Nothing ever removed a submission: users could not retract a pending row, no
route deleted blobs or rows, and the reaper never touches uploads — so every
upload accumulated on the 5 GiB PVC forever and the only cleanup was SQL or
kubectl against the store.
- Blobs.Delete on both transports (local: RemoveAll of the id-namespaced dir,
id re-validated at the boundary; S3: idempotent object DELETE).
- Store: DeleteSubmission (admin, any status) and DeletePendingSubmission
(owner+pending CAS — a reviewed row can never be withdrawn out from under
its build).
- Manager.Delete / Manager.Withdraw delete the ROW first (under the CAS for
withdraw) and the blob after, so a live row can never point at a reaped
blob; a cleanup failure names the orphan explicitly instead of failing mute.
- API: DELETE /me/submissions/{id} (withdraw, app tier) and
DELETE /api/v1/submissions/{id} (admin) both return the row as it was;
audit events submission.withdraw / submission.delete; openapi documents both
paths; admin route pinned in the admin-only table.
- Panel: two-step withdraw on a pending row (frees the pending slot and the
storage budget); two-step delete on every admin row; zh/en copy; wire tests.
Unit: submit (withdraw happy path / wrong owner / reviewed row / no transport /
blob-cleanup failure), local+S3 delete idempotence, api handlers (200/404/409/
503 + route tier); pgint: withdraw CAS + admin delete exactly-once.
go vet/go test/gofmt clean; panel vitest 120 + typecheck green.
A logged-in user could file submissions without bound and stream a 1 GiB
context per submission. The only limits were the single-blob size cap and the
5 GiB uploads PVC (platform/workloads.go); nothing counted a user's rows or
bytes, so one account could fill the volume and every other user's upload
would start failing.
- Create: per-user pending_review cap (default 5) — the review queue cannot
be parked full of one account's rows. Check-then-insert, documented soft.
- UploadContext: per-user stored-context budget (default 2 GiB) charged
against the blob store's REAL sizes (new Blobs.Size on local/S3 stores), so
the sum cannot drift from the volume; the write is capped at the remaining
budget, so the excess is refused before it is persisted, and a re-upload is
charged only for its new bytes.
- API: per-user create/upload throttles (30s/15s, cmd/felis-wired) on a
dedicated cooldown keyspace, reserve→release so a failed attempt never
burns the window and a burst collapses to one winner; ErrQuotaExceeded →
403 submission_quota_exceeded (distinct from the 400 an oversize blob
gets), 429 submission_cooldown for the throttles.
- Panel: zh/en copy for both codes; openapi documents 403/429 on the two
user routes; pgint covers the pending-queue count.
Unit tests: submit package (cap, budget boundary/exact-fit/replacement,
oversize-vs-quota split) and api handlers (quota 403 both paths, throttle
429 + recovery + failure-release). go vet/go test/gofmt clean; panel
vitest 118 + typecheck green.
login/lobby carry reserved names, so every per-server route rejects them —
yet the cockpit offered claim/stop/wake and a console link on their rows,
each answering 400 bad_name. The fleet view now marks them (system:true,
shared naming.IsSystemServer) and the panel renders a plain label instead
of dead actions.
/me/submissions (and the admin queue) now attach build_status/build_error by
a read-only Builder.Get — until now a failed build was visible only on the
admin-tier /images/build routes, so the person who submitted the modpack
never learned the build died. A missing build row renders as "no outcome";
any other lookup failure surfaces instead of being swallowed. The panel's
My Submissions page renders the outcome in the expanded row, localised.
A submitted modpack was durable but unreadable: the uploads PVC cannot cross
namespaces (felis-api mounts it; Kaniko runs in felis-build) and the s3 lane
handed the sandboxed build Pod no credentials, so NO user build could ever
consume its context. The transport is now the API itself:
- submit: derived context refs become the internal-face URL
/api/v1/internal/submissions/{id}/context (service-token gated), and Blobs
gains Open (local + s3) with an ErrBlobNotFound sentinel for the route's 404.
- api: serves that route on the internal face only (openapi.yaml updated; the
route-coverage test enforces it).
- build: an http(s) context renders a context-fetch initContainer (the felis
image's new fetch-context entrypoint) that streams the blob with the
namespace-local service-token Secret — never mounted into Kaniko — and
extracts it under a zip-slip guard into a size-limited emptyDir that Kaniko
reads read-only as --context=/context.
- platform/install: the api Deployment carries its own internal base URL; the
build namespace gets the token Secret through the existing replica mechanism
(bootstrap.sh + felis setup); the build egress lock opens exactly the control
namespace on the internal port.
- cmd/felis: fetch-context entrypoint (registered, documented, unit-tested for
escapes/symlinks/non-gzip).
Tests cover rendering, hardening, the s3/local Open paths, and the route's
404/503 mapping. Verified next on the real single-node cluster with Kaniko.
- [registry] gains kaniko_image / trivy_image / build_cpu_limit /
build_mem_limit overrides; empty keeps the compiled-in defaults. An
air-gapped or mirrored install has no route to gcr.io/aquasec (the
build egress policy allows only DNS + registry + package mirrors), so
builds previously could not even start their executors.
- deferred-seams: the uploads-context entry now records WHY a mount is
impossible (PVCs cannot cross namespaces) and that the s3 lane also
lacks credentials in the build Pod — options captured for the real fix.
- troubleshooting 8e (executor ImagePullBackOff + the overrides),
13b rewritten (verified eviction refusal, 5m pressure-transition,
image-GC recovery), 15 (upgrade/rollback runbook for Recreate).
- Backup semantics decided and documented: a backup is the whole /data
volume (worlds + config + plugins + cache) and a restore rolls all of
it back — OpenAPI/README wording updated to match (same-tag images are
still watched for regressions by the openapi parity gate).
Backup and restore only enqueue a cluster Job; a later failure left its
only trace in that Job object, invisible without kubectl. Add
GET /api/v1/servers/{name}/jobs (owner-or-admin) projecting the newest
20 managed Jobs (felis-backup / felis-restore) as
running|succeeded|failed with message and timestamps. Nil reader -> 503
jobs_unavailable, mirroring the backup/restore feature gates. RBAC gains
jobs:list; OpenAPI parity updated.
The hasJoined contract listed only 200 and 204 and named authlib as
the caller. The handler now answers four more ways, and a proxy
operator reading the contract could not tell a refused login from a
down source.
- 204 also covers a missing or oversized parameter (no source is
asked), a third-party name that is not a legal Minecraft username,
and an identity id that does not parse.
- 400 for a request that declares a body. There is no response body,
and the connection is closed.
- 500 when the bar-list lookup fails, with the usual error body.
- 503 when no source validated and at least one failed, since that
source's player may be the one logging in.
The three query parameters now carry the 64-byte cap. The profile name
says a third-party player holding a registered Mojang name gets it
back prefixed and cut to 16 characters. The description names
Velocity, drops the "thin login hook" that does not exist, and says
that a non-200, non-204 answer makes Velocity report the auth servers
as down.
Lemon-miaow
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