feat(api): 添加或删除 passkey、修改邮箱前须 5 分钟内用已有因子重新验证，变更后邮件通知账户，面板加确认对话框与修改邮箱入口

docs/openapi.yaml

@@ -157,6 +157,27 @@ components:
       content:
         application/json:
           schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+    Reauthed:
+      description: This session is reauthed until the returned time.
+      content:
+        application/json:
+          schema:
+            type: object
+            required: [ok, until]
+            properties:
+              ok: { type: boolean, const: true }
+              until: { type: string, format: date-time }
+    ReauthRequired:
+      description: >
+        reauth_required: this change adds, removes or moves a way into the account,
+        and the account has a passkey or a verified email, so the session must have
+        proven one of them within the last 5 minutes. Signing in by passkey, email
+        code, op-login or the setup token counts; a bind-code sign-in does not.
+        GET /api/v1/account/reauth lists the factors that can give the proof, then
+        retry the change.
+      content:
+        application/json:
+          schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
     MailUndeliverable:
       description: >
         The configured SMTP relay refused the message (code mail_undeliverable), so no
@@ -3977,7 +3998,8 @@ paths:
         Generates a one-time code bound to the authenticated principal and the
         supplied address, persists only its hash, and delivers it out of band. The
         code is never returned in the response. A re-request supersedes the prior
-        unconsumed code.
+        unconsumed code. Once the account has a passkey or a verified email, the
+        session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required).
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
@@ -4008,6 +4030,8 @@ paths:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ReauthRequired'
         '429':
           description: >-
             Resend requested before the cooldown elapsed (otp_resend_cooldown); or the
@@ -4030,7 +4054,9 @@ paths:
         success the user's email is written and email_verified is set true. When the
         new address replaces a different verified one, every other session of the
         caller is signed out: sign-in codes now go to the new address, so a session
-        opened through the old one ends. Too many
+        opened through the old one ends; the old address is mailed a notice with the
+        new one masked. A verified code also counts as a reauth for this session.
+        Too many
         incorrect attempts lock the code (429 otp_locked); 10 wrong codes in 24h,
         counted across every code, lock the account's email-code door until the
         window ends (429 otp_account_locked with Retry-After). An unknown, expired,
@@ -4082,7 +4108,9 @@ paths:
         Writes the supplied address to the authenticated principal's user row and
         clears email_verified (already false for a fresh Owner). The setup bootstrap
         has no SMTP, so the Owner cannot receive an emailed code; a later Settings/SMTP
-        flow proves control of the address via /account/email/verify.
+        flow proves control of the address via /account/email/verify. Clearing a
+        verified address strips a factor, so once the account has one the session
+        must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required).
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
@@ -4112,6 +4140,8 @@ paths:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ReauthRequired'
 
   /api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin:
     post:
@@ -4122,8 +4152,10 @@ paths:
         Mints a credential-creation challenge bound to the authenticated principal,
         stashes the server-side ceremony state under a short TTL, and returns the
         WebAuthn publicKey creation options for navigator.credentials.create(). The
-        challenge is never echoed by the client. Enrollment only — passkey login is a
+        challenge is never echoed by the client. Once the account has a passkey or a
-        deferred slice. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured on this instance.
+        verified email, the session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403
+        reauth_required). 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured on this
+        instance.
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
@@ -4137,6 +4169,8 @@ paths:
                 description: Opaque WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, passed verbatim to the browser.
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ReauthRequired'
         '503':
           description: Passkey subsystem is not configured.
           content:
@@ -4153,7 +4187,9 @@ paths:
         authenticator's attestation against the server-stashed ceremony state, and
         persists the public credential. A missing or expired ceremony is a 400; an
         attestation that fails verification is a 400; a credential already bound to any
-        account is a 409. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured.
+        account is a 409. The verified email is mailed a notice, and the ceremony
+        counts as a reauth for this session. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not
+        configured.
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
@@ -4231,7 +4267,9 @@ paths:
         silently no-ops as success. The account's only passkey cannot be removed while
         its email is unverified (409 last_passkey): it is then the account's only
         durable way in. Removing a passkey signs out every other session of the
-        caller, so a session opened with that passkey ends with it.
+        caller, so a session opened with that passkey ends with it, and mails the
+        verified email a notice. The session must have reauthed within 5 minutes
+        (403 reauth_required).
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
@@ -4246,6 +4284,8 @@ paths:
           description: Passkey unbound.
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ReauthRequired'
         '404':
           description: No such passkey for this caller.
           content:
@@ -4257,6 +4297,196 @@ paths:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
 
+  /api/v1/account/reauth:
+    get:
+      tags: [account]
+      operationId: reauthStatus
+      summary: Say whether a passkey or email change needs a reauth first, and how to give one.
+      description: >
+        needed is true when the account has a passkey or a verified email and this
+        session has not proven one within the last 5 minutes. until is when the
+        current proof stops counting. factors lists the ways this caller can
+        reauth, best first: passkey (an enrolled passkey), email (a player's
+        verified address), sign_in (an operator signs out and back in through
+        op-login or a passkey).
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Where the caller stands.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [needed, factors]
+                properties:
+                  needed: { type: boolean }
+                  until: { type: string, format: date-time }
+                  factors:
+                    type: array
+                    items: { type: string, enum: [passkey, email, sign_in] }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+
+  /api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/begin:
+    post:
+      tags: [account]
+      operationId: reauthPasskeyBegin
+      summary: Begin a passkey assertion that reauths this session.
+      description: >
+        Returns WebAuthn assertion request options over the caller's own passkeys,
+        bound to a fresh reauth-purpose challenge.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: WebAuthn assertion request options (PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions) for navigator.credentials.get.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { type: object, description: Opaque WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions. }
+        '400':
+          description: The caller has no enrolled passkey (no_passkey), or no browser session to mark (no_session).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '503':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ServiceUnavailable'
+
+  /api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish:
+    post:
+      tags: [account]
+      operationId: reauthPasskeyFinish
+      summary: Finish the passkey assertion and mark this session reauthed for 5 minutes.
+      description: >
+        Verifies the assertion against the reauth challenge with the login door's
+        clone check (a cloned authenticator is 400 passkey_login_invalid).
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [assertion]
+              properties:
+                assertion:
+                  type: object
+                  description: The navigator.credentials.get() PublicKeyCredential assertion.
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Reauthed'
+        '400':
+          description: Assertion invalid, challenge stale, or a cloned authenticator (passkey_login_invalid); no browser session (no_session).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '503':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/ServiceUnavailable'
+
+  /api/v1/account/reauth/email/start:
+    post:
+      tags: [account]
+      operationId: reauthEmailStart
+      summary: Mail a reauth code to the caller's verified address.
+      description: >
+        For players with a verified email. Operators reauth with a passkey or by
+        signing in again (403 staff_reauth).
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
+      responses:
+        '202':
+          description: Code minted and dispatched.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [sent, expires_at]
+                properties:
+                  sent: { type: boolean, const: true }
+                  expires_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
+        '400':
+          description: No browser session to mark (no_session).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          description: Operators cannot reauth by email (staff_reauth).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '409':
+          description: The account has no verified email (no_step_up_factor).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '429':
+          description: >-
+            Resend requested before the cooldown elapsed (otp_resend_cooldown); or the
+            account's daily wrong-code budget is spent (otp_account_locked, with
+            Retry-After); or the install-wide mail budget is spent
+            (mail_rate_limited, with Retry-After).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '502':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/MailUndeliverable'
+
+  /api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify:
+    post:
+      tags: [account]
+      operationId: reauthEmailVerify
+      summary: Redeem the reauth code and mark this session reauthed for 5 minutes.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [code]
+              properties:
+                code: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Reauthed'
+        '400':
+          description: Invalid or expired code (invalid_code), or no browser session (no_session).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          description: Operators cannot reauth by email (staff_reauth).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '409':
+          description: The account has no verified email (no_step_up_factor).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '429':
+          description: >-
+            Too many incorrect attempts on this code (otp_locked), or the account's
+            daily wrong-code budget is spent (otp_account_locked, with Retry-After).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
   /api/v1/account/sessions:
     get:
       tags: [account]

internal/api/account_notice.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/metrics"
+)
+
+// Account change notices tell the owner of an account, at the verified address,
+// that a way into it was just added, removed or moved: a passkey registered or
+// removed, the email replaced (that notice goes to the OLD address, which is the
+// one the owner still reads if someone else made the change). They carry the time
+// and the source address and say what to do if the change was not theirs.
+// Best effort, like the lock notice: the change already happened.
+
+// notifyAccountChange mails one notice to the given address.
+func (a *API) notifyAccountChange(r *http.Request, to, subject, body string) {
+	if to == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	sender, ok := a.Mailer.(noticeSender)
+	if !ok {
+		log.Printf("auth: no notice mailer; account change notice %q was not sent (request_id=%s)",
+			subject, requestIDFromContext(r.Context()))
+		return
+	}
+	if ok, _ := a.mailGate().take(mailGateKey); !ok {
+		metrics.MailTotal.WithLabelValues("notice", "throttled").Inc()
+		log.Printf("auth: mail budget spent; account change notice %q was not sent (request_id=%s)",
+			subject, requestIDFromContext(r.Context()))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := sender.SendNotice(r.Context(), to, subject, body); err != nil {
+		metrics.MailTotal.WithLabelValues("notice", "failed").Inc()
+		log.Printf("auth: account change notice failed (request_id=%s): %v", requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), err)
+		return
+	}
+	metrics.MailTotal.WithLabelValues("notice", "sent").Inc()
+}
+
+// verifiedEmail is where a notice about p's account goes: the address it proved,
+// or nothing.
+func verifiedEmail(p *Principal) string {
+	if !p.EmailVerified {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return p.Email
+}
+
+func (a *API) notifyPasskeyAdded(r *http.Request, p *Principal) {
+	subject, body := accountChangeNotice(
+		"已添加 Passkey", "passkey added",
+		"你的 Felis 账户刚刚添加了一个 Passkey。", "A passkey was just added to your Felis account.",
+		"删除这个 Passkey", "remove that passkey",
+		a.now(), a.noticeIP(r))
+	a.notifyAccountChange(r, verifiedEmail(p), subject, body)
+}
+
+func (a *API) notifyPasskeyRemoved(r *http.Request, p *Principal) {
+	subject, body := accountChangeNotice(
+		"已删除 Passkey", "passkey removed",
+		"你的 Felis 账户刚刚删除了一个 Passkey，其它设备上的登录已全部退出。",
+		"A passkey was just removed from your Felis account, and every other device was signed out.",
+		"检查剩下的 Passkey", "check the passkeys that remain",
+		a.now(), a.noticeIP(r))
+	a.notifyAccountChange(r, verifiedEmail(p), subject, body)
+}
+
+// notifyEmailChanged tells the previous verified address where the account's
+// mail now goes, masked so the notice does not hand the new address to whoever
+// reads the old mailbox.
+func (a *API) notifyEmailChanged(r *http.Request, oldEmail, newEmail string) {
+	masked := maskEmail(newEmail)
+	subject, body := accountChangeNotice(
+		"邮箱已更换", "email changed",
+		"你的 Felis 账户的邮箱刚刚更换为 "+masked+"，这个地址以后不会再收到登录验证码。",
+		"The email on your Felis account was just changed to "+masked+". This address will no longer receive sign-in codes.",
+		"把邮箱改回来", "change the email back",
+		a.now(), a.noticeIP(r))
+	a.notifyAccountChange(r, oldEmail, subject, body)
+}
+
+func (a *API) noticeIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	if ip := a.clientIP(r); ip.IsValid() {
+		return ip.String()
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// accountChangeNotice renders a bilingual notice. zhUndo/enUndo name the step
+// that reverses the change, for the "if this wasn't you" line.
+func accountChangeNotice(zhTitle, enTitle, zhWhat, enWhat, zhUndo, enUndo string, at time.Time, ip string) (subject, body string) {
+	when := at.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST")
+	zhIP, enIP := ip, ip
+	if ip == "" {
+		zhIP, enIP = "未知", "unknown"
+	}
+	subject = "Felis " + zhTitle + " · " + enTitle
+	body = fmt.Sprintf(`%s
+时间：%s
+来源 IP：%s
+如果不是你本人操作，请立即登录 Felis，在账户页%s并退出其它设备，然后联系服务器管理员。
+
+%s
+Time: %s
+From IP: %s
+If this wasn't you, sign in to Felis now, %s and sign out other devices on the Account page, then contact the server operator.
+`, zhWhat, when, zhIP, zhUndo, enWhat, when, enIP, enUndo)
+	return subject, body
+}
+
+// maskEmail keeps the first character of the local part and the domain:
+// [email protected] → a***@example.com.
+func maskEmail(email string) string {
+	at := strings.LastIndexByte(email, '@')
+	if at <= 0 {
+		return "***"
+	}
+	first := []rune(email[:at])[0]
+	return string(first) + "***" + email[at:]
+}

internal/api/api.go

@@ -560,6 +560,16 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/finish", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyRegisterFinish},
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyList},
 		{Method: "DELETE", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/{id}", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyDelete},
+		// Reauth (reauth.go): the fresh proof that passkey enrollment and removal and an
+		// email change require once the account has a factor. Status says whether one
+		// is needed and how to give it; the pairs below take a passkey assertion or an
+		// email code and mark the caller's session. SetupAllowed like the routes they
+		// unlock.
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/reauth", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleReauthStatus},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/begin", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleReauthPasskeyBegin},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleReauthPasskeyFinish},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/start", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleReauthEmailStart},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleReauthEmailVerify},
 		// The caller's own sessions (handlers_account_sessions.go): list every signed-in
 		// device and sign out one or all the others. App-tier and scoped to the caller
 		// inside the handler, like the passkey routes above.

