `http://127.0.0.1:5000`. Missing or changed:
|
||
re-run the installer (it rewrites the file and restarts k3s only when the
|
||
content changed).
|
||
4. Re-mirror a tag the registry does not have (hand-built images were never
|
||
pushed): `sudo systemctl start docker` (the installer leaves the daemon
|
||
stopped), log in as `platform` (password: `kubectl -n felis get secret
|
||
felis-registry-auth -o jsonpath='{.data.platform}' | base64 -d`), then `docker tag <ref>
|
||
127.0.0.1:5000/<repo>:<tag> && docker push 127.0.0.1:5000/<repo>:<tag>`.
|
||
|
||
For an image that is in neither place, the old fallback still stands: re-run the
|
||
installer (it rebuilds/re-imports from the local Docker store AND mirrors into
|
||
the registry), or for a single image
|
||
`docker save felis:<tag> | k3s ctr images import -`. The Docker store remains a
|
||
deliberate second copy on the node; treat it as the recovery path, not as free
|
||
space.
|
||
|
||
## 13c. The host's address, name or clock changed
|
||
|
||
An install is bound to the address it was made on. `bootstrap.sh` gives that
|
||
address to the k3s node and writes it into the network policies, the panel
|
||
certificate and the default `<ip>.nip.io` root domain, and nothing re-addresses
|
||
a live install. When the host loses the address (a DHCP lease that came back
|
||
different, a moved VM), the cluster and the proxy's path to the game servers
|
||
still name the old one, and the panel stops answering on its old name. The watchdog reports it as
|
||
`host-address` (critical, after 5 minutes). The installer warns at install time
|
||
when the address is a DHCP lease.
|
||
|
||
Remedy: give the host its old address back, either as a DHCP reservation on
|
||
the router or as a static address (`nmcli con mod <con> ipv4.method manual
|
||
ipv4.addresses <ip>/<prefix> ipv4.gateway <gw> ipv4.dns <dns> && nmcli con up
|
||
<con>` on Rocky), then restart felis-api (`sudo k3s kubectl -n felis rollout restart
|
||
deploy/felis-api`) and the proxy (`sudo systemctl restart felis-velocity`). Moving an install
|
||
to a new address is a reinstall onto a restored backup (docs/operations.md §5). A
|
||
default `<ip>.nip.io` root domain names the old address too; once the install runs on
|
||
its new address, `sudo felis domain set <new-ip>.nip.io` moves it (docs/operations.md §6).
|
||
|
||
The node **name** is pinned. Every local-path volume (worlds, registry,
|
||
uploads, backups) is bound to its node by name, and k3s takes the name from the
|
||
hostname unless told otherwise, so renaming the host used to bring k3s back as
|
||
a second, empty node with every volume Pending on the old one. The installer
|
||
pins the name in `/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml.d/50-felis.yaml`
|
||
(`node-name:`); a hostname change is then harmless. Check the pin with `sudo
|
||
k3s kubectl get node -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.annotations.k3s\.io/node-args}'`.
|
||
That file also sets `write-kubeconfig-mode: "0600"`: the admin kubeconfig
|
||
`/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml` is cluster-admin and readable by root only, so
|
||
use `sudo k3s kubectl` (or `sudo -E kubectl`).
|
||
|
||
The **clock** must be kept by NTP. Sign-in codes and sessions expire by it,
|
||
S3 refuses off-site uploads signed more than 15 minutes off, and certificate
|
||
checks fail on a clock far off. The installer turns NTP on (`timedatectl
|
||
set-ntp true`, installing chrony where there is no client to enable) unless
|
||
`FELIS_MANAGE_TIME_SYNC=0`. The watchdog reports an unsynchronized clock as
|
||
`clock` (warning, after 30 minutes). Check with `timedatectl` (want `System
|
||
clock synchronized: yes` and `NTP service: active`) and `chronyc sources`;
|
||
a firewall that drops outbound UDP 123 keeps it unsynchronized.
|
||
|
||
The system journal is persistent (`/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/50-felis.conf`,
|
||
capped by `FELIS_JOURNAL_MAX_USE`, default 1G), so `journalctl -b -1` shows the
|
||
boot before a reboot.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 14. Health alerts, and metrics for diagnosis (spec §23)
|
||
|
||
Every full install runs `felis watchdog` from `felis-watchdog.timer`, which
|
||
mails the owners when something breaks, with no monitoring stack needed. The
|
||
metrics and Prometheus rules below are for a deployment that also runs its own
|
||
Prometheus.
|
||
|
||
### The watchdog: what mails the owners
|
||
|
||
Every two minutes the host checks:
|
||
|
||
| Check | Mailed after | Severity |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `felis-api`, `felis-operator` or `registry` Deployment has no available pod (or is missing) | 5 min | critical |
|
||
| Kubernetes API unreachable (k3s down): the cluster checks below are then unknown and keep their state | 5 min | critical |
|
||
| Login gate not `Running` while it should be | 10 min | critical |
|
||
| Other system servers (lobby) not `Running` while they should be | 10 min | warning |
|
||
| A user server in `Failed` (§2) | 5 min | warning |
|
||
| A backup, restore or reaper Job failed in the last 24h | at once, once | warning |
|
||
| The reaper CronJob last succeeded over 26h ago (§10) | at once | warning |
|
||
| Node `NotReady`, or kubelet reports Disk/Memory/PID pressure (§13b) | 2–5 min | critical |
|
||
| PostgreSQL unreachable | 3 min | critical |
|
||
| The game proxy (`felis-velocity`) refuses connections on the game port | 3 min | critical |
|
||
| Newest control-plane database backup over 26h old, or none (§16) | 10 min | critical |
|
||
| A watched filesystem below 15% free (below 5%: critical) | 15 min (5 min) | warning |
|
||
| Host memory available below 10% | 15 min | warning |
|
||
| The host no longer holds the address the install was made on (§13c) | 5 min | critical |
|
||
| The system clock is not synchronized by NTP (§13c) | 30 min | warning |
|
||
|
||
How it mails:
|
||
|
||
- **Recipients** are the verified email addresses of enabled owner accounts.
|
||
The relay is the `[smtp]` one sign-in codes use.
|
||
- **One mail per run**, holding everything that came due: new problems, a
|
||
daily reminder for each problem still open, and a resolved notice once a
|
||
problem has stayed gone for 10 minutes. A condition that heals before its
|
||
delay is never mailed; one that turns critical is mailed again at once.
|
||
- **During an install** nothing is mailed. `bootstrap.sh` writes
|
||
`/run/felis/watchdog-quiet-until` and removes it when it exits.
|
||
- **Caching:** the relay password comes from `/etc/felis/smtp-password`, which
|
||
the watchdog reads even while the API server is down (an install without that
|
||
file reads the `felis-smtp` Secret instead). It and the recipient list are
|
||
cached in `/var/lib/felis/watchdog/state.json` (root-only). An outage of
|
||
PostgreSQL or of the API server can therefore still be mailed. [GO-TESTED: a
|
||
run with the API server and PostgreSQL both down caches the host copy.]
|
||
- **No relay or no verified owner address:** each alert is written to the
|
||
journal only.
|
||
|
||
Commands:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
journalctl -u felis-watchdog -n 40 # every check of the latest runs
|
||
sudo felis watchdog -dry-run # run the checks now; mail nothing, change nothing
|
||
systemctl list-timers felis-watchdog.timer # when it last and next runs
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A healthy run logs `every check passed`. Otherwise it logs one line per
|
||
finding, and the mail's subject once one is sent.
|
||
|
||
A `-dry-run` from a shell uses the command's defaults, and those do not include
|
||
the game-proxy or the address check. The unit carries `-proxy-addr
|
||
127.0.0.1:<game port>`, `-node-ip <install address>` and the disk list the
|
||
install chose. `systemctl cat felis-watchdog` shows them.
|
||
|
||
### Metrics
|
||
|
||
All four mandated metrics have real producers; scrape them when triaging:
|
||
|
||
- `felis_servers_total` — managed server count.
|
||
- `felis_server_phase{server,role,phase,desired}` — 1 for each server's
|
||
current phase. `role` is `login`/`lobby` for system servers and empty for
|
||
user servers. `desired` tells a server that is down on purpose from one that
|
||
failed to come up.
|
||
- `felis_build_info{component,version}` — 1 on the process serving it
|
||
(`operator` or `api`). Its absence is how an alert tells which process is down.
|
||
- `felis_start_duration_seconds` — histogram, observed once per start when
|
||
readiness is first reached (`ReadySignalAt − StartRequestedAt`). A start that
|
||
never completes (§1) contributes **nothing** here — absence of observations is
|
||
itself the signal that starts are hanging.
|
||
- `felis_image_build_failures_total` — increments on build Job failure (§8d).
