Felis/internal/api/pgrepo.go

package api

import (
	"context"
	"database/sql"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"time"
)

// PGRepo is the production Repo backed by Postgres (spec §6). It owns only the
// business projection the CRD cannot express. The SQL here is exercised by
// integration tests against a live database, not the hermetic api_test.go suite.
type PGRepo struct {
	db *sql.DB
}

// NewPGRepo wraps an existing pool (from store.PostgresDriver.DB()).
func NewPGRepo(db *sql.DB) *PGRepo { return &PGRepo{db: db} }

func (p *PGRepo) Ping(ctx context.Context) error { return p.db.PingContext(ctx) }

func (p *PGRepo) ServerBySubdomain(ctx context.Context, subdomain string) (*ServerRecord, error) {
	const q = `SELECT s.name, sa.subdomain, COALESCE(s.owner_id, ''), COALESCE(s.cached_phase, ''),
		s.retire_requested_at, s.retire_delete
		FROM server_aliases sa JOIN servers s ON s.name = sa.server_name
		WHERE sa.subdomain = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL`
	var r ServerRecord
	var retireAt sql.NullTime
	var retireDelete bool
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, subdomain).Scan(&r.Name, &r.Subdomain, &r.OwnerID, &r.CachedPhase, &retireAt, &retireDelete); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	r.Retire = retireState(retireAt, retireDelete)
	return &r, nil
}

func (p *PGRepo) ServerByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*ServerRecord, error) {
	const q = `SELECT s.name, COALESCE(sa.subdomain, ''), COALESCE(s.owner_id, ''), COALESCE(s.cached_phase, ''),
		s.retire_requested_at, s.retire_delete
		FROM servers s LEFT JOIN server_aliases sa ON sa.server_name = s.name
		WHERE s.name = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL`
	var r ServerRecord
	var retireAt sql.NullTime
	var retireDelete bool
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, name).Scan(&r.Name, &r.Subdomain, &r.OwnerID, &r.CachedPhase, &retireAt, &retireDelete); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	r.Retire = retireState(retireAt, retireDelete)
	return &r, nil
}

// retireState is a servers row's pending retirement, nil when there is none.
func retireState(at sql.NullTime, deleteServer bool) *RetireState {
	if !at.Valid {
		return nil
	}
	return &RetireState{RequestedAt: at.Time, Delete: deleteServer}
}

func (p *PGRepo) IsLinked(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error) {
	var ok bool
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM account_links WHERE user_id = $1)`, userID).Scan(&ok)
	return ok, err
}

// CreateLinkCode persists a one-time link code for a verified in-game UUID (spec
// §10). expires_at is supplied by the caller (the API clock + TTL) so expiry is
// driven by one authoritative clock. The code is a PRIMARY KEY; a collision on
// the crypto/rand value is astronomically unlikely but surfaces as a plain
// driver error (the caller can retry) rather than being masked here.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateLinkCode(ctx context.Context, code, mcUUID, authSource string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO account_link_codes (code, mc_uuid, auth_source, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)`,
		code, mcUUID, authSource, expiresAt)
	return err
}

// VerifyLinkCode consumes a code for userID and writes the account_links binding
// in one transaction (spec §10). The different-user conflict is detected by a
// guarded SELECT inside the tx rather than by inspecting a driver-specific unique
// violation, so the logic is portable. On the conflict path the tx rolls back, so
// the code is NOT consumed — a wrong user must not be able to burn the real
// owner's pending code. The UNIQUE(mc_uuid) constraint is the last-resort guard
// against a concurrent racer that passed the SELECT; that loses to a 500, which
// is acceptable for this integration-only path.
func (p *PGRepo) VerifyLinkCode(ctx context.Context, userID, code string, now time.Time) (string, string, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", "", err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var mcUUID, authSource string
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT mc_uuid, auth_source FROM account_link_codes
		 WHERE code = $1 AND expires_at > $2
		 FOR UPDATE`,
		code, now).Scan(&mcUUID, &authSource); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", "", ErrLinkCodeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", err
	}

	// If this UUID is already linked, only the same user may re-verify (idempotent).
	// A different LIVE user is a conflict and must not consume the code. A link whose
	// account was soft-deleted is the exception: the identity is unclaimed (the
	// account is gone; e.g. a migrated source, whose retire keeps the link but is
	// otherwise dead), and the fresh in-game code proves the caller still holds this
	// UUID, so the live caller takes the link over. Disabled-but-not-deleted stays a
	// conflict — taking over a locked account's identity would bypass the lockout.
	var existingUser string
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT user_id FROM account_links WHERE mc_uuid = $1`, mcUUID).Scan(&existingUser); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		// not yet linked — fall through to insert
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", err
	default:
		if existingUser != userID {
			var linkedDeleted bool
			if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
				`SELECT deleted_at IS NOT NULL FROM users WHERE id = $1`,
				existingUser).Scan(&linkedDeleted); err != nil {
				return "", "", err
			}
			if !linkedDeleted {
				return "", "", ErrConflict
			}
			if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
				`UPDATE account_links SET user_id = $1, auth_source = $2, verified_at = now()
				  WHERE mc_uuid = $3`,
				userID, authSource, mcUUID); err != nil {
				return "", "", fmt.Errorf("take over retired link: %w", err)
			}
		}
	}

	// Copy the code's auth_source onto the durable link. On the idempotent
	// re-verify path DO UPDATE refreshes it (a player who re-linked via a different
	// Yggdrasil this time gets the latest source stored), keeping the persisted
	// value equal to the one returned to the caller.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO account_links (user_id, mc_uuid, auth_source) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
		 ON CONFLICT (user_id, mc_uuid) DO UPDATE SET auth_source = EXCLUDED.auth_source`,
		userID, mcUUID, authSource); err != nil {
		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("write account link: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1`, code); err != nil {
		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("consume link code: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return "", "", err
	}
	return mcUUID, authSource, nil
}

// RedeemPlayerBindCode redeems a Bind Code into a player account + link in one
// transaction (console-tier access model). It mirrors VerifyLinkCode's structure —
// strict expiry against the passed clock, the durable-link write, and the DELETE
// that consumes the code — but creates or fetches the user instead of requiring one.
// See the Repo interface for the full contract. Like VerifyLinkCode a concurrent
// racer that passed the SELECT loses to the UNIQUE(mc_uuid)/UNIQUE(username) guard
// (a 500), acceptable for this integration-only path; the primary idempotency is the
// mc_uuid-keyed fetch below.
func (p *PGRepo) RedeemPlayerBindCode(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code string, now time.Time) (string, string, string, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", "", "", err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var mcUUID, authSource string
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT mc_uuid, auth_source FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1 AND expires_at > $2
		 FOR UPDATE`,
		code, now).Scan(&mcUUID, &authSource); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", "", "", ErrLinkCodeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", "", err
	}
	// The lock above serialises redeemers of ONE code; the ON CONFLICT arms below
	// cover the rarer cross-code race (two live codes for the same UUID redeemed
	// together), where both transactions reach the inserts before either commits.

	// Create-or-fetch keyed on the verified UUID. An already-linked role='user' player
	// is fetched (idempotent "log in via the game"); any STAFF account (admin or
	// owner, i.e. role != 'user') is refused (op.console only) BEFORE any consume, so
	// the code survives; a DISABLED or soft-deleted account is refused the same way
	// (audit #33 — a dead account must not resurrect through the bind door); an
	// unlinked UUID births a fresh role='user' player with a uuid-derived unique
	// username.
	userID := newUserID
	var existingRole string
	var disabled, deleted bool
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT u.id, u.role::text, u.disabled, u.deleted_at IS NOT NULL
		   FROM account_links al JOIN users u ON u.id = al.user_id WHERE al.mc_uuid = $1`,
		mcUUID).Scan(&userID, &existingRole, &disabled, &deleted); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`INSERT INTO users (id, username, role) VALUES ($1, $2, 'user')
			 ON CONFLICT (username) DO NOTHING`,
			newUserID, mcUUID); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("create player: %w", err)
		}
		// Re-read by username so a cross-code race converges on the winner's row
		// (our id was discarded by DO NOTHING) instead of a bare 500 — and so a
		// deleted row squatting on the username is refused rather than reused.
		var role string
		var dis, del bool
		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
			`SELECT id, role::text, disabled, deleted_at IS NOT NULL FROM users WHERE username = $1`,
			mcUUID).Scan(&userID, &role, &dis, &del); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("create player: %w", err)
		}
		if role != "user" {
			return "", "", "", ErrPlayerBindForbidden
		}
		if dis || del {
			return "", "", "", ErrPlayerAccountRetired
		}
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`INSERT INTO account_links (user_id, mc_uuid, auth_source) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
			 ON CONFLICT (mc_uuid) DO NOTHING`,
			userID, mcUUID, authSource); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("write account link: %w", err)
		}
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", "", err
	default:
		if existingRole != "user" {
			return "", "", "", ErrPlayerBindForbidden // staff must use op.console
		}
		if disabled || deleted {
			return "", "", "", ErrPlayerAccountRetired
		}
	}

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1`, code); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("consume link code: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", err
	}
	return userID, mcUUID, authSource, nil
}

// CompleteOwnerSetup consumes an in-game link code, creates-or-promotes the bound
// account to the passwordless Owner (role='owner'), enables local auth, and stores
// the one-time first-login token in one transaction. It is the `felis setup`
// MC-bind path: the operator enters limbo, runs /link, and types the code here.
// Unlike RedeemPlayerBindCode — which refuses an already-staff account so a game
// login can never self-elevate — this DELIBERATELY elevates: an unlinked UUID is
// born directly as staff, and an already-linked account (player OR staff) is
// promoted in place, preserving its id so any live sessions and its username
// survive. The elevation is gated by the caller's local-root break-glass
// authority, not by anything in-band. Returns the Owner's (userID, mcUUID,
// authSource); an absent or expired code is ErrLinkCodeInvalid and consumes
// nothing. Any failure in the auth-toggle or token writes rolls the elevation and
// code consumption back, leaving the operator able to retry setup.
func (p *PGRepo) CompleteOwnerSetup(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code string, now time.Time,
	tokenHash string, tokenExpiresAt time.Time) (string, string, string, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", "", "", err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var mcUUID, authSource string
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT mc_uuid, auth_source FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1 AND expires_at > $2`,
		code, now).Scan(&mcUUID, &authSource); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", "", "", ErrLinkCodeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", "", err
	}

	// Create-or-promote keyed on the verified UUID. An unlinked UUID births a fresh
	// staff row (role='owner') with a uuid-derived username; an already-linked
	// account is promoted to role='owner' in place (idempotent when it already is),
	// keeping its id and username. Setup elevates on purpose, so there is no staff
	// refusal here — that guard belongs to the player path only.
	userID := newUserID
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT user_id FROM account_links WHERE mc_uuid = $1`, mcUUID).Scan(&userID); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`INSERT INTO users (id, username, role) VALUES ($1, $2, 'owner')`,
			newUserID, mcUUID); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("create owner: %w", err)
		}
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`INSERT INTO account_links (user_id, mc_uuid, auth_source) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
			newUserID, mcUUID, authSource); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("write account link: %w", err)
		}
		userID = newUserID
	case err != nil:
		return "", "", "", err
	default:
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`UPDATE users SET role = 'owner' WHERE id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("promote owner: %w", err)
		}
	}

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO platform_settings (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2::jsonb)
		 ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value, updated_at = now()`,
		LocalAuthEnabledKey, "true"); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("enable local auth: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO setup_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
		tokenHash, userID, tokenExpiresAt); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("mint setup token: %w", err)
	}

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1`, code); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("consume link code: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return "", "", "", err
	}
	return userID, mcUUID, authSource, nil
}

