270 lines
12 KiB
Go
270 lines
12 KiB
Go
// Package naming enforces the portability and admission rules (spec §2, §22):
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// a server name matches ^[a-z0-9-]{3,32}$ and is non-reserved, and every
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// hostname must be a single label under the configured root_domain. The root
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// domain is never hardcoded — it is always supplied by config — so this package
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// stays free of any deployment-specific domain.
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package naming
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import (
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"unicode"
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"unicode/utf8"
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)
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var (
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serverNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9-]{3,32}$`)
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dnsLabelRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$`)
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)
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// reserved subdomains/server names that users may not claim: proxy/lobby and
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// the platform's own faces.
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var reserved = map[string]struct{}{
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"login": {},
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"lobby": {},
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"admin": {},
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"panel": {},
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"console": {}, // the player web console (console.<root>); op.console carries a dot and can never collide
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"api": {},
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"felis": {},
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"velocity": {},
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"registry": {},
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"internal": {},
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"www": {},
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}
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// System server names Felis provisions itself. They deliberately live on the
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// reserved list so no user can claim them, yet the platform must be able to
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// create them — see ValidateSystemServerName.
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const (
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// SystemLoginServer is the always-on limbo auth gate (LOOHP/Limbo). It is the
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// front door every fresh connection lands on and the ONLY safe fallback: a
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// stopped/starting backend routes here, never onward past authentication.
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SystemLoginServer = "login"
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// SystemLobbyServer is the post-auth /menu hub (Paper + felis-paper). It is
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// reachable only after the login gate passes a player through, so it must
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// never be used as a fallback target (that would bypass the gate).
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SystemLobbyServer = "lobby"
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)
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// IsSystemServer reports whether name is one of the platform-provisioned system
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// services above. They carry reserved names on purpose, and the API's per-server
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// routes reject those names outright (ValidateServerName) — so a caller that only
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// DISPLAYS fleet rows uses this to mark them as not user-manageable instead of
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// offering actions (claim/wake/stop/console) that would answer 400.
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func IsSystemServer(name string) bool {
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return name == SystemLoginServer || name == SystemLobbyServer
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}
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// ServiceTokenSecretName / ServiceTokenSecretKey name the proxy's internal-API
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// bearer credential Secret (spec §7); CallerTokens lists it with the tokens the
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// other internal callers hold. The Secrets are provisioned out-of-band
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// (deploy/bootstrap.sh) and replicated by `felis setup` into the namespace whose
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// pods mount them; these constants only name them.
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const (
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ServiceTokenSecretName = "felis-service-token"
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ServiceTokenSecretKey = "token"
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// LimboTokenSecretName is the login gate's token, replicated into the
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// minecraft namespace; the operator injects it into the login pod only.
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LimboTokenSecretName = "felis-limbo-token"
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// BuildTokenSecretName is the build Job's token, replicated into the build
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// namespace for the context-fetch initContainer.
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BuildTokenSecretName = "felis-build-token"
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// OpsTokenSecretName is the on-node console's token (`felis backup-now`); it
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// stays in the control namespace.
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OpsTokenSecretName = "felis-ops-token"
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// EnvAPIBaseURL carries the internal-face base URL (platform.InternalAPIBaseURL)
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// into a pod: the login gate dials it, and the api reads it to derive the build
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// contexts' fetch URLs, so both sides name the same address for the same face.
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EnvAPIBaseURL = "FELIS_API_BASE_URL"
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)
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// Registry write credentials (internal/registrygate). The registry namespace holds
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// RegistryAuthSecretName with one key per principal (platform, build, prune),
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// mounted into the gate sidecar; felis-api reads the prune key into env. The build namespace holds RegistryPushSecretName with the build
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// principal's username/password, read only by a build Job's push container. Both
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// are provisioned out-of-band by deploy/bootstrap.sh.