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -75,10 +75,12 @@ type fakeRepo struct {
 	// failSessionUser / failGetSetting force those reads to fail with a generic
 	// (non-ErrNotFound) error, simulating a store outage for the 503 auth path.
 	failSessionUser error
-	// failTouchSession / failRevokeOthers force those session writes to fail.
+	// failTouchSession / failRevokeOthers / failMarkReauth force those session
+	// writes to fail.
 	failTouchSession error
 	failRevokeOthers error
-	failGetSetting  error
+	failMarkReauth   error
+	failGetSetting   error
 	// player email OTPs (spec §B2). Keyed by row id; the verify path scans for the
 	// newest live (user, purpose) just as the PG query does.
 	otps map[string]*fakeEmailOTP
@@ -220,6 +222,8 @@ type fakeSession struct {
 	userAgent string
 	clientIP  string
 	touches   int
+	// reauthAt is reauth_at: when the session last proved a factor; zero = never.
+	reauthAt time.Time
 }
 
 // fakeBackup mirrors a world_backups row: the client-facing view plus the
@@ -904,7 +908,16 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) CreateSession(_ context.Context, ns NewSession) error {
 	now := ns.ExpiresAt.Add(-sessionTTL)
 	f.sessions[ns.TokenHash] = &fakeSession{
 		userID: ns.UserID, expiresAt: ns.ExpiresAt, createdAt: now, lastSeen: now,
-		userAgent: ns.UserAgent, clientIP: ns.ClientIP,
+		userAgent: ns.UserAgent, clientIP: ns.ClientIP, reauthAt: ns.ReauthAt,
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+func (f *fakeRepo) MarkSessionReauth(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, at time.Time) error {
+	if f.failMarkReauth != nil {
+		return f.failMarkReauth
+	}
+	if s, ok := f.sessions[tokenHash]; ok && !s.revoked {
+		s.reauthAt = at
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -951,7 +964,7 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) SessionUser(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Tim
 	}
 	return &SessionedUser{
 		ID: u.ID, Username: u.Username, Email: u.Email, Role: u.Role,
-		EmailVerified: u.EmailVerified, LastSeenAt: s.lastSeenAt(now),
+		EmailVerified: u.EmailVerified, LastSeenAt: s.lastSeenAt(now), ReauthAt: s.reauthAt,
 	}, nil
 }
 func (f *fakeRepo) TouchSession(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) error {

internal/api/audit_test.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestAuditCannotBeSignedWithAnotherPersonsEmail(t *testing.T) {
 	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
 	repo.staff["owner"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Username: "owner", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "owner", EmailVerified: true}
 	repo.staff["mallory"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u2", Username: "mallory", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user", EmailVerified: true}
-	repo.sessions[hashCookie("tok")] = &fakeSession{userID: "u2", expiresAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).Add(time.Hour)}
+	repo.sessions[hashCookie("tok")] = &fakeSession{userID: "u2", expiresAt: frozenNow.Add(time.Hour), reauthAt: frozenNow}
 	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
 	api.External = SessionAuth{Repo: repo, RootDomain: testRoot, Now: api.now}
 	api.ClientIPHeader = "CF-Connecting-IP"

internal/api/auth.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
 )
@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ type Principal struct {
 	// passed Zero Trust at the edge, so the local-email-verification gate is not
 	// the right boundary for them.
 	ViaSession bool
+	// ReauthAt is when the holder of the session last proved a factor of the
+	// account; zero for a session that never did and for a JWT caller.
+	ReauthAt time.Time
 }
 
 // staffRole reports whether a stored user role carries staff standing: admin,

internal/api/handlers_account_migrate.go

@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
 package api
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
@@ -25,7 +23,9 @@ import (
 //	                                         email-OTP — advancing to 'confirmed'. Mere
 //	                                         session possession is never enough; a stolen
 //	                                         session cannot read the mailbox nor present the
-//	                                         authenticator.
+//	                                         authenticator, and cannot enroll one of its own
+//	                                         without a recent proof of an existing factor
+//	                                         (reauth.go).
 //	3. web      issue code + name target  → handleMigrateIssueCode: the source names the
 //	                                         target account by id and mints a one-time code
 //	                                         ('code_issued').
@@ -205,54 +205,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmOTPStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
 	}
 	// Per-recipient cooldown, namespaced apart from the other OTP doors so they never
 	// perturb each other's throttle.
-	if until, err := a.Repo.OTPLockedUntil(r.Context(), p.UserID, otpPurposeMigrate, a.now()); err != nil {
+	a.startStepUpOTP(w, r, p, otpPurposeMigrate, "migrate:confirm:", "account.migrate.confirm_otp_sent")
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	} else if !until.IsZero() {
-		writeOTPAccountLocked(w, r, until, a.now())
-		return
-	}
-	emailKey := "migrate:confirm:" + strings.ToLower(p.Email)
-	lim := a.otpLimiter()
-	emailAt, ok := lim.reserve(emailKey, otpResendCooldown)
-	if !ok {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_resend_cooldown",
-			"a code was sent recently; wait a moment before requesting another"))
-		return
-	}
-	committed := false
-	defer func() {
-		if !committed {
-			lim.release(emailKey, emailAt)
-		}
-	}()
-	code, err := newEmailOTP()
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	id, err := newOTPID()
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	expiresAt := a.now().Add(otpTTL)
-	if err := a.Repo.CreateEmailOTP(r.Context(), id, p.UserID, p.Email, otpCodeHash(code), otpPurposeMigrate, expiresAt); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := a.deliverOTP(r.Context(), p.Email, code); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	committed = true
-	a.audit(r, "account.migrate.confirm_otp_sent", "")
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"sent": true, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC()})
-}
-
-// migrateConfirmOTPVerifyRequest is the OTP step-up verify body: the code from the email.
-type migrateConfirmOTPVerifyRequest struct {
-	Code string `json:"code"`
 }
 
 // handleMigrateConfirmOTPVerify redeems the migration step-up code and, on a match,
@@ -260,7 +213,7 @@ type migrateConfirmOTPVerifyRequest struct {
 // is the login-door one (no identity side-effect): the address is already proven.
 func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
-	var req migrateConfirmOTPVerifyRequest
+	var req stepUpOTPVerifyRequest
 	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
@@ -273,25 +226,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	if _, ok := a.requireInitiatedMigration(w, r, p.UserID); !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	var lock *OTPAccountLockedError
+	if !a.verifyStepUpOTP(w, r, p, otpPurposeMigrate, "migrate_confirm", code) {
-	err := a.Repo.ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(r.Context(), p.UserID, otpPurposeMigrate, otpCodeHash(code), a.now())
-	if isOTPRefusal(err) {
-		a.authFailure(r, "migrate_confirm", otpFailureReason(err), nil)
-	}
-	switch {
-	case errors.As(err, &lock):
-		a.noteOTPLock(r, err, p.UserID, otpPurposeMigrate)
-		writeOTPAccountLocked(w, r, lock.Until, a.now())
-		return
-	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPLocked):
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_locked",
-			"too many incorrect attempts; request a new code"))
-		return
-	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPInvalid):
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired"))
-		return
-	case err != nil:
-		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
 	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "email_otp", a.now()); err != nil {
@@ -307,17 +242,6 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"confirmed": true})
 }
 
-// migratePasskeyUser builds the PasskeyUser the assertion ceremony needs for the
-// already-logged-in source (contrast the login door, which resolves it from a typed
-// email). The credential set must be identical between begin and finish.
-func migratePasskeyUser(p *Principal, creds []PasskeyCredential) PasskeyUser {
-	name := p.Email
-	if name == "" {
-		name = p.UserID
-	}
-	return PasskeyUser{ID: p.UserID, Name: name, DisplayName: name, Credentials: creds}
-}
-
 // handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyBegin starts a fresh passkey assertion bound to the
 // migration step-up (spec §B3, external app face). Unlike the login door it needs no
 // email — the caller is already authenticated — so it scopes the challenge to the
@@ -331,39 +255,8 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyBegin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	if _, ok := a.requireInitiatedMigration(w, r, p.UserID); !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+	a.beginStepUpPasskey(w, r, p, passkeyPurposeMigrate,
-	if err != nil {
+		"no passkey enrolled; confirm the migration with an email code")
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if len(creds) == 0 {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "no_passkey",
-			"no passkey enrolled; confirm the migration with an email code"))
-		return
-	}
-	options, sessionData, err := a.Passkey.BeginLogin(migratePasskeyUser(p, creds))
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_failed",
-			"could not start passkey confirmation"))
-		return
-	}
-	id, err := newPasskeyID()
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	expiresAt := a.now().Add(passkeyChallengeTTL)
-	if err := a.Repo.CreatePasskeyChallenge(r.Context(), id, p.UserID, passkeyPurposeMigrate, sessionData, expiresAt); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, options)
-}
-
-// migrateConfirmPasskeyFinishRequest is the assertion the browser produced, captured
-// as raw bytes so the exact response reaches the verifier without re-encoding.
-type migrateConfirmPasskeyFinishRequest struct {
-	Assertion json.RawMessage `json:"assertion"`
 }
 
 // handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyFinish verifies the migration step-up assertion and, on
@@ -375,7 +268,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 		writeError(w, r, errPasskeyUnavailable)
 		return
 	}
-	var req migrateConfirmPasskeyFinishRequest
+	var req stepUpPasskeyFinishRequest
 	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
@@ -387,42 +280,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 	if _, ok := a.requireInitiatedMigration(w, r, p.UserID); !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	sessionData, err := a.Repo.ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(r.Context(), p.UserID, passkeyPurposeMigrate, a.now())
+	if !a.finishStepUpPasskey(w, r, p, passkeyPurposeMigrate, "migrate_passkey", req.Assertion) {
-	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid) {
-			a.authFailure(r, "migrate_passkey", "challenge_invalid", nil)
-			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
-				"passkey confirmation could not be completed; begin again"))
-			return
-		}
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	va, err := a.Passkey.FinishLogin(migratePasskeyUser(p, creds), sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion))
-	if err != nil {
-		a.authFailure(r, "migrate_passkey", "bad_assertion", nil)
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
-			"passkey confirmation could not be completed; begin again"))
-		return
-	}
-	// Same clone policy as the login door (applyAssertionCounter): a rolled-back counter
-	// fails closed with the opaque envelope and advances nothing, so the migrate step-up is
-	// never a weaker sibling that would accept an authenticator login refuses. A clean
-	// assertion advances the stored sign-count, keeping the clone signal meaningful for the
-	// next login.
-	if err := a.applyAssertionCounter(r.Context(), va); err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator) {
-			a.passkeyCloneRejected(r, "migrate_passkey", nil, va.CredentialID)
-			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
-				"passkey confirmation could not be completed; begin again"))
-			return
-		}
-		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
 	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "passkey", a.now()); err != nil {

internal/api/handlers_account_sessions_test.go

@@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ func newSessionsFixture(t *testing.T) *sessionsFixture {
 	api.External = SessionAuth{Repo: repo, RootDomain: testRoot, Now: api.now}
 	now := api.now()
 	for tok, s := range map[string]*fakeSession{
-		laptopTok: {userID: "u1", lastSeen: now.Add(-10 * time.Minute), userAgent: "Firefox on Linux", clientIP: "203.0.113.5"},
+		// The laptop signed in by a proving door a minute ago, so the guarded
+		// changes below run without a reauth (reauth_test.go covers the gate).
+		laptopTok: {userID: "u1", lastSeen: now.Add(-10 * time.Minute), userAgent: "Firefox on Linux", clientIP: "203.0.113.5", reauthAt: now.Add(-time.Minute)},
 		phoneTok:  {userID: "u1", lastSeen: now.Add(-2 * time.Hour), userAgent: "Safari on iPhone", clientIP: "198.51.100.7"},
 		alexTok:   {userID: "u2", lastSeen: now.Add(-time.Minute)},
 	} {

internal/api/handlers_auth_email.go

@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ func (a *API) handleLoginEmailVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID, provenSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_email_otp.go

@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ func (a *API) handleEmailOTPStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
 		return
 	}
+	// Gate the start: the verify only redeems a code minted here.
+	if !a.requireReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
 	// Atomically reserve the cooldown on both the caller and the recipient BEFORE
 	// minting, so a burst of truly concurrent starts yields exactly one winner. Here
 	// the throttle is the sole defense and each admitted send is a real, non-idempotent
@@ -249,10 +253,14 @@ func (a *API) handleEmailOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	a.audit(r, "account.email.verified", "")
+	// Proving the address is an email reauth.
+	a.markReauthQuietly(r)
 	// Replacing a verified address moves where sign-in codes go, so a session
-	// opened through the old one ends. A first verification retires nothing.
+	// opened through the old one ends, and the old mailbox hears about it. A
+	// first verification retires nothing.
 	if p.EmailVerified && !strings.EqualFold(p.Email, email) {
 		a.revokeOtherSessionsAfter(r, "email change")
+		a.notifyEmailChanged(r, p.Email, email)
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"verified": true, "email": email})
 }
@@ -320,6 +328,11 @@ func (a *API) handleSetEmail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
 		return
 	}
+	// Recording an address unverifies the current one, which would strip the
+	// account's email factor and with it the reauth that guards adding a passkey.
+	if !a.requireReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
 	if err := a.Repo.SetUserEmail(r.Context(), p.UserID, email); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return

internal/api/handlers_onboard.go

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ func (a *API) handleBindRedeem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, userID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, userID, bindCodeSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_op_login.go

@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ func (a *API) handleOpLoginFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "staff_account", "that account is not an operator"))
 		return
 	}
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID, provenSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_passkey.go

@@ -253,6 +253,10 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyRegisterBegin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		return
 	}
 	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	// Gate the begin: the finish only consumes the challenge minted here.
+	if !a.requireReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
 	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
@@ -356,6 +360,11 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyRegisterFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 		return
 	}
 	a.audit(r, "account.passkey.registered", cred.ID)
+	// The session just showed an authenticator now bound to the account, the
+	// same strength as a passkey reauth, so the next guarded step of a first-time
+	// setup (verifying an email) runs without asking again.
+	a.markReauthQuietly(r)
+	a.notifyPasskeyAdded(r, p)
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, passkeyView(cred))
 }
 
@@ -409,6 +418,9 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "credential id is required"))
 		return
 	}
+	if !a.requireReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
 	if err := a.Repo.DeletePasskeyCredential(r.Context(), p.UserID, id); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
 			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "no such passkey"))
@@ -424,6 +436,7 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 	a.audit(r, "account.passkey.removed", id)
 	a.revokeOtherSessionsAfter(r, "passkey removal")
+	a.notifyPasskeyRemoved(r, p)
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 }
 
@@ -654,7 +667,7 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID, provenSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_passkey_discoverable.go

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginDiscoverableFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *htt
 		return
 	}
 
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, resolved.ID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, resolved.ID, provenSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_setup.go

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func (a *API) handleSetupRedeem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	// Mint the session — a regular felis_session; the lockdown is a product-level
 	// restriction the frontend enforces until email is verified / a passkey is bound.
-	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID); err != nil {
+	if err := a.startSession(w, r, u.ID, provenSignIn); err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}

internal/api/handlers_setup_test.go

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ func TestSetEmailClearsVerified(t *testing.T) {
 	repo.staff["u"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Username: "u", Role: "admin", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true}
 
 	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
-	api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Role: "admin", ViaSession: true, EmailVerified: true}}
+	api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Role: "admin", ViaSession: true, EmailVerified: true, ReauthAt: frozenNow}}
 	h := api.ExternalHandler()
 
 	w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)

internal/api/pgrepo.go

@@ -1114,10 +1114,11 @@ func (p *PGRepo) InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string)
 // CreateSession records a minted session by the sha-256 of its cookie value
 // (spec §B). Only the hash is stored, mirroring tokens.
 func (p *PGRepo) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error {
+	reauth := sql.NullTime{Time: s.ReauthAt, Valid: !s.ReauthAt.IsZero()}
 	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, user_agent, client_ip)
+		`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, user_agent, client_ip, reauth_at)
-		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)`,
+		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
-		s.TokenHash, s.UserID, s.ExpiresAt, s.UserAgent, s.ClientIP)
+		s.TokenHash, s.UserID, s.ExpiresAt, s.UserAgent, s.ClientIP, reauth)
 	return err
 }
 
@@ -1136,17 +1137,21 @@ const sessionLive = `s.revoked_at IS NULL AND s.expires_at > $2
 // SessionUser resolves a live session hash to its user, or ErrNotFound.
 func (p *PGRepo) SessionUser(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (*SessionedUser, error) {
 	const q = `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text, COALESCE(u.email_verified, false),
-			s.last_seen_at
+			s.last_seen_at, s.reauth_at
 		FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
 		WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND ` + sessionLive
 	var u SessionedUser
+	var reauth sql.NullTime
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, tokenHash, now, now.Add(-staffSessionIdle)).Scan(
-		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified, &u.LastSeenAt); {
+		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified, &u.LastSeenAt, &reauth); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	case err != nil:
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	if reauth.Valid {
+		u.ReauthAt = reauth.Time
+	}
 	return &u, nil
 }
 
@@ -1158,6 +1163,14 @@ func (p *PGRepo) TouchSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Ti
 	return err
 }
 
