setup builds the always-on, reaper-exempt login/lobby MinecraftServers (create-if-absent), bakes the login limbo's non-secret config (internal API URL, root domain, lobby name) into spec.env, and replicates the felis-service-token Secret from the control namespace into the minecraft namespace so the operator's namespace-local secretKeyRef on the login pod resolves.
329 lines
15 KiB
Go
329 lines
15 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"felis.lolicon.best/internal/apis/felis/v1alpha1"
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"felis.lolicon.best/internal/naming"
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corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
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apierrors "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/errors"
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"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/resource"
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metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
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"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/runtime"
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clientgoscheme "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/scheme"
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"k8s.io/client-go/tools/clientcmd"
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ctrl "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime"
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"sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/client"
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)
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// System services are the always-on backends Felis provisions for itself after
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// setup: the login limbo (LOOHP/Limbo auth gate) and the lobby (Paper + the
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// felis-paper /menu hub). Unlike a user server they are created Running, are
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// exempt from the world reaper, and carry reserved names — so they take the
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// ValidateSystemServerName admission path rather than the user ValidateServerName.
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//
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// The routing topology and the one security invariant they encode:
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//
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// connect → login (auth gate, front door) → lobby (/menu hub) → target backend
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//
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// A stopped/starting server's fallback must land on the LOGIN gate, never on the
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// lobby: falling back to the lobby would drop an unauthenticated player past the
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// gate. So login has NO fallback (if it is down we refuse the connection rather
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// than route onward) and everything else — the lobby included — falls back to
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// login. "Rather have login unreachable than abandon authentication."
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// systemServerSpec is the small, explicit shape a system service is built from.
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// It is intentionally narrower than the user applyRequest: no autostart choice
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// (always public), no RCON, no resource overrides — a system service is uniform
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// by construction so the invariants above cannot be configured away.
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type systemServerSpec struct {
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name string
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subdomain string
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displayName string
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image string
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memory string // container memory limit == request (§22 ceiling)
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storage string // world PVC size
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fallbackServer string // "" = none (refuse when down); never the lobby
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healthHTTPPort int32 // > 0 → gate readiness on an HTTP health endpoint
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// env are extra plain (non-secret) environment variables baked into the pod.
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// System-service configuration derived from the deployment (the internal API
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// URL, root domain, lobby name) rides here; secrets never do — the service
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// token is injected by the operator via secretKeyRef, not as a literal value.
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env []v1alpha1.EnvVar
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}
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// felisLimboHealthPort is the port the felis-limbo readiness plugin serves its
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// HTTP health endpoint on. The login system service gates pod readiness on it so
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// "the limbo has finished starting" — not merely "the game socket is bound" —
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// is what marks it Ready.
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const felisLimboHealthPort int32 = 8080
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// The felis-limbo login plugin reads its deployment configuration from these
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// environment variables (env wins over its felis-link.properties template). The
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// non-secret three are baked into the login pod's Spec.Env here at provision time
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// (they derive from the deployment: the internal API URL, the root domain, the
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// lobby server name); the service-token secret is injected separately by the
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// operator via secretKeyRef. Without the token the plugin fail-safes to
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// readiness-only, so a login pod that has the URL/domain but not yet the token is
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// safe (it simply does not authenticate) rather than broken.
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const (
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envAPIBaseURL = "FELIS_API_BASE_URL"
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envRootDomain = "FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN"
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envLobbyServer = "FELIS_LOBBY_SERVER"
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)
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// buildSystemServer constructs an always-on, reaper-exempt MinecraftServer from
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// a systemServerSpec. It is a pure function (no K8s, no I/O) so it is unit
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// testable without a cluster. Unlike buildMinecraftServerFromApplyRequest it:
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// - permits reserved names (login/lobby) via ValidateSystemServerName,
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// - sets DesiredState=Running (the service is up the moment it exists),
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// - sets ReaperExempt=true and AutostartPolicy=public,
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// - leaves RCON disabled (LOOHP/Limbo has none; readiness is gated on pod
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// TCP/HTTP health, not an RCON probe — see the operator reconciler).
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func buildSystemServer(in systemServerSpec, namespace string) (*v1alpha1.MinecraftServer, error) {
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if err := naming.ValidateSystemServerName(in.name); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid name: %w", err)
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}
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if err := naming.ValidateSystemServerName(in.subdomain); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid subdomain: %w", err)
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}
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if in.image == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("image is required for system server %q", in.name)
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}
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// A system service must never fall back onto the lobby: that would route an
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// unauthenticated player past the login gate. Refuse to build one that does,
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// rather than silently ship the bypass.