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const (
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RegistryAuthSecretName = "felis-registry-auth"
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RegistryPushSecretName = "felis-registry-push"
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RegistryPushUsernameKey = "username"
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RegistryPushPasswordKey = "password"
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)
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// ForwardingSecretName / ForwardingSecretKey name the Velocity modern player-info
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// forwarding secret — the shared HMAC key the proxy signs each login handshake with
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// and every backend verifies. It is what makes a backend's idea of "who is this
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// player" trustworthy: with modern forwarding on, the UUID arrives inside the signed
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// forwarding payload rather than being derived offline from the username, which is
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// the whole basis of the Owner bind (the Owner IS a Minecraft account, claimed by
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// joining the login gate). Legacy/BungeeCord forwarding carries no secret at all and
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// fails OPEN — anyone who can reach a backend directly can assert any UUID — so Felis
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// mandates modern (spec §20).
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//
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// Unlike the service token this is NOT login-only: Velocity's forwarding mode is a
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// single proxy-wide setting, so once it is "modern" EVERY backend must speak it or it
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// rejects the proxy's logins outright. The secret authenticates the PROXY to the
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// backend; every backend verifies it before accepting the forwarded identity. The
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// NetworkPolicy narrows game-port reachability to declared Velocity CIDRs for non-node
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// traffic, but Kubernetes always permits traffic from a pod's resident node, so the
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// policy is defense in depth and never replaces HMAC verification.
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//
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// Provisioned out-of-band (deploy/bootstrap.sh, the same run that writes Velocity's
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// forwarding.secret) and replicated into the minecraft namespace by `felis setup`.
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const (
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ForwardingSecretName = "felis-forwarding-secret"
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ForwardingSecretKey = "secret"
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)
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// ValidateServerName checks the §22 name rule and reservation list.
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func ValidateServerName(name string) error {
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if !serverNameRE.MatchString(name) {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: invalid server name %q: must match ^[a-z0-9-]{3,32}$", name)
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(name, "-") || strings.HasSuffix(name, "-") {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: server name %q must not start or end with '-'", name)
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}
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if _, ok := reserved[name]; ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: server name %q is reserved", name)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ValidateSystemServerName checks the §22 format rule (^[a-z0-9-]{3,32}$, no
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// leading/trailing dash) but DELIBERATELY skips the reservation check. It is the
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// admission path for platform-provisioned system services (login, lobby), which
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// carry reserved names on purpose: users can never claim them via
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// ValidateServerName, yet setup must still be able to create them. It is not a
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// public claim path — only the setup/system-service provisioner calls it.
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func ValidateSystemServerName(name string) error {
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if !serverNameRE.MatchString(name) {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: invalid system server name %q: must match ^[a-z0-9-]{3,32}$", name)
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(name, "-") || strings.HasSuffix(name, "-") {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: system server name %q must not start or end with '-'", name)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// zeroWidthJoiner (U+200D) glues emoji such as the rainbow flag into one picture.
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const zeroWidthJoiner = 0x200D
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// MaxDisplayName is the most characters a server's display name may have. The
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// panel shows it on one line in the fleet grid and the server header.
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const MaxDisplayName = 64
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// CleanDisplayName trims a server's display name and checks what is left: at most
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// MaxDisplayName characters, every one a visible character or a space. Control
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// characters, line breaks and the invisible format characters (bidi overrides,
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// zero-width spaces) are refused, since they would break the line the panel puts
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// the name on or make it read as something else; the zero-width joiner stays,
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// because emoji such as the rainbow flag are built with it. An empty result is
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// valid: the server then goes by its name.
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func CleanDisplayName(s string) (string, error) {
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s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
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if n := utf8.RuneCountInString(s); n > MaxDisplayName {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("naming: display name has %d characters, at most %d are allowed", n, MaxDisplayName)
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}
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for _, r := range s {
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if r == utf8.RuneError || !unicode.IsGraphic(r) && r != zeroWidthJoiner {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("naming: display name contains %U, which is not a visible character", r)
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}
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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// worldVolumeName mirrors operator.dataVolumeName: the per-server StatefulSet's
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// volumeClaimTemplate is named "world", so a single-replica server's world PVC
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// is "world-<name>-0". This is the one naming convention shared by the operator
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// (which creates the PVC), the reaper (which deletes it), and restore (which
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// mounts it), so it lives here rather than being duplicated per subsystem.
