Configure connection and storage before creating or resuming the one-time Owner login. Remove Minecraft prerequisites from setup and preserve established login credentials.
Let staff preview and confirm roles from configured authentication sources using the existing account-link storage and game UUID mapping. Retain in-game code proof for players, add client-version and lobby guidance, and support NodePort passkey origins.
Nothing ever removed a submission: users could not retract a pending row, no
route deleted blobs or rows, and the reaper never touches uploads — so every
upload accumulated on the 5 GiB PVC forever and the only cleanup was SQL or
kubectl against the store.
- Blobs.Delete on both transports (local: RemoveAll of the id-namespaced dir,
id re-validated at the boundary; S3: idempotent object DELETE).
- Store: DeleteSubmission (admin, any status) and DeletePendingSubmission
(owner+pending CAS — a reviewed row can never be withdrawn out from under
its build).
- Manager.Delete / Manager.Withdraw delete the ROW first (under the CAS for
withdraw) and the blob after, so a live row can never point at a reaped
blob; a cleanup failure names the orphan explicitly instead of failing mute.
- API: DELETE /me/submissions/{id} (withdraw, app tier) and
DELETE /api/v1/submissions/{id} (admin) both return the row as it was;
audit events submission.withdraw / submission.delete; openapi documents both
paths; admin route pinned in the admin-only table.
- Panel: two-step withdraw on a pending row (frees the pending slot and the
storage budget); two-step delete on every admin row; zh/en copy; wire tests.
Unit: submit (withdraw happy path / wrong owner / reviewed row / no transport /
blob-cleanup failure), local+S3 delete idempotence, api handlers (200/404/409/
503 + route tier); pgint: withdraw CAS + admin delete exactly-once.
go vet/go test/gofmt clean; panel vitest 120 + typecheck green.
A logged-in user could file submissions without bound and stream a 1 GiB
context per submission. The only limits were the single-blob size cap and the
5 GiB uploads PVC (platform/workloads.go); nothing counted a user's rows or
bytes, so one account could fill the volume and every other user's upload
would start failing.
- Create: per-user pending_review cap (default 5) — the review queue cannot
be parked full of one account's rows. Check-then-insert, documented soft.
- UploadContext: per-user stored-context budget (default 2 GiB) charged
against the blob store's REAL sizes (new Blobs.Size on local/S3 stores), so
the sum cannot drift from the volume; the write is capped at the remaining
budget, so the excess is refused before it is persisted, and a re-upload is
charged only for its new bytes.
- API: per-user create/upload throttles (30s/15s, cmd/felis-wired) on a
dedicated cooldown keyspace, reserve→release so a failed attempt never
burns the window and a burst collapses to one winner; ErrQuotaExceeded →
403 submission_quota_exceeded (distinct from the 400 an oversize blob
gets), 429 submission_cooldown for the throttles.
- Panel: zh/en copy for both codes; openapi documents 403/429 on the two
user routes; pgint covers the pending-queue count.
Unit tests: submit package (cap, budget boundary/exact-fit/replacement,
oversize-vs-quota split) and api handlers (quota 403 both paths, throttle
429 + recovery + failure-release). go vet/go test/gofmt clean; panel
vitest 118 + typecheck green.
Two defects live-drilled in the break-glass staff provisioning:
- An Owner reset that typed any username other than the occupied seat took
UpsertOwner's insert arm and silently minted a SECOND owner row, leaving the
existing seat — possibly the compromised account the reset was meant to
replace — live; every owner row is undeletable through the panel, so the tier
could never converge back to one. provisionOwner now refuses with
ownerSeatTakenError naming the seat (recoverable: the TUI routes back to the
form); bootstrap still mints, and the seat's own username still resets in
place. PGRepo gains OwnerUsername for the guard.
- InsertOperator returned the raw driver error on a taken username while the
console keys its rename prompt off api.ErrConflict — the "choose another
name" leg died with SQLSTATE 23505 against real Postgres (the fake encoded
the contract; PGRepo had drifted). Map the unique violation to ErrConflict
and pin it in pgint.
Live (auditfix37): fresh username refused naming the seat; seat reset kept the
id/email with still exactly one owner; taken operator name returned to the form
with the retry note, and the retyped name succeeded (drill rows cleaned).
UserByMCUUID now resolves only live accounts: claim, menu, wake
authorization, op-login vouch and the QR link-status poll treat a
disabled or soft-deleted link holder exactly like an unlinked UUID
instead of a retired identity. VerifyLinkCode lets a soft-deleted
link be taken over by a fresh in-game code (the deleted account is
gone, e.g. a migrated source), while a disabled holder still 409s so
the lockout is not bypassable; failed attempts still do not consume
the code. Fake repo and pgint coverage pin both branches.
