A submitted modpack was durable but unreadable: the uploads PVC cannot cross
namespaces (felis-api mounts it; Kaniko runs in felis-build) and the s3 lane
handed the sandboxed build Pod no credentials, so NO user build could ever
consume its context. The transport is now the API itself:
- submit: derived context refs become the internal-face URL
/api/v1/internal/submissions/{id}/context (service-token gated), and Blobs
gains Open (local + s3) with an ErrBlobNotFound sentinel for the route's 404.
- api: serves that route on the internal face only (openapi.yaml updated; the
route-coverage test enforces it).
- build: an http(s) context renders a context-fetch initContainer (the felis
image's new fetch-context entrypoint) that streams the blob with the
namespace-local service-token Secret — never mounted into Kaniko — and
extracts it under a zip-slip guard into a size-limited emptyDir that Kaniko
reads read-only as --context=/context.
- platform/install: the api Deployment carries its own internal base URL; the
build namespace gets the token Secret through the existing replica mechanism
(bootstrap.sh + felis setup); the build egress lock opens exactly the control
namespace on the internal port.
- cmd/felis: fetch-context entrypoint (registered, documented, unit-tested for
escapes/symlinks/non-gzip).
Tests cover rendering, hardening, the s3/local Open paths, and the route's
404/503 mapping. Verified next on the real single-node cluster with Kaniko.
172 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
172 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"archive/tar"
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"bytes"
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"compress/gzip"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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type tarEntry struct {
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name string
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body string
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mode int64
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typ byte
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linkname string
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}
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// tgzBody builds an in-memory .tar.gz from entries, preserving each entry's type
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// and mode so the tests can exercise the guards with exactly the bytes an
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// attacker could upload.
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func tgzBody(t *testing.T, entries ...tarEntry) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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zw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
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tw := tar.NewWriter(zw)
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for _, e := range entries {
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typ := e.typ
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if typ == 0 {
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typ = tar.TypeReg
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}
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mode := e.mode
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if mode == 0 {
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mode = 0o644
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}
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hdr := &tar.Header{Name: e.name, Typeflag: typ, Mode: mode, Size: int64(len(e.body))}
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if typ == tar.TypeSymlink {
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hdr.Linkname = e.linkname
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hdr.Size = 0
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}
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if err := tw.WriteHeader(hdr); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write header %q: %v", e.name, err)
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}
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if hdr.Size > 0 {
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if _, err := tw.Write([]byte(e.body)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write body %q: %v", e.name, err)
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}
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}
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("close tar: %v", err)
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}
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if err := zw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("close gzip: %v", err)
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}
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return buf.Bytes()
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}
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// A normal context extracts with its tree intact, and the executable bit that
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// modpack entrypoints rely on survives.
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func TestExtractTarGzRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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body := tgzBody(t,
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tarEntry{name: "Dockerfile", body: "FROM scratch\n"},
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tarEntry{name: "mods/example.jar", body: "jar-bytes"},
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tarEntry{name: "start.sh", body: "#!/bin/sh\n", mode: 0o755},
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tarEntry{name: "mods/", typ: tar.TypeDir, mode: 0o755},
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)
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if err := extractTarGz(bytes.NewReader(body), dir); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("extract: %v", err)
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}
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for name, want := range map[string]string{
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"Dockerfile": "FROM scratch\n",
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"mods/example.jar": "jar-bytes",
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} {
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got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name))
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if err != nil || string(got) != want {
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t.Fatalf("%s = (%q, %v), want %q", name, got, err, want)
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}
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}
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fi, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "start.sh"))
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if err != nil || fi.Mode()&0o111 == 0 {
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t.Fatalf("entrypoint script lost its exec bit: %v (%v)", fi, err)
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}
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}
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// The guards: "..", absolute paths, symlinks, and special files are refused whole
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// — nothing escapes, and nothing is silently skipped.
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func TestExtractTarGzRefusesEscapes(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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entries []tarEntry
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}{
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{"dotdot", []tarEntry{{name: "../outside", body: "x"}}},
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{"nested dotdot", []tarEntry{{name: "a/../../outside", body: "x"}}},
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{"absolute", []tarEntry{{name: "/etc/outside", body: "x"}}},
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{"symlink", []tarEntry{{name: "link", typ: tar.TypeSymlink, linkname: "/etc"}}},
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{"hardlink", []tarEntry{{name: "hard", typ: tar.TypeLink, linkname: "somewhere"}}},
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{"device", []tarEntry{{name: "dev", typ: tar.TypeChar}}},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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if err := extractTarGz(bytes.NewReader(tgzBody(t, tc.entries...)), dir); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("extract accepted a hostile entry, want an error")
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}
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// Nothing may have been written outside the target (or at all).
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entries, _ := os.ReadDir(dir)
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if len(entries) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("hostile archive left %d entries behind", len(entries))
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// The command end to end: it dials the URL with the bearer token from the
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// environment, and refuses to run without it (the internal face would 401
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// anyway; failing at parse time is the honest earlier error).
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func TestCmdFetchContextFetchAndExtract(t *testing.T) {
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body := tgzBody(t, tarEntry{name: "Dockerfile", body: "FROM scratch\n"})
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer test-token" {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/gzip")
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_, _ = w.Write(body)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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t.Setenv("FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "test-token")
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if code := cmdFetchContext([]string{"--url=" + srv.URL + "/sub-1/context", "--out=" + dir}, io.Discard, io.Discard); code != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("cmdFetchContext exit = %d, want 0", code)
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}
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if got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "Dockerfile")); err != nil || string(got) != "FROM scratch\n" {
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t.Fatalf("extracted Dockerfile = (%q, %v)", got, err)
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}
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// No token: refuse before dialing.
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t.Setenv("FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "")
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var stderr bytes.Buffer
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if code := cmdFetchContext([]string{"--url=" + srv.URL + "/sub-1/context", "--out=" + t.TempDir()}, io.Discard, &stderr); code != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("missing token exit = %d, want 2 (stderr %q)", code, stderr.String())
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}
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// A non-200 answer (e.g. the route's 404 for a never-uploaded context) fails.
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srv404 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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}))
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defer srv404.Close()
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t.Setenv("FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "test-token")
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if code := cmdFetchContext([]string{"--url=" + srv404.URL + "/sub-1/context", "--out=" + t.TempDir()}, io.Discard, io.Discard); code != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("404 exit = %d, want 1", code)
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}
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}
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// A body that is not a gzip tarball must fail the extraction rather than produce
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// an empty (or partial) context Kaniko would then try to build.
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func TestExtractTarGzRejectsNonGzip(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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err := extractTarGz(strings.NewReader("not a tarball"), dir)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "gzip") {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want a gzip complaint", err)
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}
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}
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