Two defects from the live Sync drill:
- The picker listed the system servers (login/lobby), which the backup API can
never accept (reserved names, no servers row): the pick died in name
validation with a raw "server name is reserved" error. backupPickable now
filters them out; the halt picker keeps them on purpose (break-glass retains
full power over system servers).
- backupErrorFromResponse mapped every 409 to the stopped gate, so the new
world-volume refusal would have displayed the wrong reason. The 409 arm now
keys on the body's error code; a code-less body still reads as the stopped
gate.
Live (auditfix38): the picker shows only user servers; a world-less pick shows
the API's own "no world volume yet — start it once" text; the not_stopped text
is unchanged.
A server whose world PVC does not exist yet (never started) or no longer exists
(the world was already reaped) accepted the backup/restore POST, answered 202,
and the Job sat Pending on the missing claim until its deadline with nothing
recorded anywhere — a silent no-op from the operator's seat. The live drill on
the reaped `resolvecheck` world reproduced exactly that.
Both handlers now read the world PVC (Cluster.WorldVolumeExists, over the same
naming.WorldPVCName the Jobs mount) and answer a specific 409 no_world_volume
with "start it once to create it, then retry". The felis-api Role gains the
matching get-only PVC grant — the first live run surfaced the missing RBAC as a
403 behind a 500, so the fix ships with it.
Live (auditfix38): resolvecheck -> 409 no_world_volume on both faces; test-one
(which has a world) still backs up through the new gate end to end.
Two defects live-drilled in the break-glass staff provisioning:
- An Owner reset that typed any username other than the occupied seat took
UpsertOwner's insert arm and silently minted a SECOND owner row, leaving the
existing seat — possibly the compromised account the reset was meant to
replace — live; every owner row is undeletable through the panel, so the tier
could never converge back to one. provisionOwner now refuses with
ownerSeatTakenError naming the seat (recoverable: the TUI routes back to the
form); bootstrap still mints, and the seat's own username still resets in
place. PGRepo gains OwnerUsername for the guard.
- InsertOperator returned the raw driver error on a taken username while the
console keys its rename prompt off api.ErrConflict — the "choose another
name" leg died with SQLSTATE 23505 against real Postgres (the fake encoded
the contract; PGRepo had drifted). Map the unique violation to ErrConflict
and pin it in pgint.
Live (auditfix37): fresh username refused naming the seat; seat reset kept the
id/email with still exactly one owner; taken operator name returned to the form
with the retry note, and the retyped name succeeded (drill rows cleaned).
Two things in the same surface. --reaper-node is the supported multi-node
answer: the rendered CronJob's pod gets a kubernetes.io/hostname selector, so
it reads the hostPath on the node that actually holds the worlds instead of
possibly scheduling where it is empty (naming a node without
--worlds-host-path is fail-loud). And the render note still told operators to
grant uid-1000 traverse / setfacl after #35 moved every world executor to
root+DAC_OVERRIDE — it now states that fact instead of the obsolete ritual.
login/lobby carry reserved names, so every per-server route rejects them —
yet the cockpit offered claim/stop/wake and a console link on their rows,
each answering 400 bad_name. The fleet view now marks them (system:true,
shared naming.IsSystemServer) and the panel renders a plain label instead
of dead actions.
The backend could list/read/write a stopped server's world volume since the
file-editor slice, but the panel had no entry, so the one repair path for a
server that will not boot (a wrong line in server.properties) was API-only.
New /servers/:name/files page: breadcrumb browser, editor dialog with the
base64 []byte codec, binary files open read-only, the stopped gate is owned
up front (with a stop action) instead of letting every call 409, and a
doorway card on the console. i18n files namespace + wire-shape tests.
/me/submissions (and the admin queue) now attach build_status/build_error by
a read-only Builder.Get — until now a failed build was visible only on the
admin-tier /images/build routes, so the person who submitted the modpack
never learned the build died. A missing build row renders as "no outcome";
any other lookup failure surfaces instead of being swallowed. The panel's
My Submissions page renders the outcome in the expanded row, localised.
