The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
27 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
27 lines
1.4 KiB
Go
package api
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import "context"
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// Restorer starts a world restore from a stored backup (spec §466: former_owner
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// 3mo 内重新 claim → restore PVC). Restore only STARTS the work: recreating the
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// per-server world PVC and extracting the archive into it is pod-filesystem work
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// felis-api cannot do in-process — the world PVC is RWO and its lifecycle is owned
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// by the operator's StatefulSet, so the API process has nothing to mount at
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// request time. The production implementation therefore hands off to a restore
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// Job, exactly the way internal/build hands an image build to a Kaniko Job. The
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// call returns once the restore is enqueued, so the handler answers 202
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// (restoring), never claiming the world is already back.
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//
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// It returns ErrNotFound if the server is unknown to the execution backend; any
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// other error is an internal failure (the handler maps it to 500).
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//
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// It is an interface so the handler is tested against a fake (api_test.go). The
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// production executor — a restore Job mirroring internal/build's jobspec + weak-SA
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// isolation — is integration-only and is a deliberate follow-up: until it is wired
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// the API.Restorer is nil and POST /servers/{name}/restore-backup reports 503, so
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// the restore authorization boundary is exercised without shipping a stub that
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// cannot run in the real cluster topology.
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type Restorer interface {
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Restore(ctx context.Context, serverName, backupRef string) error
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}
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