817 lines
49 KiB
Go
817 lines
49 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"time"
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)
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// ServerRecord is the business-layer projection of a server (spec §6 servers /
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// server_aliases). It carries only what the CRD cannot express — ownership and
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// the cached subdomain alias — never authoritative lifecycle fields.
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type ServerRecord struct {
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Name string
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Subdomain string
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// OwnerID is the claiming user, or "" when the server is unclaimed.
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OwnerID string
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// CachedPhase is the non-authoritative phase projection used for fast lists.
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CachedPhase string
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}
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// MyServerView is a row of GET /api/v1/me/servers: a server the caller owns,
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// may auto-start, or may claim. Everything after Claimable is NOT stored in
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// Postgres — handleMyServers joins it best-effort from the CRD status
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// (Cluster.ListServers) at read time, so a cluster hiccup renders 0/0 and the
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// cached phase, never a 500. DesiredState, AutostartPolicy and
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// PlayerCountUnknown are owner detail and stay empty on rows the caller does
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// not own, the same split publicServerInfo makes on the status route.
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type MyServerView struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Subdomain string `json:"subdomain"`
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Owned bool `json:"owned"`
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Claimable bool `json:"claimable"`
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Phase string `json:"phase,omitempty"`
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PlayersOnline int32 `json:"playersOnline"`
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PlayersMax int32 `json:"playersMax"`
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DisplayName string `json:"displayName,omitempty"`
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DesiredState string `json:"desiredState,omitempty"`
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AutostartPolicy string `json:"autostartPolicy,omitempty"`
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PlayerCountUnknown bool `json:"playerCountUnknown,omitempty"`
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}
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// ServerOwnership is one live server's claim state as the fleet read joins it.
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type ServerOwnership struct {
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// OwnerID is the claiming account, "" while the server is unclaimed. The fleet
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// compares it with the caller's id: an account without an email shows its
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// username as Owner, so the display text cannot say whose server it is.
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OwnerID string
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// Owner is the claiming account's display identity (email, or username when
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// the address is absent), "" while unclaimed.
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Owner string
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}
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// AuditEntry is one row written to audit_logs (spec §6). Actor is display text:
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// a verified email or the username for people (auditActor), the component name
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// for internal callers. ActorUserID is the account that acted, the column to
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// attribute by: an unverified email proves nothing, so only the id is binding.
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type AuditEntry struct {
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Actor string
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ActorUserID string
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Source string
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Action string
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ServerName string
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RequestID string
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// ClientIP and UserAgent say where an external call came from; empty for
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// internal callers. ClientIP is the address the sign-in limit keys on.
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ClientIP string
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UserAgent string
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// Payload is an optional structured detail blob stored in the audit_logs.payload
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// jsonb column. It MUST be valid JSON or nil; nil (the zero value) is stored as
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// SQL NULL, so existing callers that leave it unset are unaffected. The
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// break-glass console uses it to record the accountability detail (mode, target
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// owner, OS user, admin account) that does not fit the flat columns.
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Payload []byte
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}
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// BackupView is one row of GET /api/v1/backups (spec §7, world_backups in §22).
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// It deliberately omits backup_ref — the opaque internal storage handle (a tar
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// path / VolumeSnapshot name / Longhorn URL, spec §19) — on the same principle
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// that keeps the RCON password server-side (spec §286): the client lists backups
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// and triggers a restore by server, never by handle.
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type BackupView struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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ServerName string `json:"server_name"`
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FormerOwner string `json:"former_owner,omitempty"`
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SizeBytes int64 `json:"size_bytes"`
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Reason string `json:"reason"`
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Status string `json:"status"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
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// Corrupt reports that the archive failed a read-back: it cannot be
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// restored. VerifiedAt is its last read-back that matched, and
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// SkippedEntries the world entries it could not hold (symbolic links,
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// devices, sockets).
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Corrupt bool `json:"corrupt,omitempty"`
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VerifiedAt *time.Time `json:"verified_at,omitempty"`
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SkippedEntries int `json:"skipped_entries,omitempty"`
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}
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// BackupRecord is the server-side view of a backup used to drive a restore (spec
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// §466). It carries the opaque backup_ref the Restorer needs and the former_owner
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// the restore authorization compares against — neither is ever serialized to the
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// client (contrast BackupView).
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type BackupRecord struct {
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ID string
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ServerName string
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FormerOwner string
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BackupRef string
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SizeBytes int64
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// Corrupt reports that the archive failed a read-back (see BackupView).
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Corrupt bool
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}
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// StaffUser is the login-side projection of a users row (spec §B passwordless
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// auth). The Owner is the role=owner row, minted by `felis setup` (MC link) and
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// recovered by `felis breakGlass` (email OTP); Operators are role=admin;
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// players are role=user. There is no password column — staff authenticate via
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// email-OTP / passkey + in-game approve, never a password.
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type StaffUser struct {
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ID string
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Username string
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Email string
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Role string
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// EmailVerified mirrors users.email_verified (spec §B2): the address was proven
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// via an email OTP, not merely asserted. Players carry it through onboarding;
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// staff rows seeded by setup leave it false until a code is redeemed.
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EmailVerified bool
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}
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// PasskeyCredential is one bound passkey (Phase 6 WebAuthn enrollment). It carries
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// only public, non-secret attestation material: a WebAuthn public key is meant to
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// be public (unlike a session token), so it is safe at rest. CredentialID is the
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// authenticator's globally-unique handle (base64url) and PublicKey the COSE key
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// (base64); SignCount is the uint32 signature counter captured at registration.
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// LastUsedAt is nil until an assertion stamps it. The passkey login door now exists
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// (Public /auth/passkey/login/{begin,finish}, #72), but no path yet writes
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// last_used_at, so in practice it stays nil; wiring the stamp is a follow-up there.