DELETE /users/{id}/passkeys shipped as the owner-tier remediation for a
lost or compromised authenticator, but nothing in the panel reached it.
Add the danger-zone action with a confirm dialog; the account keeps its
other doors (email OTP, in-game op-login re-enrollment), so this severs
a credential without locking anyone out. Wire-shape test pins the call.
The backups page could list and restore archives but not create one,
and nothing surfaced backup/restore Job outcomes — a failed 202 was
visible only through kubectl. Add a Back up now action (enabled only on
a stopped server, the backend's own gate; a raced 409 is surfaced in
its words) and a Recent operations card fed by GET /servers/{name}/jobs
that shows running/succeeded/failed with the Job's failure message,
re-reads on an interval while a Job is running, and persists across
reloads. Wire-shape tests pin both endpoints.
A live backup drill on test-one failed: 'tar walk: open
/world/world/level.dat: permission denied'. The world volume belongs to
the game image's own UID (root for every Paper image we ship), and Paper
saves level.dat mode 0600 — a fixed uid-1000 executor can neither read
it (backup/reaper archive) nor overwrite it (restore). The same identity
silently broke on-demand backups, restores, and the reaper for every
server that had saved once.
Run the backup Job, restore Job, file Job, and the reaper pod as root
with DAC_OVERRIDE on top of drop-ALL — the same owner-matching precedent
as the operator's forwarding-init container; DAC_OVERRIDE extends it to
game images whose UID is neither root nor ours. FSGroup is omitted when
zero so a root executor never chgrps the world volume. Shape tests
updated for the new identity.
UserByMCUUID now resolves only live accounts: claim, menu, wake
authorization, op-login vouch and the QR link-status poll treat a
disabled or soft-deleted link holder exactly like an unlinked UUID
instead of a retired identity. VerifyLinkCode lets a soft-deleted
link be taken over by a fresh in-game code (the deleted account is
gone, e.g. a migrated source), while a disabled holder still 409s so
the lockout is not bypassable; failed attempts still do not consume
the code. Fake repo and pgint coverage pin both branches.
'smtpSecretManifest' hardcoded namespace=felis, so the 'configure email'
refresh of the minecraft-namespace copies failed before it began: kubectl
refuses a manifest whose namespace conflicts with -n (found live: 'the
namespace from the provided object "felis" does not match the namespace
"minecraft"'), and the felis-config mirror never ran at all because the
smtp apply returned early. A later SMTP change could therefore never reach
the reaper's pre-reap warnings — the exact failure the refresh was added to
close.
Render the Secret with the caller's namespace (felis for the control-plane
apply, the workload namespace for the mirror). Regression test pins both.
Records the Access-policy upsert fix and the first end-to-end runs of
account/migrate (all four steps + negative matrix + retire assertions),
passkey credential management, the access player-management group, the
updates window, and fleet — plus the environment restore notes.
The comment described a deterministic-name collision that the unique random
suffix made near-impossible; align it with Backuper.Backup and jobspec's
contract (ErrAlreadyExists survives only as the defensive no-op).
CreateAccessPolicy treated a Cloudflare "policy_already_exists" as idempotent
success and kept whatever policy was there. On a re-run with a changed
identity — or against a hand-made broader policy — op.console would stay
guarded by something weaker than the fail-closed body this package builds and
guards, while Setup reported success. The fail-closed validation only ever ran
on the policy we built, never on the one that stayed live.
Now it upserts by name: lookup, PUT the guarded body over the existing policy,
POST only when absent (a racing POST re-looks up and PUTs). apiPost/apiPut
share one apiWrite; three httptest cases pin update-over-existing, create-when-
absent, and the race fallback.