|
||
- `felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total` — increments only after a world PVC is
|
||
actually deleted post-backup (§10); a spike here means worlds crossed the 15d
|
||
idle line — cross-check that join events are flowing (§10 risk vectors).
|
||
- `felis_http_requests_total{face,method,route,code}` and
|
||
`felis_http_request_duration_seconds{face,route}` — every API request, by the
|
||
route pattern it matched (`/api/v1/servers/{name}/status`, never the raw
|
||
path; `unmatched` for a path no route serves). `face` is `internal` or
|
||
`external`. Log streams count as requests but stay out of the latency
|
||
histogram. A rise in `code=~"5.."` on one route narrows a failure to one
|
||
handler; `route="unmatched"` rising is someone scanning.
|
||
- The Go runtime and process series (`go_*`, `process_*`) of `felis-api`:
|
||
goroutines, heap, open file descriptors. Goroutines that climb without
|
||
falling back usually mean streams or uploads that never end.
|
||
- `go_sql_*{db_name="felis"}` — the API's database pool. It is capped at 25
|
||
connections, and every connection runs with `statement_timeout=15s` and
|
||
`idle_in_transaction_session_timeout=60s` (a `[database] url` that sets
|
||
either keeps its own). `go_sql_in_use_connections` sitting at
|
||
`go_sql_max_open_connections` with `go_sql_wait_count_total` climbing means
|
||
requests are queueing for a connection: look for a slow query or a lock
|
||
(`SELECT pid, state, wait_event, query FROM pg_stat_activity`). A statement
|
||
cut off by the limit logs `canceling statement due to statement timeout`.
|
||
|
||
The API also writes one access-log line per request to its log, in logfmt:
|
||
`face`, `method`, `route`, `path`, `status`, `duration_ms`, `bytes`,
|
||
`request_id` (the id in every error envelope) and `principal` (the user id,
|
||
once signed in). Successful probes and scrapes are left out.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-api | grep 'msg=request' | grep 'status=5'
|
||
kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-api | grep 'request_id=<id from the error>'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The plugins' calls are the `face="internal"` series, one route per call: a
|
||
failing join-event, wake or link-status poll shows up as its own route.
|
||
|
||
```promql
|
||
sum by (route, code) (rate(felis_http_requests_total{face="internal", route="/api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/join-event"}[5m]))
|
||
sum by (route, code) (rate(felis_http_requests_total{face="internal", route="/api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/wake"}[5m]))
|
||
histogram_quantile(0.95, sum by (le, route) (rate(felis_http_request_duration_seconds_bucket{face="internal"}[5m])))
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A call that never reached felis-api (refused, reset, timed out) is missing from
|
||
those series; the caller counts it. The proxy logs one line per active 10 minutes
|
||
with felis-api as it saw it plus its own failures, and `/felis` at the proxy
|
||
console prints the totals since start:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
journalctl -u felis-velocity | grep 'Felis: last 10 min'
|
||
# Felis: last 10 min: felis-api calls=412 (no answer=0, 4xx=3, 5xx=0, retried=0), avg=18 ms, max=240 ms,
|
||
# busy refusals=0, join-events failed=0, join-events dropped=0, transfers failed=0,
|
||
# server-list refreshes failed=0, waiting now=0
|
||
journalctl -u felis-velocity | grep 'server list refresh'
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft logs login-0 | grep 'link status poll'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`no answer` rising with a flat `felis_http_requests_total` means the path to the
|
||
internal face is broken (NetworkPolicy, Service, the api Pod down); `busy
|
||
refusals` or `join-events dropped` above zero means felis-api is slower than the
|
||
proxy's pool of 8 threads can absorb. A refresh or link-status outage warns when it
|
||
starts, every 5 minutes while it lasts with the failure count, and at info when
|
||
it recovers.
|
||
|
||
### Scraping
|
||
|
||
The series come from two processes. Both Services carry the
|
||
`prometheus.io/scrape|port|path` annotations, so a Prometheus that discovers
|
||
annotated Service endpoints picks them up as is.
|
||
|
||
- `felis-operator` `:8080/metrics` (Service `felis-operator-metrics`) —
|
||
`felis_servers_total`, `felis_server_phase`, `felis_start_duration_seconds`,
|
||
`felis_build_info{component="operator"}`, and controller-runtime's
|
||
`controller_runtime_reconcile_*` / `workqueue_*` series.
|
||
- `felis-api` internal face `:8081/metrics` (Service `felis-api-internal`) —
|
||
`felis_build_info{component="api"}`, the `felis_http_*` request series, the
|
||
`go_*`/`process_*` runtime series, the `go_sql_*` pool series,
|
||
`felis_image_build_failures_total`, and the sign-in series of §17
|
||
(`felis_mail_total`, `felis_rate_limited_total`,
|
||
`felis_auth_otp_lockouts_total`, `felis_auth_failures_total`,
|
||
`felis_sessions_revoked_total`, `felis_audit_write_failures_total`).
|
||
Unauthenticated like the probes;
|
||
ClusterIP-only, and the external face never serves it.
|
||
- `felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total` is produced inside the one-shot reaper
|
||
CronJob, which exits long before any scrape interval — without a pushgateway
|
||
it has no scrape path. Read the reaper Pod log or the `world_backups` table
|
||
for deletions instead.
|
||
|
||
### Alert rules
|
||
|
||
`deploy/alerts/` ships ready-made rules for these groups:
|
||
|
||
- **Control plane:** `felis-operator` or `felis-api` down or unscraped
|
||
(`FelisOperatorDown`, `FelisAPIDown`).
|
||
- **Servers:** the login gate or another system server not running
|
||
(`FelisLoginGateDown`, `FelisSystemServerDown`), and a user server in
|
||
`Failed` (`FelisServerFailed`).
|
||
- **Operator reconcile:** errors piling up (`FelisReconcileErrors`), and a
|
||
pass stuck past its 3-minute bound (`FelisReconcileStuck`). The operator's
|
||
liveness probe restarts a pod whose pass passes 10 minutes; its readiness
|
||
waits for the informer caches to sync.
|
||
- **World Jobs (kube-state-metrics):** a failed backup/restore/reaper Job
|
||
(`FelisWorldJobFailed`) and a reaper that has not succeeded in 26h
|
||
(`FelisReaperStale`).
|
||
- **Builds and starts:** build failures and slow starts.
|
||
- **Node:** disk and memory thresholds, and the kubelet `DiskPressure`
|
||
condition.
|
||
- **Database backups:** control-plane backup freshness (§16; needs
|
||
node-exporter's textfile collector).
|
||
- **Sign-in abuse (§17):** the mail budget, relay failures, throttled floods,
|
||
account code locks and the refused sign-in rate, plus lost audit rows.
|
||
|
||
- Plain Prometheus: add `felis-alerts.yaml` to `rule_files`. Check and unit-test
|
||
it standalone with `promtool check rules felis-alerts.yaml` and
|
||
`promtool test rules felis-alerts_test.yml` (the tests pin exactly when each
|
||
alert fires).
|
||
- kube-prometheus-stack / prometheus-operator: `kubectl apply -f
|
||
felis-prometheusrule.yaml` (adjust its `release:` label to your stack's
|
||
ruleSelector).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 15. Control-plane upgrades, and rolling back a bad one
|
||
|
||
There is no in-place updater: an upgrade is re-running the installer
|
||
(`curl -fsSL <installer URL> | sudo bash`), which imports the release's images
|
||
(or rebuilds them on the host, operations §1 "Where the binary and the images come
|
||
from") and re-applies the bundle. `felis update --panel` prints that command with the
|
||
script read at the newest release's tag, so the installer and the binary it
|
||
downloads come from the same release. (`sudo felis setup` is not this path; on a completed
|
||
install it only opens the config console.) The channel is not persisted across
|
||
the re-run, so pass `FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev` on a host that tracks main.
|
||
Two properties of the control plane matter when you do:
|
||
|
||
- Both Deployments use strategy **Recreate** (single replica, no leader election:
|
||
two overlapping instances would fight over the same cluster). An upgrade takes
|
||
the panel/API down for the rollout window — seconds normally, longer if the new
|
||
image still has to be imported.
|
||
- If the new pod cannot start (bad tag, missing image), the installer's rollout
|
||
wait fails after 180s and prints `kubectl describe` diagnostics: you see
|
||
`ErrImagePull`/`ImagePullBackOff` there instead of a silent hang.