+// MarkSessionReauth records a proven factor on a live session.
+func (p *PGRepo) MarkSessionReauth(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, at time.Time) error {
+	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE sessions SET reauth_at = $2 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
+		tokenHash, at)
+	return err
+}
+
 // RevokeSession marks a session revoked (logout). Idempotent: a missing or
 // already-revoked session is not an error.
 func (p *PGRepo) RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error {

internal/api/reauth.go

@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Reauth (step-up) guards the changes that plant or remove a lasting way into an
+// account: adding or removing a passkey and changing the email. Holding the
+// session is not enough for them once the account has a factor of its own; the
+// holder must have proven one within reauthWindow. Otherwise a stolen cookie
+// (XSS, a shared machine) could register the thief's passkey and keep the
+// account long after the session ends, and for staff that passkey would skip
+// op-login's in-game approval for good.
+//
+// What proves a factor, and so marks the session (sessions.reauth_at):
+//
+//   - signing in by passkey, by email code, through op-login or with the setup
+//     token (startSession with provenSignIn);
+//   - a passkey assertion or an email code on the reauth endpoints below;
+//   - verifying an email address by code (the address is proven that moment,
+//     and reaching that step already passed this gate when the account had a
+//     factor to protect).
+//
+// A bind-code sign-in proves only the in-game identity and marks nothing: whoever
+// controls the Minecraft account must still show the account's passkey or mailbox
+// before touching them.
+//
+// Staff reauth with a passkey or by signing in again through op-login. An email
+// code alone is not a staff factor, because signing in as staff by email also
+// takes in-game approval.
+
+const (
+	// reauthWindow is how long a proven factor lets the session make guarded
+	// changes. Long enough to finish a passkey ceremony or an email change.
+	reauthWindow = 5 * time.Minute
+
+	otpPurposeReauth     = "reauth"
+	passkeyPurposeReauth = "passkey_reauth"
+
+	reauthFactorPasskey = "passkey"
+	reauthFactorEmail   = "email"
+	// reauthFactorSignIn: sign out and back in through a proving door.
+	reauthFactorSignIn = "sign_in"
+)
+
+// reauthState is where the caller stands with the guarded changes.
+type reauthState struct {
+	// Needed: a guarded change would be refused until the caller reauths.
+	Needed bool `json:"needed"`
+	// Until is when the current proof stops counting; absent when there is none
+	// or the account has nothing to guard.
+	Until *time.Time `json:"until,omitempty"`
+	// Factors are the ways this caller can reauth, best first.
+	Factors []string `json:"factors"`
+}
+
+func (a *API) reauthState(r *http.Request, p *Principal) (reauthState, error) {
+	st := reauthState{Factors: []string{}}
+	if !p.ViaSession {
+		// A Cloudflare Access caller is authenticated by the proxy on every
+		// request and has no session here to mark.
+		return st, nil
+	}
+	hasPasskey, err := a.userHasPasskey(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return st, err
+	}
+	if hasPasskey {
+		st.Factors = append(st.Factors, reauthFactorPasskey)
+	}
+	if staffRole(p.Role) {
+		st.Factors = append(st.Factors, reauthFactorSignIn)
+	} else if p.EmailVerified {
+		st.Factors = append(st.Factors, reauthFactorEmail)
+	}
+	if !hasPasskey && !p.EmailVerified {
+		// Nothing to protect yet: the session is the account's only way in.
+		return st, nil
+	}
+	if until := p.ReauthAt.Add(reauthWindow); !p.ReauthAt.IsZero() && a.now().Before(until) {
+		until = until.UTC()
+		st.Until = &until
+		return st, nil
+	}
+	st.Needed = true
+	return st, nil
+}
+
+// requireReauth lets a guarded change through, or answers 403 reauth_required
+// and returns false.
+func (a *API) requireReauth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal) bool {
+	st, err := a.reauthState(r, p)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	if st.Needed {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "reauth_required",
+			"confirm it's you first: this change needs your passkey or email code from the last few minutes"))
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// markReauth records the proof on the caller's session and answers with the new
+// window.
+func (a *API) markReauth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal, factor string) {
+	now := a.now()
+	if err := a.Repo.MarkSessionReauth(r.Context(), currentSessionHash(r), now); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	a.audit(r, "account.reauth", factor)
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true, "until": now.Add(reauthWindow).UTC()})
+}
+
+// markReauthQuietly records a proof that happened as part of another change
+// (a passkey registration, an email verification). The change already went
+// through, so a failure here is logged and the next guarded change just asks.
+func (a *API) markReauthQuietly(r *http.Request) {
+	hash := currentSessionHash(r)
+	if hash == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.Repo.MarkSessionReauth(r.Context(), hash, a.now()); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("auth: could not record reauth on the session (request_id=%s): %v",
+			requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), err)
+	}
+}
+
+// handleReauthStatus reports whether a guarded change needs a reauth first and
+// which factors can provide it, so the panel can ask before starting one.
+func (a *API) handleReauthStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	st, err := a.reauthState(r, principalFromContext(r.Context()))
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, st)
+}
+
+// requireReauthSession refuses the reauth endpoints to a caller with no session
+// to mark.
+func requireReauthSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal) bool {
+	if !p.ViaSession || currentSessionHash(r) == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "no_session",
+			"only a signed-in browser session can confirm it's you"))
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func (a *API) handleReauthPasskeyBegin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	if a.Passkey == nil {
+		writeError(w, r, errPasskeyUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+	if !requireReauthSession(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
+	a.beginStepUpPasskey(w, r, p, passkeyPurposeReauth,
+		"no passkey enrolled; confirm with an email code instead")
+}
+
+func (a *API) handleReauthPasskeyFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	if a.Passkey == nil {
+		writeError(w, r, errPasskeyUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+	var req stepUpPasskeyFinishRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.Assertion) == 0 {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "assertion is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	if !requireReauthSession(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
+	if !a.finishStepUpPasskey(w, r, p, passkeyPurposeReauth, "reauth_passkey", req.Assertion) {
+		return
+	}
+	a.markReauth(w, r, p, reauthFactorPasskey)
+}
+
+// requireEmailReauth admits a player with a verified address to the email-code
+// reauth; staff confirm with a passkey or by signing in again.
+func requireEmailReauth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal) bool {
+	if staffRole(p.Role) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "staff_reauth",
+			"operators confirm with a passkey or by signing in again"))
+		return false
+	}
+	if !p.EmailVerified || p.Email == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "no_step_up_factor",
+			"there is no verified email on this account to send a code to"))
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func (a *API) handleReauthEmailStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	if !requireReauthSession(w, r, p) || !requireEmailReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
+	a.startStepUpOTP(w, r, p, otpPurposeReauth, "reauth:", "account.reauth.otp_sent")
+}
+
+func (a *API) handleReauthEmailVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	var req stepUpOTPVerifyRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	code := strings.TrimSpace(req.Code)
+	if code == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "code is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	if !requireReauthSession(w, r, p) || !requireEmailReauth(w, r, p) {
+		return
+	}
+	if !a.verifyStepUpOTP(w, r, p, otpPurposeReauth, "reauth_email", code) {
+		return
+	}
+	a.markReauth(w, r, p, reauthFactorEmail)
+}
+
+// ---- step-up ceremonies shared by reauth and the migration confirm ----
+
+// stepUpPasskeyFinishRequest is the assertion the browser produced, captured as
+// raw bytes so the exact response reaches the verifier without re-encoding.
+type stepUpPasskeyFinishRequest struct {
+	Assertion json.RawMessage `json:"assertion"`
+}
+
+// stepUpOTPVerifyRequest is the code from the step-up email.
+type stepUpOTPVerifyRequest struct {
+	Code string `json:"code"`
+}
+
+// stepUpPasskeyUser builds the PasskeyUser the assertion ceremony needs for the
+// already signed-in caller (contrast the login door, which resolves it from a
+// typed email). The credential set must be identical between begin and finish.
+func stepUpPasskeyUser(p *Principal, creds []PasskeyCredential) PasskeyUser {
+	name := p.Email
+	if name == "" {
+		name = p.UserID
+	}
+	return PasskeyUser{ID: p.UserID, Name: name, DisplayName: name, Credentials: creds}
+}
+
+// beginStepUpPasskey starts an assertion over the caller's own passkeys, its
+// challenge stashed under purpose, and writes the options (go-webauthn's
+// {"publicKey": {...}} document). The caller has checked a.Passkey.
+func (a *API) beginStepUpPasskey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal, purpose, noPasskey string) {
+	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if len(creds) == 0 {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "no_passkey", "%s", noPasskey))
+		return
+	}
+	options, sessionData, err := a.Passkey.BeginLogin(stepUpPasskeyUser(p, creds))
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_failed",
+			"could not start passkey confirmation"))
+		return
+	}
+	id, err := newPasskeyID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expiresAt := a.now().Add(passkeyChallengeTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreatePasskeyChallenge(r.Context(), id, p.UserID, purpose, sessionData, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, options)
+}
+
+// finishStepUpPasskey consumes the purpose's stashed challenge and verifies the
+// assertion against the caller's passkeys. It reports whether the caller passed;
+// on false the error is written. door names the failure in metrics and audit.
+// The caller has checked a.Passkey and that the assertion is present.
+func (a *API) finishStepUpPasskey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal, purpose, door string, assertion json.RawMessage) bool {
+	invalid := func() bool {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+			"passkey confirmation could not be completed; begin again"))
+		return false
+	}
+	sessionData, err := a.Repo.ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(r.Context(), p.UserID, purpose, a.now())
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid) {
+			a.authFailure(r, door, "challenge_invalid", nil)
+			return invalid()
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	va, err := a.Passkey.FinishLogin(stepUpPasskeyUser(p, creds), sessionData, bytes.NewReader(assertion))
+	if err != nil {
+		a.authFailure(r, door, "bad_assertion", nil)
+		return invalid()
+	}
+	// Same clone policy as the login door (applyAssertionCounter): a rolled-back
+	// counter fails closed with the opaque envelope, so a step-up never accepts an
+	// authenticator that login refuses. A clean assertion advances the stored
+	// sign-count, keeping the clone signal meaningful for the next login.
+	if err := a.applyAssertionCounter(r.Context(), va); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator) {
+			a.passkeyCloneRejected(r, door, nil, va.CredentialID)
+			return invalid()
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// startStepUpOTP mails a fresh code under purpose to the caller's (verified)
+// address and answers 202. keyPrefix namespaces the per-mailbox resend cooldown
+// so the step-up doors never perturb each other's throttle.
+func (a *API) startStepUpOTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal, purpose, keyPrefix, auditAction string) {
+	if until, err := a.Repo.OTPLockedUntil(r.Context(), p.UserID, purpose, a.now()); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	} else if !until.IsZero() {
+		writeOTPAccountLocked(w, r, until, a.now())
+		return
+	}
+	emailKey := keyPrefix + strings.ToLower(p.Email)
+	lim := a.otpLimiter()
+	emailAt, ok := lim.reserve(emailKey, otpResendCooldown)
+	if !ok {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_resend_cooldown",
+			"a code was sent recently; wait a moment before requesting another"))
+		return
+	}
+	committed := false
+	defer func() {
+		if !committed {
+			lim.release(emailKey, emailAt)
+		}
+	}()
+	code, err := newEmailOTP()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	id, err := newOTPID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expiresAt := a.now().Add(otpTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateEmailOTP(r.Context(), id, p.UserID, p.Email, otpCodeHash(code), purpose, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.deliverOTP(r.Context(), p.Email, code); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	committed = true
+	a.audit(r, auditAction, "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"sent": true, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC()})
+}
+
+// verifyStepUpOTP redeems a step-up code. The lifecycle is the login door's (no
+// identity side effect): the address is already proven. It reports whether the
+// code matched; on false the error is written.
+func (a *API) verifyStepUpOTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *Principal, purpose, door, code string) bool {
+	var lock *OTPAccountLockedError
+	err := a.Repo.ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(r.Context(), p.UserID, purpose, otpCodeHash(code), a.now())
+	if isOTPRefusal(err) {
+		a.authFailure(r, door, otpFailureReason(err), nil)
+	}
+	switch {
+	case errors.As(err, &lock):
+		a.noteOTPLock(r, err, p.UserID, purpose)
+		writeOTPAccountLocked(w, r, lock.Until, a.now())
+		return false
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPLocked):
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_locked",
+			"too many incorrect attempts; request a new code"))
+		return false
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPInvalid):
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired"))
+		return false
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}