RCON-secret deletion lockup and the stale start anchor (with its permanent
Provisioned=False) get their full live evidence trail, plus the sts
accidental-deletion drill. Deployed image note bumped to auditfix24.
Found live while validating the RCON-secret heal: a server that had already
recovered to Ready was marked Failed(StartupTimeout) minutes later, the moment
an unrelated pod rollout briefly dropped readyReplicas. The anchor
(status.startRequestedAt) was never cleared on success, so its 300s budget
kept ticking under a healthy server and any later blip spent it.
markRunningReady now clears the anchor: every start-or-recovery attempt gets
its own budget. It also flips ConditionProvisioned back to True — markFailed
sets it False and nothing ever reset it, leaving a permanent failure flag on
recovered servers that every conditions consumer would read.
Unit tests pin both: anchor cleared on Ready, Provisioned recovers from
Failed to Running.
Deleting the per-server RCON Secret used to leave a running pod authenticating
with the lost password while the operator re-minted a fresh one and probed
with it: the RCON gate failed forever (live: 96s+ of RconNotReachable, headed
for ReadinessTimeout) and nothing re-triggered a pod restart — the server only
came back when the pod was deleted by hand.
Two changes pair up:
- Owns(&corev1.Secret{}) so the deletion is noticed at all (a quiet Running
server emits no other events; the Secret is controller-owned, so the watch
maps it back to the CR).
- The pod template now carries a fingerprint of the current password
(RconSecretAnnotation). Re-creation changes the fingerprint, the
StatefulSet rolls, and the new pod picks the new password up; while the
Secret is untouched the value is stable so no spurious rolls.
Unit tests pin stability across reconciles and the change-on-recreation roll.
Records the three stacked defects (schema pruning, no wake-up, missing RBAC
grant) with the live evidence trail, and turns §11 from a 'it is implemented'
note into a three-step self-check for the field. Deployed image note bumped to
auditfix22.
Two stacked blockers behind the frozen auto-stop, both found live after the
first two fixes let the timer finally tick:
- The stop used a whole-object Update while the same reconcile loop writes
status; that risks clobbering a concurrent status write. Switch to the
reaper's merge-patch pattern (spec.desiredState only; EmptySince is left for
markStopped to clear).
- The operator Role never carried minecraftservers:patch, so the call failed
closed with 403 (visible in the operator log as 'cannot update resource
"minecraftservers"'). Grant patch and pin it in the RBAC scope test.
With all three layers fixed, the auto-stop path is: timer persists (schema),
wake-up fires (requeue), spec write allowed (RBAC).
EmptySince was stamped and then never revisited: player joins/leaves do not
touch the CRD, RCON is only probed inside Reconcile, and a steady Running
server produces no watch events (its status update goes out unchanged and is a
no-op). Live, an empty server with a 30s grace sat Running for minutes with
zero reconciles in the log — the auto-stop existed only on paper.
reconcileRunning now returns a RequeueAfter for idle-enabled servers: exactly
at the deadline while empty, or a 30s probe cadence while occupied so the
moment the last player leaves is noticed. New unit tests pin all three:
deadline requeue, occupied cadence, and no requeue when disabled.
The operator stamps EmptySince to time the idle auto-stop window, but the CRD's
status schema never declared it. Kubernetes pruned the field on every write
(apiserver warning: unknown field "status.emptySince"), so the timer reset to
nil on every read and idle auto-stop could never fire — a defect invisible to
the fake-client unit tests, which do not enforce the CRD schema. Found live:
the stamp was silently dropped the moment it was set.
Schema now declares emptySince (date-time) like its sibling timestamps.
The auditfix20 image (8e7c7bb) was exercised against a real SMTP sink with a
dedicated warntest server: delivery content, tier precedence, dedupe, retry
semantics (bad relay / unverified email / unowned), threshold boundaries, and
zero backup side effects. Ledger #24 records the defect and the evidence; the
deployed image note is bumped to auditfix20.
Lemon-miaow