Two defects in the §9.3 quota path, both invisible to the hermetic suite:
- Audit #4's TOCTOU was real and documented: QuotaCheck and ClaimServer were
separate statements, so two concurrent claims by one user for two different
ownerless servers both read count < max_servers and both won. The gate now
lives inside ClaimServer, in the SAME transaction as the ownership write,
under pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(user_id)) — the aggregate read, the
four-dimension re-check (shared with QuotaCheck via one helper so the two
cannot drift), and the UPDATE are one serialized decision. The loser gets
ErrQuotaExceeded, which both claim handlers map to the same 403 the
sequential path gives; the server row is additionally taken FOR UPDATE so
same-server races still resolve to exactly one winner.
- The server PATCH path called UpdateServerResources(..., 0) for storage even
though a resources patch cannot change storage. The cached columns are the
ONLY input to the quota aggregate, so every resource patch silently dropped
that server's storage contribution from its owner's cap. The handler now
reads the current spec and passes storage through.
Red-then-green: the new pgint test drives two real concurrent claims against
max_servers=1 (before: both win; now: exactly one win + one gated 403, and the
DB shows one owned row); the hermetic suite pins the 403 mapping and the
storage-preserving cache write.
Found live while verifying the admin email-edit fix: the Owner account could
not load /api/v1/users at all. Root cause: migration 0011 adds the 'owner'
role and gates every user-administration route on it, but NOTHING ever wrote
it. break-glass (UpsertOwner), the setup MC-bind (CompleteOwnerSetup), and the
re-provision path all forced 'admin', so in a fresh install the entire
owner tier — list/create/edit/disable/delete users, quotas, sessions — was
unreachable. The role was a dead letter in the other direction too: staff
predicates that predate the role did not know it.
- UpsertOwner and CompleteOwnerSetup now write role='owner'; the username-
conflict arm re-asserts it, which is also the documented pre-0011 promotion
path ("re-provision via break-glass"). InsertOperator stays plain 'admin'.
- Staff doors learn the role: op-login start/finish admit the Owner; the
player email door refuses it like any staff account; the in-game approver
check already used staffRole.
- Reclaim protection: IsProtectedAdminLink (and the break-glass bootstrap
switch AdminExists) count admin OR owner — the Owner must never be displaced
by a Mojang-priority reclaim.
- Panel guards make migration 0011's claim true now that owner rows exist: an
owner can never be demoted, deleted, or disabled through the API (only the
local break-glass console resets the identity); username/email edits still
work.
Tests: pgint pins both provisioning paths, the protected-link predicate and
the reset/promote semantics; hermetic suites cover the owner-admitting staff
door, the owner-refusing player door, the three panel guards, and break-glass
attribution.
UpdateUser wrote a new address but kept email_verified, so patching a verified
account asserted a proof of an address nobody had proven — and the
pre-session login mails and resolves on exactly that flag, so a typo'd edit
could hand the account's sign-in codes to the wrong mailbox.
Changing the address now clears the flag in the same write; a no-op patch that
passes the same value keeps it. The fake mirrors the semantics, and the pgint
suite pins both halves (same value keeps proof, new value drops it).
The design has claimed since migration 0010 that at most one account can hold
a PROVEN email address, with ErrEmailTaken as the 409 a second verifier sees.
Neither half ever shipped: no migration created users_verified_email_unique,
and VerifyEmailOTP had no guard at all — the sentinel was defined but never
returned, so two accounts could both verify one address. The damage is not
cosmetic: the pre-session login resolves accounts BY verified email, so the
duplicate decided which identity a mailed sign-in code belonged to.
- Migration 0020 creates the partial unique index (lower(email) WHERE
email_verified) the comments have been citing — the database-level backstop.
- VerifyEmailOTP now refuses the take-over with ErrEmailTaken BEFORE consuming
the code (the address, not the code, is the problem), charges no attempt,
and maps a lost cross-user race (unique violation) to the same answer.
- The verify handler answers 409 email_taken instead of a generic 500.
Covered by the pgint suite (sequential double-verify refused with the code
still live, a direct duplicate write still loses to the index, the refused
account can still prove its own address) and a hermetic 409 case.
The hermetic suites encode the store contracts against fakes; PGRepo drifted
behind them three times (attempt accounting, a missing JOIN, a missing FOR
UPDATE) while every unit test stayed green. This harness replays the real
embedded migrations onto a throwaway database — its name must contain "pgint"
or the harness refuses to run — and exercises the SQL directly: sessions, the
onboarding email-OTP lifecycle (supersede/expiry/lockout), the pre-session
login consume, the op-login state machine, link and bind-code redemption,
submissions, and builds with the image admission round trip.
Run it after touching SQL under internal/api/pgrepo.go, internal/submit, or
internal/build; CONTRIBUTING.md carries the one-liner.
Lemon-miaow