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type PasskeyCredential struct {
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ID string
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UserID string
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CredentialID string
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PublicKey string
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SignCount uint32
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AAGUID string
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Name string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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LastUsedAt *time.Time
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// Ceremony flags captured at enrollment (migration 0009). UserVerified records that a
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// PIN/biometric was performed at bind; BackupEligible/BackupState record whether the
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// credential is syncable/backed up. Persisted so a future login path can enforce UV
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// per credential and reason about single-device vs. synced authenticators.
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UserVerified bool
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BackupEligible bool
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BackupState bool
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}
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// SessionedUser is the projection resolved from a live session cookie: the
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// identity SessionAuth needs to build a Principal. EmailVerified mirrors
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// users.email_verified so the lockdown middleware can gate setup-incomplete
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// accounts without a second DB read.
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type SessionedUser struct {
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ID string
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Username string
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Email string
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Role string
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EmailVerified bool
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// LastSeenAt is when the session last authenticated a request, as last
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// recorded by TouchSession (so up to sessionTouchEvery stale).
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LastSeenAt time.Time
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}
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// NewSession is one session to record at sign-in: the sha-256 of the opaque
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// cookie value, its owner, its absolute expiry, and the device it was minted for,
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// so the account's session list can tell the holder which sign-in is which.
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type NewSession struct {
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TokenHash string
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UserID string
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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UserAgent string
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ClientIP string
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}
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// OpLoginRequest is one op.console staff-login attempt (spec §B op-login): the
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// durable second factor (in-game approval) that pairs with an email_otps code under
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// purpose 'op_login'. Username is populated only by ListPendingOpLogins (the join the
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// in-game admin needs to name who is waiting); Consumed reflects consumed_at, so the
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// finish path can refuse an already-spent request without a second query.
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type OpLoginRequest struct {
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ID string
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UserID string
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Username string // joined for the in-game pending list; "" elsewhere
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Email string
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Status string // 'pending' | 'approved' | 'denied'
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Consumed bool // consumed_at IS NOT NULL (single-use guard)
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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// MigrationView is the live account-migration for a source user (spec §B3 inherit,
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// scenario A): its state-machine position and the fields the web step-up, issue-code,
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// and status paths read. TargetUserID is empty until a code is issued; ConfirmFactor
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// and ConfirmedAt are empty/nil until the source completes step-up; CodeExpiresAt is
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// nil until code_issued.
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type MigrationView struct {
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ID string
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SourceUserID string
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TargetUserID string
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State string
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ConfirmFactor string
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ConfirmedAt *time.Time
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CodeExpiresAt *time.Time
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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// Repo is the business-layer data access the API depends on. It is an interface
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// so handlers are tested against an in-memory fake; the Postgres implementation
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// (pgRepo) is integration-tested only — it requires a live database.
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type Repo interface {
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// Ping probes the database — used by the /readyz endpoint (spec §7) to verify
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// the DB connection is alive.
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Ping(ctx context.Context) error
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// ServerBySubdomain resolves a subdomain alias to its server, or ErrNotFound.
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ServerBySubdomain(ctx context.Context, subdomain string) (*ServerRecord, error)
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// ServerByName loads a server's business projection, or ErrNotFound.
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ServerByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*ServerRecord, error)
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// IsLinked reports whether the user has a verified MC account link (spec §10),
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// a precondition for every ownership operation.
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IsLinked(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error)
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// CreateLinkCode mints a one-time account-link code for an in-game player
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// (spec §10: 游戏内 /link → 生成一次性码). The code is born knowing only the
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// verified mc_uuid (online-mode=true established it) and the authSource that
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// established it (mojang|thirdparty, spec §10 dual-Yggdrasil); a web user binds
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// it to their user_id later via VerifyLinkCode. This is internal-face only — the
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// web has no verified UUID to mint against (the account_link_codes schema has no
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// user_id column, which forces the in-game origin), nor does it see the
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// authentication, which is why authSource also originates here.
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CreateLinkCode(ctx context.Context, code, mcUUID, authSource string, expiresAt time.Time) error
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// VerifyLinkCode consumes a non-expired code for the logged-in user and writes
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// the account_links binding, atomically (spec §10: 网页 verify 填码 → 写
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// account_links). It returns the bound mc_uuid and the authSource captured at
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// mint (copied from the code onto the durable link). A missing or expired code →
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// ErrLinkCodeInvalid; a uuid already linked to a *different* user → ErrConflict;
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// re-verifying the same (user, uuid) pair is idempotent and refreshes the stored
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// authSource. now is the API clock so expiry is testable.
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VerifyLinkCode(ctx context.Context, userID, code string, now time.Time) (mcUUID, authSource string, err error)
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// RedeemPlayerBindCode is the account-less player-console bootstrap (console-tier
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// access model): it redeems a one-time Bind Code into a PLAYER account + link in
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// one atomic step, so a first-time player with no Felis account can create one
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// from the console.<root_domain> door. Unlike VerifyLinkCode it takes NO prior
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// user — it creates or fetches one, keyed on the verified mc_uuid the code carries:
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//
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// - code missing/expired → ErrLinkCodeInvalid (does not consume it);
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// - the uuid is not yet linked → create a role='user' player row with id
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// newUserID (username derived from the uuid so it is unique and
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// deterministic), write the account_links binding, consume the code, and
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// return newUserID;
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// - the uuid is already linked to a role='user' player → return THAT user
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// (idempotent "log in via the game"), consuming the code;
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// - the uuid is linked to a STAFF account (role != 'user', i.e. admin or owner)
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// → ErrPlayerBindForbidden WITHOUT consuming the code (staff use op.console
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// behind Zero Trust; the public bootstrap never mints a session for a staff
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// identity).
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//
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// Safe as an unauthenticated entrypoint because a Bind Code is minted internal-face
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// only (CreateLinkCode), against an online-mode-verified UUID, short-TTL and
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// single-use — possession already proves control of a Minecraft identity. now is
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// the API clock so expiry is testable. It returns the effective userID plus the
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// bound mc_uuid and authSource (for the response + audit).
