Give RoutingSource its second upstream so every non-pinned component now
resolves a real latest-stable: Velocity via PaperMC (already wired), and
felis-api, k3s and cloudflared via the GitHub REST API.
github.go queries /repos/{repo}/releases/latest (one request, rate-limit
friendly) and fails closed: a transport error, a non-200 status (404 = no
stable release), an undecodable body, a draft/prerelease flag, or an
unparseable / prerelease-parsing tag all return an error, never a zero
version. It sends the User-Agent GitHub requires (a UA-less request is
403'd) and tolerates the two live tag styles -- cloudflared's CalVer
"2026.6.1" and k3s's v-prefixed, build-tagged "v1.36.2+k3s1" -- while
String() keeps the raw tag for the report.
source.go routes sourceGitHub to it and drops the errGitHubNotWired stub;
velocity still routes to PaperMC.
Tests: github_test.go covers both tag styles, the User-Agent gate, and
fail-closed on 404 / prerelease-flag / unparseable tag, with fixtures
captured from api.github.com on 2026-07-05. runner_test.go now drives
PaperMC and GitHub through dual httptest servers end to end with no source
degrading to an error.
doc.go re-tiers the verification boundary: both release sources are now
built and live-grounded; the VersionGatherer's version-extraction core is
the next verifiable slice (logic over an exec seam, not pure I/O); the
genuine I/O remainder is the Notifier, Applier and felis update CLI/CronJob.
felis-api's coord is still a placeholder slug, so that component is dark at
runtime until a real repository is configured.
An out-of-band curl of the live Fill v3 endpoint contradicted two claims the
previous commit shipped and surfaced a mis-tiering:
- User-Agent is NOT enforced: fill.papermc.io/v3/projects/velocity returned
HTTP 200 to a bare curl UA. The comments claimed a generic UA "is refused"
and the API "REQUIRES" a contact UA. Reword to what is true — PaperMC's usage
policy asks for a descriptive UA and may block generic ones, but sending it is
etiquette/defensive here, not a gate Felis depends on.
- The test fixture's shape was invented, not captured: the real "versions"
object groups the entire 3.x line under a single key "3.0.0", not the
per-minor keys the fixture used. Replace it with the real body (keys and
version strings as returned). The key-agnostic parser already produced the
right answer, and an independent max-stable check confirms 3.4.0.
- Re-tier doc.go: the GitHub Releases source is verifiable-here (the same
httptest-testable shape as PaperMC), not integration remainder. It is why
3 of 4 components report "latest unknown" today and is the next verifiable
slice — the release-source work is only ~half done until it exists.
No production logic changed. WSL oracle: build + vet clean, internal/updater
10/10, full tree go test RC=0 (19 ok, 0 fail).
internal/updates is a pure, fakes-tested decision core with no production caller,
so nothing could produce its "版本号状态" report. Add internal/updater as that caller:
- topology: the fixed platform components and their user-set policies (felis-api
and cloudflared Scheduled+manageable; k3s Notify, high-blast-radius single node;
velocity Notify, off-cluster and unmanageable). Minecraft is pinned by ABSENCE,
never force-tracked here, appended from the live fleet at runtime.
- PaperMC Fill v3 release source: the v2 API (api.papermc.io) was retired
2026-07-01 and returns HTTP 410, so this targets fill.papermc.io/v3, sends the
required non-generic User-Agent, and returns the newest STABLE version, filtering
the -SNAPSHOT/rc prereleases the plan would otherwise suppress. Its test fixture
is captured from the live v3 response shape (2026-07-04).
- RoutingSource: the single ReleaseSource updates.Run requires, dispatching
velocity to PaperMC and returning errGitHubNotWired for the GitHub-backed
components so they degrade to "latest unknown" honestly, never a fabricated one.
- Runner: gather current versions (seam) -> assemble Components -> updates.Run ->
Report; report-only when notifier and applier are nil.
Verification boundary: the parse/plan/compose logic is unit-tested (httptest +
fakes, fixture grounded in the live v3 shape). Live network/TLS/User-Agent
enforcement, the GitHub Releases source, the concrete version gatherer, the
notifier and applier, and the felis update CLI/CronJob remain integration work,
enumerated in doc.go.
Added by the tooling in commit 0c1cc59, not authored guidance. Untrack and gitignore it: the file claims precedence over CLAUDE.md and tells agents to run go fmt, which rewrites the CRLF working tree. The file stays on disk (git rm --cached) so local tooling keeps it, but it is no longer tracked or committed.
