A user-directed extension over the build subsystem: an uploaded modpack stays in pending_review and is never built until an admin approves. Approval is a single-winner compare-and-swap that hands off to the image-build Job, keeping the mandatory vulnerability scan in front of any push.
419 lines
18 KiB
Go
419 lines
18 KiB
Go
// Package submit implements the user-uploaded modpack approval lane.
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//
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// PROVENANCE — read this before trusting the spec citations elsewhere. This lane
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// is a USER-DIRECTED extension, not a feature of Felis-Spec-V4.1 as written. The
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// spec's §16 build subsystem deliberately DELETED a manual-approve flow ("简化掉
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// (admin 信任,删):人工 approve 流程 → 删 ... 无人工 approve 端点") under a trust
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// model where "上传仅 SysAdmin" (§1 invariant 9: "build 鉴权简化(admin-only)").
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// The product owner subsequently required the opposite: ordinary, untrusted
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// users may upload their own modpacks, and an admin must approve each one before
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// it is usable. Re-introducing untrusted-origin uploads is exactly the condition
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// under which §16's deleted gate must come BACK — the spec removed the approve
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// step only because it had assumed every uploader was already a trusted SysAdmin.
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// So this lane departs from §16's *ingress* simplification on purpose, with the
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// owner's instruction as the authority; it does NOT relax anything §16 calls
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// non-negotiable. (Do not cite "spec §8" for this lane — §8 is Readiness/优雅关闭
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// /Console. Earlier drafts mis-cited it; those citations have been corrected.)
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//
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// What is preserved (§16, non-negotiable). The build subsystem treats the
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// Dockerfile as hostile at runtime (build/build.go): Kaniko reads the Dockerfile
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// from inside the uploaded context, so every build — admin or user — runs in the
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// isolated felis-build namespace under a weak service account behind a default-
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// deny egress policy, and a CRITICAL CVE fails the Trivy gate ("运行时隔离不能
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// 省"). This lane changes none of that: an approved submission is built through
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// the SAME gated Builder.Submit. The approval gate is layered in FRONT of the
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// still-mandatory Trivy scan, never instead of it — a human "yes" does not skip
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// the scan, so a CRITICAL CVE still blocks admission after approval.
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//
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// Two further guards close the gap an untrusted origin opens:
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//
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// - The push target (image_ref) is DERIVED by the Manager as
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// {registry}/user-uploads/{submissionID}:latest — a namespace platform refs
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// never use, so a submitter can neither collide with nor target the platform
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// image namespace.
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// - The build context (context_ref) is DERIVED as {contextStore}/{id}/...
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// too, NOT taken as free-form user input. Kaniko interpolates the context
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// ref straight into its `--context=` argument (build/jobspec.go); a user-
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// chosen ref would let an untrusted origin point the build at an arbitrary
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// source. By deriving it from the submission id the user selects nothing
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// that reaches the executor — only the modpack blob behind the pinned,
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// id-namespaced location (uploaded by a separate, deferred transport).
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//
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// Source of truth. submissions is a NEW Postgres business-truth domain, added to
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// §1 invariant 2's enumeration (owner/claim/accounts/audit/quota/images/builds/
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// backups) by the same owner instruction that introduced this lane. The
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// image_submissions row is the business authority — the approval record — while
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// the build is the execution record in image_builds. Approve never copies the
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// build's authoritative fields; it records the derived push target it asked the
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// Builder to build plus the reviewer identity, and links the build id once
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// Submit succeeds.
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//
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// The Manager depends on the Store and Builds interfaces, so creation, the
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// approve CAS, rejection, and build hand-off are all unit-tested against
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// in-memory fakes. The Postgres implementation (PGStore) compiles here but is
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// exercised only by integration tests against a live database.
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package submit
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"felis.lolicon.best/internal/build"
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)
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// Status mirrors the submission_status enum (spec §6, migration 0002).
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type Status string
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const (
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StatusPendingReview Status = "pending_review"
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StatusApproved Status = "approved"
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StatusRejected Status = "rejected"
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)
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// Sentinels. The API layer maps ErrInvalid→400, ErrNotFound→404 and
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// ErrAlreadyReviewed→409; they are kept distinct from store/cluster failures so
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// those surface as 500.
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var (
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ErrInvalid = errors.New("submit: invalid request")
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ErrNotFound = errors.New("submit: submission not found")
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ErrAlreadyReviewed = errors.New("submit: submission already reviewed")
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)
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// invalidf wraps ErrInvalid so every malformed-request case maps to one 400.