// QuotaAvailable treats a missing quota row or a NULL max_servers as unlimited;
// otherwise it compares the live owned-server count against the cap (spec §9.3).
// It is the single-dimension convenience read; handlers use the four-dimension
// QuotaCheck. The former audit-#4 TOCTOU (check and claim in separate statements)
// is closed inside ClaimServer, which re-runs the four-dimension gate under a
// per-user advisory lock in the SAME transaction as the ownership write.
func (p *PGRepo) QuotaAvailable(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error) {
	var maxServers sql.NullInt64
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT max_servers FROM quotas WHERE user_id = $1`, userID).Scan(&maxServers); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return true, nil
	case err != nil:
		return false, err
	}
	if !maxServers.Valid {
		return true, nil
	}
	var n int64
	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT count(*) FROM servers WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID).Scan(&n); err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	return n < maxServers.Int64, nil
}

// QuotaCheck reports whether accepting a server with resource spec `incoming`
// would push userID over any quota cap. excludeName is the server row whose own
// cached resources should be excluded ("" for a fresh claim where the row
// doesn't exist yet). Four dimensions are checked: server count, CPU millicores,
// memory MB, and storage MB. A NULL or missing quota row/column means unlimited
// for that dimension. As a standalone read it is advisory — it backs the
// handler's fast-path 403 — while the AUTHORITATIVE gate for claims is the one
// ClaimServer re-runs atomically; the resize path (server PATCH) keeps this
// advisory shape because its write goes through the Kubernetes API, not this
// transaction.
func (p *PGRepo) QuotaCheck(ctx context.Context, userID string, excludeName string, incoming ResourceSpec) (bool, error) {
	var maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor sql.NullInt64
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb
		 FROM quotas WHERE user_id = $1`, userID).Scan(
		&maxServers, &maxCPU, &maxMem, &maxStor); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return true, nil // no quota row → unlimited
	case err != nil:
		return false, err
	}

	var count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum int64
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT COUNT(*), COALESCE(SUM(cached_cpu_milli), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_memory_mb), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_storage_mb), 0)
		 FROM servers WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL AND name != $2`,
		userID, excludeName).Scan(&count, &cpuSum, &memSum, &storSum); {
	case err != nil:
		return false, err
	}

	return quotaAllows(maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor, count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum, 1, incoming), nil
}

// UpdateServerResources updates the resource cache for a server after a spec
// mutation (spec §7 PATCH). The per-owner aggregate used by QuotaCheck is a
// SQL SUM over the cached columns, so every mutation must write through here.
func (p *PGRepo) UpdateServerResources(ctx context.Context, name string, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB int) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers SET cached_cpu_milli = $2, cached_memory_mb = $3, cached_storage_mb = $4 WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
		name, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB)
	return err
}

// ServerResources returns the cached resource spec for a server.
func (p *PGRepo) ServerResources(ctx context.Context, name string) (ResourceSpec, error) {
	var r ResourceSpec
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb, cached_storage_mb FROM servers WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
		name).Scan(&r.CPUMilli, &r.MemoryMB, &r.StorageMB); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return r, nil
	case err != nil:
		return r, err
	}
	return r, nil
}

// ClaimServer performs the atomic ownership transfer (spec §9.3). A missing
// server is ErrNotFound; an existing-but-owned server yields claimed=false so the
// handler can answer 409; a claim that would push the user over any of the four
// quota caps yields ErrQuotaExceeded (the handler's pre-check is a fast path,
// this gate is the authoritative one). The whole decision — quota read,
// per-owner aggregate, and the ownership UPDATE — runs in ONE transaction under
// pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(user_id)), so two concurrent claims by the same
// user for two DIFFERENT ownerless servers serialize instead of both passing the
// gate (audit #4); the row is additionally taken FOR UPDATE so concurrent claims
// of the SAME server still resolve to exactly one winner.
//
// A claim starts the reaper's clock afresh: last_active_at moves to the claim
// and the pre-reap warnings clear. A world reaped before keeps its release time
// as last_active_at, so without the reset a new owner who configures it from
// the panel before anyone joins would lose it on the next reaper run, with no
// warning and no archive of their own.
//
// It also empties the wake allowlist. Every entry is a player who joined while
// someone else held the server (or nobody did), so it vouches for nothing on the
// new owner's; a friend of the new owner is added again by their next join.
func (p *PGRepo) ClaimServer(ctx context.Context, name, userID string) (bool, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	// Serialize this user's claim lane: the aggregate read below and the
	// ownership write must observe one consistent quota state. A hashtext
	// collision across users merely serializes unrelated claims — never waives a
	// cap.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1))`, userID); err != nil {
		return false, err
	}

	var owned sql.NullString
	var retiring bool
	var cpu, mem, stor int
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT owner_id, retire_requested_at IS NOT NULL, cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb, cached_storage_mb
		 FROM servers WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL FOR UPDATE`,
		name).Scan(&owned, &retiring, &cpu, &mem, &stor); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return false, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return false, err
	}
	if owned.Valid {
		return false, nil // already claimed → 409 at the handler
	}
	// An unowned server an admin is releasing or deleting: its world is about to
	// be archived and deleted, or the server itself removed. The handler refuses
	// it up front; this holds against a request that lands in between.
	if retiring {
		return false, nil
	}

	// The four-dimension gate, re-run inside the transaction. A missing quota
	// row leaves every NullInt64 invalid → quotaAllows treats each dimension as
	// unlimited, matching QuotaCheck.
	var maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor sql.NullInt64
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb
		 FROM quotas WHERE user_id = $1`, userID).Scan(
		&maxServers, &maxCPU, &maxMem, &maxStor); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
		return false, err
	}
	var count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum int64
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT COUNT(*), COALESCE(SUM(cached_cpu_milli), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_memory_mb), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_storage_mb), 0)
		 FROM servers WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL AND name != $2`,
		userID, name).Scan(&count, &cpuSum, &memSum, &storSum); err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	if !quotaAllows(maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor, count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum,
		1, ResourceSpec{CPUMilli: cpu, MemoryMB: mem, StorageMB: stor}) {
		return false, ErrQuotaExceeded
	}

	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers SET owner_id = $2, claimed_at = now(), last_active_at = now(), warned_3d_at = NULL, warned_1d_at = NULL
		 WHERE name = $1 AND owner_id IS NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL AND retire_requested_at IS NULL`,
		name, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	if n != 1 {
		return false, nil
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM server_allowlist WHERE server_name = $1`, name); err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	return true, nil
}

// quotaAllows applies the four spec §9.3 caps to one per-owner aggregate plus
// incomingCount servers whose specs sum to incoming. Shared by QuotaCheck (the
// advisory pre-check), ClaimServer (the atomic gate) and RedeemMigration (a
// migration's servers arriving at once) so they can never drift. An invalid (NULL or
// missing) cap means unlimited for that dimension; storage is compared in MB
// against max_storage_gb × 1024.
func quotaAllows(maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor sql.NullInt64,
	count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum, incomingCount int64, incoming ResourceSpec) bool {
	if maxServers.Valid && count+incomingCount > maxServers.Int64 {
		return false
	}
	if maxCPU.Valid && cpuSum+int64(incoming.CPUMilli) > maxCPU.Int64 {
		return false
	}
	if maxMem.Valid && memSum+int64(incoming.MemoryMB) > maxMem.Int64 {
		return false
	}
	if maxStor.Valid && storSum+int64(incoming.StorageMB) > maxStor.Int64*1024 {
		return false
	}
	return true
}

// UserInAllowlist reports whether any Minecraft UUID linked to the user is on the
// wake allowlist with its wake right intact (revoked_at IS NULL).
func (p *PGRepo) UserInAllowlist(ctx context.Context, name, userID string) (bool, error) {
	const q = `SELECT EXISTS(
		SELECT 1 FROM server_allowlist sa JOIN account_links al ON al.mc_uuid = sa.mc_uuid
		WHERE sa.server_name = $1 AND al.user_id = $2 AND sa.revoked_at IS NULL)`
	var ok bool
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, name, userID).Scan(&ok)
	return ok, err
}

// UUIDInAllowlist is the internal-face allowlist check keyed by the in-game UUID
// directly (spec §9.4). The server_allowlist table is UUID-keyed, so the
// velocity-driven wake — which knows the joining player only by their online-mode
// UUID — needs no account_links bridge (contrast UserInAllowlist). A revoked
// entry does not count.
func (p *PGRepo) UUIDInAllowlist(ctx context.Context, name, mcUUID string) (bool, error) {
	const q = `SELECT EXISTS(
		SELECT 1 FROM server_allowlist WHERE server_name = $1 AND mc_uuid = $2 AND revoked_at IS NULL)`
	var ok bool
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, name, mcUUID).Scan(&ok)
	return ok, err
}

// ServerAllowlist lists a server's wake allowlist, newest first, revoked entries
// included so the owner can give the right back. Username is the live account the
// UUID is linked to, empty when there is none: only linked players get past the
// login gate, so an unnamed entry belongs to a closed or unlinked account.
func (p *PGRepo) ServerAllowlist(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]AllowlistEntry, error) {
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx,
		`SELECT sa.mc_uuid::text, COALESCE(u.username, ''), sa.added_at, sa.revoked_at IS NULL
		   FROM server_allowlist sa
		   LEFT JOIN account_links al ON al.mc_uuid = sa.mc_uuid
		   LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = al.user_id AND u.deleted_at IS NULL
		  WHERE sa.server_name = $1
		  ORDER BY sa.added_at DESC, sa.mc_uuid`, name)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	out := []AllowlistEntry{}
	for rows.Next() {
		var e AllowlistEntry
		if err := rows.Scan(&e.MCUUID, &e.Username, &e.AddedAt, &e.CanWake); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		out = append(out, e)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// SetAllowlistWake gives an allowlisted UUID its wake right back or takes it away.
// ErrNotFound when the UUID is not on the server's list. Taking it away keeps the
// row (revoked_at) so the player's next join cannot restore it; repeating either
// call changes nothing, and a repeated revoke keeps the first revoked_at.
func (p *PGRepo) SetAllowlistWake(ctx context.Context, name, mcUUID string, canWake bool) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE server_allowlist
		    SET revoked_at = CASE WHEN $3 THEN NULL ELSE COALESCE(revoked_at, now()) END
		  WHERE server_name = $1 AND mc_uuid = $2`, name, mcUUID, canWake)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// RequestRetire records the server's retirement for the reaper to carry out.
// Asking again keeps the first request time, so the panel's "since" stays true,
// and a deletion once asked for is not turned back into a release by the owner
// asking too.
func (p *PGRepo) RequestRetire(ctx context.Context, name string, deleteServer bool) (RetireState, error) {
	var st RetireState
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers
		    SET retire_requested_at = COALESCE(retire_requested_at, now()),
		        retire_delete = retire_delete OR $2
		  WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
		  RETURNING retire_requested_at, retire_delete`, name, deleteServer).Scan(&st.RequestedAt, &st.Delete); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return RetireState{}, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return RetireState{}, err
	}
	return st, nil
}

// CancelRetire drops the server's pending retirement. The row is locked while
// the deletion flag is read, so an owner cannot cancel a deletion an admin asked
// for in between.
func (p *PGRepo) CancelRetire(ctx context.Context, name string, mayCancelDelete bool) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit
	var deleteServer bool
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT retire_delete FROM servers WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL FOR UPDATE`,
		name).Scan(&deleteServer); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return err
	}
	if deleteServer && !mayCancelDelete {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers SET retire_requested_at = NULL, retire_delete = false WHERE name = $1`, name); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// UserByMCUUID resolves a verified in-game UUID to its linked user_id (spec §10
// account_links), or ErrNotFound when the UUID is not linked to any account. A
// link whose account is dead reads the same as no link at all (audit #33), so the
// in-game doors never act as a retired identity.
func (p *PGRepo) UserByMCUUID(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (string, error) {
	var userID string
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT al.user_id FROM account_links al
		   JOIN users u ON u.id = al.user_id
		  WHERE al.mc_uuid = $1 AND u.disabled = false AND u.deleted_at IS NULL`,
		mcUUID).Scan(&userID); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return "", err
	}
	return userID, nil
}

