Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing must_change_password. - Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL. - Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error. - Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json, returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie. - Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password. - Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players are role=user rows with hash NULL. - /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a first-login change. Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration, forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
92 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
92 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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)
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// Sentinel errors the repository and cluster layers return so handlers can map
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// domain outcomes onto HTTP status codes without leaking driver details.
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var (
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// ErrNotFound means the requested server / record does not exist.
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ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
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// ErrConflict means an atomic precondition failed (e.g. claim lost the race).
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ErrConflict = errors.New("conflict")
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// ErrLinkCodeInvalid means an account-link code is unknown or expired (spec
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// §10). It is a client error (the verify endpoint exists; the code is bad), so
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// handlers map it to 400, not 404.
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ErrLinkCodeInvalid = errors.New("link code invalid or expired")
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// ErrConsoleUnavailable means the RCON write channel could not be reached —
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// the dial timed out, was refused, or the password was rejected (spec §8).
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// Because readiness IS an RCON probe (spec §141: phase=Running ⟺ RCON
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// answers), a reachable failure here is a transient/racy "the server isn't
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// actually up", not a server bug. Handlers map it to 503, not 500, so the
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// caller is told to wake/retry rather than shown an opaque internal error.
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ErrConsoleUnavailable = errors.New("server console is unavailable")
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)
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// apiError is a handler-level error carrying an HTTP status and a stable,
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// machine-readable code. The error envelope matches the platform convention:
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//
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// {"error": {"code": "...", "message": "...", "request_id": "..."}}
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type apiError struct {
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status int
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code string
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msg string
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}
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func (e *apiError) Error() string { return e.msg }
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// newError builds an apiError with a formatted message.
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func newError(status int, code, format string, a ...any) *apiError {
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return &apiError{status: status, code: code, msg: fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)}
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}
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// Common errors reused across handlers.
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var (
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errUnauthorized = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "authentication required")
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errForbidden = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not permitted")
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errBadRequest = newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request")
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// errInvalidCredentials is the single, deliberately vague answer to any failed
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// local-password login (spec §B): unknown username, player row, or wrong
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// password all collapse to it so the response never reveals which usernames
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// carry a password. The anti-enumeration dummy-hash compare keeps the timing
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// uniform alongside it (handlers_auth.go).
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errInvalidCredentials = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "invalid username or password")
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// errPasswordChangeRequired fences a staff principal that still owes a
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// first-login password change to the change-password surface. The lockdown
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// middleware returns it from every authenticated route except the opt-out set
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// (change-password / logout / me), so a half-onboarded account cannot act until
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// it sets its own password.
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errPasswordChangeRequired = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "password_change_required",
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"change your password before continuing")
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)
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// writeJSON writes v as an indented JSON body with the given status.
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
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enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
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_ = enc.Encode(v)
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}
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// writeError renders err as the standard error envelope. Non-apiError values
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// collapse to a 500 so driver/internal details never reach the client.
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
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var ae *apiError
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if !errors.As(err, &ae) {
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ae = newError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
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}
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body := map[string]any{
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"error": map[string]string{
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"code": ae.code,
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"message": ae.msg,
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"request_id": requestIDFromContext(r.Context()),
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},
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}
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writeJSON(w, ae.status, body)
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}
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