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RedeemPlayerBindCode(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code string, now time.Time) (userID, mcUUID, authSource string, err error)
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// QuotaAvailable reports whether the user is under their max_servers quota
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// (spec §9.3 step ②, evaluated before provisioning).
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QuotaAvailable(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error)
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// QuotaCheck reports whether claiming a server with the given resource spec
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// would push the user over any of their four quota caps: max_servers,
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// max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, and max_storage_gb (spec §9.3 / §22). A nil
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// or missing quota row/unset column means unlimited for that dimension.
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// excludeName is the server being claimed/edited ("" when checking a fresh
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// claim without an existing cached row) so its own current resources are
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// not double-counted.
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QuotaCheck(ctx context.Context, userID string, excludeName string, incoming ResourceSpec) (bool, error)
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// ClaimServer atomically sets owner_id where it is currently NULL and returns
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// whether a row changed. false means the server was already claimed (spec §9.3:
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// 0 rows → 409). The claim runs in one transaction that re-checks the four quota
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// dimensions under pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(user_id)), so it is the
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// authoritative gate: a claim that would exceed a cap → ErrQuotaExceeded (403),
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// and two concurrent claims by one user cannot both pass (audit #4).
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// QuotaCheck remains the advisory pre-check for the handler's fast-path 403.
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// A successful claim resets last_active_at to now and clears warned_*, so the
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// reaper counts idleness from the claim.
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ClaimServer(ctx context.Context, name, userID string) (bool, error)
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// UserInAllowlist reports whether the user's linked UUID is on the server
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// allowlist (spec §9.4).
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UserInAllowlist(ctx context.Context, name, userID string) (bool, error)
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// UUIDInAllowlist reports whether an in-game UUID is on the server allowlist
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// (spec §9.4). It is the internal-face symmetric of UserInAllowlist: velocity
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// drives a domain-autostart wake knowing the joining player only by their
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// online-mode UUID, never a web user_id, so the allowlist gate for that path
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// must be keyed by UUID directly (the allowlist table is UUID-keyed; the
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// account_links join in UserInAllowlist only exists to bridge the web side).
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UUIDInAllowlist(ctx context.Context, name, mcUUID string) (bool, error)
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// UserByMCUUID resolves a verified in-game UUID to the user_id it is linked to
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// (spec §10 account_links), or ErrNotFound when the UUID is not linked. The
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// internal-face wake uses it to apply the owner bypass for a player known only
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// by UUID; an unlinked UUID simply falls through to the autostartPolicy gate.
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// Only a LIVE account resolves (audit #33): a link whose account is disabled or
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// soft-deleted carries no standing on the in-game doors — claim, menu, wake
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// authorization, op-login vouch and the QR link-status poll all read a dead
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// account exactly like an unlinked UUID, never as a retired identity.
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UserByMCUUID(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (userID string, err error)
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// RecordJoin updates last_active_at, clears reaper warnings, and auto-appends
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// the UUID to the allowlist (spec §7 join-event, §9.4).
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RecordJoin(ctx context.Context, name, mcUUID string) error
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// MyServers lists the servers a user owns or may claim.
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MyServers(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]MyServerView, error)
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// ServerOwners maps every live server to its claim state, for the SysAdmin
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// cockpit's fleet read. It is a READ-ONLY join: owner stays authored in Postgres
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// (§6 business authority) and is never written back to the CRD, so this does not
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// breach §1's store-of-record split. An unclaimed server is present with an empty
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// OwnerID; a soft-deleted one, or a CRD with no business row, is absent, and
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// cannot be claimed. The cockpit treats it as best-effort: a lookup error leaves
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// ownership unknown rather than failing the fleet read.
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ServerOwners(ctx context.Context) (map[string]ServerOwnership, error)
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// AllBackups lists every present world backup, newest first (spec §7 GET
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// /backups, admin scope). Expired/deleted rows are never returned.
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AllBackups(ctx context.Context) ([]BackupView, error)
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// BackupsForUser lists the present world backups of worlds the user formerly
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// owned, newest first (spec §7 GET /backups, former_owner scope). The
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// former_owner column is stamped when the world is archived at release time, so
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// a user sees their own released worlds even after the server is re-seeded.
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BackupsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]BackupView, error)
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// LatestBackup returns the most recent present backup for a server, or
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// ErrNotFound when none exists (spec §466 restore). The returned BackupRecord
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// carries the server-side backup_ref + former_owner the restore path needs; the
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// client never sees them.
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LatestBackup(ctx context.Context, serverName string) (*BackupRecord, error)
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// BackupByID returns a single present backup by its id, or ErrNotFound when
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// none matches. Like LatestBackup the returned BackupRecord carries the
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// server-side backup_ref the restore path needs; the client never sees it.
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BackupByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*BackupRecord, error)
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// LastBackupRequest returns when an on-demand backup of the server was last
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// accepted (its newest backup.create audit row) at or after since, or the zero
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// time when there was none. The since bound keeps the lookup inside the
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// cooldown window the caller enforces.
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LastBackupRequest(ctx context.Context, serverName string, since time.Time) (time.Time, error)
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// BackupStoreBytes sums the sizes of every present world backup, the figure
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// [archive] max_local_bytes caps.
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BackupStoreBytes(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
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// SeedServer inserts the business-layer rows for a newly created server (spec
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// §15): a servers row (owner_id NULL — claimed later, spec §9.3) and its
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// subdomain alias, both idempotent. The resource cache (cpuMilli, memoryMB,
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// storageMB) is seeded alongside so QuotaCheck can aggregate per-owner usage
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// without cross-system CRD reads. It returns ErrConflict if the subdomain is
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// already bound to a different server.