|
||
|
||
**What the installer checks before it runs anything it downloaded:**
|
||
|
||
| Download | Check |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| `felis-linux-<arch>` (release channel) | its sha256 must match the release's `SHA256SUMS`; a release without one, or a mismatch, is compiled from the same tag instead |
|
||
| the image tars `felis-image-*-linux-<arch>.tar`, their listing `felis-images-linux-<arch>.txt`, `felis-velocity.jar` (release channel, `FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR`) | each sha256 must match the release's `SHA256SUMS`; the listing must give one known role per line with sha256 digests, and each image must be in containerd under the digest the listing names once its tar is imported. An asset that fails is built on the host instead (§15c); from `FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR` the install stops |
|
||
| k3s's own images (`k3s-airgap-images-<arch>.tar.zst`) | against the k3s release's `sha256sum-<arch>.txt`; a mismatch leaves k3s pulling them from Docker Hub |
|
||
| k3s (fresh install, or `FELIS_UPGRADE_DEPS=1`) | the install script is read at `FELIS_K3S_VERSION`'s tag (default `v1.36.4+k3s1`), and it checks the binary against that release's sha256 list |
|
||
| cloudflared (when absent, or `FELIS_UPGRADE_DEPS=1`) | release `FELIS_CLOUDFLARED_VERSION` (default `2026.9.1`) against a pinned sha256; another version needs `FELIS_CLOUDFLARED_SHA256` |
|
||
| Go toolchain (nano, source builds) | pinned sha256 per architecture; another version needs `FELIS_GO_SHA256` |
|
||
| the registry and PostgreSQL images | pinned by digest (`registry:2.8.3@sha256:a3d8…`, `postgres:18.6-trixie@sha256:5a5a…`); a release's copy must carry that name and digest |
|
||
| Limbo, its spawn schematic, Paper, LuckPerms, Velocity | the builds and sha256s in `deploy/game-stack.lock`; each image build and the proxy install refuse a download that hashes differently (§15b) |
|
||
| the Temurin JRE the proxy runs on | release `25.0.4.1+1` against a pinned sha256 per architecture |
|
||
| base images of the felis, limbo, lobby and paper images | pinned by digest in each `Dockerfile` |
|
||
|
||
On a public repository each release also carries a signed build-provenance
|
||
attestation. Check a downloaded binary with
|
||
`gh attestation verify felis-linux-amd64 --repo FelisMC/Felis`; it names the
|
||
workflow run and commit that built it.
|
||
|
||
Each release runs under its own image tag, `felis/felis:v1.2.3` (a source
|
||
build's stamp `v1.2.3+gabc1234` becomes `v1.2.3-gabc1234`; a build that reports
|
||
no version uses `:demo`). At the end of an upgrade the installer prints the tag
|
||
it moved away from, and keeps it in `/etc/felis/previous-felis-image`. Roll
|
||
back with:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n felis rollout undo deployment/felis-api deployment/felis-operator
|
||
kubectl -n felis rollout status deploy/felis-api
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`rollout undo` returns each Deployment to its previous ReplicaSet, which names
|
||
the previous release's tag. That image is normally still on the node; if the
|
||
image GC collected it, the registry re-serves it (§13b): the pruner keeps the
|
||
five newest `felis/felis` tags and every image a game pod still runs. A rerun
|
||
of the same version reuses its tag and restarts both Deployments onto the
|
||
rebuilt image, so after such a rerun undo lands on that same tag again. The
|
||
next installer run re-applies the bundle and moves the image to whatever that
|
||
run installs.
|
||
|
||
A platform upgrade leaves running game servers alone. Their init containers
|
||
run the felis image too; a running server keeps the one it started with and
|
||
picks up the new release on its next start. A release that changes the game
|
||
pod in any other way still restarts running servers once, as a server edit
|
||
does.
|
||
|
||
**What a rerun restarts.** Each of these drops every connected player (or cuts
|
||
felis-api's open transactions), so the installer restarts one only when what it
|
||
runs changed:
|
||
|
||
| Component | Restarted when |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| `felis-velocity` (the proxy) | its unit, the JRE, `velocity.jar`, `velocity.toml`, the forwarding secret, the felis-link settings or a plugin jar changed, or it was not running. The fingerprint lives in `/etc/felis/velocity.fingerprint`; delete it to force a restart. |
|
||
| login and lobby pods | the rebuilt limbo or lobby image has a new image ID (`/etc/felis/system-server-images`). The installer then pins that server's `spec.image` to the digest its tag names now (`felis pin-images --system login\|lobby`) and the operator rolls the pod onto it, each on its own; with the registry unreachable it recreates the pod instead. The installer turns off BuildKit's default provenance attestation (`BUILDX_NO_DEFAULT_ATTESTATIONS=1`): it records the build time, which would give every rebuild a new ID. |
|
||
| felis-postgres | the release moved `POSTGRES_IMAGE` or changed the pod; a few seconds without the API. A rerun that changes neither leaves it running. |
|
||
| felis-api, felis-operator, the registry pod (its gate and GC containers run the felis binary) | the image tag changed (an upgrade), or a same-version rerun rebuilt it. |
|
||
|
||
**PostgreSQL across reruns.** The database runs in k3s from the image the release
|
||
pins, so a distribution upgrade never moves it. The installer refuses to start a
|
||
PostgreSQL whose major version differs from the cluster in `/var/lib/felis/postgres`
|
||
and names the dump-and-restore path (docs/operations.md §4). The first rerun of a
|
||
release with felis-postgres on a host an earlier release installed moves the
|
||
database off the host PostgreSQL (docs/operations.md §4, "The database's move into
|
||
k3s"), and removes that release's `felis-postgres-firewall.service`. On Arch the
|
||
installer's `pacman -Syu` keeps holding the host `postgresql` package back while its
|
||
cluster exists: that cluster is the copy a rollback of the move starts again.
|
||
|
||
`rollout undo` reverts the image only. The upgrade's database migrations stay
|
||
applied; when they are the problem, restore the `pre-migrate` bundle the upgrade
|
||
took (§16, "Roll back an upgrade that broke the database").
|
||
|
||
**Schema guard.** felis-api, the reaper, the off-site copy and `felis migrate up`
|
||
compare the migrations the database records with the ones their build embeds, as
|
||
sets. A database a newer release migrated stops them with `database schema is
|
||
newer than this felis build: it records migration 0026, and this build knows
|
||
migrations up to 0025`, so an undo across an upgrade that migrated shows up as
|
||
felis-api in CrashLoopBackOff until the `pre-migrate` bundle is restored. A
|
||
database still missing migrations stops felis-api, the reaper and the off-site
|
||
copy with `database schema is behind this felis build` until `felis migrate up`
|
||
runs; `felis setup`'s preflight applies them itself. [PG-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
**A failed rerun and the host binary.** The installer replaces
|
||
`/usr/local/bin/felis` early (the steps after it run the new binary) and keeps
|
||
the old one as `felis.prev` until the new one is in use. A run that fails before
|
||
the database migrations start puts the old binary back, so the host timers and
|
||
`felis setup` keep matching the database and the control plane that are still
|
||
running; a rerun continues from there. Once migrations have started, the new
|
||
binary stays. [VM-VERIFIED]
|
||
|
||
## 15b. Game images, pinned builds, and moving a world to a newer Minecraft
|
||
|
||
Each release pins the upstream builds it installs in `deploy/game-stack.lock`:
|
||
the Limbo CI build and its Minecraft version, the Paper build for that version,
|
||
LuckPerms and Velocity, each with its sha256. Every host installing one release
|
||
builds the same login gate, lobby and plain-Paper image, and a rerun of the same
|
||
release rebuilds nothing. Moving the stack to newer upstream builds is a release
|
||
change: `bash deploy/update-game-stack-lock.sh` resolves and hashes upstream's
|
||
newest builds and rewrites the lock (`--check` only reports whether upstream
|
||
moved on). Two installer knobs leave the lock:
|
||
|
||
- `FELIS_GAME_STACK=latest` resolves upstream's newest builds at install time,
|
||
hashes the ones that publish no digest, and warns that they are not the
|
||
release's builds.
|
||
- `FELIS_VELOCITY_VERSION=<minor>` installs that minor's newest Velocity build
|
||
(content-addressed, so still sha256-checked).
|
||
|
||
`FELIS_JRE_VERSION` picks the proxy's Java feature release (default 25, pinned
|
||
to Temurin `25.0.4.1+1`). A JRE the installer put there moves to the pinned
|
||
build on the next rerun; a JRE from any other vendor is left in place.
|
||
|
||
The platform's game images live under mutable tags
|
||
(`registry.felis.svc:5000/felis/paper:demo`): an installer run that builds a
|
||
different stack pushes the new build over the same tag. A server never follows
|
||
that tag on its own. felis-api stores the image a server is
|
||
created with pinned to the digest the tag named at that moment
|
||
(`…/felis/paper:demo@sha256:…`), and the installer's `pin_user_server_images`
|
||
step pins any older server still on a bare tag *before* it pushes the new
|
||
builds. Kubernetes pulls a digest-qualified ref by the digest, so a pinned
|
||
server wakes on exactly the build it was created on, however often the tag moves.