internal/api/reauth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Reauth: once an account has a passkey or a verified email, adding or removing a
+// passkey and changing the email need a factor proven within reauthWindow. These
+// tests drive the real SessionAuth, so the proof is read from the session row the
+// cookie names, exactly as in production.
+
+const opTok = "tok-op"
+
+// reauthFixture is the sessions fixture (steve: a player with a verified email,
+// signed in on the laptop and the phone; alex: a player with no factor) plus a
+// passkey verifier and an operator, pam, with a verified email. Every session
+// starts with no proof on it.
+func reauthFixture(t *testing.T) *sessionsFixture {
+	t.Helper()
+	f := newSessionsFixture(t)
+	f.api.Passkey = &fakePasskeyVerifier{}
+	f.repo.staff["pam"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u3", Username: "pam", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true}
+	now := f.api.now()
+	f.repo.sessions[hashCookie(opTok)] = &fakeSession{userID: "u3", lastSeen: now, expiresAt: now.Add(time.Hour)}
+	for _, s := range f.repo.sessions {
+		s.reauthAt = time.Time{}
+	}
+	f.eh = f.api.ExternalHandler()
+	return f
+}
+
+func (f *sessionsFixture) reauthAt(tok string) time.Time {
+	return f.repo.sessions[hashCookie(tok)].reauthAt
+}
+
+func (f *sessionsFixture) setReauth(tok string, at time.Time) {
+	f.repo.sessions[hashCookie(tok)].reauthAt = at
+}
+
+func jsonCookie(tok string) map[string]string {
+	h := asCookie(tok)
+	h["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+	return h
+}
+
+func TestSigningInByEmailCodeCountsAsReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, mailer := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", `{"email":"[email protected]","code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verify = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	s := repo.sessions[hashCookie(sessionCookieValue(t, w))]
+	if !s.reauthAt.Equal(api.now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("reauth_at = %v, want the sign-in time %v", s.reauthAt, api.now())
+	}
+}
+
+// A bind code proves the Minecraft account, and nothing about the account's own
+// passkey or mailbox.
+func TestSigningInByBindCodeIsNoReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo := seedBindAPI(t)
+	mintBindCode(t, api, repo, "ABCD2345", bindTestUUID, authSourceMojang)
+	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/bind", `{"code":"ABCD2345"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("bind = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if s := repo.sessions[hashCookie(sessionCookieValue(t, w))]; !s.reauthAt.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("reauth_at = %v, want none after a bind-code sign-in", s.reauthAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// guardedChange is a request the gate covers, the status it gets once the gate
+// lets it through, and a check that it changed nothing when refused.
+type guardedChange struct {
+	name, method, path, body string
+	ok                       int
+	untouched                func(f *sessionsFixture) bool
+}
+
+var guardedChanges = []guardedChange{
+	{"add a passkey", "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", http.StatusOK,
+		func(f *sessionsFixture) bool { return len(f.repo.passkeyChallenges) == 0 }},
+	{"remove a passkey", "DELETE", "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/a", "", http.StatusNoContent,
+		func(f *sessionsFixture) bool { _, ok := f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"]; return ok }},
+	{"change the email", "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, http.StatusAccepted,
+		func(f *sessionsFixture) bool { return len(f.repo.otps) == 0 }},
+	{"record an unverified email", "POST", "/api/v1/account/email", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, http.StatusOK,
+		func(f *sessionsFixture) bool { return f.repo.staff["steve"].EmailVerified }},
+}
+
+func TestGuardedChangesNeedARecentReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		proof  time.Duration // how long ago the session proved a factor; -1 = never
+		wantOK bool
+	}{
+		{"never proved", -1, false},
+		{"proved 6 minutes ago", 6 * time.Minute, false},
+		{"proved exactly 5 minutes ago", 5 * time.Minute, false},
+		{"proved 4m59s ago", 5*time.Minute - time.Second, true},
+		{"proved just now", 0, true},
+	} {
+		for _, g := range guardedChanges {
+			t.Run(tc.name+"/"+g.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+				f := reauthFixture(t)
+				f.api.Mailer = &captureMailer{}
+				f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+				if tc.proof >= 0 {
+					f.setReauth(laptopTok, f.api.now().Add(-tc.proof))
+				}
+				w := do(f.eh, g.method, g.path, g.body, jsonCookie(laptopTok))
+				if tc.wantOK {
+					if w.Code != g.ok {
+						t.Fatalf("%s = %d (%s), want %d", g.name, w.Code, w.Body.String(), g.ok)
+					}
+					return
+				}
+				if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "reauth_required" {
+					t.Fatalf("%s = %d (%s), want 403 reauth_required", g.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+				}
+				if !g.untouched(f) {
+					t.Fatalf("%s went through despite the refusal", g.name)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// With no passkey and no verified email the session is the account's only way
+// in, so there is nothing a reauth could protect and nothing to give one with.
+func TestAccountWithoutAFactorNeedsNoReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.api.Mailer = &captureMailer{}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("register begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("email start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// An unverified address is no factor: it never received a code.
+func TestUnverifiedEmailIsNoFactor(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.repo.staff["alex"].Email = "[email protected]"
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("register begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A passkey alone is a factor worth guarding.
+func TestPasskeyAloneNeedsReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["x"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "x", UserID: "u2", CredentialID: "c-x", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(alexTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "reauth_required" {
+		t.Fatalf("register begin = %d (%s), want 403 reauth_required", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A Cloudflare Access caller is authenticated by the proxy on every request and
+// has no session to mark.
+func TestAccessCallerNeedsNoReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.staff["op"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Username: "op", Role: "admin", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true}
+	repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Passkey = &fakePasskeyVerifier{}
+	api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true}}
+	if w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", nil); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("register begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+type reauthStatusBody struct {
+	Needed  bool       `json:"needed"`
+	Until   *time.Time `json:"until"`
+	Factors []string   `json:"factors"`
+}
+
+func getReauthStatus(t *testing.T, f *sessionsFixture, tok string) reauthStatusBody {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := do(f.eh, "GET", "/api/v1/account/reauth", "", asCookie(tok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var b reauthStatusBody
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &b); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func TestReauthStatusNamesTheFactors(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["p"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "p", UserID: "u3", CredentialID: "c-p", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+
+	steve := getReauthStatus(t, f, laptopTok)
+	if !steve.Needed || steve.Until != nil || strings.Join(steve.Factors, ",") != "passkey,email" {
+		t.Fatalf("player status = %+v, want needed with passkey,email", steve)
+	}
+	// An operator's verified email is no factor: signing in as staff by email
+	// also takes in-game approval.
+	pam := getReauthStatus(t, f, opTok)
+	if !pam.Needed || strings.Join(pam.Factors, ",") != "passkey,sign_in" {
+		t.Fatalf("operator status = %+v, want needed with passkey,sign_in", pam)
+	}
+	alex := getReauthStatus(t, f, alexTok)
+	if alex.Needed || len(alex.Factors) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no-factor status = %+v, want not needed and no factors", alex)
+	}
+
+	proved := f.api.now().Add(-time.Minute)
+	f.setReauth(laptopTok, proved)
+	steve = getReauthStatus(t, f, laptopTok)
+	if steve.Needed || steve.Until == nil || !steve.Until.Equal(proved.Add(reauthWindow)) {
+		t.Fatalf("after a proof status = %+v, want not needed until %v", steve, proved.Add(reauthWindow))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReauthByEmailCode(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	f.api.Mailer = mailer
+
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/start", "", asCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if mailer.email != "[email protected]" || mailer.code == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("code went to %q (%q), want [email protected]", mailer.email, mailer.code)
+	}
+	wrong := "000000"
+	if mailer.code == wrong {
+		wrong = "111111"
+	}
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify", `{"code":"`+wrong+`"}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong code = %d (%s), want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(laptopTok).IsZero() {
+		t.Fatal("a wrong code marked the session")
+	}
+
+	w = do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify", `{"code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verify = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var body struct {
+		OK    bool      `json:"ok"`
+		Until time.Time `json:"until"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)
+	if !body.OK || !body.Until.Equal(f.api.now().Add(reauthWindow)) {
+		t.Fatalf("verify body = %s, want ok until now+5m", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(laptopTok).Equal(f.api.now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("laptop reauth_at = %v, want now", f.reauthAt(laptopTok))
+	}
+	// The proof belongs to the session that gave it.
+	if !f.reauthAt(phoneTok).IsZero() {
+		t.Fatal("the phone was marked by the laptop's code")
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("register begin after reauth = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var audited bool
+	for _, e := range f.repo.audits {
+		audited = audited || (e.Action == "account.reauth" && e.ServerName == "email")
+	}
+	if !audited {
+		t.Fatalf("no account.reauth audit naming the email factor: %+v", f.repo.audits)
+	}
+}
+
+// A code from another step-up (the email change, a migration) does not reauth.
+func TestReauthCodeIsItsOwnPurpose(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	f.api.Mailer = mailer
+	f.setReauth(laptopTok, f.api.now())
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("email start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify", `{"code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, jsonCookie(phoneTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("onboarding code on the reauth door = %d (%s), want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOperatorsCannotReauthByEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	f.api.Mailer = mailer
+	for _, path := range []string{"/api/v1/account/reauth/email/start", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify"} {
+		w := do(f.eh, "POST", path, `{"code":"123456"}`, jsonCookie(opTok))
+		if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "staff_reauth" {
+			t.Fatalf("%s = %d (%s), want 403 staff_reauth", path, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	if mailer.calls != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("a code was mailed to an operator")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReauthByEmailNeedsAVerifiedAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.api.Mailer = &captureMailer{}
+	f.repo.staff["alex"].Email = "[email protected]"
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/start", "", asCookie(alexTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusConflict || decodeErr(t, w) != "no_step_up_factor" {
+		t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s), want 409 no_step_up_factor", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReauthByPasskey(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	pv := f.api.Passkey.(*fakePasskeyVerifier)
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", SignCount: 4, CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	finish := func() int {
+		t.Helper()
+		if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/begin", "", asCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if len(pv.lastUser.Credentials) != 1 || pv.lastUser.Credentials[0].CredentialID != "c-a" {
+			t.Fatalf("assertion offered %+v, want the caller's own passkey", pv.lastUser.Credentials)
+		}
+		return do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish", `{"assertion":{"id":"c-a"}}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok)).Code
+	}
+
+	pv.failErr = errors.New("assertion rejected")
+	if code := finish(); code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("bad assertion = %d, want 400", code)
+	}
+	pv.failErr = nil
+	pv.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "c-a", SignCount: 2, CloneWarning: true}
+	if code := finish(); code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("cloned authenticator = %d, want 400", code)
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(laptopTok).IsZero() {
+		t.Fatal("a failed assertion marked the session")
+	}
+
+	pv.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "c-a", SignCount: 5}
+	if code := finish(); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("finish = %d, want 200", code)
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(laptopTok).Equal(f.api.now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("reauth_at = %v, want now", f.reauthAt(laptopTok))
+	}
+	if got := f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"].SignCount; got != 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("sign count = %d, want it advanced to 5", got)
+	}
+	// The challenge was spent: a replayed finish has nothing to consume.
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish", `{"assertion":{"id":"c-a"}}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("replayed finish = %d (%s), want 400 passkey_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// A migration's passkey challenge cannot be spent on a reauth, or the reverse.
+func TestReauthPasskeyChallengeIsItsOwnPurpose(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	pv := f.api.Passkey.(*fakePasskeyVerifier)
+	pv.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "c-a", SignCount: 5}
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	if err := f.repo.CreatePasskeyChallenge(t.Context(), "m1", "u1", passkeyPurposeMigrate, []byte("s"), f.api.now().Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish", `{"assertion":{"id":"c-a"}}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok))
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("finish on a migration challenge = %d (%s), want 400", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// Proving an address by code is an email reauth, so a first-time setup can go on
+// to its next guarded step.
+func TestVerifyingAnEmailCountsAsReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	f.api.Mailer = mailer
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, jsonCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verify = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(alexTok).Equal(f.api.now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("reauth_at = %v, want now", f.reauthAt(alexTok))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegisteringAPasskeyCountsAsReauth(t *testing.T) {
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	f.api.Passkey.(*fakePasskeyVerifier).credential = VerifiedCredential{CredentialID: "c-new", PublicKey: "pk"}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/finish", `{"attestation":{"id":"x"}}`, jsonCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("finish = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if !f.reauthAt(alexTok).Equal(f.api.now()) {
+		t.Fatalf("reauth_at = %v, want now", f.reauthAt(alexTok))
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- change notices ----
+
+func noticeFixture(t *testing.T) (*sessionsFixture, *noticeMailer) {
+	t.Helper()
+	f := reauthFixture(t)
+	mailer := &noticeMailer{}
+	f.api.Mailer = mailer
+	f.api.ClientIPHeader = "CF-Connecting-IP"
+	f.setReauth(laptopTok, f.api.now())
+	return f, mailer
+}
+
+func fromIP(h map[string]string) map[string]string {
+	h["CF-Connecting-IP"] = "203.0.113.9"
+	return h
+}
+
+func onlyNotice(t *testing.T, m *noticeMailer) (to, subject, body string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if len(m.notices) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("notices = %q, want exactly one", m.notices)
+	}
+	parts := strings.SplitN(m.notices[0], "|", 3)
+	return parts[0], parts[1], parts[2]
+}
+
+func TestRemovingAPasskeyMailsTheAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	f, mailer := noticeFixture(t)
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-a", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "DELETE", "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/a", "", fromIP(asCookie(laptopTok))); w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("delete = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	to, subject, body := onlyNotice(t, mailer)
+	if to != "[email protected]" || subject != "Felis 已删除 Passkey · passkey removed" {
+		t.Fatalf("notice to %q subject %q", to, subject)
+	}
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"A passkey was just removed from your Felis account, and every other device was signed out.",
+		"Time: 2023-11-14 22:13 UTC",
+		"From IP: 203.0.113.9",
+		"check the passkeys that remain",
+		"来源 IP：203.0.113.9",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(body, want) {
+			t.Errorf("notice body lacks %q:\n%s", want, body)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAddingAPasskeyMailsTheAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	f, mailer := noticeFixture(t)
+	f.api.Passkey.(*fakePasskeyVerifier).credential = VerifiedCredential{CredentialID: "c-new", PublicKey: "pk"}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", "", asCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("begin = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/finish", `{"attestation":{"id":"x"}}`, fromIP(jsonCookie(laptopTok))); w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("finish = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	to, subject, body := onlyNotice(t, mailer)
+	if to != "[email protected]" || subject != "Felis 已添加 Passkey · passkey added" ||
+		!strings.Contains(body, "A passkey was just added to your Felis account.") ||
+		!strings.Contains(body, "remove that passkey") {
+		t.Fatalf("notice to %q subject %q body:\n%s", to, subject, body)
+	}
+}
+
+// Replacing the address mails the OLD one, which is the mailbox the owner still
+// reads if someone else made the change. The new address is masked.
+func TestChangingTheEmailMailsTheOldAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	f, mailer := noticeFixture(t)
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonCookie(laptopTok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, fromIP(jsonCookie(laptopTok))); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verify = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	to, subject, body := onlyNotice(t, mailer)
+	if to != "[email protected]" || subject != "Felis 邮箱已更换 · email changed" {
+		t.Fatalf("notice to %q subject %q", to, subject)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(body, "The email on your Felis account was just changed to s***@new.example.") ||
+		!strings.Contains(body, "From IP: 203.0.113.9") {
+		t.Fatalf("notice body:\n%s", body)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(body, "[email protected]") {
+		t.Fatalf("notice hands the new address to the old mailbox:\n%s", body)
+	}
+}
+
+// A first verification and a re-verification of the same address move nothing.
+func TestVerifyingAFirstOrSameEmailMailsNoNotice(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, tok, address string
+	}{
+		{"first address", alexTok, "[email protected]"},
+		{"same address", laptopTok, "[email protected]"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			f, mailer := noticeFixture(t)
+			if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"`+tc.address+`"}`, jsonCookie(tc.tok)); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+				t.Fatalf("start = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if w := do(f.eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+mailer.code+`"}`, jsonCookie(tc.tok)); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("verify = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if len(mailer.notices) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("notices = %q, want none", mailer.notices)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// Nothing proves an unverified address belongs to the owner, so nothing is sent
+// there.
+func TestPasskeyNoticeSkipsAnUnverifiedAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	f, mailer := noticeFixture(t)
+	f.repo.staff["alex"].Email = "[email protected]"
+	// Two passkeys, so removing one is allowed without a verified email.
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["x"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "x", UserID: "u2", CredentialID: "c-x", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	f.repo.passkeyCreds["y"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "y", UserID: "u2", CredentialID: "c-y", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	f.setReauth(alexTok, f.api.now())
+	if w := do(f.eh, "DELETE", "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/x", "", asCookie(alexTok)); w.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("delete = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(mailer.notices) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("notices = %q, want none", mailer.notices)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMaskEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	for in, want := range map[string]string{
+		"[email protected]": "a***@example.com",
+		"李雷@example.cn":     "李***@example.cn",
+		"[email protected]":             "a***@b.c",
+		"broken":            "***",
+		"@nolocal.example":  "***",
+	} {
+		if got := maskEmail(in); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("maskEmail(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/api/repo.go

@@ -165,6 +165,9 @@ type SessionedUser struct {
 	// LastSeenAt is when the session last authenticated a request, as last
 	// recorded by TouchSession (so up to sessionTouchEvery stale).
 	LastSeenAt time.Time
+	// ReauthAt is when the holder last proved a factor of the account (see
+	// requireReauth); zero when the session never did.
+	ReauthAt time.Time
 }
 
 // NewSession is one session to record at sign-in: the sha-256 of the opaque
@@ -176,6 +179,9 @@ type NewSession struct {
 	ExpiresAt time.Time
 	UserAgent string
 	ClientIP  string
+	// ReauthAt is set when the sign-in itself proved a factor (passkey, email
+	// code, op-login, setup token); zero for a bind-code sign-in.
+	ReauthAt time.Time
 }
 
 // OpLoginRequest is one op.console staff-login attempt (spec §B op-login): the
@@ -596,6 +602,9 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// never moves last_seen_at backwards, and touching an absent session is not
 	// an error.
 	TouchSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) error
+	// MarkSessionReauth records that the holder of a live session proved a factor
+	// at the given time. Marking an absent or revoked session is not an error.
+	MarkSessionReauth(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, at time.Time) error
 	// RevokeSession marks a session revoked (logout). It is idempotent: revoking an
 	// absent or already-revoked session is not an error.
 	RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error

internal/api/session.go

@@ -66,24 +66,43 @@ func hashCookie(value string) string {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
 }
 