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SeedServer(ctx context.Context, name, subdomain string, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB int) error
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// UpdateServerResources updates the resource cache columns for a server
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// after a spec mutation (spec §7 PATCH), so the per-owner aggregate stays in
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// sync.
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UpdateServerResources(ctx context.Context, name string, cpuMilli, memoryMB, storageMB int) error
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// ServerResources returns the cached resource spec for a server, or zeroes
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// when the row does not exist or has been cleared.
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ServerResources(ctx context.Context, name string) (ResourceSpec, error)
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// Audit appends one audit row.
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Audit(ctx context.Context, e AuditEntry) error
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// ---- player email verification (spec §B2 onboarding) ----
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// CreateEmailOTP persists a freshly minted one-time code for (userID, purpose):
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// only its sha-256 (codeHash), never the digits. It supersedes any prior live
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// (unconsumed) code for the same (userID, purpose) so a user has at most one
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// outstanding code per purpose — a re-request invalidates the earlier mail.
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// expiresAt is the API clock + TTL so expiry is driven by one authoritative clock.
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CreateEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email, codeHash, purpose string, expiresAt time.Time) error
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// VerifyEmailOTP redeems the newest live code for (userID, purpose) against
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// codeHash, atomically (spec §B2). No live code, an expired one, or a consumed
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// one → ErrOTPInvalid; an exhausted attempt budget → ErrOTPLocked; a spent
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// (user, purpose) wrong-code budget → *OTPAccountLockedError, even for the right
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// code; a hash mismatch increments attempts, charges that budget, and returns
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// ErrOTPInvalid WITHOUT consuming the code (so a typo does not burn it). On a match the code is consumed and the
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// user row is flipped to email=<the proven address>, email_verified=true; the
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// proven email is returned — unless a DIFFERENT account has already proven the
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// same address, which is ErrEmailTaken with the code left unconsumed (the
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// address, not the code, is the problem). now is the API clock so expiry is
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// testable.
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//
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// This is the ONBOARDING primitive: verifying the code is the moment the address
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|
// becomes proven, so the write is load-bearing. The pre-session LOGIN door must
|
|
// NOT use it — see ConsumeLoginEmailOTP.
|
|
VerifyEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) (email string, err error)
|
|
// SetUserEmail records email on the user row WITHOUT proving control of it, and
|
|
// clears email_verified in the same write (proving nothing, it must never leave a
|
|
// stale verified flag — see the PGRepo impl). This backs the setup wizard's Step 1:
|
|
// the bootstrap has no SMTP, so the Owner cannot receive an emailed code, and the
|
|
// address is stored unverified for a later Settings/SMTP flow to verify. An unknown
|
|
// userID returns ErrNotFound.
|
|
SetUserEmail(ctx context.Context, userID, email string) error
|
|
// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP redeems the newest live code for (userID, purpose) against
|
|
// codeHash for the PRE-SESSION email LOGIN door, with the SAME code lifecycle as
|
|
// VerifyEmailOTP (FOR UPDATE, expiry+lockout before hash compare, mismatch charges
|
|
// one attempt without consuming) but with NO identity side-effects: it neither
|
|
// writes users.email nor runs the verified-email uniqueness guard. Login resolved
|
|
// userID via UserByEmail, which already requires email_verified, so the address is
|
|
// settled — re-proving control of a code this session must not re-touch the row.
|
|
// Returning only an error is deliberate: unlike onboarding, login has nothing to
|
|
// prove about the address, so there is no email to hand back. Errors are exactly
|
|
// ErrOTPInvalid / ErrOTPLocked / *OTPAccountLockedError (ErrEmailTaken is
|
|
// structurally impossible here).
|
|
ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) error
|
|
// OTPLockedUntil reports when the (userID, purpose) wrong-code lock ends, or the
|
|
// zero time when that door is open. Both redeem paths enforce the lock
|
|
// themselves (returning *OTPAccountLockedError, and charging every mismatch to
|
|
// the budget); the start doors read it so a locked door mails no code.
|
|
OTPLockedUntil(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose string, now time.Time) (time.Time, error)
|
|
|
|
// ---- op.console staff login: in-game approval state machine (spec §B op-login) ----
|
|
|
|
// CreateOpLoginRequest records a fresh pending op.console login attempt for a staff
|
|
// account (spec §B op-login). id is the opaque handle the browser polls; email is a
|
|
// snapshot for the audit trail. It writes the SECOND factor only — the email-OTP
|
|
// itself is minted separately under purpose 'op_login' (CreateEmailOTP) — so a row
|
|
// here means "this staff account is waiting for an in-game admin to vouch". expiresAt
|
|
// is the API clock + TTL so expiry is driven by one authoritative clock.
|
|
CreateOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email string, expiresAt time.Time) error
|
|
// OpLoginRequestByID loads a request by its handle, or ErrNotFound. The status poll
|
|
// and the finish path both use it: finish additionally checks Status=='approved',
|
|
// !Consumed, and ExpiresAt>now before it will mint a session, so a pending, spent, or
|
|
// expired request can never be exchanged. Username is left empty (no join needed here).
|
|
OpLoginRequestByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*OpLoginRequest, error)
|
|
// ListPendingOpLogins returns the live (pending, unconsumed, unexpired at now)
|
|
// requests oldest-first, each joined to its staff username, for the in-game admin's
|
|
// approval prompt (Velocity polls this on the internal face). A resolved or expired
|
|
// request drops out of the list, so an admin only ever sees actionable attempts.
|
|
ListPendingOpLogins(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]OpLoginRequest, error)
|
|
// ApproveOpLogin marks a pending request approved by approverUserID (the in-game
|
|
// admin, resolved from their online-mode UUID via UserByMCUUID), atomically: it
|
|
// stamps status='approved', approved_by, approved_at only WHERE the row is still
|
|
// pending, unconsumed, and unexpired at now. A request that is gone, already
|
|
// resolved, or expired affects zero rows and returns ErrNotFound, so a double
|
|
// approval or an approval of a dead request is a no-op the caller can surface.