// RecordJoin renews activity and auto-appends the UUID to the allowlist in one
// transaction (spec §7, §9.4). A missing server is ErrNotFound. An entry the
// owner revoked stays revoked: the append leaves an existing row alone.
func (p *PGRepo) RecordJoin(ctx context.Context, name, mcUUID string) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers SET last_active_at = now(), warned_3d_at = NULL, warned_1d_at = NULL
		 WHERE name = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, name)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO server_allowlist (server_name, mc_uuid) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
		name, mcUUID); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("append allowlist: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// MyServers lists the servers the user owns, each with its pending retirement,
// and the unowned ones they may claim. An unowned server an admin is releasing or
// deleting is listed but not claimable.
func (p *PGRepo) MyServers(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]MyServerView, error) {
	const q = `SELECT s.name, COALESCE(sa.subdomain, ''),
		COALESCE(s.owner_id = $1, false) AS owned, (s.owner_id IS NULL AND s.retire_requested_at IS NULL) AS claimable,
		COALESCE(s.cached_phase, ''), s.retire_requested_at, s.retire_delete
		FROM servers s LEFT JOIN server_aliases sa ON sa.server_name = s.name
		WHERE s.deleted_at IS NULL AND (s.owner_id = $1 OR s.owner_id IS NULL)
		ORDER BY s.name`
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []MyServerView
	for rows.Next() {
		var v MyServerView
		var retireAt sql.NullTime
		var retireDelete bool
		if err := rows.Scan(&v.Name, &v.Subdomain, &v.Owned, &v.Claimable, &v.Phase, &retireAt, &retireDelete); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if v.Owned {
			v.Retiring = retireState(retireAt, retireDelete)
		}
		out = append(out, v)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// ServerOwners returns name -> claim state for every non-deleted server (the
// SysAdmin cockpit's fleet read). The LEFT JOIN keeps unclaimed servers (owner_id
// NULL) with an empty OwnerID, and the deleted_at filter drops soft-deleted ones.
// The display value prefers the recognizable email (the same identity the audit
// log records as the human actor, §6) and falls back to the never-NULL username
// when the address is absent.
func (p *PGRepo) ServerOwners(ctx context.Context) (map[string]ServerOwnership, error) {
	const q = `SELECT s.name, COALESCE(s.owner_id, ''), COALESCE(NULLIF(u.email, ''), u.username, ''),
		s.retire_requested_at, s.retire_delete
		FROM servers s LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = s.owner_id
		WHERE s.deleted_at IS NULL`
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	out := make(map[string]ServerOwnership)
	for rows.Next() {
		var name string
		var o ServerOwnership
		var retireAt sql.NullTime
		var retireDelete bool
		if err := rows.Scan(&name, &o.OwnerID, &o.Owner, &retireAt, &retireDelete); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		o.Retire = retireState(retireAt, retireDelete)
		out[name] = o
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// SeedServer inserts the business rows backing a newly created server (spec
// §15): the servers row (owner_id NULL — the server is created unowned and
// claimed later, spec §9.3) and its subdomain alias. The create handler has
// already found no server and no world volume of this name, so a row that is
// here belongs to an earlier server of the same name: one removed with kubectl,
// a create whose CRD write failed, or one the reaper deleted between removing
// its MinecraftServer and marking the row. That row starts over, and the earlier
// server's other aliases and allowlist go with it; nothing of its owner, claim,
// activity clock, reaper warnings or pending retirement reaches the new server,
// so the reaper's unfinished deletion no longer applies to it. A retried create
// lands on the same fresh state. The alias subdomain is a PRIMARY KEY: bound to
// another server, it rolls the whole seed back and returns ErrConflict, letting
// the create handler answer 409 before it touches the CRD.
//
// Two creates of one name racing between the handler's cluster check and the
// first CRD write can still leave the loser's alias in place of the winner's;
// that window is the create path's documented non-transactional tradeoff.
func (p *PGRepo) SeedServer(ctx context.Context, name, subdomain string, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB int) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO servers (name, cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb, cached_storage_mb) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
		 ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET owner_id = NULL, claimed_at = NULL, last_active_at = now(),
		   warned_3d_at = NULL, warned_1d_at = NULL, cached_phase = NULL, created_at = now(), deleted_at = NULL,
		   retire_requested_at = NULL, retire_delete = false,
		   cached_cpu_milli = EXCLUDED.cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb = EXCLUDED.cached_memory_mb,
		   cached_storage_mb = EXCLUDED.cached_storage_mb`,
		name, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("seed server row: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM server_allowlist WHERE server_name = $1`, name); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("clear an earlier allowlist: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM server_aliases WHERE server_name = $1`, name); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("clear earlier aliases: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO server_aliases (subdomain, server_name) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`,
		subdomain, name); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("seed subdomain alias: %w", err)
	}
	var boundTo string
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT server_name FROM server_aliases WHERE subdomain = $1`, subdomain).Scan(&boundTo); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("confirm subdomain alias: %w", err)
	}
	if boundTo != name {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// AllBackups lists one page of every present world backup, newest first (spec
// §7 GET /backups, admin scope; world_backups in §22). Only status='present' rows
// are listed — an expired or deleted backup is gone (spec §466).
func (p *PGRepo) AllBackups(ctx context.Context, opts BackupListOpts) ([]BackupView, int, error) {
	return p.pageBackups(ctx, ``, opts)
}

// BackupsForUser lists one page of the present world backups of worlds the user
// formerly owned, newest first (spec §7 GET /backups, former_owner scope). A NULL
// former_owner never matches a user id, so orphaned backups stay admin-only.
func (p *PGRepo) BackupsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, opts BackupListOpts) ([]BackupView, int, error) {
	return p.pageBackups(ctx, ` AND former_owner = $2`, opts, userID)
}

// pageBackups counts and reads one page of present backups under the caller's
// scope clause, whose parameters follow the server filter ($1). id breaks
// created_at ties so a page boundary never repeats or skips a row.
func (p *PGRepo) pageBackups(ctx context.Context, scope string, opts BackupListOpts, scopeArgs ...any) ([]BackupView, int, error) {
	match := ` FROM world_backups WHERE status = 'present' AND ($1::text = '' OR server_name = $1::text)` + scope
	args := append([]any{opts.Server}, scopeArgs...)
	var total int
	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT count(*)`+match, args...).Scan(&total); err != nil {
		return nil, 0, err
	}
	n := len(args)
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT id, server_name, COALESCE(former_owner, ''), COALESCE(size_bytes, 0),
		reason, status, created_at, expires_at, corrupt_at IS NOT NULL, verified_at, skipped_entries%s
		ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT $%d OFFSET $%d`, match, n+1, n+2), append(args, opts.Limit, opts.Offset)...)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, 0, err
	}
	out, err := scanBackupViews(rows)
	return out, total, err
}

// scanBackupViews drains a world_backups result set into BackupViews. backup_ref
// is intentionally not selected — it never leaves the server (spec §286 principle).
func scanBackupViews(rows *sql.Rows) ([]BackupView, error) {
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []BackupView
	for rows.Next() {
		var v BackupView
		var verified sql.NullTime
		if err := rows.Scan(&v.ID, &v.ServerName, &v.FormerOwner, &v.SizeBytes,
			&v.Reason, &v.Status, &v.CreatedAt, &v.ExpiresAt, &v.Corrupt, &verified, &v.SkippedEntries); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if verified.Valid {
			v.VerifiedAt = &verified.Time
		}
		out = append(out, v)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// LatestBackup returns the most recent present backup for a server that has not
// failed a read-back (spec §466 restore), or ErrNotFound. Unlike the list queries
// this selects backup_ref — the caller (the restore handler) hands it to the
// Restorer and never serializes it.
func (p *PGRepo) LatestBackup(ctx context.Context, serverName string) (*BackupRecord, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, server_name, COALESCE(former_owner, ''), backup_ref, COALESCE(size_bytes, 0)
		FROM world_backups WHERE server_name = $1 AND status = 'present' AND corrupt_at IS NULL
		ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1`
	var b BackupRecord
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, serverName).Scan(
		&b.ID, &b.ServerName, &b.FormerOwner, &b.BackupRef, &b.SizeBytes); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &b, nil
}

// BackupByID returns a single present backup by its id, or ErrNotFound.
func (p *PGRepo) BackupByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*BackupRecord, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, server_name, COALESCE(former_owner, ''), backup_ref, COALESCE(size_bytes, 0),
		corrupt_at IS NOT NULL
		FROM world_backups WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'present'`
	var b BackupRecord
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, id).Scan(
		&b.ID, &b.ServerName, &b.FormerOwner, &b.BackupRef, &b.SizeBytes, &b.Corrupt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &b, nil
}

// LastBackupRequest reads the newest backup.create audit row for the server
// since the given time; the created_at index bounds the scan to that window.
func (p *PGRepo) LastBackupRequest(ctx context.Context, serverName string, since time.Time) (time.Time, error) {
	var at sql.NullTime
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT max(created_at) FROM audit_logs
		 WHERE created_at >= $2 AND action = 'backup.create' AND server_name = $1`,
		serverName, since).Scan(&at)
	if err != nil {
		return time.Time{}, err
	}
	return at.Time, nil
}

// BackupStoreBytes sums size_bytes over the present world backups.
func (p *PGRepo) BackupStoreBytes(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
	var n int64
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT COALESCE(sum(size_bytes), 0) FROM world_backups WHERE status = 'present'`).Scan(&n)
	return n, err
}

// ScheduledBackupCandidates is the ScheduleStore behind BackupScheduler. A
// world's point is its current owner's newest intact scheduled backup taken
// since they claimed it: a previous owner's backups say nothing about the world
// the new owner has built, and a corrupt one restores nothing. last_active_at
// moves on every join, so a world nobody joined since its point is skipped. A
// world being given up is skipped too: the reaper archives it anyway, and a
// backup Job holding it when the reaper runs would put the release off a day.
func (p *PGRepo) ScheduledBackupCandidates(ctx context.Context, before time.Time) ([]ScheduledCandidate, error) {
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx,
		`SELECT s.name, s.owner_id FROM servers s
		 LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
		   SELECT max(b.created_at) AS at FROM world_backups b
		   WHERE b.server_name = s.name AND b.reason = 'scheduled' AND b.status = 'present'
		     AND b.corrupt_at IS NULL AND b.former_owner = s.owner_id
		     AND b.created_at >= COALESCE(s.claimed_at, '-infinity')
		 ) pt ON true
		 WHERE s.deleted_at IS NULL AND s.owner_id IS NOT NULL
		   AND s.retire_requested_at IS NULL
		   AND s.last_active_at > COALESCE(pt.at, '-infinity')
		   AND COALESCE(pt.at, '-infinity') < $1
		 ORDER BY pt.at NULLS FIRST, s.name`, before)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []ScheduledCandidate
	for rows.Next() {
		var c ScheduledCandidate
		if err := rows.Scan(&c.Name, &c.OwnerID); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		out = append(out, c)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

func (p *PGRepo) Audit(ctx context.Context, e AuditEntry) error {
	// A nil Payload must land as SQL NULL, not the text "null"; a non-nil Payload is
	// passed as a JSON text the jsonb column parses (same idiom as reaper.PGStore).
	var payload any
	if len(e.Payload) > 0 {
		payload = string(e.Payload)
	}
	// actor_user_id goes through a lookup so an id with no users row (a purged
	// account) lands as NULL instead of failing
	// the foreign key and losing the row.
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO audit_logs (actor, source, action, server_name, request_id, payload,
		                         actor_user_id, client_ip, user_agent)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''), NULLIF($5, ''), $6,
		         (SELECT id FROM users WHERE id = NULLIF($7, '')), NULLIF($8, '')::inet, NULLIF($9, ''))`,
		e.Actor, e.Source, e.Action, e.ServerName, e.RequestID, payload,
		e.ActorUserID, e.ClientIP, e.UserAgent)
	return err
}