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func invalidf(format string, a ...any) error {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: "+format, append([]any{ErrInvalid}, a...)...)
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}
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const (
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maxDisplayName = 200
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maxRejectReason = 1000
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)
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// displayNameRE constrains the user-supplied label to a calm, single-line set:
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// it is the only free-form string a submission carries, and although JSON
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// encoding already neutralises it in responses, rejecting control characters
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// and odd whitespace here keeps it clean in the admin review queue and any log
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// line. Length is bounded separately so this stays a charset check.
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var displayNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^[\p{L}\p{N} ._:()\[\]/+-]+$`)
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// Submission mirrors an image_submissions row (spec §6, migration 0002): a
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// user's request to have a modpack built into a runnable image, plus the admin
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// review verdict. The user supplies only DisplayName; ContextRef/ImageRef/
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// BuildID/ReviewedBy are filled by the platform, never by the submitter.
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type Submission struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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SubmittedBy string `json:"submitted_by"`
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DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
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ContextRef string `json:"context_ref"`
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Status Status `json:"status"`
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ImageRef string `json:"image_ref,omitempty"`
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BuildID string `json:"build_id,omitempty"`
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ReviewedBy string `json:"reviewed_by,omitempty"`
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RejectReason string `json:"reject_reason,omitempty"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
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ReviewedAt *time.Time `json:"reviewed_at,omitempty"`
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}
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// Store is the business-layer persistence the Manager depends on. It is an
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// interface so the Manager is tested against an in-memory fake; the Postgres
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// implementation (PGStore) is integration-tested only.
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type Store interface {
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// CreateSubmission inserts a pending_review row.
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CreateSubmission(ctx context.Context, s *Submission) error
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// GetSubmission loads one submission, or ErrNotFound.
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GetSubmission(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Submission, error)
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// ListSubmissions returns every submission, newest first (admin queue).
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ListSubmissions(ctx context.Context) ([]Submission, error)
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// ListSubmissionsBy returns one user's submissions, newest first.
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ListSubmissionsBy(ctx context.Context, submittedBy string) ([]Submission, error)
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// ApproveSubmission atomically flips pending_review -> approved, recording the
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// derived image_ref, the reviewer and reviewed_at. It reports whether THIS
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// call won the transition: false means a concurrent review already moved the
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// row, so the caller must NOT start a build.
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ApproveSubmission(ctx context.Context, id, reviewedBy, imageRef string, at time.Time) (won bool, err error)
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// RejectSubmission atomically flips pending_review -> rejected, recording the
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// reviewer, the reason and reviewed_at. Reports whether THIS call won.
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RejectSubmission(ctx context.Context, id, reviewedBy, reason string, at time.Time) (won bool, err error)
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// LinkBuild records the build id on an approved submission. It runs only after
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// Builder.Submit succeeds, so the implication is ONE-WAY: build_id non-null ⇒
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// a build started. The converse does NOT hold — if Submit succeeds but this
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// link write then fails, build_id stays NULL while a build is genuinely running
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// (Approve surfaces that distinctly so remediation does not double-build; see
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// the Approve ordering note and the package KNOWN-LIMITATION).
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LinkBuild(ctx context.Context, id, buildID string) error
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}
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// Builds is the slice of the build subsystem the approval lane drives. An
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// approved submission is built through the SAME gated Builder.Submit as an
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// admin's direct build, so the Trivy scan-gate applies identically (spec §16).
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type Builds interface {
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Submit(ctx context.Context, req build.Request) (*build.Build, error)
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}
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// Manager orchestrates the approval lane. It holds no mutable state; the clock
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// and id generator are injectable for hermetic tests.
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type Manager struct {
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Store Store
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Builds Builds
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// Registry is the internal registry host[:port] the derived push target
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// addresses. It MUST be the SAME value the Builder is configured with
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// (build.Config.RegistryURL): the Manager pre-validates the derived ref
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// against this host before the approve CAS, and the Builder re-validates
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// against its own config at Submit — if the two disagree the pre-check passes
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// but Submit rejects, stranding an approved row. cmd/felis wires both from one
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// field. The derived ref is {Registry}/user-uploads/{id}:latest.
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Registry string
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// ContextStore is the pinned Kaniko build-context base for user uploads, e.g.
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// "s3://felis-user-uploads" (mirrors a configured object store). The derived
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// context ref is {ContextStore}/{id}/context.tar.gz; the modpack blob is
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// placed there by a separate upload transport (deferred — see package doc).