|
||
The login and lobby servers are pinned the same way, by the installer, each time
|
||
it moves them onto a new build, so `kubectl -n minecraft get minecraftserver login
|
||
-o jsonpath='{.spec.image}'` names the build the login gate runs.
|
||
|
||
Each installer run also pushes every game build under a tag no later run
|
||
rewrites, `<Minecraft version>-<12 hex of the image id>`
|
||
(`felis/paper:26.2-3f9c0a1b2c4d`). Whitelist one of those to create servers on a
|
||
specific Minecraft version after `:demo` has moved on.
|
||
|
||
Moving an existing world to a newer build is an explicit step: pick the image in
|
||
the panel's **Edit server** dialog (re-picking the current tag moves it to that
|
||
tag's newest build) and tick the backup confirmation. Over the API the same
|
||
PATCH needs `"confirmImageChange": true`, or it is refused with `409
|
||
image_change_unconfirmed`. Back the world up first: Minecraft upgrades chunks
|
||
as it loads them, and the old version cannot open them again. The audit log keeps
|
||
`image_from`/`image_to` for every change, so the exact previous build can be set
|
||
back (it is admitted by its tag) together with a restore of the pre-upgrade
|
||
backup. That rollback works while the registry still holds the old build: a
|
||
build no server and no whitelist entry names is pruned after 24 hours, and the
|
||
5 newest builds of each `felis/` repository are kept regardless (§9).
|
||
|
||
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| Create/edit refused with `image_not_in_registry` | the whitelisted tag was never pushed to the internal registry, or was deleted | push or rebuild the image, then retry |
|
||
| Create/edit refused with `registry_unavailable` | felis-api could not reach `registry.felis.svc:5000` | `kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=registry`; check the `felis-registry-ingress` NetworkPolicy still admits felis-api |
|
||
| Installer warns `could not pin every user server` | the registry was down, or a server names a tag the registry lost | fix the registry, then `sudo felis pin-images` before starting those servers; a server whose tag is gone keeps its bare tag until an admin picks a new image |
|
||
| Installer warns `could not pin the login system server` (or lobby) | the registry did not answer right after the push | the installer recreated the pod instead, which starts the new build only while `spec.image` names the bare tag; rerun the installer once `kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=registry` is Ready |
|
||
| A running server restarted during an installer re-run | it was pinned in place: the operator rolled it onto the pinned ref, the build it already ran | nothing; it happens once per server |
|
||
| Create/edit refused with `the registry no longer holds build …` | the image names a digest the pruner deleted: nothing referenced it for 24 hours (§9) | pick a current tag; whitelist the versioned tag of a build you want kept |
|
||
|
||
## 15c. The installer builds on the host although it installs a release
|
||
|
||
A release install takes its images and the Velocity plugin from the release's assets
|
||
(operations §1, "Where the binary and the images come from"). When one cannot be used the
|
||
installer names it and the reason, and builds that image with Docker instead (the registry
|
||
and PostgreSQL images are pulled from Docker Hub). Nothing unchecked is used either way
|
||
**[SH-TESTED]**.
|
||
|
||
| Message | Meaning | What to do |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `release vX publishes no SHA256SUMS … building them on this host instead` | the release predates release assets, or release.yml is still uploading them | nothing for an old release; for a new one, rerun once the release page lists `SHA256SUMS` |
|
||
| `SHA256SUMS lists no <file>` or `could not download <file> from release vX` | the release lacks that asset (a partial upload) | rerun later; the host build is correct meanwhile |
|
||
| `downloaded <file> hashes to …, but release vX's SHA256SUMS says …` | the download was corrupted, or the asset was replaced after `SHA256SUMS` was written | rerun: the bad copy is gone and is fetched again; the same mismatch every time means the asset itself is bad, so report it |
|
||
| `the release's image listing … is malformed` | `felis-images-linux-<arch>.txt` does not parse | report it; every image is built on the host |
|
||
| `the release's registry image is …, but this installer runs …` | the release's base tar carries another digest than this `bootstrap.sh` pins: the installer and the release are from different versions | run the installer read at the release's tag (`felis update --panel` prints that command) |
|
||
| `k3s containerd holds no <image> from <tar>` | the tar was imported but did not hold the image under the listed digest | `sudo k3s ctr images ls \| grep felis` shows what it holds; report it |
|
||
| `FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR: …`, and the install stops | an asset is missing from the directory or fails its checksum; nothing is built from a directory | copy the named file from the release again and rerun |
|
||
|
||
An install that stops part way leaves the downloaded tars in `/var/lib/felis/artifacts`; the
|
||
rerun reuses those that still match `SHA256SUMS` and deletes the directory once the images
|
||
are in the registry.
|
||
|
||
## 16. Control-plane database backups and disaster recovery
|
||
|
||
The PostgreSQL database behind felis-api holds everything that is not a world:
|
||
accounts, passkeys, Minecraft account links, server ownership, quotas, audit
|
||
logs, and the `world_backups` index that maps an archive (§10) back to its
|
||
owner. Losing it orphans every world archive. It runs in k3s as the
|
||
`felis-postgres` Deployment, with its cluster on the host in
|
||
`/var/lib/felis/postgres`; `felis db` runs `pg_dump`, `psql` and `pg_restore`
|
||
inside that pod (the host config's `[database] deployment`) and keeps the
|
||
bundles on the host.
|
||
|
||
### What runs, and where the bundles go
|
||
|
||
- **`felis-db-backup.timer`** runs `felis db backup` daily at
|
||
`FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME` (default `*-*-* 03:30:00`, plus up to 15 min random
|
||
delay). `Persistent=true` catches up at boot after the host was off at that
|
||
time. The installer takes the first backup during the install, so a broken
|
||
pipeline shows up there. [CODE-ONLY; unit and timer content GO-TESTED in
|
||
`deploy/bootstrap_test.sh`]
|
||
- **Every upgrade** (`felis migrate up`, which the installer runs) takes a
|
||
`pre-migrate` bundle first when the database already has data and a
|
||
migration is pending, and **applies nothing** if that backup fails
|
||
(`pre-migration backup failed, nothing applied`). [GO-TESTED]
|
||
- **Every restore** takes a `pre-restore` bundle of the database it is about to
|
||
replace (skip with `-no-safety-backup`). [GO-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
Bundles land in `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_DIR` (default `/var/lib/felis/db-backups`,
|
||
mode 0700; outside `/var/lib/rancher` so a k3s reinstall cannot take them
|
||
along). One bundle is `felis-db-<UTC stamp>-<label>.tar`:
|
||
|
||
| Member | Content |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| `MANIFEST.json` | version, schema version, `pg_dump --version`, sha256 of every member |
|
||
| `db.dump` | `pg_dump --format=custom` of the `felis` database |
|
||
| `state/etc/felis/...` | every file in `/etc/felis`: `secrets.env` (DB password, session/forwarding secrets, registry tokens), `felis.host.toml`, `felis.pod.toml`, the `felis.toml` symlink, `offsite.env` (bucket credentials and encryption key), `smtp-password`, `uploads-s3-access-key` and `uploads-s3-secret-key` (the mail relay password and the uploads bucket keys `felis setup` took), the panel TLS pair, and the installer's own markers (`system-server-images`, `velocity.fingerprint`). `bootstrap.done` is left out on purpose |
|
||
| `k8s/minecraftservers.json` | every MinecraftServer, status and server-side metadata stripped, ready for `kubectl apply` (best effort: when the cluster did not answer, the manifest records why) |
|
||
|
||
next to a `.sha256` sidecar in `sha256sum` format. **A bundle contains the
|
||
secrets; treat it like `/etc/felis` itself.** Retention per label: `daily` 14
|
||
(`FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP`), `pre-migrate` 10, `pre-restore` 5, `manual` never
|
||
pruned.
|
||
|
||
Installer knobs: `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_DIR`, `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP`,
|
||
`FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME`, `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_METRICS` and
|
||
`FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP` (below).
|
||
|
||
### Is the newest backup fresh?
|
||
|
||
Three places answer, all with the same 26 h limit:
|
||
|
||
- The panel: **管理 → 维护与备份** shows the newest backup, its kind and size,
|
||
and turns red with the fix commands when it is missing or overdue (read from
|
||
the `db_backup_last` platform setting each backup writes).
|
||
- `sudo felis db check` exits 1 with the reason; `sudo felis db list` shows every
|
||
bundle with its age.
|
||
- Prometheus: `FelisDBBackupStale` (critical) and `FelisDBBackupMetricMissing`
|
||
(warning) in `deploy/alerts/`. They read
|
||
`felis_db_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds`, which each daily run writes
|
||
to `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_METRICS` (default
|
||
`/var/lib/node_exporter/textfile_collector/felis_db_backup.prom`). Point
|
||
node-exporter's `--collector.textfile.directory` at that directory, or
|
||
`FelisDBBackupMetricMissing` fires after 2 h.