// ---- player email verification (spec §B2 onboarding) ----

// CreateEmailOTP supersedes any prior live code for (user, purpose) and inserts the
// fresh one, in one transaction (spec §B2). The supersede DELETE means a re-request
// invalidates the earlier mail, so only the most recent code can ever verify — a
// player who requested twice cannot be confused into typing the stale digits. Only
// the hash is stored; the digits live only in the email.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email, codeHash, purpose string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM email_otps WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL`,
		userID, purpose); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("supersede prior otp: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO email_otps (id, user_id, email, code_hash, purpose, expires_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
		id, userID, email, codeHash, purpose, expiresAt); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("insert otp: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// AddLoginEmailOTP stores a code for a pre-session login door beside the codes
// already mailed for (user, purpose), keeping the newest otpLiveLoginCodes live:
// it drops every unconsumed code outside the newest otpLiveLoginCodes-1 unexpired
// ones (so expired codes go too), then inserts. It never cancels a code just because another start came in, so knowing
// an address is not enough to keep its owner from holding a working code
// (ConsumeLoginEmailOTP accepts any live one).
func (p *PGRepo) AddLoginEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email, codeHash, purpose string, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM email_otps
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL
		   AND id NOT IN (
		       SELECT id FROM email_otps
		       WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $3
		       ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT $4)`,
		userID, purpose, now, otpLiveLoginCodes-1); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("trim live login codes: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO email_otps (id, user_id, email, code_hash, purpose, expires_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
		id, userID, email, codeHash, purpose, expiresAt); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("insert otp: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// VerifyEmailOTP redeems the newest live code for (user, purpose) in one
// transaction (spec §B2). The row is taken FOR UPDATE so a concurrent verify of the
// same code cannot double-spend it. The branch order is deliberate: expiry and the
// attempt cap are checked before the hash compare, so an expired or locked code is
// never silently accepted, and a hash mismatch costs an attempt (UPDATE attempts+1)
// without consuming the code — a typo must not burn a still-valid code. On a match
// the code is consumed and the user row is flipped verified, returning the proven
// address — unless a DIFFERENT account already proved the same address, which is
// ErrEmailTaken with the code left unconsumed (the address, not the guess, is the
// problem). ErrOTPInvalid / ErrOTPLocked / ErrEmailTaken are the only domain errors.
func (p *PGRepo) VerifyEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var (
		id         string
		email      string
		storedHash string
		attempts   int
		expiresAt  time.Time
	)
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT id, email, code_hash, attempts, expires_at FROM email_otps
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL
		 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1 FOR UPDATE`,
		userID, purpose).Scan(&id, &email, &storedHash, &attempts, &expiresAt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", ErrOTPInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return "", err
	}

	if !expiresAt.After(now) {
		return "", ErrOTPInvalid
	}
	if until, err := otpLockedUntil(ctx, tx, userID, purpose, now, true); err != nil {
		return "", err
	} else if !until.IsZero() {
		return "", &OTPAccountLockedError{Until: until}
	}
	if attempts >= otpMaxAttempts {
		return "", ErrOTPLocked
	}
	if storedHash != codeHash {
		return "", chargeOTPMismatch(ctx, tx, userID, purpose, now)
	}

	// A DIFFERENT account may not also prove this address: the pre-session login
	// door resolves accounts BY verified email (UserByEmail), so a second verified
	// holder would make the identity ambiguous. The code is NOT consumed and no
	// attempt is charged — the address, not the guess, is the problem. The check is
	// the application-level counterpart of the users_verified_email_unique index
	// (migration 0020), which catches a cross-user race that passes this SELECT.
	var taken bool
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM users
		 WHERE lower(email) = lower($1) AND email_verified = true AND id <> $2)`,
		email, userID).Scan(&taken); err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("check verified-email uniqueness: %w", err)
	}
	if taken {
		return "", ErrEmailTaken
	}

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE email_otps SET consumed_at = $2 WHERE id = $1`, id, now); err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("consume otp: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE users SET email = $2, email_verified = true WHERE id = $1`, userID, email); err != nil {
		// Lost the race the guarded SELECT above cannot serialise: the index rejects
		// the second write, and it reads as the same answer the sequential path gives.
		// The rollback undoes the OTP consumption with it, so the code stays live.
		if isUniqueViolation(err) {
			return "", ErrEmailTaken
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("mark email verified: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	return email, nil
}

// SetUserEmail records email on the user row WITHOUT verifying it (setup bootstrap
// has no SMTP — the Owner enters an address a later Settings/SMTP flow will verify).
// It clears email_verified in the same write: only VerifyEmailOTP ever sets that
// flag, and it does so only alongside the proven address, so recording a fresh
// (unproven) address must drop any prior verification rather than leave a stale
// email_verified=true asserting an address the user never proved. For a fresh Owner
// the flag is already false, so this is a no-op there.
func (p *PGRepo) SetUserEmail(ctx context.Context, userID, email string) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE users SET email = $2, email_verified = false WHERE id = $1`, userID, email)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// ---- player game-login: username-collision reclaim (spec §B3) ----

// ReclaimUsername bars the squatter UUID and stashes its data hold in one
// transaction (spec §B3 正版优先), returning the hold's EFFECTIVE expiry — the
// value actually persisted, which the caller echoes so the rejected player is
// told the truth about how long their data is kept. The blacklist insert is
// ON CONFLICT (mc_uuid) DO NOTHING; the hold insert is a no-op DO UPDATE so a
// retried reclaim of an already-stashed UUID does not move the original window
// yet RETURNING still fires, handing back the FIRST reclaim's expires_at rather
// than a fresh now()+TTL (DO NOTHING would suppress RETURNING and lose it). The
// two writes share the tx so a failure on the second rolls back the first: the
// system is never left with a barred UUID whose data was never held (data loss)
// nor a hold for a UUID still able to connect (squatter not barred). dataRef ""
// lands as SQL NULL (the column is nullable — archival may be deferred),
// mirroring the NULLIF idiom used for optional text elsewhere.
func (p *PGRepo) ReclaimUsername(ctx context.Context, id, squatterUUID, username, dataRef string, expiresAt time.Time) (time.Time, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return time.Time{}, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO username_blacklist (mc_uuid, username) VALUES ($1, $2)
		 ON CONFLICT (mc_uuid) DO NOTHING`,
		squatterUUID, username); err != nil {
		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("blacklist squatter uuid: %w", err)
	}
	var effective time.Time
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO player_data_holds (id, mc_uuid, username, data_ref, expires_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''), $5)
		 ON CONFLICT (mc_uuid) DO UPDATE SET mc_uuid = EXCLUDED.mc_uuid
		 RETURNING expires_at`,
		id, squatterUUID, username, dataRef, expiresAt).Scan(&effective); err != nil {
		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("stash data hold: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return time.Time{}, err
	}
	return effective, nil
}

// IsUsernameBlacklisted reports whether an in-game UUID is barred by a prior
// reclaim (spec §B3). It is a single EXISTS keyed by the UUID — the genuine
// Mojang player, who shares the contested name under a different UUID, never
// matches.
func (p *PGRepo) IsUsernameBlacklisted(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool, error) {
	var ok bool
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM username_blacklist WHERE mc_uuid = $1)`, mcUUID).Scan(&ok)
	return ok, err
}

// IsProtectedAdminLink reports whether mc_uuid belongs to a Linked Operator/SysAdmin
// who authenticates through the third-party Yggdrasil — the admin-on-Yggdrasil reclaim
// exception (spec §B3). The EXISTS joins account_links to users on exactly three
// conjuncts: the UUID is linked, that link authenticated via 'thirdparty', and the
// linked user is staff (admin OR owner — the Owner is the one identity that must never
// be displaced). It intentionally does not test HOW the account signs in: staff may
// authenticate via SSO (Cloudflare Access, §14) or any local passwordless door and
// must be protected just the same — the sign-in method is orthogonal to "is staff"
// and "logs in via the Login Server". Keyed by UUID, the only identity velocity holds.
func (p *PGRepo) IsProtectedAdminLink(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool, error) {
	var ok bool
	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(
			SELECT 1 FROM account_links al JOIN users u ON u.id = al.user_id
			WHERE al.mc_uuid = $1 AND al.auth_source = 'thirdparty' AND u.role IN ('admin', 'owner'))`,
		mcUUID).Scan(&ok)
	return ok, err
}

// ---- staff account lookups (spec §B, passwordless) ----

// UserByUsername loads a staff login projection by username, or ErrNotFound.
// The account is passwordless — staff authenticate via email-OTP / passkey, so
// no password column is read.
func (p *PGRepo) UserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*StaffUser, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
		FROM users WHERE username = $1`
	var u StaffUser
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, username).Scan(
		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &u, nil
}

// AdminExists reports whether any staff account (admin or owner) already exists. It is the
// break-glass console's bootstrap-vs-recovery switch: false means the typed
// credential mints the first Owner (no prior identity to verify against), true
// means the operator must identify against an existing staff account for accountability.
// It is not on the Repo interface because only the break-glass CLI consults it.
func (p *PGRepo) AdminExists(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
	const q = `SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE role IN ('admin', 'owner') LIMIT 1`
	var one int
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q).Scan(&one); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return false, nil
	case err != nil:
		return false, err
	}
	return true, nil
}

// UserByID loads the same staff projection by id, or ErrNotFound. The
// account is passwordless — no password column is read.
func (p *PGRepo) UserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
		FROM users WHERE id = $1`
	var u StaffUser
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, id).Scan(
		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &u, nil
}

// UpsertOwner creates or resets the Owner account direct-to-Postgres (the
// break-glass first-run / recovery path). role is forced to 'owner' — the
// platform-level identity above admin (migration 0011); every owner-tier route
// and the panel's owner surfaces gate on exactly this role, so writing a plain
// 'admin' here would silently strand them. On a username conflict the email is
// overwritten while the existing id is preserved, so live sessions referencing
// it survive a reset — and the role is re-asserted, which is also the documented
// promotion path for a pre-0011 install whose Owner row is still 'admin'. The
// account is passwordless by design. The empty email is stored as NULL
// (users.email is nullable).
func (p *PGRepo) UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role) VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'owner')
		 ON CONFLICT (username) DO UPDATE SET email = EXCLUDED.email, role = 'owner'`,
		id, username, email)
	return err
}

// OwnerUsername names the single active Owner seat, or "" when no owner exists.
// It backs the console's single-seat guard: once a seat is occupied only that
// username may be re-targeted (see cmd/felis provisionOwner), because a fresh
// name would take the upsert's insert arm and mint a SECOND owner row that no
// supported path can remove (the panel protects every owner row).
func (p *PGRepo) OwnerUsername(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
	var name string
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT username FROM users WHERE role = 'owner' AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1`).Scan(&name); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", nil
	case err != nil:
		return "", err
	default:
		return name, nil
	}
}

// InsertOperator mints a NEW Operator (additional staff admin) account
// direct-to-Postgres. role is forced to 'admin'. UNLIKE UpsertOwner this is
// insert-only: a username conflict leaves the existing row untouched and
// surfaces as ErrConflict — the console routes a rename off that sentinel — so
// adding an Operator can never silently reset the Owner's or another
// Operator's row. The account is passwordless by design. The empty email is
// stored as NULL.
func (p *PGRepo) InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role) VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'admin')`,
		id, username, email)
	if err != nil && isUniqueViolation(err) {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return err
}