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const worldVolumeName = "world"
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// GameUID / GameGID are the identity every game server process runs as, and so the
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// owner every file on a world volume must carry. The operator pins them in the
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// server pod's securityContext (whatever USER the image declares), its prepare-data
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// initContainer chowns a world that an older root-run release or a root restore
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// left behind, and the file editor hands a file it creates to them. 1000 is the
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// uid the eclipse-temurin (Ubuntu) images the Felis game images build on already
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// reserve for their unprivileged user.
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const (
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GameUID int64 = 1000
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GameGID int64 = 1000
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)
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// WorldPVCName returns the world PersistentVolumeClaim name for a server,
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// matching the operator's StatefulSet volumeClaimTemplate naming
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// ("world-<name>-0" for the sole replica).
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func WorldPVCName(server string) string {
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return worldVolumeName + "-" + server + "-0"
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}
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// RconSecretKey is the key holding the password inside a server's RCON Secret.
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const RconSecretKey = "password"
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// RconSecretName returns the per-server RCON password Secret name. Like
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// WorldPVCName this convention is shared rather than duplicated: felis-api writes
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// it into spec.rcon.secretRef when creating a server, `felis setup` writes the
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// same for the system lobby, and the operator both provisions the Secret under
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// that name and reads it back for the readiness probe. One password per server,
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// never a shared one — the console grants whoever holds it full command authority
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// over that server, so a single cluster-wide value would make every owner an
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// operator of everyone else's world.
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func RconSecretName(server string) string {
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return server + "-rcon"
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}
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// Hostname composes subdomain.rootDomain after validating the subdomain.
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func Hostname(subdomain, rootDomain string) (string, error) {
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if err := ValidateServerName(subdomain); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if rootDomain == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("naming: root domain is empty")
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}
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return subdomain + "." + rootDomain, nil
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}
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// ValidateHostname enforces the §2 invariant that host is a single label
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// directly under rootDomain.
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func ValidateHostname(host, rootDomain string) error {
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if rootDomain == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: root domain is empty")
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}
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suffix := "." + rootDomain
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if !strings.HasSuffix(host, suffix) {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: hostname %q must be under %q", host, rootDomain)
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}
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label := strings.TrimSuffix(host, suffix)
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if label == "" || strings.Contains(label, ".") {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: hostname %q must be a single label under %q", host, rootDomain)
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}
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if !dnsLabelRE.MatchString(label) {
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return fmt.Errorf("naming: invalid hostname label %q", label)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// CallerToken ties one internal-face caller (api.Caller) to the Secret holding
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// its token, the env var felis-api reads that token from, and the namespace a
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// replica of the Secret must reach for the caller's pods ("" when the caller
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// runs outside the cluster or in the control namespace).
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type CallerToken struct {
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Caller string
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Secret string
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APIEnv string
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// Replica names where the caller's pods run: "minecraft" or "build".
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Replica string
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}
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// CallerTokens is every internal caller, one token each. felis-api refuses to
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// start when two share a value, so a token copied from one namespace opens only
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// the routes that caller is listed on.
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var CallerTokens = []CallerToken{
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{Caller: "velocity", Secret: ServiceTokenSecretName, APIEnv: "FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN"},
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{Caller: "limbo", Secret: LimboTokenSecretName, APIEnv: "FELIS_LIMBO_TOKEN", Replica: "minecraft"},
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{Caller: "build", Secret: BuildTokenSecretName, APIEnv: "FELIS_BUILD_TOKEN", Replica: "build"},
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{Caller: "ops", Secret: OpsTokenSecretName, APIEnv: "FELIS_OPS_TOKEN"},
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}
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