Adds POST /api/v1/auth/bind, the one public pre-account entrypoint of the
player console (console.<root_domain>). An account-less player redeems the
one-time Bind Code minted in the in-game Login Lobby; in a single step the
platform creates a role=user player, links it to the verified in-game UUID,
and mints a host-only felis_session. Login is thus not forced at the edge
while operations stay app-authenticated.
The operator console (op.console.<root_domain>) is unaffected and stays
behind Zero Trust: a code whose UUID resolves to a staff (role=admin)
account is refused with 403 (ErrPlayerBindForbidden) without consuming the
code, so the public door provably never yields an admin principal — the
session it mints carries ViaAdminAccess=false and is host-only to console,
never sent to op.console.
Repo layer: new RedeemPlayerBindCode on the Repo interface, implemented on
PGRepo (single tx: resolve code, create-or-fetch the player, consume) and
the test fake. The returning-player branch is idempotent and is a deliberate
standing "log in via the game" door, not just first-time onboarding.
Honest labeling:
- ORACLE-VERIFIED (Go): account/session logic — role=user, refuse-staff,
idempotent create-or-fetch, single-use code, and the op.console redline
(player session rejected on admin routes). Covered by handlers_onboard_test
and the OpenAPI parity gate.
- INTEGRATION-dependent: the endpoint's security rests on the Bind Code having
been minted against an online-mode-Yggdrasil-authenticated UUID, a
precondition that lives in velocity/Java and is not verifiable from this
repo (CODE-ONLY). The Go layer proves the logic, not that identity guarantee.
- No app-level attempt cap: rate-limiting is deferred to the edge as for the
public /auth/login; the ~1e12 keyspace, single use and short TTL make a
blind app-level cap non-critical.
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