// CreateSession records a minted session by the sha-256 of its cookie value
// (spec §B). Only the hash is stored, mirroring tokens.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error {
	reauth := sql.NullTime{Time: s.ReauthAt, Valid: !s.ReauthAt.IsZero()}
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, user_agent, client_ip, reauth_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
		s.TokenHash, s.UserID, s.ExpiresAt, s.UserAgent, s.ClientIP, reauth)
	return err
}

// sessionLive is the condition every reader of live sessions shares, over
// sessions s JOIN users u, with $2 = now and $3 = the staff idle cutoff (now
// minus staffSessionIdle). The disabled/deleted filter is the belt to the doors'
// braces: even a session minted for an account that was alive a moment ago stops
// authenticating the instant the account is disabled or soft-deleted, so every
// authenticated route is fail-closed regardless of which door minted the cookie
// (audit #33). A staff session also dies after sitting idle; a player's lasts
// to its expiry.
const sessionLive = `s.revoked_at IS NULL AND s.expires_at > $2
	AND u.disabled = false AND u.deleted_at IS NULL
	AND (u.role = 'user' OR s.last_seen_at > $3)`

// SessionUser resolves a live session hash to its user, or ErrNotFound.
func (p *PGRepo) SessionUser(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (*SessionedUser, error) {
	const q = `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text, COALESCE(u.email_verified, false),
			s.last_seen_at, s.reauth_at
		FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
		WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND ` + sessionLive
	var u SessionedUser
	var reauth sql.NullTime
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, tokenHash, now, now.Add(-staffSessionIdle)).Scan(
		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified, &u.LastSeenAt, &reauth); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	if reauth.Valid {
		u.ReauthAt = reauth.Time
	}
	return &u, nil
}

// TouchSession advances a session's last_seen_at to now, never backwards.
func (p *PGRepo) TouchSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = $2 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND last_seen_at < $2`,
		tokenHash, now)
	return err
}

// MarkSessionReauth records a proven factor on a live session.
func (p *PGRepo) MarkSessionReauth(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, at time.Time) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET reauth_at = $2 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
		tokenHash, at)
	return err
}

// RevokeSession marks a session revoked (logout). Idempotent: a missing or
// already-revoked session is not an error.
func (p *PGRepo) RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
		tokenHash)
	return err
}

// ---- runtime platform settings (spec §B platform_settings) ----

// GetSetting reads a setting's raw jsonb value as bytes, or ErrNotFound.
func (p *PGRepo) GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error) {
	var value []byte
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT value FROM platform_settings WHERE key = $1`, key).Scan(&value); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return value, nil
}

// SetSetting upserts a setting's raw jsonb value by key. value is cast to jsonb
// so a []byte argument lands in the jsonb column without a driver round-trip
// guessing the type.
func (p *PGRepo) SetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO platform_settings (key, value) VALUES ($1, $2::jsonb)
		 ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value, updated_at = now()`,
		key, string(value))
	return err
}

// ---- player passkey enrollment (spec §14 WebAuthn / Phase 6 bind, migration 0007) ----

// CreatePasskeyChallenge supersedes any prior challenge for (user, purpose) and inserts
// the fresh one, in one transaction (mirrors CreateEmailOTP). The supersede DELETE
// removes ALL prior rows for (user, purpose) — not just the live one — so a re-begin
// invalidates the earlier ceremony AND reaps any already-consumed or expired row it left
// behind. That bounds the table at one row per (user, purpose): the begin→finish loop
// nets zero growth, since each begin sweeps the consumed row the previous finish stamped.
// (Deleting a consumed row is safe: it has already been redeemed and nothing reads it.)
// Begins for one (user, purpose) take a transaction-scoped advisory lock first: without
// it two racing begins each delete what the other has not committed yet and both insert,
// leaving extra rows that only the next begin sweeps.
// The opaque SessionData is held server-side so the client cannot forge the challenge
// it must answer at finish.
func (p *PGRepo) CreatePasskeyChallenge(ctx context.Context, id, userID, purpose string, sessionData []byte, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext('passkey-challenge:' || $1 || ':' || $2))`,
		userID, purpose); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("lock passkey challenges: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_challenges WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2`,
		userID, purpose); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("supersede prior passkey challenge: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO webauthn_challenges (id, user_id, purpose, session_data, expires_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)`,
		id, userID, purpose, sessionData, expiresAt); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("insert passkey challenge: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser redeems the newest live (unconsumed, unexpired at now)
// challenge for (user, purpose) in one transaction (mirrors VerifyEmailOTP). The row is
// taken FOR UPDATE so a concurrent finish cannot double-spend it; expiry is checked
// before consuming so a stale challenge is never accepted. On success consumed_at is
// stamped (single-use) and the stashed SessionData is returned. No live row →
// ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var (
		id          string
		sessionData []byte
		expiresAt   time.Time
	)
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT id, session_data, expires_at FROM webauthn_challenges
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL
		 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1 FOR UPDATE`,
		userID, purpose).Scan(&id, &sessionData, &expiresAt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}

	if !expiresAt.After(now) {
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE webauthn_challenges SET consumed_at = $2 WHERE id = $1`, id, now); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume passkey challenge: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return sessionData, nil
}

// maxLiveChallengesPerSource bounds the live login challenges one source (an IPv4
// address or IPv6 /48, see challengeSource) holds in each login store. A ceremony
// takes seconds and a challenge lives passkeyChallengeTTL, so a network with a few
// dozen people signing in at once stays well inside it, while a flood of begins
// fills its own allowance and leaves the other networks their sign-ins. Each store's
// begins from one source serialise on a transaction-scoped advisory lock
// (lockChallengeSource), so racing begins cannot all pass one count.
const maxLiveChallengesPerSource = 32

// lockChallengeSource takes the advisory lock that makes a login store's per-source
// count and insert one decision. store names the table, so the two stores' allowances
// for one source never wait on each other. The lock is released at commit or rollback.
func lockChallengeSource(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, store, source string) error {
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1 || ':' || $2))`, store, source); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("lock %s source: %w", store, err)
	}
	return nil
}

// AddPasskeyLoginChallenge stores an email-first login ceremony beside the ones
// already live for (user, purpose); finish finds it by the challenge the browser
// signed (ConsumePasskeyLoginChallenge), so a begin by anyone who knows the address
// never cancels its owner's ceremony. Under the source's lock it reaps the account's
// spent login rows, refuses with ErrTooManyPasskeyChallenges once source holds
// maxLiveChallengesPerSource live login challenges, then inserts.
func (p *PGRepo) AddPasskeyLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, id, userID, purpose, source, challenge string, sessionData []byte, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if err := lockChallengeSource(ctx, tx, "webauthn_challenges", source); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_challenges
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND (expires_at <= $3 OR consumed_at IS NOT NULL)`,
		userID, purpose, now); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("reap login challenges: %w", err)
	}
	var fromSource int
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT count(*) FROM webauthn_challenges
		 WHERE source = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2`,
		source, now).Scan(&fromSource); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("count login challenges: %w", err)
	}
	if fromSource >= maxLiveChallengesPerSource {
		return ErrTooManyPasskeyChallenges
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO webauthn_challenges (id, user_id, purpose, session_data, expires_at, challenge, source)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)`,
		id, userID, purpose, sessionData, expiresAt, challenge, source); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("insert login challenge: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// ConsumePasskeyLoginChallenge redeems the live login challenge of (user, purpose)
// whose challenge is the one the browser signed, single-use: the row is taken FOR
// UPDATE, expiry is checked against now, consumed_at is stamped, and the stashed
// SessionData is returned. No such live row → ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumePasskeyLoginChallenge(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, challenge string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var (
		id          string
		sessionData []byte
		expiresAt   time.Time
	)
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT id, session_data, expires_at FROM webauthn_challenges
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND challenge = $3 AND consumed_at IS NULL
		 FOR UPDATE`,
		userID, purpose, challenge).Scan(&id, &sessionData, &expiresAt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	if !expiresAt.After(now) {
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE webauthn_challenges SET consumed_at = $2 WHERE id = $1`, id, now); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume login challenge: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return sessionData, nil
}

// ---- discoverable ("usernameless") passkey login (task #40, migration 0013) ----

// maxLiveDiscoverableChallenges hard-bounds the non-user-keyed discoverable-login challenge
// store: once this many LIVE (unexpired, unconsumed) rows exist, a new begin is refused
// (ErrTooManyPasskeyChallenges → 429). Each source is held to maxLiveChallengesPerSource
// first, so filling the store takes this many / 32 distinct networks; a row is a few hundred
// bytes, so the ceiling is a few MB.
const maxLiveDiscoverableChallenges = 16384

// CreateDiscoverableChallenge stashes a discoverable-login ceremony under an opaque handle,
// bounding the table in one transaction (see the Repo interface for the full contract).
// Under the source's lock it reaps expired/consumed rows, then refuses when source already
// holds maxLiveChallengesPerSource live rows or the table holds
// maxLiveDiscoverableChallenges. Because the reap ran first, the counts are exactly the live
// rows, so the bounds hold under an adversarial begin-flood (which a reap alone cannot: a
// burst inside the TTL leaves every fresh row live). The per-source bound is exact; the
// table bound can be passed by begins from different sources racing the same count, at
// most one row per open connection, which leaves the few-MB ceiling where it was.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateDiscoverableChallenge(ctx context.Context, id, source string, sessionData []byte, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if err := lockChallengeSource(ctx, tx, "webauthn_discoverable_challenges", source); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_discoverable_challenges WHERE expires_at <= $1 OR consumed_at IS NOT NULL`,
		now); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("reap discoverable challenges: %w", err)
	}
	var live, fromSource int
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT count(*), count(*) FILTER (WHERE source = $1) FROM webauthn_discoverable_challenges`,
		source).Scan(&live, &fromSource); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("count discoverable challenges: %w", err)
	}
	if fromSource >= maxLiveChallengesPerSource || live >= maxLiveDiscoverableChallenges {
		return ErrTooManyPasskeyChallenges
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO webauthn_discoverable_challenges (id, session_data, expires_at, source)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)`,
		id, sessionData, expiresAt, source); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("insert discoverable challenge: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// ConsumeDiscoverableChallenge redeems the challenge under handle id, single-use (see the Repo
// interface for the contract). The row is taken FOR UPDATE so a concurrent finish cannot
// double-spend it; expiry is checked before consuming. No live row → ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeDiscoverableChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) ([]byte, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	var (
		sessionData []byte
		expiresAt   time.Time
	)
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT session_data, expires_at FROM webauthn_discoverable_challenges
		 WHERE id = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL FOR UPDATE`,
		id).Scan(&sessionData, &expiresAt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}

	if !expiresAt.After(now) {
		return nil, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE webauthn_discoverable_challenges SET consumed_at = $2 WHERE id = $1`, id, now); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("consume discoverable challenge: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return sessionData, nil
}

// CreatePasskeyCredential stores a freshly verified passkey (enrollment). Only public
// attestation material is written; a credential_id already bound to ANY account is left
// untouched (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING) and reported as ErrConflict via a zero RowsAffected,
// so an authenticator is never silently rebound. Empty aaguid/name land as SQL NULL.
func (p *PGRepo) CreatePasskeyCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasskeyCredential) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO webauthn_credentials
		   (id, user_id, credential_id, public_key, sign_count, aaguid, name, created_at,
		    user_verified, backup_eligible, backup_state)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, NULLIF($6, ''), NULLIF($7, ''), $8, $9, $10, $11)
		 ON CONFLICT (credential_id) DO NOTHING`,
		c.ID, c.UserID, c.CredentialID, c.PublicKey, int64(c.SignCount), c.AAGUID, c.Name, c.CreatedAt,
		c.UserVerified, c.BackupEligible, c.BackupState)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return nil
}