+// signInProof says whether the sign-in minting a session proved a factor of the
+// account. A proven sign-in counts as a fresh reauth, so the new session may add
+// a passkey or change the email straight away (requireReauth).
+type signInProof bool
+
+const (
+	// provenSignIn: a passkey, an email code, op-login or the setup token.
+	provenSignIn signInProof = true
+	// bindCodeSignIn: the in-game identity alone, which never unlocks the
+	// account's other factors.
+	bindCodeSignIn signInProof = false
+)
+
 // startSession mints a session for userID and sets its cookie. Every sign-in door
 // ends here, so every session records the device it was minted for.
-func (a *API) startSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID string) error {
+func (a *API) startSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID string, proof signInProof) error {
 	token, err := newSessionToken()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	expires := a.now().Add(sessionTTL)
+	now := a.now()
+	expires := now.Add(sessionTTL)
 	ip := ""
 	if addr := a.clientIP(r); addr.IsValid() {
 		ip = addr.String()
 	}
+	var reauth time.Time
+	if proof == provenSignIn {
+		reauth = now
+	}
 	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), NewSession{
 		TokenHash: hashCookie(token),
 		UserID:    userID,
 		ExpiresAt: expires,
 		UserAgent: truncateUTF8(r.UserAgent(), maxSessionUserAgent),
 		ClientIP:  ip,
+		ReauthAt:  reauth,
 	}); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -227,6 +246,7 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
 		ViaAdminAccess: staffRole(u.Role) && hostIsAdminConsole(r, s.RootDomain, s.AdminHostname),
 		EmailVerified:  u.EmailVerified,
 		ViaSession:     true,
+		ReauthAt:       u.ReauthAt,
 	}, nil
 }
 

internal/pgint/sessions_test.go

@@ -187,3 +187,59 @@ func TestRevokeOtherUserSessionsKeepsOne(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("revoke-others keeping nothing = %d, %v; want 1", n, err)
 	}
 }
+
+// reauth_at: a proven sign-in stores the proof, a bind-code sign-in stores
+// none, SessionUser reads it back, and a reauth marks only a live session.
+func TestSessionReauthProof(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	now := mustNow()
+	u := newUser(t, "user", "reauth")
+
+	unproven := newSession(t, u.ID, "unproven", now.Add(time.Hour))
+	su, err := repo.SessionUser(ctx, unproven, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SessionUser: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !su.ReauthAt.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("ReauthAt = %v on a session with no proof, want zero", su.ReauthAt)
+	}
+
+	proven := "proven-" + suffix(t)
+	signedIn := now.Add(-time.Minute)
+	if err := repo.CreateSession(ctx, api.NewSession{
+		TokenHash: proven, UserID: u.ID, ExpiresAt: now.Add(time.Hour), ReauthAt: signedIn,
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateSession: %v", err)
+	}
+	if su, err = repo.SessionUser(ctx, proven, now); err != nil || !sameMicro(su.ReauthAt, signedIn) {
+		t.Fatalf("SessionUser = %+v, %v; want ReauthAt %v", su, err, signedIn)
+	}
+
+	if err := repo.MarkSessionReauth(ctx, unproven, now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("MarkSessionReauth: %v", err)
+	}
+	if su, err = repo.SessionUser(ctx, unproven, now); err != nil || !sameMicro(su.ReauthAt, now) {
+		t.Fatalf("after a mark SessionUser = %+v, %v; want ReauthAt %v", su, err, now)
+	}
+	// The other session keeps its own proof.
+	if su, _ = repo.SessionUser(ctx, proven, now); !sameMicro(su.ReauthAt, signedIn) {
+		t.Fatalf("marking one session moved another's proof to %v", su.ReauthAt)
+	}
+
+	if err := repo.RevokeSession(ctx, proven); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.MarkSessionReauth(ctx, proven, now.Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marking a revoked session: %v", err)
+	}
+	var stored time.Time
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT reauth_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = $1`, proven).Scan(&stored); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !sameMicro(stored, signedIn) {
+		t.Fatalf("a revoked session's reauth_at moved to %v", stored)
+	}
+	if err := repo.MarkSessionReauth(ctx, "no-such-"+suffix(t), now); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marking an absent session: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/store/migrations/0028_session_reauth.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-- When the holder of a session last proved a factor the account already had: a
+-- passkey assertion, a code mailed to the verified address, or a sign-in through
+-- one of those (op-login and the setup token count too). Adding or removing a
+-- passkey and changing the email need that proof within the last few minutes,
+-- so a stolen cookie alone cannot plant a lasting way in. NULL means the session
+-- never proved one (a bind-code sign-in), which is what every existing row gets.
+ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN reauth_at timestamptz;

panel/dev/mockApi.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ interface MockAccount {
   updated_at?: string;
   quota?: QuotaView;
   sessions?: SessionView[];
+  // Until when this browser's session counts as re-authenticated (ms epoch),
+  // and the address an email-change code was last sent to.
+  reauthUntil?: number;
+  pendingEmail?: string;
 }
 
 interface MockServer extends ServerStatus {
@@ -568,6 +572,41 @@ function setSessionCookie(res: ServerResponse, accountID: string): void {
   res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${accountID}; Path=/; SameSite=Lax`);
 }
 
+// signInProven opens a session through a door that proved a factor (email code,
+// passkey, operator login), which like the real API counts as a re-auth.
+function signInProven(ctx: RequestContext, accountID: AccountID): void {
+  setSessionCookie(ctx.res, accountID);
+  const acc = ctx.state.accounts[accountID];
+  if (acc) acc.reauthUntil = Date.now() + REAUTH_MS;
+}
+
+const REAUTH_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+
+/** reauthFactors mirrors reauthState: a passkey, an email code to a verified
+ *  address (users) or a fresh sign-in (operators). None → nothing to re-prove. */
+function reauthFactors(state: MockState, acc: MockAccount): string[] {
+  const hasPasskey = (state.passkeys[acc.id] ?? []).length > 0;
+  if (!hasPasskey && !acc.emailVerified) return [];
+  const factors = hasPasskey ? ["passkey"] : [];
+  if (acc.role !== "user") factors.push("sign_in");
+  else if (acc.emailVerified) factors.push("email");
+  return factors;
+}
+
+/** refusedForReauth answers 403 reauth_required, as the real API does, for a
+ *  change to how the account signs in without a recent proof. */
+function refusedForReauth(ctx: SessionContext): boolean {
+  const acc = ctx.account;
+  if (reauthFactors(ctx.state, acc).length === 0 || (acc.reauthUntil ?? 0) > Date.now()) return false;
+  sendError(ctx.res, 403, "reauth_required", "confirm it's you first: this change needs your passkey or email code from the last few minutes");
+  return true;
+}
+
+function markReauth(ctx: SessionContext): void {
+  ctx.account.reauthUntil = Date.now() + REAUTH_MS;
+  sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { ok: true, until: new Date(ctx.account.reauthUntil).toISOString() });
+}
+
 function clearSessionCookie(res: ServerResponse): void {
   res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Max-Age=0; SameSite=Lax`);
 }
@@ -784,7 +823,7 @@ async function handlePublic(ctx: RequestContext): Promise<boolean> {
         return true;
       }
       opLogins.delete(body.request_id!);
-      setSessionCookie(ctx.res, "owner");
+      signInProven(ctx, "owner");
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { user_id: "mock-owner", role: "owner" });
       return true;
     }
@@ -828,7 +867,7 @@ async function handlePublic(ctx: RequestContext): Promise<boolean> {
         sendError(ctx.res, 400, "bad_request", "login_id and assertion are required");
         return true;
       }
-      setSessionCookie(ctx.res, "owner");
+      signInProven(ctx, "owner");
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, {
         user_id: "mock-owner",
         role: "owner"
@@ -857,7 +896,7 @@ async function handlePublic(ctx: RequestContext): Promise<boolean> {
         sendError(ctx.res, 400, "bad_request", "email and assertion are required");
         return true;
       }
-      setSessionCookie(ctx.res, "owner");
+      signInProven(ctx, "owner");
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, {
         user_id: "mock-owner",
         role: "owner"
@@ -879,7 +918,7 @@ async function handlePublic(ctx: RequestContext): Promise<boolean> {
         sendError(ctx.res, 400, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired");
         return true;
       }
-      setSessionCookie(ctx.res, "owner");
+      signInProven(ctx, "owner");
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, {
         user_id: "mock-owner",
         role: "owner"
@@ -993,6 +1032,8 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
         sendError(ctx.res, 400, "bad_request", "invalid email");
         return true;
       }
+      if (refusedForReauth(ctx)) return true;
+      ctx.account.pendingEmail = body.email.trim();
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 202, { sent: true, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString() });
       return true;
     }
@@ -1002,11 +1043,22 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
         sendError(ctx.res, 400, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired");
         return true;
       }
+      const next = ctx.account.pendingEmail ?? ctx.account.email;
+      // Like the real API: replacing a verified address signs the other devices
+      // out, and proving a code counts as a re-auth.
+      if (ctx.account.emailVerified && next.toLowerCase() !== ctx.account.email.toLowerCase()) {
+        const here = thisSessionHash(ctx.account);
+        ctx.account.sessions = accountSessions(ctx.account).filter((s) => s.token_hash === here);
+      }
+      ctx.account.email = next;
+      ctx.account.pendingEmail = undefined;
       ctx.account.emailVerified = true;
+      ctx.account.reauthUntil = Date.now() + REAUTH_MS;
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { verified: true, email: ctx.account.email });
       return true;
     }
     case "POST account/passkey/register/begin": {
+      if (refusedForReauth(ctx)) return true;
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, {
         challenge: "c29tZV9jaGFsbGVuZ2VfZGF0YQ",
         rp: { name: "Felis Dev" },
@@ -1034,6 +1086,7 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
         ctx.state.passkeys[ctx.account.id] = [];
       }
       ctx.state.passkeys[ctx.account.id].unshift(newCred);
+      ctx.account.reauthUntil = Date.now() + REAUTH_MS;
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 201, newCred);
       return true;
     }
@@ -1042,6 +1095,61 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { credentials: list });
       return true;
     }
+    case "GET account/reauth": {
+      const factors = reauthFactors(ctx.state, ctx.account);
+      const until = ctx.account.reauthUntil ?? 0;
+      if (factors.length === 0) sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { needed: false, factors });
+      else if (until > Date.now()) sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { needed: false, until: new Date(until).toISOString(), factors });
+      else sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { needed: true, factors });
+      return true;
+    }
+    case "POST account/reauth/passkey/begin": {
+      const list = ctx.state.passkeys[ctx.account.id] ?? [];
+      if (list.length === 0) {
+        sendError(ctx.res, 409, "no_passkey", "no passkey enrolled; confirm with an email code instead");
+        return true;
+      }
+      sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, {
+        publicKey: {
+          challenge: "c29tZV9yZWF1dGhfY2hhbGxlbmdl",
+          rpId: "dev.felis.localhost",
+          allowCredentials: list.map(() => ({ type: "public-key", id: "cGstMQ" })),
+          userVerification: "preferred",
+          timeout: 60000,
+        },
+      });
+      return true;
+    }
+    case "POST account/reauth/passkey/finish": {
+      const body = await readJSON<{ assertion?: unknown }>(ctx.req);
+      if (!body.assertion) {
+        sendError(ctx.res, 400, "bad_request", "assertion is required");
+        return true;
+      }
+      markReauth(ctx);
+      return true;
+    }
+    case "POST account/reauth/email/start": {
+      if (ctx.account.role !== "user") {
+        sendError(ctx.res, 403, "staff_reauth", "operators confirm with a passkey or by signing in again");
+        return true;
+      }
+      if (!ctx.account.emailVerified) {
+        sendError(ctx.res, 409, "no_step_up_factor", "no verified email to send a code to");
+        return true;
+      }
+      sendJSON(ctx.res, 202, { sent: true, expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString() });
+      return true;
+    }
+    case "POST account/reauth/email/verify": {
+      const body = await readJSON<{ code?: string }>(ctx.req);
+      if (body.code?.trim() !== MOCK_OTP_CODE) {
+        sendError(ctx.res, 400, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired");
+        return true;
+      }
+      markReauth(ctx);
+      return true;
+    }
     case "GET account/migrate":
       // No migration pending: the real API's answer until one is started in-game.
       sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { active: false });
@@ -1076,6 +1184,8 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
         return true;
       }
       if (ctx.method === "DELETE" && ctx.parts[2] === "account" && ctx.parts[3] === "passkey" && ctx.parts[4] === "credentials" && ctx.parts[5]) {
+        // The real API asks for the re-auth before it looks the passkey up.
+        if (refusedForReauth(ctx)) return true;
         const id = ctx.parts[5];
         const list = ctx.state.passkeys[ctx.account.id] ?? [];
         const idx = list.findIndex((k) => k.id === id);

panel/src/components/ReauthDialog.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState, type FormEvent } from "react";
+import { Fingerprint, Loader2, LogIn, Mail, ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
+import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
+import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
+import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
+import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label";
+import { InlineError } from "@/components/MessageLine";
+import {
+  Dialog,
+  DialogContent,
+  DialogDescription,
+  DialogFooter,
+  DialogHeader,
+  DialogTitle,
+} from "@/components/ui/dialog";
+import { api, clientError, humanizeError } from "@/lib/api";
+import { useAsync } from "@/lib/hooks";
+import { requestAssertion } from "@/lib/passkey";
+import { useTier } from "@/lib/tier";
+
+// A change to how the account signs in (a passkey added or removed, the email
+// changed) needs this session to have proven a factor in the last few minutes,
+// so a browser left signed in cannot quietly swap the account's ways in. The API
+// refuses such a change with 403 reauth_required; useReauth catches that, asks
+// for the proof in this dialog and runs the change again once it is given.
+
+export function isReauthRequired(e: unknown): boolean {
+  return (e as { code?: string } | null)?.code === "reauth_required";
+}
+
+/** isReauthCancelled: the confirmation was closed without a proof. Nothing
+ *  failed, so callers show no error for it. */
+export function isReauthCancelled(e: unknown): boolean {
+  return (e as { code?: string } | null)?.code === "reauth_cancelled";
+}
+
+export function useReauth() {
+  const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
+  const settle = useRef<((ok: boolean) => void) | null>(null);
+
+  const finish = useCallback((ok: boolean) => {
+    setOpen(false);
+    const resolve = settle.current;
+    settle.current = null;
+    resolve?.(ok);
+  }, []);
+
+  // confirm opens the dialog and resolves true once a factor is proven, false
+  // when it is closed without one.
+  const confirm = useCallback(() => {
+    settle.current?.(false);
+    setOpen(true);
+    return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
+      settle.current = resolve;
+    });
+  }, []);
+
+  // guard runs a change. Refused for want of a fresh proof, it asks for one and
+  // runs the change a second time; closing the dialog rejects with
+  // reauth_cancelled. A change that needs a user gesture of its own (a WebAuthn
+  // create) uses confirm and lets the user press its button again instead.
+  const guard = useCallback(
+    async <T,>(change: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> => {
+      try {
+        return await change();
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (!isReauthRequired(e)) throw e;
+        if (!(await confirm())) throw clientError("reauth_cancelled");
+        return change();
+      }
+    },
+    [confirm],
+  );
+
+  const dialog = <ReauthDialog open={open} onDone={() => finish(true)} onCancel={() => finish(false)} />;
+  return { guard, confirm, dialog };
+}
+
+function ReauthDialog({ open, onDone, onCancel }: { open: boolean; onDone: () => void; onCancel: () => void }) {
+  const { t } = useTranslation("account");
+  return (
+    <Dialog open={open} onOpenChange={(next) => !next && onCancel()}>
+      <DialogContent className="sm:max-w-md">
+        <DialogHeader>
+          <DialogTitle className="flex items-center gap-2">
+            <ShieldCheck className="h-5 w-5 text-primary" />
+            {t("reauth_title")}
+          </DialogTitle>
+          <DialogDescription>{t("reauth_desc")}</DialogDescription>
+        </DialogHeader>
+        {/* Mounted per opening, so every confirmation starts from a fresh status. */}
+        {open && <ReauthBody onDone={onDone} onCancel={onCancel} />}
+      </DialogContent>
+    </Dialog>
+  );
+}
+
+type Pending = "passkey" | "send" | "verify" | "sign_in";
+
+function ReauthBody({ onDone, onCancel }: { onDone: () => void; onCancel: () => void }) {
+  const { t } = useTranslation("account");
+  const { identity, refresh } = useTier();
+  const status = useAsync(() => api.reauthStatus(), []);
+  const [pending, setPending] = useState<Pending | null>(null);
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  const [codeSent, setCodeSent] = useState(false);
+  const [code, setCode] = useState("");
+
+  // Proven meanwhile (in another tab, say): there is nothing to ask.
+  const proven = status.data?.needed === false;
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (proven) onDone();
+  }, [proven, onDone]);
+
+  async function act(kind: Pending, fn: () => Promise<void>) {
+    if (pending) return;
+    setPending(kind);
+    setError(null);
+    try {
+      await fn();
+    } catch (e) {
+      setError(humanizeError(e));
+    } finally {
+      setPending(null);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const withPasskey = () =>
+    act("passkey", async () => {
+      const options = await api.reauthPasskeyBegin();
+      await api.reauthPasskeyFinish(await requestAssertion(options.publicKey));
+      onDone();
+    });
+
+  const sendCode = () =>
+    act("send", async () => {
+      await api.reauthEmailStart();
+      setCodeSent(true);
+      setCode("");
+    });
+
+  const verifyCode = (e: FormEvent) => {
+    e.preventDefault();
+    const trimmed = code.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) return;
+    void act("verify", async () => {
+      await api.reauthEmailVerify(trimmed);
+      onDone();
+    });
+  };
+
+  // A fresh sign-in counts as the proof. Signing out flips the session to
+  // signed-out and the route guard takes the browser to the sign-in page.
+  const signInAgain = () =>
+    act("sign_in", async () => {
+      await api.logout();
+      await refresh();
+    });
+
+  if (status.loading && !status.data) {
+    return (
+      <div className="flex items-center gap-2 py-6 text-sm text-muted-foreground">
+        <Loader2 className="h-4 w-4 animate-spin" />
+        {t("reauth_checking")}
+      </div>
+    );
+  }
+  if (status.error || !status.data || proven) {
+    return (
+      <>
+        <InlineError message={status.error ? humanizeError(status.error) : null} />
+        <DialogFooter>
+          <Button variant="outline" size="sm" onClick={onCancel}>
+            {t("common:cancel")}
+          </Button>
+          {status.error ? (
+            <Button size="sm" onClick={status.reload}>
+              {t("common:try_again")}
+            </Button>
+          ) : null}
+        </DialogFooter>
+      </>
+    );
+  }
+
+  const factors = status.data.factors;
+  const email = identity?.email ?? "";
+  const options: React.ReactNode[] = [];
+
+  if (factors.includes("passkey")) {
+    options.push(
+      <Button key="passkey" className="w-full" onClick={() => void withPasskey()} disabled={pending !== null}>
+        {pending === "passkey" ? <Loader2 className="animate-spin" /> : <Fingerprint />}
+        {pending === "passkey" ? t("reauth_passkey_waiting") : t("reauth_passkey_btn")}
+      </Button>,
+    );
+  }
+  if (factors.includes("email")) {
+    options.push(
+      codeSent ? (
+        <form key="email" onSubmit={verifyCode} className="space-y-2">
+          <Label htmlFor="reauth-code">{t("reauth_code_label", { email })}</Label>
+          <div className="flex gap-2">
+            <Input
+              id="reauth-code"
+              inputMode="numeric"
+              autoComplete="one-time-code"
+              placeholder={t("otp_code_placeholder")}
+              value={code}
+              onChange={(e) => setCode(e.target.value)}
+              disabled={pending !== null}
+              maxLength={6}
+              autoFocus
+              className="font-mono text-center tracking-[0.2em]"
+            />
+            <Button type="submit" disabled={pending !== null || code.trim().length !== 6} className="shrink-0">
+              {pending === "verify" && <Loader2 className="animate-spin" />}
+              {pending === "verify" ? t("reauth_confirming") : t("reauth_confirm_btn")}
+            </Button>
+          </div>
+          <Button
+            type="button"
+            variant="link"
+            size="sm"
+            onClick={() => void sendCode()}
+            disabled={pending !== null}
+            className="h-auto p-0 font-normal"
+          >
+            {pending === "send" ? t("sending_code") : t("reauth_resend")}
+          </Button>
+        </form>
+      ) : (
+        <Button
+          key="email"
+          variant="outline"
+          className="w-full"
+          onClick={() => void sendCode()}
+          disabled={pending !== null}
+        >
+          {pending === "send" ? <Loader2 className="animate-spin" /> : <Mail />}
+          <span className="truncate">{pending === "send" ? t("sending_code") : t("reauth_email_btn", { email })}</span>
+        </Button>
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+  if (factors.includes("sign_in")) {
+    options.push(
+      <div key="sign_in" className="space-y-2">
+        <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">{t("reauth_sign_in_desc")}</p>
+        <Button variant="outline" className="w-full" onClick={() => void signInAgain()} disabled={pending !== null}>
+          {pending === "sign_in" ? <Loader2 className="animate-spin" /> : <LogIn />}
+          {t("reauth_sign_in_btn")}
+        </Button>
+      </div>,
+    );
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <div className="space-y-3 py-2">
+        {options.length === 0 ? (
+          <InlineError message={t("errors:no_step_up_factor")} />
+        ) : (
+          options.flatMap((option, i) =>
+            i === 0
+              ? [option]
+              : [
+                  <div key={`or-${i}`} className="flex items-center gap-3 text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                    <span className="h-px flex-1 bg-border" />
+                    {t("reauth_or")}
+                    <span className="h-px flex-1 bg-border" />
+                  </div>,
+                  option,
+                ],
+          )
+        )}
+        <InlineError message={error} />
+      </div>
+      <DialogFooter>
+        <Button variant="ghost" size="sm" onClick={onCancel}>
+          {t("common:cancel")}
+        </Button>
+      </DialogFooter>
+    </>
+  );
+}