The passwordless migration left ResetMailer (SendPasswordReset) and its API field with zero callers and no wiring; the web console authenticates via email-OTP and passkey only. Remove both, plus the now-orphaned context import that the interface was the last user of in handlers_users.go.
Reconcile the DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser docs in repo.go and pgrepo.go: they claimed there was no production caller, but 2f22027 wired the owner-tier DELETE /users/{id}/passkeys. Both now note that a complete authenticator remediation pairs the unbind with a session revoke (unbinding alone leaves the live hijacked session; revoking alone leaves a re-enrollable credential), and the OpenAPI operation carries the same guidance in a new description. Reword the stale local-password test-fake header, since the passwordless fakes carry no must_change_password field.
No behavior change. gofmt, build, and the full test tree are green; OpenAPI parity and passkey-unbind tests pass; a grep confirms ResetMailer/SendPasswordReset are gone from the Go tree.
Add DELETE /api/v1/users/{id}/passkeys (owner-only) to unbind every passkey a
target account holds — the authenticator remediation that stops a passkey planted
or retained via a transiently-hijacked session from surviving as a standing login
foothold. It wires the previously-uncalled DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser and
is deliberately not a lockout: the account re-enters via the email-OTP door
(players) or op-login's in-game approval (staff), then re-enrolls. Documented in
the OpenAPI, so the served/documented parity gate covers it.
Remove RevokeUserSessionsExcept: a change-password-era orphan with no callers
since the passwordless migration. Its keep-one ("log out my other devices")
semantics is inherently self-service, and no such slice is on the roadmap; the
admin remediation path already uses RevokeAllUserSessions.
The passwordless migration (b330d77) removed the password-login route, leaving
concurrencyLimiter — its bcrypt concurrency cap — with no caller, and scattered
stale "local-password" / "change-password" references through the surviving auth
code's comments.
- Remove the dead concurrencyLimiter (type + newConcurrencyLimiter + acquire):
no caller, no struct field, no test. Reword the one streamLimiter doc that
contrasted against it.
- Realign comments in repo.go, pgrepo.go, session.go, util.go to the passwordless
reality: staff lookups feed email-OTP / passkey / setup redeem, not a password
compare; RevokeUserSessionsExcept and DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser are
retained (uncalled) for the P5 account-remediation path (#78); "local sessions"
no longer implies a password.
Comments and dead code only; no behavior change. Full WSL test tree green.
Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
demo-up.sh collapses bootstrap -> build+import the limbo/lobby images -> wire [velocity] login_image/lobby_image into felis.host.toml -> felis setup into a single command, ending in the interactive Owner-creation TUI (the only step it cannot automate). Prefers prebuilt tars under deploy/images, else builds on the host, auto-resolving the LOOHP/Limbo CI jar and the latest stable Paper jar (all overridable by env); SKIP_BOOTSTRAP/SKIP_SETUP toggles for reruns.
The lobby image had never been built and two defects blocked it: the felis image .dockerignore excluded plugins/* and only re-included limbo/shared, so the lobby Dockerfile's COPY plugins/paper landed empty; and the plugin stage used eclipse-temurin:21-jdk, which ships no gradle (and the tree vendors no wrapper), failing with 'gradle: not found'. Re-include plugins/paper and build the paper plugin on gradle:8.14-jdk21, matching the limbo image. Verified: both images build and boot (limbo /healthz 200 on 25565; lobby reaches 'Done' with felis-paper enabled).
deploy/limbo assembles LOOHP/Limbo from its loose CI artifacts plus the felis-limbo plugin (and the shared link core), with an entrypoint that pins server-port to the operator's GamePort (25565) on every start. deploy/lobby carries the Paper + felis-paper hub image. .dockerignore re-includes plugins/limbo and plugins/shared so the plugin image build sees them.
The login limbo now performs the onboarding inside Limbo: on join it checks the collision blacklist, mints a bind code, opens a book linking the player to console.<root_domain> (guiding them to the system browser), polls link-status, and transfers to the lobby via BungeeCord Connect — fail-closed on blacklist, mint/transport error, or window elapse. FelisApiClient gains linkStatus/isBlacklisted on the existing internal transport.