// PasskeyCredentialsForUser lists the passkeys a user has bound, newest first, for the
// credential-management view. Nullable aaguid/name collapse to "" via COALESCE; the
// nullable last_used_at maps to a *time.Time (nil until an assertion is verified).
func (p *PGRepo) PasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]PasskeyCredential, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, user_id, credential_id, public_key, sign_count,
		COALESCE(aaguid, ''), COALESCE(name, ''), created_at, last_used_at,
		user_verified, backup_eligible, backup_state
		FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC`
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []PasskeyCredential
	for rows.Next() {
		var (
			c         PasskeyCredential
			signCount int64
			lastUsed  sql.NullTime
		)
		if err := rows.Scan(&c.ID, &c.UserID, &c.CredentialID, &c.PublicKey, &signCount,
			&c.AAGUID, &c.Name, &c.CreatedAt, &lastUsed,
			&c.UserVerified, &c.BackupEligible, &c.BackupState); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		c.SignCount = uint32(signCount)
		if lastUsed.Valid {
			t := lastUsed.Time
			c.LastUsedAt = &t
		}
		out = append(out, c)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// AdvanceCredentialSignCount records a successful assertion on the passkey identified by
// credentialID: it advances the stored signature counter to newSignCount and stamps
// last_used_at. credential_id is UNIQUE so exactly one row is touched; a missing row (the
// credential was unbound mid-ceremony) affects zero rows and is a successful no-op, never an
// error — the assertion is already cryptographically complete by the time this runs.
//
// The counter only moves forward: two assertions verified at once against the same stored
// value land in either order, and the lower one must not overwrite the higher, or a clone
// replaying the count in between would pass the next check.
func (p *PGRepo) AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE webauthn_credentials SET sign_count = GREATEST(sign_count, $2), last_used_at = $3
		  WHERE credential_id = $1`,
		credentialID, int64(newSignCount), usedAt)
	return err
}

// DeletePasskeyCredential removes the passkey row id, scoped to userID so a caller can
// only unbind their OWN credential. No matching (user, id) row → ErrNotFound via a zero
// RowsAffected, so a stale or cross-user id cannot silently no-op as success.
func (p *PGRepo) DeletePasskeyCredential(ctx context.Context, userID, id string) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
	// Lock the user row first: every delete for this user queues here, so the count
	// below cannot go stale between the check and the DELETE.
	var verified bool
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT email_verified FROM users WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE`, userID).Scan(&verified); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return err
	}
	var mine, total int
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT count(*) FILTER (WHERE id = $2), count(*) FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = $1`,
		userID, id).Scan(&mine, &total); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if mine == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	if total == 1 && !verified {
		return ErrLastPasskey
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2`, id, userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser unbinds every passkey a user holds. Unlike the
// single-credential delete this does NOT report ErrNotFound on zero rows: removing all of
// a user's passkeys when they have none is a successful no-op, since "the user holds no
// passkeys" is exactly the intended post-condition. It is the remediation that stops a
// passkey planted through a transiently-hijacked session from surviving; its production
// caller is the owner-tier DELETE /users/{id}/passkeys, which a complete remediation
// pairs with a session revoke (unbinding alone leaves the live hijacked session).
func (p *PGRepo) DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = $1`, userID)
	return err
}

// ---- user admin (spec §7, admin-only) ----

// ListUsers returns a page of non-deleted users matching the optional filters,
// newest first. total is the unfiltered count so the admin page can render
// pagination without a second round-trip.
func (p *PGRepo) ListUsers(ctx context.Context, opts ListUsersOpts) ([]UserView, int, error) {
	var total int
	{
		q := `SELECT count(*) FROM users WHERE deleted_at IS NULL`
		if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q).Scan(&total); err != nil {
			return nil, 0, err
		}
	}

	limit := opts.Limit
	if limit <= 0 || limit > 100 {
		limit = 20
	}
	offset := opts.Offset
	if offset < 0 {
		offset = 0
	}

	// Build the WHERE clause from filters. All args are positional so the order
	// of appends must match.
	where := ` WHERE u.deleted_at IS NULL`
	var args []any
	argn := 0

	if opts.Query != "" {
		argn++
		where += fmt.Sprintf(` AND (u.username ILIKE '%%' || $%d || '%%' OR u.email ILIKE '%%' || $%d || '%%')`, argn, argn)
		args = append(args, opts.Query)
	}
	if opts.Role != "" {
		argn++
		where += fmt.Sprintf(` AND u.role::text = $%d`, argn)
		args = append(args, opts.Role)
	}
	switch opts.Hidden {
	case "true":
		where += ` AND u.disabled = true`
	case "false":
		where += ` AND u.disabled = false`
	}

	q := `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text,
		u.disabled, u.email_verified,
		u.created_at, u.updated_at,
		COALESCE((SELECT count(*) FROM servers s WHERE s.owner_id = u.id AND s.deleted_at IS NULL), 0)
	  FROM users u` + where
	argn++
	q += fmt.Sprintf(` ORDER BY u.created_at DESC LIMIT $%d OFFSET $%d`, argn, argn+1)
	args = append(args, limit, offset)

	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, args...)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, 0, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()

	var out []UserView
	for rows.Next() {
		var v UserView
		if err := rows.Scan(&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
			&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
			&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); err != nil {
			return nil, 0, err
		}
		out = append(out, v)
	}
	return out, total, rows.Err()
}

// UserDetail loads one user with its linked MC accounts, or ErrNotFound.
func (p *PGRepo) UserDetail(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserDetail, error) {
	const q = `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text,
		u.disabled, u.email_verified,
		u.created_at, u.updated_at, u.deleted_at,
		COALESCE((SELECT count(*) FROM servers s WHERE s.owner_id = u.id AND s.deleted_at IS NULL), 0)
	  FROM users u WHERE u.id = $1`
	var d UserDetail
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, userID).Scan(
		&d.ID, &d.Username, &d.Email, &d.Role,
		&d.Disabled, &d.EmailVerified,
		&d.CreatedAt, &d.UpdatedAt, &d.DeletedAt, &d.ServerCount); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}

	// Load linked MC accounts.
	linkRows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx,
		`SELECT mc_uuid::text, COALESCE(auth_source, 'mojang'), verified_at
		 FROM account_links WHERE user_id = $1 ORDER BY verified_at`, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return &d, nil // best-effort; linked accounts are informational
	}
	defer linkRows.Close()
	for linkRows.Next() {
		var a LinkedAccount
		if err := linkRows.Scan(&a.MCUUID, &a.AuthSource, &a.VerifiedAt); err != nil {
			return &d, nil
		}
		d.LinkedAccounts = append(d.LinkedAccounts, a)
	}
	return &d, linkRows.Err()
}

// CreateUser mints a new user row. A username conflict → ErrConflict.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, input CreateUserInput, _ string) (*UserView, error) {
	const q = `INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role)
		VALUES (gen_random_uuid()::text, $1, NULLIF($2, ''), $3::user_role)
		ON CONFLICT (username) DO NOTHING
		RETURNING id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled, email_verified,
			created_at, updated_at, 0`
	var v UserView
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q,
		input.Username, input.Email, input.Role).Scan(
		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrConflict
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// UpdateUser applies the non-nil fields of patch and returns the updated view.
// A username conflict → ErrConflict; a non-existent user → ErrNotFound.
func (p *PGRepo) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, patch UpdateUserInput, _ string) (*UserView, error) {
	// Build a dynamic SET clause from non-nil patch fields.
	var sets []string
	var args []any
	argn := 0
	if patch.Username != nil {
		argn++
		sets = append(sets, fmt.Sprintf("username = $%d", argn))
		args = append(args, *patch.Username)
	}
	if patch.Email != nil {
		argn++
		// Changing the address voids any proof of it: only VerifyEmailOTP may assert
		// a verified address (mirrors SetUserEmail's rationale — a fresh, unproven
		// value must not keep a stale verified flag that would let the pre-session
		// email login resolve the account). A no-op edit that passes the same value
		// keeps the flag; the second expression reads the OLD row, so comparing
		// there is exact.
		sets = append(sets,
			fmt.Sprintf("email = NULLIF($%d, '')", argn),
			fmt.Sprintf("email_verified = (email_verified AND email IS NOT DISTINCT FROM NULLIF($%d, ''))", argn))
		args = append(args, *patch.Email)
	}
	if patch.Role != nil {
		argn++
		sets = append(sets, fmt.Sprintf("role = $%d::user_role", argn))
		args = append(args, *patch.Role)
	}
	if len(sets) == 0 {
		// No fields to update; return the current view.
		v, err := p.userView(ctx, userID)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		return v, nil
	}
	argn++
	args = append(args, userID)

	q := "UPDATE users SET " + sets[0]
	for _, s := range sets[1:] {
		q += ", " + s
	}
	q += fmt.Sprintf(` WHERE id = $%d AND deleted_at IS NULL`, argn)
	q += ` RETURNING id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled,
		email_verified, created_at, updated_at,
		(SELECT count(*) FROM servers WHERE owner_id = users.id AND deleted_at IS NULL)`
	var v UserView
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, args...).Scan(
		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		// A username UNIQUE violation surfaces as a driver error; map it to
		// ErrConflict so the handler can answer 409.
		if isUniqueViolation(err) {
			return nil, ErrConflict
		}
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// userView returns a live user's projection, or ErrNotFound. It is the read half
// shared by UpdateUser (no-op return) and several other paths.
func (p *PGRepo) userView(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserView, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled,
		email_verified, created_at, updated_at,
		(SELECT count(*) FROM servers WHERE owner_id = users.id AND deleted_at IS NULL)
		FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
	var v UserView
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, userID).Scan(
		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// DeleteUser soft-deletes a user in one transaction: sets deleted_at, revokes
// every live session, releases every owned server, and severs the account's
// identity assets (passkey credentials, Minecraft links) so a closed account
// cannot keep a login credential or pin an in-game identity via
// UNIQUE(mc_uuid)(audit #33). The user row is preserved so audit_logs.actor
// references survive.
func (p *PGRepo) DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, userID, _ string) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback()

	// Verify the user exists and is not already deleted.
	var exists bool
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL)`,
		userID).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if !exists {
		return ErrNotFound
	}

	// Release all owned servers, emptying their wake allowlists: the players on
	// them were the departing owner's to vouch for (ClaimServer does the same).
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`WITH released AS (
		   UPDATE servers SET owner_id = NULL WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL RETURNING name)
		 DELETE FROM server_allowlist WHERE server_name IN (SELECT name FROM released)`,
		userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// Revoke every live session.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
		userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// Sever the login credentials and in-game bindings: a passkey is a standing
	// login foothold and occupies credential_id UNIQUE, and an account_links row
	// would keep the Minecraft UUID claimed forever, blocking any future binding.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE user_id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_links WHERE user_id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// Soft-delete the user row.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE users SET disabled = true, deleted_at = now() WHERE id = $1`,
		userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	return tx.Commit()
}

// SetUserDisabled flips the disabled flag. Setting disabled→true additionally
// revokes every live session so the account is immediately locked out. Both land
// in one transaction: a disable whose revocation failed is rolled back and
// reported, so the admin never reads "disabled" while a session still stands.
func (p *PGRepo) SetUserDisabled(ctx context.Context, userID string, disabled bool) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()

	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE users SET disabled = $2 WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID, disabled)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil {
		return err
	} else if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}

	if disabled {
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
			`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
			userID); err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// ---- quota admin ----