panel/src/i18n/resources/en-US/account.json

@@ -89,5 +89,20 @@
   "migration_redeem_placeholder": "Transfer code",
   "migration_redeeming": "Redeeming…",
   "migration_redeem_btn": "Redeem",
-  "migration_redeemed": "Migration complete — {{count}} server(s) moved to this account."
+  "migration_redeemed": "Migration complete — {{count}} server(s) moved to this account.",
+  "reauth_title": "Confirm it's you",
+  "reauth_desc": "Adding or removing a passkey and changing the email need a fresh check with a way in you already have. The check lasts 5 minutes.",
+  "reauth_checking": "Checking how you can confirm…",
+  "reauth_passkey_btn": "Use a passkey",
+  "reauth_passkey_waiting": "Waiting for your passkey…",
+  "reauth_or": "or",
+  "reauth_email_btn": "Email a code to {{email}}",
+  "reauth_code_label": "Code sent to {{email}}",
+  "reauth_confirm_btn": "Confirm",
+  "reauth_confirming": "Confirming…",
+  "reauth_resend": "Send another code",
+  "reauth_sign_in_desc": "Operator accounts can also sign out and sign in again. A fresh sign-in counts for 5 minutes.",
+  "reauth_sign_in_btn": "Sign out and sign in again",
+  "reauth_done_continue": "Confirmed. Press Continue to add the passkey.",
+  "email_change_desc": "Enter the new address and we'll send it a code. Once it's verified, sign-in codes go there, the old address gets a notice, and your other devices are signed out."
 }

panel/src/i18n/resources/en-US/errors.json

@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
   "passkey_login_failed": "Passkey verification failed — try again.",
   "passkey_login_invalid": "That Passkey sign-in request is invalid or expired — start it again.",
   "too_many_challenges": "Too many verification attempts right now — try again shortly.",
+  "reauth_required": "Confirm it's you first: this change needs your Passkey or an email code from the last few minutes.",
+  "staff_reauth": "Operator accounts confirm with a Passkey or by signing in again.",
+  "no_session": "This only works in a browser signed in to Felis.",
   "op_login_invalid": "This operator sign-in couldn't be completed — restart the sign-in.",
   "op_login_not_found": "No pending operator sign-in with that id.",
   "too_many_streams": "Too many live streams are open — close some pages and try again.",

panel/src/i18n/resources/zh-CN/account.json

@@ -88,5 +88,20 @@
   "migration_redeem_placeholder": "转移码",
   "migration_redeeming": "兑换中…",
   "migration_redeem_btn": "兑换",
-  "migration_redeemed": "迁移完成——已有 {{count}} 台服务器转移至本账户。"
+  "migration_redeemed": "迁移完成——已有 {{count}} 台服务器转移至本账户。",
+  "reauth_title": "确认是你本人",
+  "reauth_desc": "添加或删除 Passkey、修改邮箱前，需要用你已有的登录方式再验证一次，验证后 5 分钟内有效。",
+  "reauth_checking": "正在查看可用的验证方式…",
+  "reauth_passkey_btn": "用 Passkey 验证",
+  "reauth_passkey_waiting": "等待 Passkey…",
+  "reauth_or": "或",
+  "reauth_email_btn": "发送验证码到 {{email}}",
+  "reauth_code_label": "验证码已发送到 {{email}}",
+  "reauth_confirm_btn": "确认",
+  "reauth_confirming": "确认中…",
+  "reauth_resend": "重新发送验证码",
+  "reauth_sign_in_desc": "管理员账户也可以退出后重新登录，重新登录后 5 分钟内视为已验证。",
+  "reauth_sign_in_btn": "退出并重新登录",
+  "reauth_done_continue": "已确认。点“继续”添加 Passkey。",
+  "email_change_desc": "输入新邮箱，我们会向新地址发送验证码。验证通过后登录验证码改发到新邮箱，旧邮箱会收到通知，其它设备会退出登录。"
 }

panel/src/i18n/resources/zh-CN/errors.json

@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
   "passkey_login_failed": "Passkey 验证失败——请重试。",
   "passkey_login_invalid": "Passkey 登录请求无效或已过期——请重新发起。",
   "too_many_challenges": "验证请求过于频繁——请稍后再试。",
+  "reauth_required": "请先确认是你本人：这项更改需要你在几分钟内用 Passkey 或邮箱验证码验证过。",
+  "staff_reauth": "管理员账户须用 Passkey 或重新登录来确认身份。",
+  "no_session": "只能在已登录 Felis 的浏览器中进行此操作。",
   "op_login_invalid": "本次管理员登录未能完成——请重新发起登录。",
   "op_login_not_found": "找不到该管理员登录请求。",
   "too_many_streams": "同时打开的实时连接过多——请关闭一些页面后再试。",

panel/src/lib/api.test.ts

@@ -1015,4 +1015,16 @@ describe("copy for the generic server codes", () => {
     expect(err.status).toBe(0);
     expect(humanizeError(err)).toBe("The browser returned no passkey. Try again.");
   });
+
+  it("words the re-authentication refusals", () => {
+    expect(humanizeError({ status: 403, code: "reauth_required", message: "raw" })).toBe(
+      "Confirm it's you first: this change needs your Passkey or an email code from the last few minutes.",
+    );
+    expect(humanizeError({ status: 403, code: "staff_reauth", message: "raw" })).toBe(
+      "Operator accounts confirm with a Passkey or by signing in again.",
+    );
+    expect(humanizeError({ status: 400, code: "no_session", message: "raw" })).toBe(
+      "This only works in a browser signed in to Felis.",
+    );
+  });
 });

panel/src/lib/api.ts

@@ -590,6 +590,26 @@ export const api = rejectingSync({
   revokeMyOtherSessions: () =>
     request<{ revoked: number }>("POST", "/account/sessions/revoke-others"),
 
+  // Re-authentication. Adding or removing a passkey and changing the email are
+  // refused with 403 reauth_required unless this session proved a factor in the
+  // last few minutes. Status names the factors that can prove it: "passkey",
+  // "email" (a code to the verified address) or "sign_in" (operators sign in
+  // again). Like the migrate begin, the passkey begin returns the raw
+  // {"publicKey": {...}} document.
+  reauthStatus: () =>
+    request<{ needed: boolean; until?: string; factors: string[] }>("GET", "/account/reauth"),
+
+  reauthPasskeyBegin: () => request<any>("POST", "/account/reauth/passkey/begin"),
+
+  reauthPasskeyFinish: (assertion: any) =>
+    request<{ ok: boolean; until: string }>("POST", "/account/reauth/passkey/finish", { assertion }),
+
+  reauthEmailStart: () =>
+    request<{ sent: boolean; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/account/reauth/email/start"),
+
+  reauthEmailVerify: (code: string) =>
+    request<{ ok: boolean; until: string }>("POST", "/account/reauth/email/verify", { code }),
+
   // Account migration (spec §B3 inherit). Started in-game with /felis migrate; the
   // web side then drives: status → step-up confirm (passkey when enrolled, email-OTP
   // otherwise) → issue-code (source names the target account and reads the one-time
@@ -982,6 +1002,13 @@ export function humanizeError(e: unknown): string {
       return t("passkey_login_invalid");
     case "too_many_challenges":
       return t("too_many_challenges");
+    // Re-authentication before a change to how the account signs in.
+    case "reauth_required":
+      return t("reauth_required");
+    case "staff_reauth":
+      return t("staff_reauth");
+    case "no_session":
+      return t("no_session");
     // Operator-login approvals, live streams, and the remaining auth doors.
     case "op_login_invalid":
       return t("op_login_invalid");