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ContextStore string
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Now func() time.Time
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IDGen func() string
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}
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func (m *Manager) now() time.Time {
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if m.Now != nil {
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return m.Now()
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}
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return time.Now()
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}
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func (m *Manager) newID() string {
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if m.IDGen != nil {
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return m.IDGen()
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}
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// The id namespaces the derived image ref (deriveImageRef) and is the PK of
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// image_submissions, so it must be lowercase (imageNameRE in build/validate.go),
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// path/argv-safe, and collision-resistant. 8 bytes of crypto/rand hex give all
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// three: lowercase hex never contains a slash or shell metachar, and the id is
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// unguessable rather than a sequential timestamp. crypto/rand.Read only fails on
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// a broken entropy source; fall back to a nanosecond stamp so creation degrades
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// instead of panicking (a PK clash would surface as a normal insert error).
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var b [8]byte
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if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
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return fmt.Sprintf("sub-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
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}
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return "sub-" + hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
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}
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// deriveImageRef is the platform-controlled push target for a submission: a pure
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// function of the registry and the submission id, in a user-uploads/ path no
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// platform ref uses, so an untrusted submitter can never collide with or target
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// the platform image namespace.
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func (m *Manager) deriveImageRef(id string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s/user-uploads/%s:latest", strings.TrimRight(m.Registry, "/"), id)
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}
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// deriveContextRef is the platform-controlled build context for a submission.
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// Like the image ref it is a pure function of the submission id, so the user
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// selects nothing that reaches Kaniko's --context argument; only the blob behind
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// this pinned, id-namespaced location (placed by the upload transport) varies.
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func (m *Manager) deriveContextRef(id string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/context.tar.gz", strings.TrimRight(m.ContextStore, "/"), id)
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}
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// auditDockerfile is the audit-archive Dockerfile recorded on the build row. It
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// is NOT what Kaniko executes — Kaniko reads the real Dockerfile from inside the
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// uploaded context (build/jobspec.go) — so this honestly documents the
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// provenance instead of implying a recipe the platform controls. It satisfies
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// build.Validate's non-empty requirement.
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func auditDockerfile(id, contextRef string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf(
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"# felis user-modpack submission %s\n"+
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"# The executed Dockerfile is provided by the uploaded build context:\n"+
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"# %s\n"+
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"# Built in the isolated felis-build sandbox and Trivy-gated (spec §16).\n",
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id, contextRef)
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}
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// CreateRequest is the validated user upload. The user supplies ONLY a
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// human-friendly name; identity comes from the authenticated principal and the
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// build inputs (image/context refs) are platform-derived, never from the body.
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type CreateRequest struct {
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DisplayName string
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SubmittedBy string
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}
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// Create records a new pending_review submission. It does NOT start a build:
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// nothing is built until an admin approves (the whole point of the lane).
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func (m *Manager) Create(ctx context.Context, req CreateRequest) (*Submission, error) {
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name := strings.TrimSpace(req.DisplayName)
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switch {
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case name == "":
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return nil, invalidf("display name is required")
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case len(name) > maxDisplayName:
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return nil, invalidf("display name exceeds %d characters", maxDisplayName)
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case !displayNameRE.MatchString(name):
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return nil, invalidf("display name contains unsupported characters")
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(req.SubmittedBy) == "" {
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return nil, invalidf("submitter identity is required")
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}
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id := m.newID()
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s := &Submission{
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ID: id,
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SubmittedBy: req.SubmittedBy,
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DisplayName: name,
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ContextRef: m.deriveContextRef(id),
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Status: StatusPendingReview,
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CreatedAt: m.now(),
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}
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if err := m.Store.CreateSubmission(ctx, s); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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// Approve is the admin gate. It atomically claims the pending_review -> approved
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// transition (CAS) and ONLY the winner starts the build, so concurrent approvals
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// can never double-build. The build runs through the SAME gated Builder.Submit as
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// an admin's direct build: approval is layered in FRONT of the Trivy scan, never
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// instead of it (spec §16), so a CRITICAL CVE still fails the build and nothing
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// is admitted even after a human approved.
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//
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// Ordering and its two post-CAS partial states. Deterministic validation (a
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// misconfigured registry/context, an id that does not form a valid ref) runs
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// BEFORE the CAS via build.Validate, so such failures never leave a stuck
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// approved row. The CAS is then committed before Submit. Two failures can occur
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// after it, and they are NOT equally benign:
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//
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// - Submit fails (transient cluster error): the row is approved with build_id
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// NULL and NO build is running. Benign and recoverable — an admin re-drives
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// it via the direct build path.