// GetQuotas returns the quotas row for a user, or a zero-value view when no
// row exists (meaning unlimited). An unknown or soft-deleted user id is
// ErrNotFound, never a zero-value "unlimited" answer — the admin sub-resource
// routes all 404 on a user that has no live row.
func (p *PGRepo) GetQuotas(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*QuotaView, error) {
	if err := p.requireLiveUser(ctx, userID); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	const q = `SELECT user_id, max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb
		FROM quotas WHERE user_id = $1`
	v := QuotaView{UserID: userID}
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, userID).Scan(
		&v.UserID, &v.MaxServers, &v.MaxCPUMilli, &v.MaxMemoryMB, &v.MaxStorageGB); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return &v, nil
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// requireLiveUser gates the user-scoped admin sub-resources (quotas, account
// links) on a live users row. Without it a write would hit the user_id foreign
// key and surface as an opaque 500, and the read would answer as if a
// never-existed id did; every admin route answers ErrNotFound → 404 instead.
func (p *PGRepo) requireLiveUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) error {
	var ok bool
	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL)`,
		userID).Scan(&ok); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if !ok {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// SetQuotas replaces the user's quotas row. A nil field stores NULL, which every
// quota gate reads as unlimited; any other value is the cap, 0 included. The form
// always carries all four caps, so clearing one is a matter of leaving it out.
func (p *PGRepo) SetQuotas(ctx context.Context, userID string, qi QuotaInput, setBy string) (*QuotaView, error) {
	if err := p.requireLiveUser(ctx, userID); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	v := QuotaView{}
	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO quotas (user_id, updated_by, max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
		 ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET updated_by = EXCLUDED.updated_by,
		   max_servers = EXCLUDED.max_servers, max_cpu_milli = EXCLUDED.max_cpu_milli,
		   max_memory_mb = EXCLUDED.max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb = EXCLUDED.max_storage_gb
		 RETURNING user_id, max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb`,
		userID, setBy, qi.MaxServers, qi.MaxCPUMilli, qi.MaxMemoryMB, qi.MaxStorageGB).Scan(
		&v.UserID, &v.MaxServers, &v.MaxCPUMilli, &v.MaxMemoryMB, &v.MaxStorageGB); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// ---- session admin ----

// ListUserSessions returns every live session for a user, most recently seen first.
func (p *PGRepo) ListUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID string, now time.Time) ([]SessionView, error) {
	const q = `SELECT s.token_hash, s.created_at, s.expires_at, s.last_seen_at, s.user_agent, s.client_ip
		FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
		WHERE s.user_id = $1 AND ` + sessionLive + `
		ORDER BY s.last_seen_at DESC, s.created_at DESC`
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, userID, now, now.Add(-staffSessionIdle))
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []SessionView
	for rows.Next() {
		var s SessionView
		if err := rows.Scan(&s.TokenHash, &s.CreatedAt, &s.ExpiresAt, &s.LastSeenAt, &s.UserAgent, &s.ClientIP); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		out = append(out, s)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// RevokeAllUserSessions marks every live session of userID revoked.
func (p *PGRepo) RevokeAllUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID string) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
		userID)
	return err
}

// RevokeUserSession revokes one unexpired session of userID, or reports
// ErrNotFound when the hash names no such session. The user_id condition is what
// keeps a hash from one account from ending a session of another.
func (p *PGRepo) RevokeUserSession(ctx context.Context, userID, tokenHash string) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now()
		 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND user_id = $2 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at > now()`,
		tokenHash, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// RevokeOtherUserSessions revokes every unexpired session of userID but
// keepTokenHash, returning how many it ended.
func (p *PGRepo) RevokeOtherUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID, keepTokenHash string) (int, error) {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now()
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND token_hash <> $2 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at > now()`,
		userID, keepTokenHash)
	if err != nil {
		return 0, err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	return int(n), err
}

// ---- account-link admin ----

// UnlinkAccount removes a single (user_id, mc_uuid) binding.
func (p *PGRepo) UnlinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, mcUUID string) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_links WHERE user_id = $1 AND mc_uuid = $2`,
		userID, mcUUID)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// LinkAccount force-binds a UUID to a user. A UUID already linked to a different
// user → ErrConflict; same (user, uuid) pair is idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO
// NOTHING on the UNIQUE(mc_uuid) constraint, plus an idempotency check via
// EXISTS).
func (p *PGRepo) LinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, mcUUID, authSource string) error {
	if err := p.requireLiveUser(ctx, userID); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	// Check idempotency first: already linked to this user → success.
	var exists bool
	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM account_links WHERE user_id = $1 AND mc_uuid = $2)`,
		userID, mcUUID).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if exists {
		return nil
	}

	// Try insert. The UNIQUE(mc_uuid) constraint will reject a UUID already
	// bound to a different user.
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO account_links (user_id, mc_uuid, auth_source, verified_at)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, now())
		 ON CONFLICT (mc_uuid) DO NOTHING`,
		userID, mcUUID, authSource)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return nil
}

// ---- account migration (spec §B3 inherit, scenario A) ----

// StartMigration puts a live source account into migrate mode. It supersedes any
// earlier unfinished migration for the source (so re-running /felis migrate restarts
// cleanly, invalidating a prior outstanding code) and inserts a fresh 'initiated' row,
// both under one transaction so the partial unique index never sees two live rows.
//
// Starts for one source serialise on a transaction-scoped advisory lock, so racing
// starts each supersede the one before instead of tripping the unique index. The
// liveness check rides on the INSERT, after the supersede: a redeem of this source holds
// the code_issued row until it commits, the supersede waits on that row, and the INSERT's
// fresh snapshot then sees the source retired (a check before the wait would not).
func (p *PGRepo) StartMigration(ctx context.Context, id, sourceUserID string, now time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext('account-migration:' || $1))`, sourceUserID); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("lock migration source: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`DELETE FROM account_migrations WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state <> 'redeemed'`,
		sourceUserID); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	// The source must be a live (non-deleted) account; a retired one can never
	// re-initiate a migration.
	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO account_migrations (id, source_user_id, state, created_at, updated_at)
		 SELECT $1, $2, 'initiated', $3, $3
		 WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE id = $2 AND deleted_at IS NULL)`,
		id, sourceUserID, now)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// MigrationForSource loads the live (non-redeemed) migration for a source, or
// ErrNotFound when none is in flight.
func (p *PGRepo) MigrationForSource(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*MigrationView, error) {
	const q = `SELECT id, source_user_id, COALESCE(target_user_id, ''), state,
		COALESCE(confirm_factor, ''), COALESCE(confirm_session, ''), confirmed_at,
		code_expires_at, created_at
		FROM account_migrations
		WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state <> 'redeemed'`
	var v MigrationView
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, sourceUserID).Scan(
		&v.ID, &v.SourceUserID, &v.TargetUserID, &v.State,
		&v.ConfirmFactor, &v.ConfirmSession, &v.ConfirmedAt, &v.CodeExpiresAt, &v.CreatedAt); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &v, nil
}

// ConfirmMigration moves the source's migration to 'confirmed', stamping the step-up
// factor, time and session. It advances only from where migrationStage puts a caller
// back at the step-up (0 rows → ErrConflict): 'initiated', a confirmation that lapsed
// or belongs to another session, or a code that expired unspent, which it clears.
func (p *PGRepo) ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor, session string, now time.Time) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE account_migrations
		 SET state = 'confirmed', confirm_factor = $2, confirmed_at = $3, confirm_session = $4,
		     target_user_id = NULL, code_hash = NULL, code_expires_at = NULL
		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND (
		   state = 'initiated'
		   OR (state = 'confirmed' AND (confirm_session IS DISTINCT FROM $4 OR confirmed_at <= $5))
		   OR (state = 'code_issued' AND code_expires_at <= $3))`,
		sourceUserID, factor, now, session, now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow))
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return nil
}

// IssueMigrationCode advances 'confirmed' → 'code_issued', binding the target and
// storing the one-time code hash + TTL. The confirmation must be this session's and
// younger than migrateConfirmWindow at now. The caller has already validated the
// target is a live account other than the source; the target FK is the backstop.
// Anything else → ErrConflict.
func (p *PGRepo) IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, session, codeHash string, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE account_migrations
		 SET state = 'code_issued', target_user_id = $2, code_hash = $3, code_expires_at = $4
		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state = 'confirmed'
		   AND confirm_session = $5 AND confirmed_at > $6`,
		sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash, expiresAt, session, now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow))
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrConflict
	}
	return nil
}

// RedeemMigration performs the atomic transfer + retirement in one transaction. See
// the interface doc for the full contract.
func (p *PGRepo) RedeemMigration(ctx context.Context, targetUserID, codeHash string, now time.Time) (string, []string, error) {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	// Find and lock the pending migration whose named target is exactly this user. A
	// code whose target is a different user simply does not match — an intercepted
	// code is useless to a non-target. FOR UPDATE serializes concurrent redeems.
	var migID, sourceUserID string
	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT id, source_user_id FROM account_migrations
		 WHERE code_hash = $1 AND target_user_id = $2 AND state = 'code_issued'
		   AND code_expires_at > $3
		 FOR UPDATE`,
		codeHash, targetUserID, now).Scan(&migID, &sourceUserID); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", nil, ErrLinkCodeInvalid
	case err != nil:
		return "", nil, err
	}

	// Take both accounts' claim lanes, ClaimServer's lock, in id order so two
	// migrations crossing between the same pair cannot deadlock. The target's makes
	// the quota read below and the move one consistent decision against its own
	// claims; the source's keeps a claim of its own from landing between the count
	// of its servers and their move.
	lanes := []string{sourceUserID, targetUserID}
	if lanes[1] < lanes[0] {
		lanes[0], lanes[1] = lanes[1], lanes[0]
	}
	for _, id := range lanes {
		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext($1))`, id); err != nil {
			return "", nil, err
		}
	}

	// The target's four caps (spec §9.3) must hold with every server the source owns
	// added in, as a claim of each would. Over any cap, nothing moves and the code
	// stays unspent, so the target can have an admin raise its quota and redeem again
	// before the code expires. A source that owns nothing moves nothing, and retires
	// even into a target already over a cap.
	var n, cpu, mem, stor int64
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT COUNT(*), COALESCE(SUM(cached_cpu_milli), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_memory_mb), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_storage_mb), 0)
		 FROM servers WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
		sourceUserID).Scan(&n, &cpu, &mem, &stor); err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}
	if n > 0 {
		var maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor sql.NullInt64
		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
			`SELECT max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, max_storage_gb
			 FROM quotas WHERE user_id = $1`, targetUserID).Scan(
			&maxServers, &maxCPU, &maxMem, &maxStor); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
			return "", nil, err
		}
		var count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum int64
		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
			`SELECT COUNT(*), COALESCE(SUM(cached_cpu_milli), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_memory_mb), 0), COALESCE(SUM(cached_storage_mb), 0)
			 FROM servers WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
			targetUserID).Scan(&count, &cpuSum, &memSum, &storSum); err != nil {
			return "", nil, err
		}
		if !quotaAllows(maxServers, maxCPU, maxMem, maxStor, count, cpuSum, memSum, storSum,
			n, ResourceSpec{CPUMilli: int(cpu), MemoryMB: int(mem), StorageMB: int(stor)}) {
			return "", nil, ErrQuotaExceeded
		}
	}

	// Re-point every server the source owns to the target, collecting the names for
	// the audit trail. Server ownership is the only thing that moves.
	rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE servers SET owner_id = $2, claimed_at = now()
		 WHERE owner_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
		 RETURNING name`,
		sourceUserID, targetUserID)
	if err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}
	var moved []string
	for rows.Next() {
		var name string
		if err := rows.Scan(&name); err != nil {
			rows.Close()
			return "", nil, err
		}
		moved = append(moved, name)
	}
	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
		rows.Close()
		return "", nil, err
	}
	rows.Close()