panel/src/lib/openapi.gen.ts

@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Mint and deliver an email one-time code for the caller (web onboarding, spec §B2).
-         * @description Generates a one-time code bound to the authenticated principal and the supplied address, persists only its hash, and delivers it out of band. The code is never returned in the response. A re-request supersedes the prior unconsumed code.
+         * @description Generates a one-time code bound to the authenticated principal and the supplied address, persists only its hash, and delivers it out of band. The code is never returned in the response. A re-request supersedes the prior unconsumed code. Once the account has a passkey or a verified email, the session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required).
          */
         post: operations["emailOtpStart"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Redeem an email one-time code and mark the caller's email verified (spec §B2).
-         * @description Consumes a previously delivered code for the authenticated principal. On success the user's email is written and email_verified is set true. When the new address replaces a different verified one, every other session of the caller is signed out: sign-in codes now go to the new address, so a session opened through the old one ends. Too many incorrect attempts lock the code (429 otp_locked); 10 wrong codes in 24h, counted across every code, lock the account's email-code door until the window ends (429 otp_account_locked with Retry-After). An unknown, expired, consumed, or mismatched code is a 400.
+         * @description Consumes a previously delivered code for the authenticated principal. On success the user's email is written and email_verified is set true. When the new address replaces a different verified one, every other session of the caller is signed out: sign-in codes now go to the new address, so a session opened through the old one ends; the old address is mailed a notice with the new one masked. A verified code also counts as a reauth for this session. Too many incorrect attempts lock the code (429 otp_locked); 10 wrong codes in 24h, counted across every code, lock the account's email-code door until the window ends (429 otp_account_locked with Retry-After). An unknown, expired, consumed, or mismatched code is a 400.
          */
         post: operations["emailOtpVerify"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Record the caller's email WITHOUT verifying it (setup bootstrap, spec §B2).
-         * @description Writes the supplied address to the authenticated principal's user row and clears email_verified (already false for a fresh Owner). The setup bootstrap has no SMTP, so the Owner cannot receive an emailed code; a later Settings/SMTP flow proves control of the address via /account/email/verify.
+         * @description Writes the supplied address to the authenticated principal's user row and clears email_verified (already false for a fresh Owner). The setup bootstrap has no SMTP, so the Owner cannot receive an emailed code; a later Settings/SMTP flow proves control of the address via /account/email/verify. Clearing a verified address strips a factor, so once the account has one the session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required).
          */
         post: operations["setEmail"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Begin a passkey (WebAuthn) registration ceremony for the caller (spec §14, Phase 6 bind).
-         * @description Mints a credential-creation challenge bound to the authenticated principal, stashes the server-side ceremony state under a short TTL, and returns the WebAuthn publicKey creation options for navigator.credentials.create(). The challenge is never echoed by the client. Enrollment only — passkey login is a deferred slice. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured on this instance.
+         * @description Mints a credential-creation challenge bound to the authenticated principal, stashes the server-side ceremony state under a short TTL, and returns the WebAuthn publicKey creation options for navigator.credentials.create(). The challenge is never echoed by the client. Once the account has a passkey or a verified email, the session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required). 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured on this instance.
          */
         post: operations["passkeyRegisterBegin"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Finish a passkey registration ceremony and bind the credential (spec §14, Phase 6 bind).
-         * @description Consumes the caller's live registration challenge (single-use), verifies the authenticator's attestation against the server-stashed ceremony state, and persists the public credential. A missing or expired ceremony is a 400; an attestation that fails verification is a 400; a credential already bound to any account is a 409. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured.
+         * @description Consumes the caller's live registration challenge (single-use), verifies the authenticator's attestation against the server-stashed ceremony state, and persists the public credential. A missing or expired ceremony is a 400; an attestation that fails verification is a 400; a credential already bound to any account is a 409. The verified email is mailed a notice, and the ceremony counts as a reauth for this session. 503 when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured.
          */
         post: operations["passkeyRegisterFinish"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ export interface paths {
         post?: never;
         /**
          * Unbind one of the caller's passkeys (spec §14, Phase 6 bind).
-         * @description Removes a passkey scoped to the authenticated principal, so a caller can only unbind their OWN credential. An unknown or cross-user id is a 404; it never silently no-ops as success. The account's only passkey cannot be removed while its email is unverified (409 last_passkey): it is then the account's only durable way in. Removing a passkey signs out every other session of the caller, so a session opened with that passkey ends with it.
+         * @description Removes a passkey scoped to the authenticated principal, so a caller can only unbind their OWN credential. An unknown or cross-user id is a 404; it never silently no-ops as success. The account's only passkey cannot be removed while its email is unverified (409 last_passkey): it is then the account's only durable way in. Removing a passkey signs out every other session of the caller, so a session opened with that passkey ends with it, and mails the verified email a notice. The session must have reauthed within 5 minutes (403 reauth_required).
          */
         delete: operations["passkeyDelete"];
         options?: never;
@@ -1492,6 +1492,103 @@ export interface paths {
         patch?: never;
         trace?: never;
     };
+    "/api/v1/account/reauth": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        /**
+         * Say whether a passkey or email change needs a reauth first, and how to give one.
+         * @description needed is true when the account has a passkey or a verified email and this session has not proven one within the last 5 minutes. until is when the current proof stops counting. factors lists the ways this caller can reauth, best first: passkey (an enrolled passkey), email (a player's verified address), sign_in (an operator signs out and back in through op-login or a passkey).
+         */
+        get: operations["reauthStatus"];
+        put?: never;
+        post?: never;
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
+    "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/begin": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        get?: never;
+        put?: never;
+        /**
+         * Begin a passkey assertion that reauths this session.
+         * @description Returns WebAuthn assertion request options over the caller's own passkeys, bound to a fresh reauth-purpose challenge.
+         */
+        post: operations["reauthPasskeyBegin"];
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
+    "/api/v1/account/reauth/passkey/finish": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        get?: never;
+        put?: never;
+        /**
+         * Finish the passkey assertion and mark this session reauthed for 5 minutes.
+         * @description Verifies the assertion against the reauth challenge with the login door's clone check (a cloned authenticator is 400 passkey_login_invalid).
+         */
+        post: operations["reauthPasskeyFinish"];
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
+    "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/start": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        get?: never;
+        put?: never;
+        /**
+         * Mail a reauth code to the caller's verified address.
+         * @description For players with a verified email. Operators reauth with a passkey or by signing in again (403 staff_reauth).
+         */
+        post: operations["reauthEmailStart"];
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
+    "/api/v1/account/reauth/email/verify": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        get?: never;
+        put?: never;
+        /** Redeem the reauth code and mark this session reauthed for 5 minutes. */
+        post: operations["reauthEmailVerify"];
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
     "/api/v1/account/sessions": {
         parameters: {
             query?: never;
@@ -2339,6 +2436,29 @@ export interface components {
                 "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
             };
         };
+        /** @description This session is reauthed until the returned time. */
+        Reauthed: {
+            headers: {
+                [name: string]: unknown;
+            };
+            content: {
+                "application/json": {
+                    /** @constant */
+                    ok: true;
+                    /** Format: date-time */
+                    until: string;
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        /** @description reauth_required: this change adds, removes or moves a way into the account, and the account has a passkey or a verified email, so the session must have proven one of them within the last 5 minutes. Signing in by passkey, email code, op-login or the setup token counts; a bind-code sign-in does not. GET /api/v1/account/reauth lists the factors that can give the proof, then retry the change. */
+        ReauthRequired: {
+            headers: {
+                [name: string]: unknown;
+            };
+            content: {
+                "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+            };
+        };
         /** @description The configured SMTP relay refused the message (code mail_undeliverable), so no code was delivered. Distinct from 500 because the fault is in the install's [smtp] settings, not in the request or the platform — most often a From address the relay will not let this account send as. The relay's own text is deliberately withheld (it names the SMTP account) and written to the felis-api log instead, keyed by the same request_id this response carries. Retrying the same address changes nothing until an operator fixes the relay. */
         MailUndeliverable: {
             headers: {
@@ -5765,6 +5885,7 @@ export interface operations {
                 };
             };
             401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            403: components["responses"]["ReauthRequired"];
             /** @description Resend requested before the cooldown elapsed (otp_resend_cooldown); or the account spent its daily wrong-code budget (otp_account_locked, with Retry-After); or the install-wide mail budget is spent (mail_rate_limited, with Retry-After). */
             429: {
                 headers: {
@@ -5865,6 +5986,7 @@ export interface operations {
                 };
             };
             401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            403: components["responses"]["ReauthRequired"];
         };
     };
     passkeyRegisterBegin: {
@@ -5886,6 +6008,7 @@ export interface operations {
                 };
             };
             401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            403: components["responses"]["ReauthRequired"];
             /** @description Passkey subsystem is not configured. */
             503: {
                 headers: {
@@ -5997,6 +6120,7 @@ export interface operations {
                 content?: never;
             };
             401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            403: components["responses"]["ReauthRequired"];
             /** @description No such passkey for this caller. */
             404: {
                 headers: {
@@ -6017,6 +6141,211 @@ export interface operations {
             };
         };
     };
+    reauthStatus: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody?: never;
+        responses: {
+            /** @description Where the caller stands. */
+            200: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": {
+                        needed: boolean;
+                        /** Format: date-time */
+                        until?: string;
+                        factors: ("passkey" | "email" | "sign_in")[];
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+        };
+    };
+    reauthPasskeyBegin: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody?: never;
+        responses: {
+            /** @description WebAuthn assertion request options (PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions) for navigator.credentials.get. */
+            200: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": Record<string, never>;
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description The caller has no enrolled passkey (no_passkey), or no browser session to mark (no_session). */
+            400: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            503: components["responses"]["ServiceUnavailable"];
+        };
+    };
+    reauthPasskeyFinish: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody: {
+            content: {
+                "application/json": {
+                    /** @description The navigator.credentials.get() PublicKeyCredential assertion. */
+                    assertion: Record<string, never>;
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        responses: {
+            200: components["responses"]["Reauthed"];
+            /** @description Assertion invalid, challenge stale, or a cloned authenticator (passkey_login_invalid); no browser session (no_session). */
+            400: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            503: components["responses"]["ServiceUnavailable"];
+        };
+    };
+    reauthEmailStart: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody?: never;
+        responses: {
+            /** @description Code minted and dispatched. */
+            202: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": {
+                        /** @constant */
+                        sent: true;
+                        /** Format: date-time */
+                        expires_at: string;
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description No browser session to mark (no_session). */
+            400: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            /** @description Operators cannot reauth by email (staff_reauth). */
+            403: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description The account has no verified email (no_step_up_factor). */
+            409: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description Resend requested before the cooldown elapsed (otp_resend_cooldown); or the account's daily wrong-code budget is spent (otp_account_locked, with Retry-After); or the install-wide mail budget is spent (mail_rate_limited, with Retry-After). */
+            429: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            502: components["responses"]["MailUndeliverable"];
+        };
+    };
+    reauthEmailVerify: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody: {
+            content: {
+                "application/json": {
+                    code: string;
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        responses: {
+            200: components["responses"]["Reauthed"];
+            /** @description Invalid or expired code (invalid_code), or no browser session (no_session). */
+            400: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            401: components["responses"]["Unauthorized"];
+            /** @description Operators cannot reauth by email (staff_reauth). */
+            403: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description The account has no verified email (no_step_up_factor). */
+            409: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+            /** @description Too many incorrect attempts on this code (otp_locked), or the account's daily wrong-code budget is spent (otp_account_locked, with Retry-After). */
+            429: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content: {
+                    "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
+                };
+            };
+        };
+    };
     listMySessions: {
         parameters: {
             query?: never;

panel/src/lib/passkey.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import { clientError } from "@/lib/api";
+import { base64urlToBytes, bytesToBase64url } from "@/lib/utils";
+
+/** requestAssertion runs the WebAuthn get() ceremony for the server's request
+ *  options (their JSON form: challenge and credential ids base64url) and returns
+ *  the assertion in the JSON form the API's finish endpoints decode. Begins that
+ *  answer with go-webauthn's {"publicKey": {...}} envelope pass the inner object. */
+export async function requestAssertion(options: any) {
+  const publicKey: PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions = {
+    ...options,
+    challenge: base64urlToBytes(options.challenge),
+    allowCredentials: options.allowCredentials?.map((cred: any) => ({
+      ...cred,
+      id: base64urlToBytes(cred.id),
+    })),
+  };
+  const credential = (await navigator.credentials.get({ publicKey })) as PublicKeyCredential | null;
+  if (!credential) throw clientError("passkey_no_credential");
+  const response = credential.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse;
+  return {
+    id: credential.id,
+    rawId: bytesToBase64url(credential.rawId),
+    type: credential.type,
+    response: {
+      clientDataJSON: bytesToBase64url(response.clientDataJSON),
+      authenticatorData: bytesToBase64url(response.authenticatorData),
+      signature: bytesToBase64url(response.signature),
+      userHandle: response.userHandle ? bytesToBase64url(response.userHandle) : null,
+    },
+  };
+}

panel/src/pages/Account.tsx

@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ import { formatAbsolute } from "@/lib/format";
 import type { PasskeyCredential } from "@/lib/types";
 import { useAsync } from "@/lib/hooks";
 import { AccountSessionsCard } from "@/pages/AccountSessions";
+import { isReauthCancelled, isReauthRequired, useReauth } from "@/components/ReauthDialog";
 import { useTier } from "@/lib/tier";
 import { base64urlToBytes, bytesToBase64url } from "@/lib/utils";
+import { requestAssertion } from "@/lib/passkey";
 import {
   Dialog,
   DialogContent,
@@ -36,8 +38,12 @@ export function Account() {
   const status = useAsync(() => api.linkStatus(), []);
   const { identity, refresh } = useTier();
   const { t, i18n } = useTranslation("account");
+  // Adding or removing a passkey and changing the email ask for a fresh proof
+  // of a factor first (ReauthDialog).
+  const reauth = useReauth();
 
-  // Email verification state
+  // Email verification state. A verified address is changed through the same
+  // two steps, opened with changingEmail.
   const [emailInput, setEmailInput] = useState("");
   const [otpCodeInput, setOtpCodeInput] = useState("");
   const [emailSending, setEmailSending] = useState(false);
@@ -46,6 +52,7 @@ export function Account() {
   const [emailSent, setEmailSent] = useState(false);
   const [sentEmailAddress, setSentEmailAddress] = useState("");
   const [initializedEmail, setInitializedEmail] = useState(false);
+  const [changingEmail, setChangingEmail] = useState(false);
 
   useEffect(() => {
     if (identity?.email && !initializedEmail) {
@@ -61,16 +68,30 @@ export function Account() {
     setEmailSending(true);
     setEmailError(null);
     try {
-      await api.emailStart(trimmed);
+      await reauth.guard(() => api.emailStart(trimmed));
       setEmailSent(true);
       setSentEmailAddress(trimmed);
     } catch (err) {
-      setEmailError(humanizeError(err));
+      if (!isReauthCancelled(err)) setEmailError(humanizeError(err));
     } finally {
       setEmailSending(false);
     }
   }
 
+  function startChangeEmail() {
+    setChangingEmail(true);
+    setEmailInput("");
+    setEmailSent(false);
+    setOtpCodeInput("");
+    setEmailError(null);
+  }
+
+  function cancelChangeEmail() {
+    setChangingEmail(false);
+    setEmailSent(false);
+    setEmailError(null);
+  }
+
   async function verifyEmailOtp(e: FormEvent) {
     e.preventDefault();
     const trimmedCode = otpCodeInput.trim();
@@ -80,6 +101,11 @@ export function Account() {
     try {
       await api.emailVerify(trimmedCode);
       await refresh();
+      if (changingEmail) {
+        // Replacing a verified address signs the other devices out.
+        setChangingEmail(false);
+        setSessionsVersion((v) => v + 1);
+      }
       setEmailSent(false);
       setEmailInput("");
       setOtpCodeInput("");
@@ -97,6 +123,7 @@ export function Account() {
   const [passkeyNickname, setPasskeyNickname] = useState("");
   const [registeringPasskey, setRegisteringPasskey] = useState(false);
   const [passkeyError, setPasskeyError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  const [passkeyNotice, setPasskeyNotice] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [registerDialogOpen, setRegisterDialogOpen] = useState(false);
   // Deleting a passkey goes through a confirm dialog that names it. The API
   // refuses to remove the only passkey of an account whose email is unverified
@@ -118,6 +145,7 @@ export function Account() {
     setRegisterDialogOpen(false);
     setPasskeyNickname("");
     setPasskeyError(null);
+    setPasskeyNotice(null);
     setRegisteringPasskey(false);
   }
 
@@ -127,12 +155,22 @@ export function Account() {
     if (!name || registeringPasskey) return;
     setRegisteringPasskey(true);
     setPasskeyError(null);
+    setPasskeyNotice(null);
 
     const controller = new AbortController();
     abortControllerRef.current = controller;
 
     try {
-      const options = await api.passkeyRegisterBegin();
+      let options;
+      try {
+        options = await api.passkeyRegisterBegin();
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (!isReauthRequired(err)) throw err;
+        // The browser lets navigator.credentials.create run only right after a
+        // click, which the confirmation used up: the user presses Continue again.
+        if (await reauth.confirm()) setPasskeyNotice(t("reauth_done_continue"));
+        return;
+      }
       const publicKey: PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions = {
         ...options,
         challenge: base64urlToBytes(options.challenge),
@@ -189,12 +227,13 @@ export function Account() {
     setDeletingPasskey(true);
     setDeleteError(null);
     try {
-      await api.passkeyDelete(pendingDelete.id);
+      await reauth.guard(() => api.passkeyDelete(pendingDelete.id));
       setPendingDelete(null);
       // The server signed the other devices out along with the passkey.
       setSessionsVersion((v) => v + 1);
       await passkeys.reload();
     } catch (err) {
+      if (isReauthCancelled(err)) return;
       // Another device may have changed the list meanwhile: refresh it. A 404
       // means the passkey is already gone, which is what was asked for.
       void passkeys.reload();
@@ -290,17 +329,20 @@ export function Account() {
           </CardTitle>
         </CardHeader>
         <CardContent className="text-sm">
-          {identity?.email_verified ? (
+          {identity?.email_verified && !changingEmail ? (
             <div className="space-y-3">
               <div className="flex items-center gap-2 font-medium text-foreground">
                 <CheckCircle2 className="h-4 w-4 text-emerald-500" />
                 {t("email_verified")}
               </div>
               <p className="text-muted-foreground">{t("email_desc")}</p>
-              <div className="flex items-center gap-2 text-muted-foreground">
+              <div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-x-3 gap-y-1 text-muted-foreground">
                 <code className="rounded bg-muted px-1.5 py-0.5 font-mono text-xs text-foreground">
                   {identity.email}
                 </code>
+                <Button variant="link" size="sm" onClick={startChangeEmail} className="h-auto p-0 font-normal">
+                  {t("change_email")}
+                </Button>
               </div>
             </div>
           ) : (
@@ -309,7 +351,7 @@ export function Account() {
                 <StepBadge n={1} />
                 <div className="w-full space-y-2">
                   <p className="font-medium text-foreground">{t("email_step1")}</p>
-                  <p className="text-muted-foreground">{t("email_step1_desc")}</p>
+                  <p className="text-muted-foreground">{t(changingEmail ? "email_change_desc" : "email_step1_desc")}</p>
                   {!emailSent ? (
                     <form onSubmit={sendEmailOtp} className="flex gap-2 max-w-md">
                       <Input
@@ -324,6 +366,11 @@ export function Account() {
                       <Button type="submit" disabled={emailSending || !emailInput}>
                         {emailSending ? t("sending_code") : t("send_code")}
                       </Button>
+                      {changingEmail && (
+                        <Button type="button" variant="ghost" onClick={cancelChangeEmail} disabled={emailSending}>
+                          {t("common:cancel")}
+                        </Button>
+                      )}
                     </form>
                   ) : (
                     <div className="flex items-center gap-2 text-emerald-600 font-medium dark:text-emerald-400">
@@ -409,6 +456,7 @@ export function Account() {
                       required
                     />
                   </div>
+                  {passkeyNotice && <MessageLine kind="success" message={passkeyNotice} />}
                   <InlineError message={passkeyError} />
                 </div>
                 <DialogFooter>
@@ -518,6 +566,8 @@ export function Account() {
         onSignOut={() => void signOut()}
         signingOut={signingOut}
       />
+
+      {reauth.dialog}
     </>
   );
 }
@@ -654,29 +704,7 @@ function MigrationCard({ userId, hasPasskey }: { userId?: string; hasPasskey: bo
   function confirmWithPasskey() {
     void run(async () => {
       const options = await api.migrateConfirmPasskeyBegin();
-      const pk = options.publicKey;
+      await api.migrateConfirmPasskeyFinish(await requestAssertion(options.publicKey));
-      const publicKey: PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions = {
-        ...pk,
-        challenge: base64urlToBytes(pk.challenge),
-        allowCredentials: pk.allowCredentials?.map((cred: any) => ({
-          ...cred,
-          id: base64urlToBytes(cred.id),
-        })),
-      };
-      const credential = (await navigator.credentials.get({ publicKey })) as PublicKeyCredential;
-      if (!credential) throw clientError("passkey_no_credential");
-      const response = credential.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse;
-      await api.migrateConfirmPasskeyFinish({
-        id: credential.id,
-        rawId: bytesToBase64url(credential.rawId),
-        type: credential.type,
-        response: {
-          clientDataJSON: bytesToBase64url(response.clientDataJSON),
-          authenticatorData: bytesToBase64url(response.authenticatorData),
-          signature: bytesToBase64url(response.signature),
-          userHandle: response.userHandle ? bytesToBase64url(response.userHandle) : null,
-        },
-      });
       await mig.reload();
     });
   }