|
|
ApproveOpLogin(ctx context.Context, id, approverUserID string, now time.Time) error
|
|
// ConsumeOpLoginRequest stamps consumed_at on an APPROVED, unconsumed, unexpired
|
|
// request, atomically, so it can be exchanged for a session exactly once. Zero rows
|
|
// affected (pending, already consumed, or expired) → ErrNotFound. This is the finish
|
|
// path's single-use guard; the email-OTP is consumed separately, so a lost race here
|
|
// never silently mints a second session.
|
|
ConsumeOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- player passkey enrollment (spec §14 WebAuthn / Phase 6 bind) ----
|
|
|
|
// CreatePasskeyChallenge persists the server-side state of a credential-creation
|
|
// ceremony for (userID, purpose): the opaque go-webauthn SessionData blob and its
|
|
// expiry. Only the server holds it, so the client cannot forge the challenge it
|
|
// must answer at finish. It supersedes any prior live (unconsumed) challenge for
|
|
// the same (userID, purpose) so a re-begin invalidates the earlier ceremony —
|
|
// at most one outstanding challenge per (user, purpose). expiresAt is the API
|
|
// clock + TTL so expiry is driven by one authoritative clock.
|
|
CreatePasskeyChallenge(ctx context.Context, id, userID, purpose string, sessionData []byte, expiresAt time.Time) error
|
|
// ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser redeems the newest live (unconsumed, unexpired at
|
|
// now) challenge for (userID, purpose), atomically: it stamps consumed_at and
|
|
// returns the stashed SessionData so finish can validate the attestation against
|
|
// it. No live challenge → ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid. Single-use: a second finish
|
|
// for the same ceremony finds nothing live and fails. now is the API clock so
|
|
// expiry is testable. Bound to user_id — enrollment and username-first login both
|
|
// know the principal at begin; the usernameless from-zero door instead uses the
|
|
// non-user-keyed pair below.
|
|
ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose string, now time.Time) (sessionData []byte, err error)
|
|
// CreateDiscoverableChallenge persists a DISCOVERABLE ("usernameless") login ceremony
|
|
// (task #40, migration 0013), keyed by an opaque server-minted handle id — NOT a user,
|
|
// since a from-zero begin has no principal. In one transaction it reaps expired/consumed
|
|
// rows (the non-user-keyed analog of CreatePasskeyChallenge's supersede) and then, if the
|
|
// live count is at the hard cap, refuses with ErrTooManyDiscoverableChallenges rather than
|
|
// inserting — the cap, not the reap, bounds an adversarial begin-flood, since a burst
|
|
// inside the TTL leaves every fresh row live. now and expiresAt are both the API clock
|
|
// (now drives the reap; expiresAt = now + TTL drives liveness).
|
|
CreateDiscoverableChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string, sessionData []byte, now, expiresAt time.Time) error
|
|
// ConsumeDiscoverableChallenge redeems the discoverable challenge under handle id,
|
|
// atomically and single-use (mirrors ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser without the user key):
|
|
// it takes the row FOR UPDATE, checks expiry against now, stamps consumed_at, and returns
|
|
// the stashed SessionData. An unknown, expired, or already-consumed handle →
|
|
// ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid, so the finish door never doubles as a state oracle.
|
|
ConsumeDiscoverableChallenge(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) (sessionData []byte, err error)
|
|
// CreatePasskeyCredential stores a freshly verified passkey for a user (Phase 6
|
|
// enrollment). It writes only public attestation material (credential_id,
|
|
// public_key, sign_count, aaguid) plus the caller's nickname. A credential_id
|
|
// already bound to ANY account → ErrConflict (the UNIQUE guard); the handler maps
|
|
// that to 409 rather than silently rebinding an authenticator.
|
|
CreatePasskeyCredential(ctx context.Context, c PasskeyCredential) error
|
|
// PasskeyCredentialsForUser lists the passkeys a user has bound, newest first, for
|
|
// the credential-management view. It returns only display fields (never a secret —
|
|
// a passkey carries none); LastUsedAt is nil where no assertion has been verified.
|
|
PasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]PasskeyCredential, error)
|
|
// DeletePasskeyCredential removes the passkey row id, scoped to userID so a caller
|
|
// can only unbind their OWN credential. No matching (user, id) row → ErrNotFound,
|
|
// so a stale or cross-user id cannot silently no-op as success. When the row is
|
|
// the user's last passkey and their email is unverified it returns ErrLastPasskey
|
|
// and deletes nothing; the check and the delete hold the user row locked, so two
|
|
// concurrent deletes of a user's last two passkeys cannot both pass.
|
|
DeletePasskeyCredential(ctx context.Context, userID, id string) error
|
|
// DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser unbinds every passkey a user holds — the
|
|
// remediation that stops a passkey planted via a transiently-hijacked session from
|
|
// surviving as a standing login foothold. Its production caller is the owner-tier
|
|
// DELETE /users/{id}/passkeys (handleUnbindUserPasskeys); a complete remediation
|
|
// pairs it with a session revoke, since unbinding the credential without revoking
|
|
// live sessions leaves the hijacked session itself, and revoking sessions without
|
|
// unbinding leaves a re-enrollable credential. Removing zero rows is success, not an
|
|
// error — an account with no passkeys is the intended post-condition either way.
|
|
DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) error
|
|
// AdvanceCredentialSignCount records a successful assertion on the passkey identified by
|
|
// credentialID (base64url): it sets the stored signature counter to newSignCount and stamps
|
|
// last_used_at. credential_id is UNIQUE, so exactly one row is updated; a missing row (the
|
|
// credential was unbound mid-ceremony) is a successful no-op, never an error. The login doors
|
|
// call it only after clone policy allows the assertion, so for a counter-keeping authenticator
|
|
// the stored counter only ever moves forward — the baseline a later regression is judged against.