WebAuthn is unusable inside the WeChat/QQ in-app WebViews, so a document navigation carrying those UAs is served a bilingual 'open in your system browser' interstitial instead of the passkey-centric SPA. API/config/health/asset requests pass through, and an ack cookie (ua_ack) lets a determined user or false-positive continue. Backend-only; the SPA is untouched.
setup builds the always-on, reaper-exempt login/lobby MinecraftServers (create-if-absent), bakes the login limbo's non-secret config (internal API URL, root domain, lobby name) into spec.env, and replicates the felis-service-token Secret from the control namespace into the minecraft namespace so the operator's namespace-local secretKeyRef on the login pod resolves.
InternalAPIBaseURL builds the felis-api internal-face DNS from SAAPI and the internal port for cross-namespace callers (the login limbo). The service-token Secret name/key now reference the shared naming constants so the Deployment wiring and the operator's login-pod injection cannot drift.
buildStatefulSet gates readiness on an HTTP probe when HealthHTTPPort is set (exposing it as a named container port). buildEnv injects FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN into the login server only — keyed off the reserved name so it can never leak into a user pod — sourced from a Secret via secretKeyRef, never inlined into the CRD.
StartupSpec.HealthHTTPPort/Path switch pod readiness from plain-TCP to an HTTP GET for RCON-less loaders (LOOHP/Limbo) that report 'started' only after the first tick. User servers now default FallbackServer to the login gate, never the lobby, so a stopped/starting backend keeps authentication in front of a fresh connection.
SystemLoginServer/SystemLobbyServer plus ValidateSystemServerName (format rule without the reservation check) let the platform provision the reserved login/lobby names users can never claim. ServiceTokenSecretName/Key are the one source of truth for the internal-API credential Secret, shared by the platform renderer and the operator's login-pod injection.
setup provisions the always-on login/lobby system services only when these image refs are set; empty means skip-and-say-so (the same fail-loud stance manifests takes), since no official LOOHP/Limbo image exists and a deployment must build its own.
handleChangePassword revoked other sessions but never cleared webauthn_credentials, and enrollment needs no step-up. A passkey planted through a transiently-hijacked session needs no password, so it survived the reset + session-revoke as a standing login foothold. Add DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser and call it in the change-password remediation so every passkey is unbound alongside the session revoke. Removing zero rows is a successful no-op. Email-OTP remains the fallback factor, so this never locks anyone out; the user re-enrolls a passkey afterward if they want one.
Enrollment set no AuthenticatorSelection, so user verification defaulted to preferred (not enforced), and the UV/backup flags the ceremony reported were discarded. Set UserVerification=required so a bound passkey always proves possession AND user (a UV-incapable device falls back to email-OTP), and capture user_verified/backup_eligible/backup_state through VerifiedCredential -> PasskeyCredential -> webauthn_credentials (migration 0009) so a future login path can enforce UV per credential. Adds a negative test proving a presence-only authenticator is rejected, and asserts the roundtrip records UV=true.
webauthn_credentials.user_id and webauthn_challenges.user_id referenced users(id) with the default ON DELETE NO ACTION, so a future user-delete would either fail or leave orphaned auth material. Recreate both FKs ON DELETE CASCADE: a bound passkey and a pending challenge are ephemeral and must not outlive the account. Scoped to the passkey tables only, not blanket, so retention-bearing child data (world_backups) is not swept away with an account.
The supersede DELETE in CreatePasskeyChallenge filtered consumed_at IS NULL, so it only reaped the prior LIVE challenge; the row that each finish stamps consumed_at on was left behind. A begin->finish loop therefore accumulated one dead row per cycle, unbounded. Drop the consumed_at clause so a fresh begin reaps ALL prior rows for (user, purpose), bounding the table at one row per (user, purpose) with zero net growth per cycle. Deleting an already-consumed row is safe: it has been redeemed and nothing reads it. The fake mirrors the widened supersede.
handlePasskeyRegisterFinish logged an empty target for account.passkey.registered, while the delete half logs the credential id. An operator auditing the log could see that a passkey was bound but not which one. Pass cred.ID as the audit target so bind and unbind are symmetric, and tighten the enrollment test to assert both halves name the credential id.
The MyServers query lists both a user's own servers and unclaimed (owner_id IS NULL) servers, but computed owned as s.owner_id = $1. For an ownerless row that comparison is SQL NULL, which fails to scan into the Go bool and 500s the whole listing. Wrap it in COALESCE(..., false) so an ownerless row reports owned=false while still surfacing as claimable.
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