|
||
|
||
When a backup is overdue:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo systemctl status felis-db-backup.timer # enabled? next run?
|
||
sudo journalctl -u felis-db-backup -n 50 --no-pager # why the last run failed
|
||
sudo felis db backup # take one now (label manual)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Common failures: felis-postgres not running (`kubectl exec` reports no running
|
||
pod, or `pg_dump: ... connection refused`; next section); `k3s: executable file not
|
||
found` from a `felis` that runs with neither `/usr/local/bin` on PATH nor k3s
|
||
anywhere else; the backup directory's disk full (the half-written `.partial` is
|
||
removed and the previous bundles stay intact); `pg_dump: server version mismatch`
|
||
when an external database (no `deployment` in `[database]`) is newer than the
|
||
host's client tools (install the matching `postgresql` client package).
|
||
|
||
### felis-postgres is not running, or never became ready
|
||
|
||
The installer stops with `felis-postgres did not become ready` after 10 minutes
|
||
and prints the pod's events; the watchdog reports the Deployment the same way it
|
||
reports felis-api. Look at the pod:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres -o wide
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis describe deploy/felis-postgres | tail -n 30
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis logs deploy/felis-postgres --tail=60
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
| What it says | Cause | Fix |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| `ImagePullBackOff` / `ErrImagePull` on `postgres` | the node cannot reach Docker Hub and has no copy | §8e, "The platform's own images on an air-gapped node" |
|
||
| `CreateContainerConfigError`, `secret "felis-postgres" not found` | the superuser Secret is gone | rerun the installer, which makes a new one. The image reads it only when it creates a cluster; the installer and `felis db` reach the database over the pod's socket |
|
||
| the log says `Permission denied` on `/var/lib/postgresql/18/docker` | the hostPath lost its owner (uid 999) or, with SELinux enforcing, its `container_file_t` label (a restore of `/var/lib/felis` by hand, `restorecon` without the installer's rule) | rerun the installer, which sets both; by hand: `sudo chown -R 999:999 /var/lib/felis/postgres` and `sudo restorecon -R /var/lib/felis/postgres` |
|
||
| the log says `database files are incompatible with server` | the cluster was made by another major version | docs/operations.md §4, "PostgreSQL major versions" |
|
||
| `Pending`, `Insufficient memory` | the node is full | §13b |
|
||
|
||
Query the database by hand from inside the pod, as the superuser over its socket:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec -it deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The copy an earlier release's host PostgreSQL still holds, from before the move
|
||
into k3s, stays on the host; docs/operations.md §4 covers going back to it.
|
||
|
||
### Check a bundle
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis db verify felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar # bare names resolve in the backup dir
|
||
sha256sum -c felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar.sha256 # on a copy, without felis
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`verify` checks the sidecar, every member against the manifest, that nothing
|
||
is missing or unlisted, and that the manifest comes first. It does not touch
|
||
the database.
|
||
|
||
### Restore on the same host (undo a mistake)
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
|
||
sudo felis db restore -yes felis-db-20260924T033012Z-daily.tar
|
||
sudo felis migrate up -config /etc/felis/felis.host.toml
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- Without `-yes`, restore prints what the bundle holds and exits 2.
|
||
- It refuses while other clients are connected (`other clients are connected to the database (N)`)
|
||
and prints the scale command; `-force` overrides, for a client you know is
|
||
idle.
|
||
- The replay is one transaction: it drops everything the `felis` role owns and
|
||
loads the dump. **Any failure rolls back and leaves the database exactly as it
|
||
was** (`rolled back, the database is unchanged`, with the psql and pg_restore
|
||
errors). [PG-TESTED]
|
||
- The database before the restore is in the `pre-restore` bundle it names;
|
||
restoring that one undoes the restore.
|
||
- `migrate up` brings an older bundle's schema up to the running release.
|
||
Nothing migrates at startup, so skip it only when you are rolling back to the
|
||
release that wrote the bundle (next section).
|
||
- Restore replaces the database only. World data (PVCs and archives, §10, §13)
|
||
is not in the bundle and is not touched; a server created after the bundle
|
||
keeps its PVC but loses its owner row.
|
||
|
||
### Roll back an upgrade that broke the database
|
||
|
||
The installer's migrations only roll forward. The `pre-migrate` bundle taken by
|
||
the upgrade is the way back:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
|
||
sudo felis db list | grep pre-migrate # newest one is the upgrade's
|
||
sudo felis db restore -yes <that bundle>
|
||
kubectl -n felis rollout undo deploy/felis-api
|
||
kubectl -n felis rollout undo deploy/felis-operator
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Do **not** run `felis migrate up` here: the host binary is already the new
|
||
release and would re-apply the migrations you are rolling back. Bring the host
|
||
back in line by installing the earlier release from its own assets, with the
|
||
installer read at that same tag (`v1.2.3` here):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/FelisMC/Felis/v1.2.3/deploy/bootstrap.sh \
|
||
| sudo FELIS_RELEASE=v1.2.3 bash
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`FELIS_RELEASE` makes the installer install that release where it would
|
||
otherwise resolve the newest one, which would install the new release again and
|
||
re-apply its migrations. It is refused together with `FELIS_REF`,
|
||
`FELIS_ARTIFACT_DIR`, `FELIS_SKIP_FETCH` or `FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev`, and
|
||
an unpublished tag stops the install before anything changes. [SH-TESTED]
|
||
|
||
- An installer older than `FELIS_RELEASE` ignores it and installs the newest.
|
||
`curl -fsSL <that URL> | grep -c FELIS_RELEASE` prints `0` for one of those;
|
||
run it with `FELIS_REF=v1.2.3` instead, which builds that tag from source
|
||
(slower, and it needs the build resources of §15c).
|
||
- While the repository is private, read the installer through the README's
|
||
token'd form with `?ref=v1.2.3` after `contents/deploy/bootstrap.sh`, and run
|
||
it as `sudo -E FELIS_RELEASE=v1.2.3 bash`.
|
||
|
||
### Whole-host disaster recovery: what comes back, and from where
|
||
|
||
When the host (or its disk) is gone, everything Felis needs comes back from the
|
||
off-site bucket (next sections) plus a fresh install. What the host holds:
|
||
|
||
| Data | On the host | In the bucket | Brought back by | Lost at most |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| Control-plane database (accounts, passkeys, ownership, quotas, audit, submissions, the `world_backups` index) | felis-postgres, `/var/lib/felis/postgres` | every bundle, copied within the hour of being written | `fetch-db`, `db restore` | changes since the newest bundle: up to a day plus an hour with the daily timer |
|
||
| Host state (`/etc/felis`: secrets, both `felis.toml` copies, `offsite.env`, the mail relay password and uploads bucket keys, panel TLS pair) | `/etc/felis` | inside every bundle | `tar -x` of the bundle's `state/` | as the database |
|
||
| MinecraftServer objects | k3s | inside every bundle (`k8s/minecraftservers.json`) | `kubectl apply` | as the database |
|
||
| World archives (reaper, "Back up now", pre-restore snapshots) | `felis-backups` volume | each one within the hour | `fetch-worlds` | archives written in the last hour |
|
||
| Live worlds | `world-*` volumes under `/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage` | **only as their archives** | a restore from the newest archive (§10) | everything since that world's newest archive |
|
||
| User images | `registry` volume | hourly; image lists kept 14 days | `fetch-images` | images pushed in the last hour |
|
||
| Submission uploads (modpacks awaiting or past review) | `felis-uploads` volume | hourly; upload lists kept 14 days | `fetch-uploads` | uploads of the last hour |
|
||
| Platform images, Velocity, the JRE, build tools | registry, `/opt/felis` | not copied | the installer builds and pushes them again | nothing |
|
||
| k3s itself (its token, CA, datastore, Secrets, Deployments) | `/var/lib/rancher/k3s` | not copied | the installer makes a new single-node cluster and renders every Secret and Deployment from `/etc/felis` | nothing: no Felis data lives only there |
|
||
|
||
**Live worlds are the gap.** A world's current state exists only in its
|
||
volume; the bucket holds the archives the reaper, an owner's "Back up now" or
|
||
a pre-restore snapshot wrote. A world that was never archived comes back as a
|
||
server with an empty world. Tell owners to back up before anything they would
|
||
hate to lose, and treat the newest archive's age (the server's backup page) as
|
||
that world's recovery point.
|
||
|
||
For a smaller database loss window, give the installer a tighter
|
||
`FELIS_DB_BACKUP_TIME` (any systemd calendar, e.g. `*-*-* 00/6:30:00` for
|
||
every 6 hours) with a matching `FELIS_DB_BACKUP_KEEP`, on every installer
|
||
run; the hourly off-site copy picks each bundle up within the hour.