|
|
AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- player game-login: username-collision reclaim (spec §B3) ----
|
|
|
|
// ReclaimUsername records a Mojang-priority username reclaim, atomically (spec
|
|
// §B3 正版优先): in one transaction it bars the non-genuine squatter UUID
|
|
// (username_blacklist) and stashes that account's data as a hold the velocity
|
|
// reclaim callback drives. The two writes are all-or-nothing — a half-applied
|
|
// reclaim (a barred UUID whose data was never held, or a hold for a UUID still
|
|
// able to connect) would either lose the player's data or let the squatter back
|
|
// in. id is the opaque hold row id; dataRef is the opaque archiver handle (""
|
|
// stored as NULL when archival is deferred); expiresAt is the proposed held_at +
|
|
// the 30-day window on the API clock. Keyed by mc_uuid on both tables, so a
|
|
// repeat reclaim of an already-barred UUID is idempotent and never errors on a
|
|
// duplicate — the block stays on the squatting UUID, never the contested name.
|
|
// It returns the EFFECTIVE persisted expiry: on a fresh reclaim that is the
|
|
// passed expiresAt, but on an idempotent retry it is the FIRST reclaim's expiry,
|
|
// so the caller never reports a window the stored hold does not actually have.
|
|
ReclaimUsername(ctx context.Context, id, squatterUUID, username, dataRef string, expiresAt time.Time) (time.Time, error)
|
|
// IsUsernameBlacklisted reports whether an in-game UUID was barred by a prior
|
|
// reclaim (spec §B3). The velocity login gate calls it on the internal face to
|
|
// reject a squatter while letting the genuine Mojang UUID — same username,
|
|
// different UUID — through: the check is keyed by UUID, never by the name.
|
|
IsUsernameBlacklisted(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool, error)
|
|
// IsProtectedAdminLink reports whether an in-game UUID belongs to a Linked
|
|
// Operator/SysAdmin who authenticates through the configured third-party
|
|
// Yggdrasil — the admin-on-Yggdrasil reclaim exception (spec §B3). Such a holder
|
|
// is staff logging in via the Login Server, not a Mojang squatter, so a
|
|
// Mojang-priority reclaim must never bar them. The predicate is exactly three
|
|
// conjuncts: the UUID is linked (account_links), that link authenticated via
|
|
// 'thirdparty' (auth_source), and the linked user is staff — admin or owner
|
|
// (migration 0011), the Owner being the identity most in need of the exception.
|
|
// It deliberately does NOT ask HOW the staff account signs in: an Operator may
|
|
// authenticate via SSO (Cloudflare Access, IdP-agnostic per §14) or any local
|
|
// passwordless door, and must be protected all the same — the sign-in method is
|
|
// orthogonal to both "is staff" and "logs in via the Login Server". An unlinked
|
|
// UUID, a Mojang-sourced link, or a player link all yield false, so the
|
|
// exception never broadens to ordinary thirdparty players (Mojang priority still
|
|
// displaces them) nor to Mojang-authenticated identities (who have no Login-Server
|
|
// name to protect). Keyed by UUID — the only identity velocity knows.
|
|
IsProtectedAdminLink(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool, error)
|
|
|
|
// ---- staff account lookups (spec §B, passwordless) ----
|
|
|
|
// UserByUsername loads the login projection of a staff account by its unique
|
|
// username, or ErrNotFound. Its caller is the `felis breakGlass` recovery TUI,
|
|
// which resolves an Owner/Operator username before sending an email-OTP — there is
|
|
// no password compare (the account is passwordless). A non-staff (role='user') row
|
|
// resolves too; callers that require staff enforce the role themselves.
|
|
UserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*StaffUser, error)
|
|
// UserByID loads the same staff projection by user id, or ErrNotFound. Callers hold
|
|
// a session (which yields a user id, not a username) and need the account behind it
|
|
// — e.g. setup redeem/status resolving the lockdown session's owner. It is the
|
|
// id-keyed counterpart of UserByUsername.
|
|
UserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error)
|
|
// UserByEmail resolves a VERIFIED email address to its login projection,
|
|
// case-insensitively, or ErrNotFound (spec §B email-first login). It is the
|
|
// entry point every email-first web login shares: the address must be proven
|
|
// (email_verified true), so a merely-asserted or unverified address never
|
|
// resolves to a session-mintable identity — an attacker cannot claim someone
|
|
// else's login by typing their email. Matching is on lower(email) to align with
|
|
// the users_verified_email_unique partial index (migration 0020), which
|
|
// guarantees at most one verified row per normalized address, so the result is
|
|
// unambiguous. A player (role='user') row resolves too — email-first login is
|
|
// passwordless and role-agnostic here; the door that consumes this result decides
|
|
// what each role may do.
|
|
UserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (*StaffUser, error)
|
|
// UpsertOwner creates or resets the single Owner account direct-to-Postgres
|
|
// (the `felis setup` / `felis breakGlass` recovery path). role is forced to
|
|
// 'owner' (migration 0011 — the tier every user-admin route gates on); on a
|
|
// username conflict the existing row's email is overwritten and the role
|
|
// re-asserted, so a reset is idempotent and a pre-0011 'admin' Owner row is
|
|
// promoted. The account is passwordless by design.
|
|
UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error
|
|
// CreateSession records a minted session (spec §B sessions). Only the hash of
|
|
// the cookie is stored, mirroring tokens, so a database read never yields a
|
|
// usable cookie. The session counts as seen at creation.
|
|
CreateSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error
|
|
// SessionUser resolves a live session hash to its user, or ErrNotFound. Live
|
|
// means unrevoked, unexpired at now, its account neither disabled nor deleted,
|
|
// and — for a staff account — seen within staffSessionIdle of now. It is the
|
|
// cookie half of SessionAuth.
