flyemoji
5a7cd5abe0
A completeness re-check of the ledger backfill (in-scope pre-fad48ff
feat/fix/refactor commits vs SHAs actually cited in detail docs, excluding
the auto-generated ledger table) surfaced one backend functional commit with
no detail-doc home: 346ec68 refactor(deploy) — an 868-insertion rework of the
cloudflare-edge TUI walkthrough plus a tested cfsetup integration-runner path.
The "improved cloudflare walkthrough" subject undersold a behaviour change, so
it is folded into the existing cloudflare-tunnel-access-edge detail doc and its
INDEX row rather than left orphaned. Backend detail-doc coverage of the
pre-ledger history is now complete (0 backend orphans).
39 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Cloudflare Tunnel + Access edge (cfsetup) + NodePort fencing (ledger backfill)
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- **Type:** feature + fix — retroactive ledger entry
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- **Date:** 2026-06-27 – 2026-07-01
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- **Area:** `internal/cfsetup` (pure core + integration runner), `cmd/felis` (TUI edge flow), edge nftables fence
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- **Commits:**
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- `53a7664` feat(cfsetup): recommended Cloudflare Tunnel + Access edge (§14) — domain- and IdP-agnostic; the load-bearing `validateFailClosed` allowlist refuses any policy that could be public; fail-shut 404 catch-all; the raw game host is never proxied
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- `ba13839` feat(breakglass): optional Tunnel + Access setup in the sudo TUI, an independent peer of Owner provisioning
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- `a531f5e` fix(cfsetup): keep the connector install in the host apply layer only (drop the duplicate `StartConnector`)
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- `2810fe8` fix(cfsetup): repoint a stale DNS record when routing a tunnel hostname
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- `7d3be64` feat(cfsetup): start the tunnel connector as a setup step
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- `346ec68` refactor(deploy): rework the cloudflare-edge walkthrough — restructured the edge TUI flow and added a tested `cfsetup` integration-runner path (with TUI height-measure/root tests)
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- `e058a64` feat(edge): close the panel NodePort to the public after the tunnel is up — nftables at prerouting `raw` (-300), before kube-proxy's NodePort DNAT, gated on the connector actually serving; loopback accepted first so the connector origin hop is untouched
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- **Tasks:** #37 (fence panel NodePort to public after tunnel)
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## What it did
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Stood up the optional one-click Zero-Trust edge: a Cloudflare Tunnel routing only the web
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hostnames plus a fail-closed Access application, provisioned from the sudo TUI against the
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operator's own Cloudflare account. `e058a64` then closes the Access-bypass hole where a
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direct `https://<node-ip>:<nodeport>/` with the right Host header reached the origin
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behind Access, by fencing the NodePort at the nftables raw hook so the packet is caught on
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its original destination port — but only once the connector is confirmed serving, so
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fencing never severs the only web path to a live origin.
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## Why
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Access is only a security boundary if the origin cannot be reached around it. The
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fail-closed policy guard (`validateFailClosed`) and the NodePort fence are the two
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load-bearing safety properties: a policy that could be public aborts the run with nothing
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created, and a routable-but-unfenced NodePort would defeat the whole edge.
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> **Backfill note.** Reconstructed 2026-07-07 from the commit history. The policy guard,
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> ingress generation, request bodies, gating, and the nftables ruleset shape / conn-count
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> gate are unit-tested; the live cloudflared/Cloudflare-API and `nft` calls are
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> INTEGRATION-ONLY (need a real account). KNOWN-LIMITATION: the fence targets nftables;
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> firewalld-native coordination is deferred. Not independently re-verified for this doc;
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> current tree green at `9911b8c`.
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