|
||
|
||
How long a rebuild takes is mostly transfer time. The installer on a blank
|
||
host builds and pushes every platform image, so it runs longer than an upgrade
|
||
and depends on the host's network; the database restore takes seconds to
|
||
minutes; the three fetches move what `sudo felis offsite status` reports the
|
||
bucket holding (images, uploads, world archives) at the bucket's bandwidth,
|
||
and each skips what is already in place, so an interrupted one resumes. Write
|
||
those sizes down with the bucket's download rate and you have the recovery
|
||
time for your install. A whole-host rehearsal on a spare machine, once per
|
||
release, is the way to know it for sure.
|
||
|
||
The order below matters: the state goes in before the installer so it reuses
|
||
the old secrets and bucket; the images go back before the database so the
|
||
servers the database restores find the digests they pin, inside the pruner's
|
||
24-hour grace; the MinecraftServers go back with the database that names their
|
||
owners; the worlds come last because a restore needs a server to restore
|
||
into.
|
||
|
||
### Rebuild on a new host (the old one is gone)
|
||
|
||
This needs the off-site copy (next section) or a bundle you copied off the old
|
||
host yourself, plus the off-site encryption key if the copy is in the bucket.
|
||
|
||
1. Get the newest bundle. From the bucket, with any `felis` binary of the same
|
||
or a newer release (the `felis-linux-<arch>` release asset runs on its own;
|
||
this works from any machine that can reach the bucket):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
export FELIS_OFFSITE_ACCESS_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY=...
|
||
sudo -E felis offsite fetch-db -endpoint https://s3.example.com -bucket felis-backups \
|
||
[-region ...] [-prefix ...] latest
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It writes the bundle into `/var/lib/felis/db-backups` (`-dir` to change),
|
||
checks it (`felis db verify`) and names it. A wrong key fails with
|
||
`object does not decrypt with this key` and writes nothing. For a copy you
|
||
made yourself, check it with `sha256sum -c felis-db-....tar.sha256`.
|
||
2. Put the old host's state in place **before** installing, so the installer
|
||
reuses the same DB password, session secret, forwarding secret, the mail
|
||
relay password and uploads bucket keys `felis setup` took, and the
|
||
`[offsite]` bucket with its credentials and key (`offsite.env`):
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo install -d -m 0700 /etc/felis
|
||
sudo tar -xpf felis-db-....tar -C / --strip-components=1 state/etc/felis
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
3. Run the installer as for a first install. `bootstrap.done` is not in the
|
||
bundle, so it takes the fresh-install path, creates the empty database with
|
||
the restored password and migrates it. It finds `[offsite]` in the restored
|
||
`felis.host.toml` and turns the hourly copy back on.
|
||
4. Push the user images back into the new registry:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis offsite fetch-images
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It restores the newest image list in the bucket (`-at <stamp>` for an
|
||
older one; `felis offsite list` shows them) through the registry's loopback
|
||
port as the platform principal, verifying every manifest and layer against
|
||
its digest, and pushes only what the registry lacks. The pruner counts a
|
||
restored image as freshly pushed and keeps it for 24 hours; finish the
|
||
database step within that window so the restored servers and whitelist
|
||
entries keep naming it. When the new host's hourly copy has already recorded
|
||
its still-empty registry, `fetch-images` refuses that newest list and names
|
||
the version to pass with `-at`; `fetch-uploads` does the same.
|
||
5. Put the submission uploads back:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis offsite fetch-uploads
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It writes every upload of the newest upload list (`-at <stamp>` for an
|
||
older one) into the `felis-uploads` volume, owned by the control plane's
|
||
uid, checking each against its sha256, and leaves one already in place
|
||
alone.
|
||
6. Restore the database and bring the servers back:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=0
|
||
sudo felis db restore -yes -no-safety-backup /var/lib/felis/db-backups/felis-db-....tar
|
||
sudo felis migrate up -config /etc/felis/felis.host.toml
|
||
kubectl -n felis scale deployment felis-api felis-operator --replicas=1
|
||
tar -xOf felis-db-....tar k8s/minecraftservers.json | kubectl apply -f -
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
7. Bring the world archives back into the archive volume:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis offsite fetch-worlds
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It fetches every archive the restored `world_backups` index lists as present
|
||
and the volume lacks, provisioning the `felis-backups` volume first if
|
||
nothing has used it yet (a short-lived `felis-bind-felis-backups-*` pod). It
|
||
lists any it could not find in the bucket. Restore a world from its archive
|
||
as usual (§10, §13).
|
||
|
||
Check the rebuild before letting players in:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis db check # the database answers and has a fresh bundle
|
||
kubectl get minecraftservers -A # every server the bundle held
|
||
kubectl -n minecraft get pods # servers pull their pinned images (no ImagePullBackOff)
|
||
sudo felis offsite status # the hourly copy runs from this host again
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Point the panel and game hostnames at the new host (DNS, or the tunnel in
|
||
front of it). In the panel: sign in with an old account (accounts and passkeys
|
||
come back with the database), open a restored server's backup page and confirm
|
||
its archives are listed, restore the newest one, start the server and join
|
||
it.
|
||
|
||
### Keep a copy somewhere else
|
||
|
||
A bundle on the same disk as the database protects against mistakes and bad
|
||
upgrades, and a world archive on the same disk as the worlds protects against
|
||
a deleted server. Neither survives losing the disk, and neither do the user
|
||
images in the platform registry or the modpacks users uploaded for review. The
|
||
installer's off-site copy sends all four to an S3-compatible bucket (AWS S3,
|
||
Cloudflare R2, Backblaze B2, MinIO, ...), encrypted on this host:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
FELIS_OFFSITE_ENDPOINT=https://<account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com \
|
||
FELIS_OFFSITE_BUCKET=felis-backups \
|
||
FELIS_OFFSITE_ACCESS_KEY=... FELIS_OFFSITE_SECRET_KEY=... \
|
||
bash deploy/bootstrap.sh # or the curl | sudo bash one-liner
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Optional: `FELIS_OFFSITE_REGION`, `FELIS_OFFSITE_PREFIX` (a key prefix, so one
|
||
bucket can hold several installs) and `FELIS_OFFSITE_DB_KEEP` (default 30).
|
||
The installer writes `[offsite]` into `felis.toml`, keeps the credentials and
|
||
a generated encryption key in `/etc/felis/offsite.env` (mode 0600), and
|
||
**prints the key once**. Store it in a password manager: the bucket holds only
|
||
sealed objects, and without the key they cannot be read. A later re-run keeps
|
||
the key; it refuses a `FELIS_OFFSITE_KEY` that differs from the one in
|
||
`offsite.env`, since every object already in the bucket is sealed with it.
|
||
Without a bucket the installer ends with `NO OFF-SITE COPY`. Installers before
|
||
the fix for a pipe race in reading `[offsite]` could also end that way on a
|
||
host that has a bucket, and removed `felis-offsite.timer` as they did; a re-run
|
||
of the current installer puts it back. `systemctl list-timers felis-offsite.timer`
|
||
shows whether the timer is there. [SH-TESTED] [VM-TESTED: a re-run that lost the race]
|
||
|
||
What runs:
|
||
|
||
- **`felis-offsite.timer`** runs `felis offsite sync` hourly (plus up to
|
||
10 min random delay, `Persistent=true`). Each run copies every world archive
|
||
whose row has no `offsite_at` yet and records it, copies the newest
|
||
`db_keep` database bundles the bucket lacks and prunes older ones there, and
|
||
deletes a world archive from the bucket once its row has been deleted and
|
||
its retention (`expires_at`) has passed. An object already in the bucket at
|
||
the right size is recorded without being sent again, so a run cut short
|
||
resumes. [GO-TESTED: `internal/offsite`]
|
||
- The same run copies the user images in the platform registry: every
|
||
repository outside `felis/` and `mirror/`, each manifest the registry's index
|
||
lists and every layer it names, read through the loopback hostPort. A layer
|
||
shared by many images is stored once. The installer pushes `felis/` and
|
||
`mirror/` again on a new host, but at new digests, so from those the run
|
||
copies only the revisions a MinecraftServer or a whitelist entry pins by
|
||
digest (a server created from the platform's Paper image, for one), without
|
||
their tags; a restore puts them back by digest and leaves the installer's
|
||
tags alone.