|
|
SessionUser(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (*SessionedUser, error)
|
|
// TouchSession records that the session authenticated a request at now. It
|
|
// never moves last_seen_at backwards, and touching an absent session is not
|
|
// an error.
|
|
TouchSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) error
|
|
// RevokeSession marks a session revoked (logout). It is idempotent: revoking an
|
|
// absent or already-revoked session is not an error.
|
|
RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error
|
|
// RevokeUserSession revokes one live session of userID. A hash that is not a
|
|
// live session of that user — another user's, already revoked, expired or
|
|
// unknown — is ErrNotFound and changes nothing.
|
|
RevokeUserSession(ctx context.Context, userID, tokenHash string) error
|
|
// RevokeOtherUserSessions revokes every live session of userID except
|
|
// keepTokenHash (every one when keepTokenHash is empty) and reports how many
|
|
// it ended.
|
|
RevokeOtherUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID, keepTokenHash string) (int, error)
|
|
|
|
// ConsumeSetupToken atomically marks a one-time setup token consumed and returns
|
|
// its user_id, or ErrNotFound when the token is absent, already consumed, or
|
|
// expired. The /setup?token=... web flow redeems it for a lockdown session that
|
|
// can only complete passwordless login setup (verify email / enroll passkey).
|
|
ConsumeSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (userID string, err error)
|
|
|
|
// ---- runtime platform settings (spec §B platform_settings) ----
|
|
|
|
// GetSetting reads a runtime setting's raw jsonb value, or ErrNotFound when the
|
|
// key is absent. The live API reads these per-request so the break-glass TUI can
|
|
// flip toggles (e.g. local_auth_enabled) direct-to-DB without rolling the pod.
|
|
GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error)
|
|
// SetSetting upserts a runtime setting's raw jsonb value by key.
|
|
SetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- user admin (spec §7, admin-only) ----
|
|
|
|
// ListUsers returns a page of non-deleted users matching the optional filters,
|
|
// newest first. total is the unfiltered count so the admin page can render
|
|
// pagination without a second round-trip.
|
|
ListUsers(ctx context.Context, opts ListUsersOpts) ([]UserView, int, error)
|
|
// UserDetail loads one user with its linked MC accounts, or ErrNotFound.
|
|
// A deleted user is returned (the row lives for audit) but flagged.
|
|
UserDetail(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserDetail, error)
|
|
// CreateUser mints a new user row (role forced to either 'admin' or 'user').
|
|
// createdBy is the actor email for audit. A username conflict → ErrConflict.
|
|
CreateUser(ctx context.Context, input CreateUserInput, createdBy string) (*UserView, error)
|
|
// UpdateUser applies the non-nil fields of patch to the user identified by
|
|
// userID and returns the updated view. A username conflict → ErrConflict;
|
|
// a non-existent user → ErrNotFound. updatedBy is the actor email.
|
|
UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, patch UpdateUserInput, updatedBy string) (*UserView, error)
|
|
// DeleteUser soft-deletes the user: sets deleted_at, revokes every live
|
|
// session, and releases every owned server (owner_id → NULL). deletedBy is
|
|
// the actor email. A non-existent or already-deleted user → ErrNotFound.
|
|
// The row is preserved so audit_logs.actor references survive.
|
|
DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, userID, deletedBy string) error
|
|
// SetUserDisabled flips the disabled flag on a live (non-deleted) user.
|
|
// Setting disabled→true additionally revokes every live session so a
|
|
// disabled account is immediately locked out. A non-existent user →
|
|
// ErrNotFound; a deleted user → ErrNotFound.
|
|
SetUserDisabled(ctx context.Context, userID string, disabled bool) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- quota admin (spec §6 quotas, admin-only) ----
|
|
|
|
// GetQuotas returns the quotas row for a user, or a zero-value view when no
|
|
// row exists (which means unlimited per spec §9.3).
|
|
GetQuotas(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*QuotaView, error)
|
|
// SetQuotas upserts a quotas row for userID. Nil fields leave the column
|
|
// untouched; a zero-value (non-nil) field clears the cap (unlimited).
|
|
SetQuotas(ctx context.Context, userID string, q QuotaInput, setBy string) (*QuotaView, error)
|
|
|
|
// ---- session admin (admin-only) ----
|
|
|
|
// ListUserSessions returns every live session for a user (live as SessionUser
|
|
// defines it), most recently seen first. An empty list is not an error.
|
|
ListUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID string, now time.Time) ([]SessionView, error)
|
|
// RevokeAllUserSessions marks every live session of userID revoked.
|
|
// Revoking zero sessions is not an error.
|
|
RevokeAllUserSessions(ctx context.Context, userID string) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- account-link admin (admin-only) ----
|
|
|
|
// UnlinkAccount removes a single (user_id, mc_uuid) binding. It does not
|
|
// consume the UUID's link code — a re-link by the player later is still
|
|
// possible — but the admin can unlink without going through the player.
|
|
// A non-existent binding → ErrNotFound.
|
|
UnlinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, mcUUID string) error
|
|
// LinkAccount force-binds a verified MC UUID to a user, bypassing the
|
|
// normal code-verification flow. The UUID must not already be linked to a
|
|
// different user (→ ErrConflict). A duplicate bind of the same pair is
|
|
// idempotent. authSource records which Yggdrasil established the UUID
|
|
// (mojang | thirdparty, spec §10 dual-Yggdrasil).
|
|
LinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, mcUUID, authSource string) error
|
|
|
|
// ---- account migration (spec §B3 inherit, scenario A) ----
|
|
|
|
// StartMigration puts a LIVE source account into migrate mode: it supersedes any
|
|
// earlier unfinished migration for the source (so re-running /felis migrate
|
|
// restarts cleanly, invalidating a prior outstanding code) and inserts a fresh row
|
|
// in state 'initiated'. id is the opaque handle. The source must be a live
|
|
// (non-deleted) account — ErrNotFound otherwise, so a retired account can never
|
|
// re-initiate. now stamps the row.