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if in.fallbackServer == naming.SystemLobbyServer {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("system server %q must not fall back to the lobby (%q) — it would bypass the login gate; fall back to %q or leave it empty",
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in.name, naming.SystemLobbyServer, naming.SystemLoginServer)
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}
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memQ, err := resource.ParseQuantity(in.memory)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid memory %q for %q: %w", in.memory, in.name, err)
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}
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if memQ.Sign() <= 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("memory must be positive for %q", in.name)
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}
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storageQ, err := resource.ParseQuantity(in.storage)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid storage %q for %q: %w", in.storage, in.name, err)
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}
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if storageQ.Sign() <= 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("storage must be positive for %q", in.name)
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}
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limits := corev1.ResourceList{corev1.ResourceMemory: memQ}
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requests := corev1.ResourceList{corev1.ResourceMemory: memQ}
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return &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{
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ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
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Name: in.name,
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Namespace: namespace,
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},
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Spec: v1alpha1.MinecraftServerSpec{
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Subdomain: in.subdomain,
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DisplayName: in.displayName,
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Image: in.image,
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JavaMemory: deriveApplyJavaHeap(memQ),
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DesiredState: v1alpha1.DesiredRunning,
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AutostartPolicy: v1alpha1.AutostartPublic,
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ReaperExempt: true,
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FallbackServer: in.fallbackServer,
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// Behind the Velocity proxy (which enforces online-mode and modern
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// forwarding), backends run offline-mode; the proxy is the one place
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// online-mode is true (spec §8, §11).
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OnlineMode: false,
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Rcon: v1alpha1.RconSpec{Enabled: false},
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Storage: v1alpha1.StorageSpec{Size: storageQ.String()},
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Resources: corev1.ResourceRequirements{Limits: limits, Requests: requests},
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Startup: v1alpha1.StartupSpec{HealthHTTPPort: in.healthHTTPPort},
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Env: in.env,
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},
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}, nil
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}
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// loginSystemServer is the LOOHP/Limbo auth gate. It is the front door and the
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// only safe fallback, so it carries no fallback of its own: if it is down the
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// proxy refuses the connection rather than routing onward past authentication.
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//
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// apiBaseURL is the felis-api internal face the login plugin authenticates to and
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// rootDomain builds the console URL the plugin links players at; both are baked in
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// as plain env. The service token is NOT passed here — the operator injects it via
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// secretKeyRef so the credential never lands in the CRD.
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func loginSystemServer(image, namespace, apiBaseURL, rootDomain string) (*v1alpha1.MinecraftServer, error) {
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return buildSystemServer(systemServerSpec{
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name: naming.SystemLoginServer,
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subdomain: naming.SystemLoginServer,
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displayName: "Login",
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image: image,
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memory: "512Mi",
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storage: "1Gi",
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fallbackServer: "", // none — refuse if the gate is down
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healthHTTPPort: felisLimboHealthPort,
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env: []v1alpha1.EnvVar{
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{Name: envAPIBaseURL, Value: apiBaseURL},
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{Name: envRootDomain, Value: rootDomain},
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{Name: envLobbyServer, Value: naming.SystemLobbyServer},
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},
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}, namespace)
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}
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// lobbySystemServer is the post-auth /menu hub (Paper + felis-paper). It falls
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// back to the login gate — never to itself and never onward — so a lobby that is
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// briefly down still routes players through authentication first.
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func lobbySystemServer(image, namespace string) (*v1alpha1.MinecraftServer, error) {
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return buildSystemServer(systemServerSpec{
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name: naming.SystemLobbyServer,
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subdomain: naming.SystemLobbyServer,
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displayName: "Lobby",
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image: image,
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memory: "1Gi",
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storage: "2Gi",
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fallbackServer: naming.SystemLoginServer,
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}, namespace)
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}
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// buildSystemServerClient builds a controller-runtime client for the setup-time
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// system-service provisioner. It is deliberately best-effort and never calls
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// ctrl.SetupSignalHandler (setup owns its own context): it first honours the
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// standard resolution (in-cluster, then $KUBECONFIG / --kubeconfig, then
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// ~/.kube/config) and, failing that, falls back to the k3s admin kubeconfig the
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// host bootstrap writes at hostBootstrapKubeconfigPath — the common case when
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// setup runs as root directly on a single-node control-plane host. A returned
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// error is not fatal to setup; the caller degrades to printed guidance.
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func buildSystemServerClient() (client.Client, error) {
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scheme := runtime.NewScheme()
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if err := clientgoscheme.AddToScheme(scheme); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := v1alpha1.AddToScheme(scheme); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cfg, err := ctrl.GetConfig()
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if err != nil {
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cfg, err = clientcmd.BuildConfigFromFlags("", hostBootstrapKubeconfigPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no reachable kubeconfig (tried in-cluster/$KUBECONFIG/~/.kube and %s): %w", hostBootstrapKubeconfigPath, err)
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}
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}
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return client.New(cfg, client.Options{Scheme: scheme})
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}
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// systemServerOutcome records what ensureSystemServers did with one service so
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// setup can report it without the provisioner deciding on the output format.