|
||
When the set changed, a new version of the image list is written; versions
|
||
replaced more than 14 days ago are dropped together with the layers only
|
||
they named, so an image deleted by mistake stays restorable for two weeks
|
||
(`fetch-images -at`). A manifest the registry lost mid-run keeps its earlier
|
||
copy and is listed under `not whole:` in `status`. The copy covers the
|
||
in-cluster registry that `[registry] url` names; `-registry host:port` points
|
||
it elsewhere, `-registry off` skips images. [VM-TESTED: 16 images, 638 MiB,
|
||
restored into an empty registry at the same digests]
|
||
- It also copies the submission uploads (`sub-*/context.tar.gz` on the
|
||
`felis-uploads` volume, §8), the source an admin rebuilds an approved image
|
||
from. Identical uploads are stored once; the upload list is versioned and
|
||
kept for 14 days like the image list (`fetch-uploads -at`). A context is read
|
||
again only when its size or modification time changed. It runs when
|
||
`[registry] user_uploads_context` is a local path (the installer's default);
|
||
`-uploads-dir` names the directory by hand, `-uploads-pvc ""` skips it.
|
||
[VM-TESTED: 17 uploads in 10 objects, 200 MiB, restored byte-identical]
|
||
- Objects are `worlds/<archive>.fenc`, `db/<bundle>.fenc`,
|
||
`registry/blobs/<sha256>.fenc`, `registry/manifests/<sha256>.fenc`,
|
||
`registry/index/<stamp>.json.fenc`, `uploads/blobs/<sha256>.fenc` and
|
||
`uploads/index/<stamp>.json.fenc`: AES-256-GCM in 64 KiB segments, so
|
||
truncation, reordering and a wrong key are all refused on the way back.
|
||
- A pass sends the database bundles first, then world archives, images and
|
||
uploads. Each object has its own time limit: 10 minutes plus its size at
|
||
512 KiB/s (about 6 hours for 10 GiB). An archive the uplink cannot send in
|
||
that time fails alone, stays pending and is tried again next pass; the rest
|
||
of the pass still goes. A pass over a big archive can run for hours; the
|
||
timer starts no second one meanwhile. An upload cut off restarts from the
|
||
beginning of that object. [GO-TESTED: `internal/offsite`]
|
||
- The reaper deletes an idle world only after its archive is in the bucket
|
||
(§10).
|
||
- The watchdog mails the owners when no sync has completed for 12 hours
|
||
(`the off-site copy last completed ... ago`).
|
||
|
||
Checking it:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sudo felis offsite status # last run, errors, what the bucket holds, what waits
|
||
sudo felis offsite list # the bundles, image lists and upload lists in the bucket, newest first
|
||
sudo journalctl -u felis-offsite -n 50 --no-pager
|
||
sudo systemctl start felis-offsite.service # run one now
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`status` exits 1 when no sync has completed in 12 hours. `missing:` lines are
|
||
archives the database records but the volume no longer has (an archive
|
||
removed by hand); there is nothing left to copy for those.
|
||
|
||
To change the bucket, edit `[offsite]` in `/etc/felis/felis.host.toml` (and
|
||
`offsite.env` for new credentials) and re-run the installer; to turn the copy
|
||
off, delete the section and re-run. Keeping the same key across buckets keeps
|
||
old copies readable.
|
||
|
||
Without a bucket, copy the backup directory off the host on a schedule of your
|
||
own (`rsync -a root@felis-host:/var/lib/felis/db-backups/ /backups/felis-db/`,
|
||
with the `.sha256` sidecars; `sha256sum -c` on the far side proves the copy).
|
||
That covers the database only; the world archives are under the
|
||
`felis-backups` volume's directory in `/var/lib/rancher/k3s/storage/`, the
|
||
registry's images under the `registry` volume's (`*_felis_registry`) and the
|
||
uploads under the `felis-uploads` volume's (`*_felis_felis-uploads`).
|
||
|
||
### `FELIS_PRE_MIGRATE_BACKUP=0`
|
||
|
||
Skips the pre-migration snapshot (`migrate up -no-backup`). The installer warns
|
||
loudly when it is set. Use it only when the snapshot cannot work and you have
|
||
another backup, e.g. an external database newer than the host's `pg_dump`.
|
||
|
||
## 17. Sign-in refused: 429 limits, no mail relay, account code locks, failed sign-ins
|
||
|
||
The public sign-in doors (`/api/v1/auth/*` except logout and the op-login
|
||
status poll) have three limits of their own. Each answers 429 with a
|
||
`Retry-After` header and a distinct error code. The doors that mail a code
|
||
also answer 503 `mail_unavailable` on an install with no mail relay.
|
||
|
||
### `rate_limited`: one address called the doors too often
|
||
|
||
Each client address gets 20 calls at once, refilled at 20 a minute, shared
|
||
across every door. A person signing in makes three or four calls, so this only
|
||
bites scripts. IPv6 clients share one limit per /64. Refusals count in
|
||
`felis_rate_limited_total{scope="auth_door"}`; `FelisSignInFlood` fires when
|
||
more than 10 a minute are refused for 10 minutes.
|
||
|
||
The address comes from `[auth] client_ip_header`:
|
||
|
||
- Behind the Cloudflare tunnel it is `CF-Connecting-IP`. The edge setup writes
|
||
it, and an install with an `access_jwt_aud` implies it. The header is
|
||
trustworthy there because the same setup fences the panel NodePort to
|
||
loopback, so every request reaching the API came through cloudflared.
|
||
- Behind your own reverse proxy it is `X-Forwarded-For` (the rightmost entry,
|
||
the one your proxy appended). Firewall the NodePort so only the proxy reaches
|
||
it, or a direct caller can write any address it likes.
|
||
- Unset, the TCP peer is used. Behind any proxy every visitor then shares the
|
||
proxy's address and one limit, so **everyone gets `rate_limited` at once**.
|
||
The `felis api` log says at start which it keys on (`sign-in rate limit keys
|
||
on ...`). Set the header in `/etc/felis/felis.toml` and
|
||
`/etc/felis/felis.pod.toml`, then `felis converge`.
|
||
|
||
### `mail_rate_limited`: the install-wide mail budget is spent
|
||
|
||
Every code and notice the API mails spends one token of a single budget,
|
||
`[smtp] max_per_hour` (default 120; a quarter of it may go at once), so a flood
|
||
cannot burn the relay's quota and get the sending account suspended. While it
|
||
is spent, every address gets the same 429 and nothing reaches the relay.
|
||
`felis_mail_total{result="throttled"}` counts refusals and
|
||
`FelisMailBudgetExhausted` fires on the first one. Look at
|
||
`felis_rate_limited_total` first: a flood shows there. If sign-ins are real,
|
||
raise `max_per_hour` to what your relay allows.
|
||
|
||
`FelisMailDeliveryFailing` is the other half: the relay itself refused mail
|
||
(`felis_mail_total{result="failed"}`, 502 `mail_undeliverable` to the caller).
|
||
The relay's reason is in the `felis-api` log.
|
||
|
||
### `mail_unavailable`: no mail relay
|
||
|
||
With no `[smtp]` section every door that mails a code answers 503
|
||
`mail_unavailable` before minting one: email sign-in, op.console sign-in,
|
||
email verification, and the email step-up for sensitive changes and
|
||
migration. The public doors answer before looking up the address, so every
|
||
address gets the same reply. Sign-in is by passkey only, and a verified email
|
||
stops counting as a way into the account (it is no longer offered as a
|
||
re-verification factor). Codes are never logged: `felis api` says at start
|
||
`[smtp] not configured`. Run `felis setup` and configure email to open the
|
||
doors.
|
||
|
||
### Relay refused for lacking TLS
|
||
|
||
A relay on port 465 is spoken to over TLS from the first byte. On any other
|
||
port Felis upgrades with STARTTLS, and when the relay does not offer it the
|
||
send fails with `smtp: <host>:<port> does not offer STARTTLS` (502
|
||
`mail_undeliverable` to the caller, the full text in the `felis-api` log, and
|
||
the same error on the `felis setup` email screen). Without TLS anyone on the
|
||
path reads the codes, and anyone who can rewrite the conversation can strip
|
||
the STARTTLS offer, so this is the default for every relay except one on this
|
||
host (`localhost`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`). Use port 465 or a relay that offers
|
||
STARTTLS. For a relay you reach over a link you trust, set
|
||
`require_tls = false` under `[smtp]` in `/etc/felis/felis.toml` and
|
||
`/etc/felis/felis.pod.toml`; installer re-runs and the setup email screen keep
|
||
it. `felis api` warns at start whenever codes may go out without TLS.
|
||
|
||
### `otp_account_locked`: ten wrong codes in 24 hours
|
||
|
||
Ten wrong email codes for one account within 24 hours, counted across every
|
||
code it was sent, lock that account's email-code sign-in until 24 hours after
|
||
the first miss. The public doors answer a locked account exactly like a wrong
|
||
code, and the owner gets one mail saying so. Signed-in doors (email
|
||
verification, migration step-up) answer 429 `otp_account_locked`. Passkey
|
||
sign-in keeps working. Each lock is audited as `auth.otp.locked` and counted in
|
||
`felis_auth_otp_lockouts_total{purpose}` (`FelisOTPAccountLocked`).
|
||
|
||
To lift a lock early once you have confirmed the owner locked themselves out:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c \
|
||
"DELETE FROM otp_failure_windows WHERE user_id = (SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '<name>');"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Who tried: the audit trail
|
||
|
||
Every refused sign-in writes an `auth.<door>.failed` row (payload `reason`:
|
||
`bad_code`, `no_account`, `staff_account`, `not_staff`, `bad_assertion`, ...)
|
||
and counts in `felis_auth_failures_total{door,reason}`; `FelisSignInFailures`
|
||
fires above 30 in 15 minutes. The first refusal of each throttled burst writes
|
||
`auth.rate_limited` with the source address. Rows carry `actor_user_id` (the
|
||
account, the column to attribute by), `client_ip` (the same address the limit
|
||
keys on) and `user_agent`. `actor` is display text: a verified email or the
|
||
username, never an address the caller set without verifying.
