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096d59716e
Retroactively author 15 grouped detail docs covering the backend functional (feat/fix) commits made before the change ledger was established (fad48ff), closing the ledger's detail-doc axis for the pre-convention history. Each doc groups a feature's constituent commits, lists their SHAs with subjects, and carries a backfill note stating it was reconstructed from git history on 2026-07-07 and not independently re-verified (current tree green at9911b8c). Add a Detail docs section to INDEX.md linking every detail doc (the 6 existing + 15 backfill) to the commit(s) it covers, so a doc is findable from the index without a column on the auto-generated ledger table. Catch the table up with the missing9911b8crow. Scope: backend (Go/Java/K8s) only, per the ledger's stated convention that frontend/panel commits are the collaborator's UI work; non-functional commits (docs/style/chore/refactor) keep their table row without a dedicated detail doc.
38 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Cloudflare Tunnel + Access edge (cfsetup) + NodePort fencing (ledger backfill)
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- **Type:** feature + fix — retroactive ledger entry
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- **Date:** 2026-06-27 – 2026-07-01
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- **Area:** `internal/cfsetup` (pure core + integration runner), `cmd/felis` (TUI edge flow), edge nftables fence
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- **Commits:**
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- `53a7664` feat(cfsetup): recommended Cloudflare Tunnel + Access edge (§14) — domain- and IdP-agnostic; the load-bearing `validateFailClosed` allowlist refuses any policy that could be public; fail-shut 404 catch-all; the raw game host is never proxied
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- `ba13839` feat(breakglass): optional Tunnel + Access setup in the sudo TUI, an independent peer of Owner provisioning
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- `a531f5e` fix(cfsetup): keep the connector install in the host apply layer only (drop the duplicate `StartConnector`)
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- `2810fe8` fix(cfsetup): repoint a stale DNS record when routing a tunnel hostname
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- `7d3be64` feat(cfsetup): start the tunnel connector as a setup step
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- `e058a64` feat(edge): close the panel NodePort to the public after the tunnel is up — nftables at prerouting `raw` (-300), before kube-proxy's NodePort DNAT, gated on the connector actually serving; loopback accepted first so the connector origin hop is untouched
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- **Tasks:** #37 (fence panel NodePort to public after tunnel)
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## What it did
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Stood up the optional one-click Zero-Trust edge: a Cloudflare Tunnel routing only the web
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hostnames plus a fail-closed Access application, provisioned from the sudo TUI against the
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operator's own Cloudflare account. `e058a64` then closes the Access-bypass hole where a
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direct `https://<node-ip>:<nodeport>/` with the right Host header reached the origin
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behind Access, by fencing the NodePort at the nftables raw hook so the packet is caught on
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its original destination port — but only once the connector is confirmed serving, so
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fencing never severs the only web path to a live origin.
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## Why
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Access is only a security boundary if the origin cannot be reached around it. The
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fail-closed policy guard (`validateFailClosed`) and the NodePort fence are the two
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load-bearing safety properties: a policy that could be public aborts the run with nothing
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created, and a routable-but-unfenced NodePort would defeat the whole edge.
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> **Backfill note.** Reconstructed 2026-07-07 from the commit history. The policy guard,
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> ingress generation, request bodies, gating, and the nftables ruleset shape / conn-count
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> gate are unit-tested; the live cloudflared/Cloudflare-API and `nft` calls are
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> INTEGRATION-ONLY (need a real account). KNOWN-LIMITATION: the fence targets nftables;
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> firewalld-native coordination is deferred. Not independently re-verified for this doc;
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> current tree green at `9911b8c`.
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