|
|
StartMigration(ctx context.Context, id, sourceUserID string, now time.Time) error
|
|
// MigrationForSource loads the live (non-redeemed) migration for a source, or
|
|
// ErrNotFound when none is in flight. The web status/confirm/issue paths use it to
|
|
// gate each step on the correct prior state.
|
|
MigrationForSource(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*MigrationView, error)
|
|
// ConfirmMigration records that the source proved control via a FRESH step-up
|
|
// (factor 'passkey' | 'email_otp'), advancing 'initiated' → 'confirmed'. It only
|
|
// advances from 'initiated'; any other current state (or no migration) → ErrConflict,
|
|
// so a confirmed/code_issued/redeemed migration can never be re-confirmed and the
|
|
// step-up cannot be replayed. now stamps confirmed_at.
|
|
ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor string, now time.Time) error
|
|
// IssueMigrationCode binds the named target and stores the one-time code hash,
|
|
// advancing 'confirmed' → 'code_issued'. targetUserID must be a live account other
|
|
// than the source (validated by the caller before this call); the target FK also
|
|
// guarantees the row exists. codeHash is the sha-256 of the code; expiresAt is its
|
|
// TTL. A migration not in 'confirmed' → ErrConflict.
|
|
IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error
|
|
// RedeemMigration is the ATOMIC transfer: keyed by (codeHash, targetUserID) it
|
|
// finds the 'code_issued', unexpired migration whose named target is exactly the
|
|
// redeeming user, re-points every server owned by the source to the target, retires
|
|
// the source account (disabled + soft-deleted, its live sessions revoked), and marks
|
|
// the migration 'redeemed' — all in one transaction. It returns the source user id
|
|
// and the moved server names for the audit trail. No matching or expired code, or a
|
|
// code whose named target is a different user → ErrLinkCodeInvalid (an intercepted
|
|
// code is useless to anyone but the named target). Server ownership is the only thing
|
|
// moved — the mc_uuid link and web credentials stay with their accounts. now drives
|
|
// expiry and the terminal timestamps.
|
|
RedeemMigration(ctx context.Context, targetUserID, codeHash string, now time.Time) (sourceUserID string, movedServers []string, err error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---- user admin types ----
|
|
|
|
// ListUsersOpts carries the optional filters and pagination for ListUsers.
|
|
// Zero values mean "no filter / default page."
|
|
type ListUsersOpts struct {
|
|
Query string // substring match on username or email
|
|
Role string // exact role match ("admin" / "user"), or "" for all
|
|
Hidden string // "true" = disabled only, "false" = enabled only, "" = all
|
|
Limit int // page size; 0 → default 20
|
|
Offset int // page offset; 0 → first page
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UserView is one row of the admin user list.
|
|
type UserView struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
Username string `json:"username"`
|
|
Email string `json:"email,omitempty"`
|
|
Role string `json:"role"`
|
|
Disabled bool `json:"disabled"`
|
|
EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
|
|
ServerCount int `json:"server_count"`
|
|
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
|
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UserDetail is the full admin view of one user, including linked MC accounts.
|
|
type UserDetail struct {
|
|
UserView
|
|
DeletedAt *time.Time `json:"deleted_at,omitempty"`
|
|
LinkedAccounts []LinkedAccount `json:"linked_accounts,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LinkedAccount is one verified MC-UUID binding (account_links, spec §10).
|
|
type LinkedAccount struct {
|
|
MCUUID string `json:"mc_uuid"`
|
|
AuthSource string `json:"auth_source"`
|
|
VerifiedAt time.Time `json:"verified_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateUserInput is the admin create-user form.
|
|
type CreateUserInput struct {
|
|
Username string `json:"username"`
|
|
Email string `json:"email,omitempty"`
|
|
Role string `json:"role"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateUserInput is the admin patch-user form. Every field is a pointer so
|
|
// an absent field ("leave unchanged") is distinguishable from a zero value.
|
|
type UpdateUserInput struct {
|
|
Username *string `json:"username,omitempty"`
|
|
Email *string `json:"email,omitempty"`
|
|
Role *string `json:"role,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// QuotaView is the admin-visible quotas row (spec §6).
|
|
type QuotaView struct {
|
|
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
|
|
MaxServers *int `json:"max_servers,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxCPUMilli *int `json:"max_cpu_milli,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxMemoryMB *int `json:"max_memory_mb,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxStorageGB *int `json:"max_storage_gb,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// QuotaInput is the admin set-quotas form. Nil fields are left unchanged;
|
|
// a non-nil zero-value field clears the cap (unlimited).
|
|
type QuotaInput struct {
|
|
MaxServers *int `json:"max_servers,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxCPUMilli *int `json:"max_cpu_milli,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxMemoryMB *int `json:"max_memory_mb,omitempty"`
|
|
MaxStorageGB *int `json:"max_storage_gb,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ResourceSpec is the resource footprint of one server, in the units that the
|
|
// quotas table uses. The resource cache on the servers row mirrors these values
|
|
// so QuotaCheck can aggregate per-owner usage with pure SQL.
|
|
type ResourceSpec struct {
|
|
CPUMilli int // CPU in millicores (e.g. 4000 = 4 cores)
|
|
MemoryMB int // memory in megabytes (e.g. 4096 = 4 GiB)
|
|
StorageMB int // storage in megabytes (e.g. 10240 = 10 GiB)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SessionView is one live session row, as the account holder and an admin see
|
|
// it. Current is set only on the holder's own list, on the session making the
|
|
// request.
|
|
type SessionView struct {
|
|
TokenHash string `json:"token_hash"`
|
|
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
|
|
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
|
|
LastSeenAt time.Time `json:"last_seen_at"`
|
|
UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
|
|
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
|
|
RevokedAt *time.Time `json:"revoked_at,omitempty"`
|
|
Current bool `json:"current,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|