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type systemServerOutcome struct {
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name string
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created bool // true = we created it this run
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skipped string // non-empty = why it was skipped (image unset / already exists)
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err error // non-nil = create failed
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}
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// ensureSystemServers idempotently creates the login and lobby system services.
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// It create-if-absent per service: an existing CRD is left untouched (so an
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// operator's later edits to a system service survive re-runs of setup), a
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// service whose image is unset in config is skipped with a reason, and any other
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// service is created. It never deletes or overwrites. The caller supplies the
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// K8s client and namespace; this function performs no signal-handler or client
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// setup of its own.
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func ensureSystemServers(ctx context.Context, cl client.Client, namespace, loginImage, lobbyImage, apiBaseURL, rootDomain string) []systemServerOutcome {
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type plan struct {
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name string
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image string
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build func(image, namespace string) (*v1alpha1.MinecraftServer, error)
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}
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plans := []plan{
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{name: naming.SystemLoginServer, image: loginImage, build: func(image, ns string) (*v1alpha1.MinecraftServer, error) {
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return loginSystemServer(image, ns, apiBaseURL, rootDomain)
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}},
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{name: naming.SystemLobbyServer, image: lobbyImage, build: lobbySystemServer},
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}
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outcomes := make([]systemServerOutcome, 0, len(plans))
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for _, p := range plans {
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if p.image == "" {
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, skipped: "image not configured"})
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continue
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}
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ms, err := p.build(p.image, namespace)
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if err != nil {
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, err: err})
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continue
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}
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// Create-if-absent: check first so an existing service is reported as a
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// deliberate skip rather than an AlreadyExists error.
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var existing v1alpha1.MinecraftServer
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getErr := cl.Get(ctx, client.ObjectKeyFromObject(ms), &existing)
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if getErr == nil {
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, skipped: "already exists"})
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continue
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}
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if !apierrors.IsNotFound(getErr) {
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, err: getErr})
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continue
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}
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if err := cl.Create(ctx, ms); err != nil {
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if apierrors.IsAlreadyExists(err) {
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, skipped: "already exists"})
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continue
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}
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, err: err})
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continue
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}
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outcomes = append(outcomes, systemServerOutcome{name: p.name, created: true})
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}
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return outcomes
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}
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// ensureServiceTokenReplica copies the internal-API service-token Secret from the
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// control namespace into the minecraft namespace so the login system server's pod
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// can mount it via secretKeyRef. A secretKeyRef is namespace-local, but the login
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// pod runs in the minecraft namespace while the source Secret lives beside the
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// control plane — so without this replica the operator's injected secretKeyRef
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// would dangle and wedge the login pod in CreateContainerConfigError. It is
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// create-if-absent: an existing replica is left untouched so a hand-rotated token
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// in the minecraft namespace is never clobbered (to rotate, delete the replica and
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// re-run setup). Best-effort like the rest of the provisioner: a missing source or
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// a create failure degrades to a reported outcome, never a hard setup failure. It
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// copies only Type and Data — never labels/annotations/ownerRefs — so the replica
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// carries no accidental GC owner or managed-by lineage.
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func ensureServiceTokenReplica(ctx context.Context, cl client.Client, controlNamespace, minecraftNamespace string) systemServerOutcome {
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const name = "service-token (minecraft ns)"
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if controlNamespace == minecraftNamespace {
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// Same namespace — the operator's secretKeyRef already resolves in place.
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, skipped: "control and minecraft namespaces coincide"}
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}
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// Never overwrite an existing replica (it may hold a rotated token).
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var existing corev1.Secret
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getErr := cl.Get(ctx, client.ObjectKey{Namespace: minecraftNamespace, Name: naming.ServiceTokenSecretName}, &existing)
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if getErr == nil {
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, skipped: "already exists"}
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}
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if !apierrors.IsNotFound(getErr) {
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, err: getErr}
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}
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// Read the source of truth from the control namespace.
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var src corev1.Secret
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if err := cl.Get(ctx, client.ObjectKey{Namespace: controlNamespace, Name: naming.ServiceTokenSecretName}, &src); err != nil {
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if apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, skipped: fmt.Sprintf(
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"source Secret %s/%s not found — provision it (deploy/bootstrap.sh), then re-run setup",
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controlNamespace, naming.ServiceTokenSecretName)}
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}
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, err: err}
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}
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replica := &corev1.Secret{
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ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{Name: naming.ServiceTokenSecretName, Namespace: minecraftNamespace},
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Type: src.Type,
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Data: src.Data,
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}
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if err := cl.Create(ctx, replica); err != nil {
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if apierrors.IsAlreadyExists(err) {
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, skipped: "already exists"}
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}
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, err: err}
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}
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return systemServerOutcome{name: name, created: true}
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}
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