panel/src/pages/AccountReauth.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+// @vitest-environment jsdom
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
+import { render, screen, waitFor, within } from "@testing-library/react";
+import userEvent from "@testing-library/user-event";
+import { MemoryRouter } from "react-router-dom";
+import type { Identity, PasskeyCredential } from "@/lib/types";
+import { Account } from "./Account";
+
+// The Account page's changes to how the account signs in (delete or add a
+// passkey, change the email) meet 403 reauth_required when the session has not
+// proven a factor lately. These drive the page through that refusal: the check
+// dialog, each factor, and the change running again afterwards.
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  passkeyList: vi.fn(),
+  passkeyDelete: vi.fn(),
+  passkeyRegisterBegin: vi.fn(),
+  listMySessions: vi.fn(),
+  emailStart: vi.fn(),
+  emailVerify: vi.fn(),
+  reauthStatus: vi.fn(),
+  reauthPasskeyBegin: vi.fn(),
+  reauthPasskeyFinish: vi.fn(),
+  reauthEmailStart: vi.fn(),
+  reauthEmailVerify: vi.fn(),
+  logout: vi.fn(),
+  refresh: vi.fn(),
+  credentialsGet: vi.fn(),
+  credentialsCreate: vi.fn(),
+  identity: null as Identity | null,
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/api", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@/lib/api")>();
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    api: {
+      ...actual.api,
+      linkStatus: () => Promise.resolve({ linked: true }),
+      migrateStatus: () => Promise.resolve({ active: false }),
+      passkeyList: mocks.passkeyList,
+      passkeyDelete: mocks.passkeyDelete,
+      passkeyRegisterBegin: mocks.passkeyRegisterBegin,
+      listMySessions: mocks.listMySessions,
+      emailStart: mocks.emailStart,
+      emailVerify: mocks.emailVerify,
+      reauthStatus: mocks.reauthStatus,
+      reauthPasskeyBegin: mocks.reauthPasskeyBegin,
+      reauthPasskeyFinish: mocks.reauthPasskeyFinish,
+      reauthEmailStart: mocks.reauthEmailStart,
+      reauthEmailVerify: mocks.reauthEmailVerify,
+      logout: mocks.logout,
+    },
+  };
+});
+vi.mock("@/lib/tier", () => ({
+  useTier: () => ({ identity: mocks.identity, refresh: mocks.refresh }),
+}));
+
+const refused = { status: 403, code: "reauth_required", message: "confirm it's you first" };
+const laptop: PasskeyCredential = { id: "pk-1", name: "Laptop", created_at: "2026-03-01T10:00:00Z" };
+const phone: PasskeyCredential = { id: "pk-2", name: "Phone", created_at: "2026-04-01T10:00:00Z" };
+
+function identity(role: Identity["role"] = "user"): Identity {
+  return {
+    user_id: "u-1",
+    email: "[email protected]",
+    role,
+    is_admin: role !== "user",
+    is_owner: role === "owner",
+    email_verified: true,
+  };
+}
+
+const bytes = (s: string) => new TextEncoder().encode(s).buffer;
+
+function renderAccount() {
+  return render(
+    <MemoryRouter>
+      <Account />
+    </MemoryRouter>,
+  );
+}
+
+const checkDialog = () => screen.findByRole("dialog", { name: "Confirm it's you" });
+
+async function askToDeleteLaptop() {
+  await userEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("button", { name: "Delete passkey “Laptop”" }));
+  const confirmDelete = screen.getByRole("dialog", { name: "Delete this passkey?" });
+  await userEvent.click(within(confirmDelete).getByRole("button", { name: "Delete" }));
+}
+
+async function proveByEmail(dialog: HTMLElement) {
+  await userEvent.click(await within(dialog).findByRole("button", { name: "Email a code to [email protected]" }));
+  await userEvent.type(await within(dialog).findByLabelText("Code sent to [email protected]"), "123456");
+  await userEvent.click(within(dialog).getByRole("button", { name: "Confirm" }));
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  for (const fn of Object.values(mocks)) if (typeof fn === "function") fn.mockReset();
+  mocks.identity = identity();
+  mocks.listMySessions.mockResolvedValue([]);
+  mocks.reauthEmailStart.mockResolvedValue({ sent: true, expires_at: "2026-09-25T10:10:00Z" });
+  mocks.reauthEmailVerify.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, until: "2026-09-25T10:05:00Z" });
+  mocks.reauthPasskeyFinish.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, until: "2026-09-25T10:05:00Z" });
+  Object.defineProperty(navigator, "credentials", {
+    value: { get: mocks.credentialsGet, create: mocks.credentialsCreate },
+    configurable: true,
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Account re-authentication", () => {
+  it("asks for an email code before deleting a passkey, then deletes it", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValueOnce({ credentials: [laptop, phone] }).mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValueOnce(refused).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["email"] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+    const dialog = await checkDialog();
+    expect(within(dialog).queryByRole("button", { name: "Use a passkey" })).toBeNull();
+    await proveByEmail(dialog);
+
+    expect(mocks.reauthEmailStart).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(mocks.reauthEmailVerify).toHaveBeenCalledWith("123456");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith("pk-1");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByRole("button", { name: "Delete passkey “Laptop”" })).toBeNull());
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("dialog")).toBeNull();
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("alert")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("closing the check keeps the passkey and the delete dialog, with no error", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [laptop, phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValue(refused);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["email"] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+    const dialog = await checkDialog();
+    await userEvent.click(within(dialog).getByRole("button", { name: "Cancel" }));
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByRole("dialog", { name: "Confirm it's you" })).toBeNull());
+    const confirmDelete = screen.getByRole("dialog", { name: "Delete this passkey?" });
+    expect(within(confirmDelete).queryByRole("alert")).toBeNull();
+    expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(mocks.passkeyList).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("a wrong code keeps the check open with the reason and changes nothing", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [laptop, phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValue(refused);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["email"] });
+    mocks.reauthEmailVerify.mockRejectedValue({ status: 400, code: "invalid_code", message: "raw" });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+    const dialog = await checkDialog();
+    await proveByEmail(dialog);
+
+    const alert = await within(dialog).findByRole("alert");
+    expect(alert.textContent).toBe("That code is invalid or expired — request a fresh one and try again.");
+    expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("proves with a passkey from the envelope the begin returns", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValueOnce({ credentials: [laptop, phone] }).mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValueOnce(refused).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["passkey", "email"] });
+    mocks.reauthPasskeyBegin.mockResolvedValue({
+      publicKey: { challenge: "Y2hhbGxlbmdl", allowCredentials: [{ type: "public-key", id: "cGstMQ" }] },
+    });
+    mocks.credentialsGet.mockResolvedValue({
+      id: "cred-1",
+      rawId: bytes("raw"),
+      type: "public-key",
+      response: {
+        clientDataJSON: bytes("cd"),
+        authenticatorData: bytes("ad"),
+        signature: bytes("sig"),
+        userHandle: null,
+      },
+    });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+    const dialog = await checkDialog();
+    // Both factors are offered, the passkey first.
+    const buttons = within(dialog).getAllByRole("button").map((b) => b.textContent);
+    expect(buttons.indexOf("Use a passkey")).toBeLessThan(buttons.indexOf("Email a code to [email protected]"));
+    await userEvent.click(within(dialog).getByRole("button", { name: "Use a passkey" }));
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    const publicKey = mocks.credentialsGet.mock.calls[0][0].publicKey;
+    expect(new TextDecoder().decode(publicKey.challenge)).toBe("challenge");
+    expect(new TextDecoder().decode(publicKey.allowCredentials[0].id)).toBe("pk-1");
+    expect(mocks.reauthPasskeyFinish).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      id: "cred-1",
+      rawId: "cmF3",
+      type: "public-key",
+      response: { clientDataJSON: "Y2Q", authenticatorData: "YWQ", signature: "c2ln", userHandle: null },
+    });
+    expect(mocks.reauthEmailStart).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("offers operators a fresh sign-in instead of an email code", async () => {
+    mocks.identity = identity("admin");
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [laptop, phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValue(refused);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["sign_in"] });
+    mocks.logout.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+    const dialog = await checkDialog();
+    expect(
+      within(dialog).getByText("Operator accounts can also sign out and sign in again. A fresh sign-in counts for 5 minutes."),
+    ).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(within(dialog).queryByRole("button", { name: /Email a code/ })).toBeNull();
+    await userEvent.click(within(dialog).getByRole("button", { name: "Sign out and sign in again" }));
+
+    expect(mocks.logout).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.refresh).toHaveBeenCalled());
+  });
+
+  it("goes straight on when the session was proven meanwhile", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValueOnce({ credentials: [laptop, phone] }).mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [phone] });
+    mocks.passkeyDelete.mockRejectedValueOnce(refused).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: false, until: "2026-09-25T10:05:00Z", factors: ["email"] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await askToDeleteLaptop();
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.passkeyDelete).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    expect(mocks.reauthEmailStart).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByRole("dialog")).toBeNull());
+  });
+
+  it("after the check, adding a passkey waits for Continue instead of starting the browser prompt", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [laptop] });
+    mocks.passkeyRegisterBegin.mockRejectedValue(refused);
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["email"] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await userEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("button", { name: "Add Passkey" }));
+    const register = screen.getByRole("dialog", { name: "Add Passkey" });
+    await userEvent.type(within(register).getByLabelText("Device Nickname"), "Phone");
+    await userEvent.click(within(register).getByRole("button", { name: "Continue" }));
+    await proveByEmail(await checkDialog());
+
+    const status = await within(screen.getByRole("dialog", { name: "Add Passkey" })).findByRole("status");
+    expect(status.textContent).toBe("Confirmed. Press Continue to add the passkey.");
+    expect(mocks.passkeyRegisterBegin).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(mocks.credentialsCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(within(screen.getByRole("dialog", { name: "Add Passkey" })).getByRole("button", { name: "Continue" })).toHaveProperty(
+      "disabled",
+      false,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("changes a verified email after the check and refreshes the devices it signs out", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [] });
+    mocks.emailStart.mockRejectedValueOnce(refused).mockResolvedValue({ sent: true, expires_at: "2026-09-25T10:10:00Z" });
+    mocks.emailVerify.mockResolvedValue({ verified: true, email: "[email protected]" });
+    mocks.reauthStatus.mockResolvedValue({ needed: true, factors: ["email"] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await userEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("button", { name: "Change email" }));
+    expect(
+      screen.getByText(
+        "Enter the new address and we'll send it a code. Once it's verified, sign-in codes go there, the old address gets a notice, and your other devices are signed out.",
+      ),
+    ).toBeTruthy();
+    const address = screen.getByPlaceholderText("[email protected]");
+    expect((address as HTMLInputElement).value).toBe("");
+    await userEvent.type(address, "[email protected]");
+    await userEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Send Code" }));
+    await proveByEmail(await checkDialog());
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.emailStart).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    expect(mocks.emailStart).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith("[email protected]");
+    expect(await screen.findByText(/Verification code sent\./)).toBeTruthy();
+
+    await userEvent.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText("6-digit code"), "654321");
+    await userEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Verify" }));
+
+    expect(mocks.emailVerify).toHaveBeenCalledWith("654321");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(mocks.listMySessions).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    expect(mocks.refresh).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("cancelling a change of email returns to the verified address", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [] });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    await userEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("button", { name: "Change email" }));
+    await userEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Cancel" }));
+
+    expect(screen.getByText("[email protected]")).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(screen.queryByPlaceholderText("[email protected]")).toBeNull();
+    expect(mocks.emailStart).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

panel/src/pages/Login.tsx

@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
 import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label";
 import { useTier } from "@/lib/tier";
 import { loginReturnPath } from "@/lib/auth";
-import { api, clientError, humanizeError } from "@/lib/api";
+import { api, humanizeError } from "@/lib/api";
 import { loadConfig } from "@/lib/config";
-import { base64urlToBytes, bytesToBase64url } from "@/lib/utils";
+import { requestAssertion } from "@/lib/passkey";
 import { InlineError } from "@/components/MessageLine";
 import { formatCountdown, opLoginDeadline, useOpLoginPoll } from "@/lib/opLoginPoll";
 
@@ -143,41 +143,10 @@ export function Login() {
 
     const identifier = email.trim();
     try {
-      let assertion: any;
       if (!identifier) {
         // Discoverable (Usernameless) passkey login
         const options = await api.authPasskeyDiscoverableBegin();
-        const publicKey: PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions = {
+        await api.authPasskeyDiscoverableFinish(options.login_id, await requestAssertion(options.publicKey));
-          ...options.publicKey,
-          challenge: base64urlToBytes(options.publicKey.challenge),
-          allowCredentials: options.publicKey.allowCredentials?.map((cred: any) => ({
-            ...cred,
-            id: base64urlToBytes(cred.id),
-          })),
-        };
-
-        const credential = (await navigator.credentials.get({
-          publicKey,
-        })) as PublicKeyCredential;
-
-        if (!credential) {
-          throw clientError("passkey_no_credential");
-        }
-
-        const response = credential.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse;
-        assertion = {
-          id: credential.id,
-          rawId: bytesToBase64url(credential.rawId),
-          type: credential.type,
-          response: {
-            clientDataJSON: bytesToBase64url(response.clientDataJSON),
-            authenticatorData: bytesToBase64url(response.authenticatorData),
-            signature: bytesToBase64url(response.signature),
-            userHandle: response.userHandle ? bytesToBase64url(response.userHandle) : null,
-          },
-        };
-
-        await api.authPasskeyDiscoverableFinish(options.login_id, assertion);
       } else {
         // Email-first passkey login
         if (!identifier.includes("@")) {
@@ -185,37 +154,7 @@ export function Login() {
         }
 
         const options = await api.authPasskeyLoginBegin(identifier);
-        const publicKey: PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions = {
+        await api.authPasskeyLoginFinish(identifier, await requestAssertion(options));
-          ...options,
-          challenge: base64urlToBytes(options.challenge),
-          allowCredentials: options.allowCredentials?.map((cred: any) => ({
-            ...cred,
-            id: base64urlToBytes(cred.id),
-          })),
-        };
-
-        const credential = (await navigator.credentials.get({
-          publicKey,
-        })) as PublicKeyCredential;
-
-        if (!credential) {
-          throw clientError("passkey_no_credential");
-        }
-
-        const response = credential.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse;
-        assertion = {
-          id: credential.id,
-          rawId: bytesToBase64url(credential.rawId),
-          type: credential.type,
-          response: {
-            clientDataJSON: bytesToBase64url(response.clientDataJSON),
-            authenticatorData: bytesToBase64url(response.authenticatorData),
-            signature: bytesToBase64url(response.signature),
-            userHandle: response.userHandle ? bytesToBase64url(response.userHandle) : null,
-          },
-        };
-
-        await api.authPasskeyLoginFinish(identifier, assertion);
       }
 
       await refresh();