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// - Submit SUCCEEDS but the follow-up LinkBuild fails: the row is approved with
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// build_id NULL while a build IS running and will push to the derived
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// image_ref. On the row this is indistinguishable from the benign case, so a
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// blind "re-drive" would double-build and double-push to :latest (no unique
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// constraint stops it). Approve therefore returns a DISTINCT error naming the
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// running build id and warning not to re-submit.
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//
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// Both are labeled KNOWN-LIMITATIONs (see package doc); the second is the worse
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// one and the reason the error is differentiated. The alternative ordering
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// (Submit-then-CAS) would either double-build under a concurrent approve or
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// orphan a build on a lost race, both worse still.
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func (m *Manager) Approve(ctx context.Context, id, reviewedBy string) (*Submission, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(reviewedBy) == "" {
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return nil, invalidf("reviewer identity is required")
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}
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sub, err := m.Store.GetSubmission(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if sub.Status != StatusPendingReview {
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return nil, ErrAlreadyReviewed
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}
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imageRef := m.deriveImageRef(id)
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req := build.Request{
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ImageRef: imageRef,
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Dockerfile: auditDockerfile(id, sub.ContextRef),
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ContextRef: sub.ContextRef,
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BaseImage: "", // declared inside the uploaded context, unknown here
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RequestedBy: reviewedBy,
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}
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// Pre-validate against the SAME registry the Builder enforces, BEFORE the CAS,
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// so a deterministic config error cannot strand the row in approved.
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if err := build.Validate(req, build.Config{RegistryURL: m.Registry}); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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now := m.now()
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won, err := m.Store.ApproveSubmission(ctx, id, reviewedBy, imageRef, now)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !won {
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// Lost the race to a concurrent approve/reject.
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return nil, ErrAlreadyReviewed
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}
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// Only the CAS winner starts the build.
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bld, err := m.Builds.Submit(ctx, req)
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if err != nil {
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// Approved but unbuilt and NOTHING is running — admin remediation via the
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// direct build path is safe (the benign partial state).
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("submit: approved but build hand-off failed: %w", err)
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}
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if err := m.Store.LinkBuild(ctx, id, bld.ID); err != nil {
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// The worse partial state: the build IS running and will push to image_ref,
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// but the row still shows build_id NULL. A blind re-drive would double-build.
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// Name the running build id and warn explicitly so an operator reconciles it
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// (link it by hand / let it finish) instead of re-submitting.
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("submit: approved and build %s started but linking it to the submission failed (build is running — do NOT re-submit, reconcile build_id by hand): %w", bld.ID, err)
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}
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reviewedAt := now
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sub.Status = StatusApproved
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sub.ImageRef = imageRef
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sub.BuildID = bld.ID
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sub.ReviewedBy = reviewedBy
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sub.ReviewedAt = &reviewedAt
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return sub, nil
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}
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// Reject is the admin's other verdict: it atomically claims
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// pending_review -> rejected with a required reason and starts NO build.
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func (m *Manager) Reject(ctx context.Context, id, reviewedBy, reason string) (*Submission, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(reviewedBy) == "" {
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return nil, invalidf("reviewer identity is required")
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}
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reason = strings.TrimSpace(reason)
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switch {
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case reason == "":
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return nil, invalidf("a reject reason is required")
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case len(reason) > maxRejectReason:
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return nil, invalidf("reject reason exceeds %d characters", maxRejectReason)
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}
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sub, err := m.Store.GetSubmission(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if sub.Status != StatusPendingReview {
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return nil, ErrAlreadyReviewed
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}
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now := m.now()
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won, err := m.Store.RejectSubmission(ctx, id, reviewedBy, reason, now)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !won {
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return nil, ErrAlreadyReviewed
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}
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reviewedAt := now
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sub.Status = StatusRejected
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sub.ReviewedBy = reviewedBy
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sub.RejectReason = reason
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sub.ReviewedAt = &reviewedAt
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return sub, nil
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}
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// List returns every submission, newest first (the admin review queue).
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func (m *Manager) List(ctx context.Context) ([]Submission, error) {
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return m.Store.ListSubmissions(ctx)
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}
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// ListBy returns one user's submissions, newest first (the "my uploads" view).
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func (m *Manager) ListBy(ctx context.Context, submittedBy string) ([]Submission, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(submittedBy) == "" {
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return nil, invalidf("submitter identity is required")
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}
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return m.Store.ListSubmissionsBy(ctx, submittedBy)
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}
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// Compile-time proof that the production build subsystem satisfies Builds.
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var _ Builds = (*build.Builder)(nil)
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