	// Retire the source: revoke its live sessions and soft-delete it so it can neither
	// log in nor start another migration (double-spend defense). The servers just moved
	// away, so there is nothing left to release.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
		sourceUserID); err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE users SET disabled = true, deleted_at = now() WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
		sourceUserID); err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}

	// Mark the migration terminal.
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE account_migrations SET state = 'redeemed', redeemed_at = $2 WHERE id = $1`,
		migID, now); err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}

	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return "", nil, err
	}
	return sourceUserID, moved, nil
}

// ---- pre-session email login (spec §B) ----

// UserByEmail resolves a VERIFIED email address to its login projection, or
// ErrNotFound. Only a proven (email_verified true) address resolves, so a
// merely-asserted address never reaches a session-mintable identity. The
// account is passwordless — no password column is read.
func (p *PGRepo) UserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (*StaffUser, error) {
	// lower() on both sides honors the interface's case-insensitivity contract
	// and matches the users_verified_email_unique index (lower(email)).
	// Disabled and soft-deleted accounts are invisible here on purpose: every caller
	// is a pre-session LOGIN door (console email/passkey, op-login, /auth/options),
	// and a dead account must not be able to mint a session again — deletion and the
	// disable lockout would otherwise be bypassable by simply logging in (audit #33).
	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
		FROM users WHERE lower(email) = lower($1) AND email_verified = true
		  AND disabled = false AND deleted_at IS NULL`
	var u StaffUser
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, email).Scan(
		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	return &u, nil
}

// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP redeems a live code for the PRE-SESSION login doors (and
// the step-up doors, which keep one code live) in one transaction. Every live,
// unexpired code for (user, purpose) is taken FOR UPDATE, since a login door keeps
// several (AddLoginEmailOTP). The branch order matches VerifyEmailOTP: nothing live
// is ErrOTPInvalid; the account lock comes next; when every live code has used up
// its attempts the answer is ErrOTPLocked; a code matching none charges one attempt
// to each code still open and one failure to the account, and consumes nothing. A
// match consumes that code and every other live one for (user, purpose): the
// sign-in they were mailed for has happened. There are no identity side-effects:
// it neither writes users.email nor runs the verified-email uniqueness guard —
// login already resolved the userID via UserByEmail, which requires
// email_verified, so the address is settled. Errors are exactly ErrOTPInvalid /
// ErrOTPLocked / *OTPAccountLockedError.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) error {
	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit

	rows, err := tx.QueryContext(ctx,
		`SELECT code_hash, attempts FROM email_otps
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $3
		 FOR UPDATE`,
		userID, purpose, now)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	var live, open int
	matched := false
	for rows.Next() {
		var (
			storedHash string
			attempts   int
		)
		if err := rows.Scan(&storedHash, &attempts); err != nil {
			rows.Close()
			return err
		}
		live++
		if attempts < otpMaxAttempts {
			open++
			matched = matched || storedHash == codeHash
		}
	}
	rows.Close()
	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if live == 0 {
		// Nothing live: never minted, already consumed, trimmed, or expired.
		return ErrOTPInvalid
	}
	if until, err := otpLockedUntil(ctx, tx, userID, purpose, now, true); err != nil {
		return err
	} else if !until.IsZero() {
		return &OTPAccountLockedError{Until: until}
	}
	if open == 0 {
		return ErrOTPLocked
	}
	if !matched {
		return chargeOTPMismatch(ctx, tx, userID, purpose, now)
	}

	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE email_otps SET consumed_at = $3
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL`,
		userID, purpose, now); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("consume otp: %w", err)
	}
	return tx.Commit()
}

// OTPLockedUntil reads the (user, purpose) wrong-code lock for a start door.
func (p *PGRepo) OTPLockedUntil(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose string, now time.Time) (time.Time, error) {
	return otpLockedUntil(ctx, p.db, userID, purpose, now, false)
}

// otpQuerier is the read half shared by *sql.DB and *sql.Tx.
type otpQuerier interface {
	QueryRowContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) *sql.Row
}

// otpLockedUntil returns when the (user, purpose) lock ends, or zero when the
// budget is not spent in the current window. forUpdate takes the row lock so a
// redeem serialises its check with its own charge.
func otpLockedUntil(ctx context.Context, q otpQuerier, userID, purpose string, now time.Time, forUpdate bool) (time.Time, error) {
	query := `SELECT window_start, failures FROM otp_failure_windows WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2`
	if forUpdate {
		query += ` FOR UPDATE`
	}
	var (
		start    time.Time
		failures int
	)
	switch err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, userID, purpose).Scan(&start, &failures); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return time.Time{}, nil
	case err != nil:
		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("read otp failure budget: %w", err)
	}
	return otpLockEnd(start, failures, now), nil
}

// otpLockEnd is the lock rule on one budget row: spent inside a live window.
func otpLockEnd(windowStart time.Time, failures int, now time.Time) time.Time {
	end := windowStart.Add(otpFailureWindow)
	if failures < otpFailureBudget || !end.After(now) {
		return time.Time{}
	}
	return end
}

// chargeOTPMismatch records one wrong guess against every live code of (user,
// purpose) that still has attempts left and against the account budget, commits,
// and returns what the caller should answer: ErrOTPInvalid, or the lock this guess
// just tripped. The caller holds those codes FOR UPDATE, so the charged set is the
// set it compared. A window that has ended starts over at 1.
func chargeOTPMismatch(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, userID, purpose string, now time.Time) error {
	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE email_otps SET attempts = attempts + 1
		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND consumed_at IS NULL
		   AND expires_at > $3 AND attempts < $4`,
		userID, purpose, now, otpMaxAttempts); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("record otp attempt: %w", err)
	}
	var (
		start    time.Time
		failures int
	)
	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO otp_failure_windows (user_id, purpose, window_start, failures)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 1)
		 ON CONFLICT (user_id, purpose) DO UPDATE SET
		   failures = CASE WHEN otp_failure_windows.window_start + $4 * interval '1 second' <= $3
		                   THEN 1 ELSE otp_failure_windows.failures + 1 END,
		   window_start = CASE WHEN otp_failure_windows.window_start + $4 * interval '1 second' <= $3
		                   THEN $3 ELSE otp_failure_windows.window_start END
		 RETURNING window_start, failures`,
		userID, purpose, now, int64(otpFailureWindow/time.Second)).Scan(&start, &failures); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("charge otp failure budget: %w", err)
	}
	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if failures == otpFailureBudget {
		return &OTPAccountLockedError{Until: start.Add(otpFailureWindow), JustLocked: true}
	}
	return ErrOTPInvalid
}

// ---- op.console staff login: in-game approval state machine (spec §B op-login) ----

// CreateOpLoginRequest records a fresh pending op.console login attempt for a staff
// account. It writes the SECOND factor only — the email-OTP is minted separately
// under purpose 'op_login' — so a row here means this staff account is waiting for
// an in-game admin to vouch. Email is a snapshot for the audit trail.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req NewOpLoginRequest) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO op_login_requests (id, user_id, email, expires_at, client_ip, user_agent)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
		req.ID, req.UserID, req.Email, req.ExpiresAt, req.ClientIP, req.UserAgent)
	return err
}

// OpLoginRequestByID loads a request by its handle, joined to its account's
// username, or ErrNotFound. finish additionally checks Status=='approved',
// !Consumed, and ExpiresAt>now before minting a session. Status is derived from
// approved_at: 'approved' once set, else 'pending'.
func (p *PGRepo) OpLoginRequestByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*OpLoginRequest, error) {
	const q = `SELECT r.id, r.user_id, u.username, r.email, r.expires_at, r.created_at,
		       r.consumed_at, r.approved_at, r.client_ip, r.user_agent
		FROM op_login_requests r JOIN users u ON u.id = r.user_id WHERE r.id = $1`
	var (
		r          OpLoginRequest
		consumedAt sql.NullTime
		approvedAt sql.NullTime
	)
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, id).Scan(
		&r.ID, &r.UserID, &r.Username, &r.Email, &r.ExpiresAt, &r.CreatedAt,
		&consumedAt, &approvedAt, &r.ClientIP, &r.UserAgent); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return nil, ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return nil, err
	}
	r.Consumed = consumedAt.Valid
	if approvedAt.Valid {
		r.Status = "approved"
	} else {
		r.Status = "pending"
	}
	return &r, nil
}

// ListPendingOpLogins returns the live (pending, unconsumed, unexpired at now)
// requests oldest-first, for the in-game admin's approval prompt. A resolved or
// expired request drops out of the list, so an admin only ever sees actionable
// attempts. The username is joined because the approval prompt names the staff
// account; created_at orders the list and lets the prompt show how long a request
// has been waiting.
func (p *PGRepo) ListPendingOpLogins(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]OpLoginRequest, error) {
	const q = `SELECT r.id, r.user_id, u.username, r.email, r.expires_at, r.created_at,
		       r.client_ip, r.user_agent
		FROM op_login_requests r JOIN users u ON u.id = r.user_id
		WHERE r.consumed_at IS NULL AND r.approved_at IS NULL AND r.expires_at > $1
		ORDER BY r.created_at`
	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, now)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	defer rows.Close()
	var out []OpLoginRequest
	for rows.Next() {
		var r OpLoginRequest
		if err := rows.Scan(&r.ID, &r.UserID, &r.Username, &r.Email, &r.ExpiresAt, &r.CreatedAt,
			&r.ClientIP, &r.UserAgent); err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		r.Status = "pending"
		out = append(out, r)
	}
	return out, rows.Err()
}

// ApproveOpLogin marks a pending request approved by approverUserID (the in-game
// admin), atomically: it stamps approved_at and approved_by only WHERE the row is
// still pending, unconsumed, and unexpired at now. Zero rows affected (gone,
// already resolved, or expired) → ErrNotFound, so a double approval or an
// approval of a dead request is a no-op the caller can surface.
func (p *PGRepo) ApproveOpLogin(ctx context.Context, id, approverUserID string, now time.Time) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE op_login_requests SET approved_at = $3, approved_by = $2
		 WHERE id = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND approved_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $3`,
		id, approverUserID, now)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// ConsumeOpLoginRequest stamps consumed_at on an APPROVED, unconsumed, unexpired
// request, atomically, so it can be exchanged for a session exactly once. Zero
// rows affected (pending, already consumed, or expired) → ErrNotFound. This is the
// finish path's single-use guard; the email-OTP is consumed separately, so a lost
// race here never silently mints a second session.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error {
	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE op_login_requests SET consumed_at = $2
		 WHERE id = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2`,
		id, now)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if n == 0 {
		return ErrNotFound
	}
	return nil
}

// ---- setup token redemption (spec §B) ----

// ConsumeSetupToken atomically marks a one-time setup token consumed and returns
// its user_id, or ErrNotFound when the token is absent, already consumed, or
// expired. The /setup?token=... web flow redeems it for a lockdown session.
func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
	var userID string
	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`UPDATE setup_tokens SET consumed_at = $2
		 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2
		 RETURNING user_id`,
		tokenHash, now).Scan(&userID); {
	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
		return "", ErrNotFound
	case err != nil:
		return "", err
	}
	return userID, nil
}

// CreateSetupToken persists a one-time first-web-login token, storing only its
// hash (the raw value rides in the /setup?token=... URL). The setup Owner-bind
// path uses CompleteOwnerSetup so identity binding, local auth, and this token
// commit atomically; this lower-level helper remains for callers that already
// established the user. The token is redeemed exactly once by ConsumeSetupToken.
func (p *PGRepo) CreateSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
		`INSERT INTO setup_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
		tokenHash, userID, expiresAt)
	return err
}

// isUniqueViolation reports whether err is a Postgres unique-constraint
// violation (code 23505).
func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
	return stringsContains(err.Error(), "duplicate key") || stringsContains(err.Error(), "23505")
}

func stringsContains(s, sub string) bool {
	for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(sub); i++ {
		if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}