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c "
|
||
SELECT created_at, action, actor, client_ip, payload->>'reason' AS reason
|
||
FROM audit_logs
|
||
WHERE action LIKE 'auth.%' AND created_at > now() - interval '1 hour'
|
||
ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 50;"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
A failed audit write does not fail the action; it logs `audit: lost ...` in
|
||
`felis-api` and counts in `felis_audit_write_failures_total`
|
||
(`FelisAuditWriteFailing`). The cause is almost always PostgreSQL (§16).
|
||
|
||
### How long rows are kept
|
||
|
||
`felis-api` prunes the database a minute after it starts and every 6 hours
|
||
after that, and logs `retention: pruned spent rows` with a count per table:
|
||
|
||
| Rows | Deleted |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| sessions | 30 days after they expired or were signed out |
|
||
| email codes, passkey challenges, setup links, op-login requests | 30 days after they expired or were used |
|
||
| `/felis link` bind codes | 30 days after they expired |
|
||
| account migrations that never completed | 30 days after their last step (completed ones stay) |
|
||
| wrong-code windows (`otp_failure_windows`) | 30 days after they began |
|
||
| `audit_logs` | once older than `[audit] retention` |
|
||
|
||
`[audit] retention` defaults to `365d`; it takes days (`90d`), months of 30
|
||
days (`18mo`) or `forever`, and refuses anything under `30d`. The daily
|
||
`felis db backup` bundles (§16) still hold the rows for as long as the bundles
|
||
are kept. To keep audit rows past the retention, export them before they go:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo felis db audit-export -until 2026-01-01 -out /root/audit-2025.jsonl
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`-since` and `-until` take a day (UTC midnight) or an RFC 3339 instant; the
|
||
window is `[since, until)`. Each line is one row as JSON, oldest first. The
|
||
file is created `0600` and an existing file is never overwritten.
|
||
|
||
### `felis breakGlass`: the recovery code and the OVERRIDE [VM-VERIFIED]
|
||
|
||
Once a staff account exists, `sudo felis breakGlass` asks which admin or owner
|
||
is breaking the glass and mails that account's verified address a six-digit
|
||
code through the same `[smtp]` relay as the sign-in codes. The code works for
|
||
10 minutes and five wrong ones end it. The console reads the relay password
|
||
the way the watchdog does (the `password_ref` env var, else
|
||
`/etc/felis/smtp-password`, else the `felis-smtp` Secret, else no AUTH), so a
|
||
host whose k3s is down still gets its code, and the mail skips the API's
|
||
`max_per_hour` budget.
|
||
Only the right code makes the run a `recovery` attributed to that account; the
|
||
mail says which host and OS user asked, so an admin who did not ask learns
|
||
that root there is in other hands.
|
||
|
||
Every other ending leads to the typed `OVERRIDE`, and the screen says why:
|
||
the name matches no staff account, the account has no verified address, no
|
||
relay (`[smtp] is not configured in felis.toml`, or the Secret could not be
|
||
read), the relay refused the mail, the code expired or took five wrong tries,
|
||
or the operator typed `OVERRIDE` at the code prompt. Esc on either screen
|
||
starts over with a new code. With the relay down recovery still works, as an
|
||
unverified override that records the reason.
|
||
|
||
The audit row is `break_glass.recovery` or `break_glass.root_override`
|
||
(`break_glass.operator_create` for a new Operator account), source
|
||
`break-glass`. `verified` is true only for a run a code proved, which also
|
||
carries `verified_by: email_otp` and `code_sent_to`. An override carries
|
||
`otp_skipped` (`unknown_admin`, `no_verified_email`, `no_relay`,
|
||
`send_failed`, `code_expired`, `code_rejected`, `operator_skipped`) and, where
|
||
something failed, `otp_skip_detail`. Root can edit the row afterwards, so it
|
||
records attribution without proving it.
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
sudo k3s kubectl -n felis exec deploy/felis-postgres -c postgres -- psql -U postgres felis -c "
|
||
SELECT created_at, action, actor, payload->>'verified' AS verified,
|
||
payload->>'otp_skipped' AS skipped, payload->>'otp_skip_detail' AS detail
|
||
FROM audit_logs WHERE source = 'break-glass' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 20;"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Optional: a Cloudflare rate limiting rule in front
|
||
|
||
The limits above live in the API, so they hold on any edge. Behind Cloudflare
|
||
you can also stop floods before they reach the tunnel: Security → WAF → Rate
|
||
limiting rules, match URI Path starts with `/api/v1/auth/` on the console and
|
||
op.console hostnames, count by IP, 30 requests per 10 seconds, action Block
|
||
for 10 seconds (the Free plan's limits).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Quick reference: symptom → section
|
||
|
||
| Symptom | Section |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| Stuck `Starting`, never `Running` | §1 |
|
||
| `Starting` with `PodNotReady` (image? PVC? boot?) | §1a |
|
||
| RCON secret/auth/port errors | §1b, §1c |
|
||
| Phase `Failed` | §2 |
|
||
| Players land in lobby / wrong place | §3, §4 |
|
||
| Wake refused / rate-limited (403/409/429/503) | §3a |
|
||
| `maintenance_in_progress`; server won't start after a restore | §3b |
|
||
| Routing disabled, offline-mode | §4 |
|
||
| Panel 401/403; fails-closed; audience error | §5 |
|
||
| Local password login rejected | §5c |
|
||
| Internal callers 401 (service token) | §6 |
|
||
| Link/claim 400/409/412/403/404 | §7 |
|
||
| Build push 400 / SA denied / egress hang / Failed / executor ImagePullBackOff | §8, §8e |
|
||
| Registry push/pull unreachable | §9 |
|
||
| World deleted unexpectedly / backup skipped | §10 |
|
||
| Reaper `awaiting_stop` stays above 0; `corrupt=` / backup shown as damaged; `orphan_archives` | §10 |
|
||
| Idle auto-stop not firing; player count 0; `PlayersCounted=False` | §11 |
|
||
| A config field seems ignored | §12 |
|
||
| PVC left behind after delete | §13 |
|
||
| Node out of disk; pods evicted / ImagePullBackOff | §13b |
|
||
| Which metric to scrape | §14 |
|
||
| An alert mail from the watchdog; nothing is mailed when something breaks | §14 |
|
||
| `FelisOperatorDown` / `FelisAPIDown` / `FelisLoginGateDown` / `FelisReconcileStuck` | §14, §1, §2 |
|
||
| Upgrade / roll back a bad control-plane image | §15 |
|
||
| `image_change_unconfirmed` / `image_not_in_registry` / `registry_unavailable`; move a world to a newer Minecraft | §15b |
|
||
| Database backup overdue / `FelisDBBackupStale` / panel shows 从未备份 | §16 |
|
||
| `pre-migration backup failed, nothing applied` during an upgrade | §16 |
|
||
| Undo a mistaken change / restore the control-plane database | §16 |
|
||
| Host lost: rebuild from a database bundle | §16 |
|
||
| `felis-postgres did not become ready`; `kubectl exec` finds no database pod | §16 |
|
||
| `the off-site copy last completed ... ago` / `NO OFF-SITE COPY` / reaper `awaiting_offsite` stays above 0 | §16, §10 |
|
||
| Sign-in 429 `rate_limited` for everyone at once | §17 |
|
||
| 429 `mail_rate_limited` / `FelisMailBudgetExhausted` | §17 |
|
||
| Right code refused; `otp_account_locked` / `FelisOTPAccountLocked` | §17 |
|
||
| `FelisSignInFailures` / who is guessing, from where | §17 |
|
||
| `FelisAuditWriteFailing` | §17 |
|
||
| `felis breakGlass` sends no code / shows `Root override`; `otp_skipped` in the audit | §17 |
|
||
| How long sessions, codes and audit rows are kept; export audit rows | §17 |
|