Files
Felis/internal/build/jobspec.go
T
flyemoji 708cdfc5b8 feat(core): add naming, RCON, store, config, and image-build libraries
Foundational libraries: deterministic resource naming, the RCON client, the Postgres store with embedded SQL migrations, configuration loading, and container image-build helpers.
2026-06-26 23:31:58 +09:00

285 lines
9.5 KiB
Go

package build
import (
"fmt"
"time"
batchv1 "k8s.io/api/batch/v1"
corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
networkingv1 "k8s.io/api/networking/v1"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/resource"
metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/intstr"
)
// Label keys applied to build objects. ManagedBy doubles as the NetworkPolicy
// pod selector, so every build Pod is captured by the egress lock.
const (
LabelManagedBy = "app.kubernetes.io/managed-by"
LabelComponent = "app.kubernetes.io/component"
LabelBuildID = "felis.lolicon.best/build-id"
managedByValue = "felis-build"
componentValue = "image-build"
)
// Container names within the build Pod. Kaniko is the initContainer that builds
// and pushes the image — its log IS the "build log" an admin watches (spec §16);
// Trivy is the main container whose CRITICAL-CVE verdict gates admission and is
// surfaced via the build status, not the log stream. Exported so the build-log
// streamer (internal/api.K8sBuildLogStreamer, spec §416 日志流复用 §8) follows the
// same container this Job defines — one source of truth for the name.
const (
ContainerKaniko = "kaniko"
ContainerTrivy = "trivy"
)
// JobParams are the rendered inputs to a build Job. They are derived from a
// Build + Config by the Builder; jobspec is a pure function of them so the
// security-critical Job shape is unit-tested without a cluster.
type JobParams struct {
BuildID string
ImageRef string
ContextRef string
Namespace string
ServiceAccount string
RegistryURL string
KanikoImage string
TrivyImage string
Deadline time.Duration
CPULimit string
MemLimit string
}
// BuildJobName is the deterministic Job name for a build id.
func BuildJobName(buildID string) string { return "build-" + buildID }
func buildLabels(p JobParams) map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
LabelManagedBy: managedByValue,
LabelComponent: componentValue,
LabelBuildID: p.BuildID,
}
}
// BuildJob renders the Kaniko+Trivy build Job (spec §16). Every isolation
// guarantee the spec demands is encoded here and asserted by jobspec_test.go,
// because no cluster runs in this environment:
//
// - runs in the isolated felis-build namespace with the weak felis-build SA
// (never the felis-api SA) and does NOT mount the SA token, so it cannot
// reach the K8s API (spec §16, §21);
// - no privileged container — Kaniko builds the Dockerfile without a daemon,
// so docker-in-docker / privileged is never needed (spec §16, §22);
// - activeDeadlineSeconds + backoffLimit=0 + per-container resource limits so
// a runaway or poisoned build cannot exhaust the cluster (spec §16);
// - the Trivy step runs with `--exit-code 1 --severity CRITICAL`, so a
// CRITICAL CVE fails the Pod and therefore the Job — the only retained
// automatic admission gate (spec §16).
//
// Sequencing: kaniko runs as an initContainer (build + push to the internal
// registry) and trivy as the main container (scan the pushed ref). The Pod
// succeeds only if kaniko pushed AND trivy found no CRITICAL CVE.
func BuildJob(p JobParams) (*batchv1.Job, error) {
limits, err := resourceLimits(p.CPULimit, p.MemLimit)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
deadline := int64(p.Deadline / time.Second)
if deadline <= 0 {
deadline = int64(defaultDeadline / time.Second)
}
// Hardened container security context shared by both build containers: no
// privilege, no privilege escalation, drop all capabilities. Kaniko needs a
// writable root filesystem to unpack layers, so we do not force read-only
// root here, but it gains no privilege.
sec := &corev1.SecurityContext{
Privileged: boolPtr(false),
AllowPrivilegeEscalation: boolPtr(false),
Capabilities: &corev1.Capabilities{Drop: []corev1.Capability{"ALL"}},
}
kaniko := corev1.Container{
Name: ContainerKaniko,
Image: p.KanikoImage,
Args: []string{
"--dockerfile=Dockerfile",
"--context=" + p.ContextRef,
"--destination=" + p.ImageRef,
// The internal registry is in-cluster only and may serve plain HTTP;
// it is never a public ingress (spec §17).
"--insecure",
"--skip-tls-verify",
},
Resources: corev1.ResourceRequirements{Limits: limits, Requests: limits},
SecurityContext: sec,
}
trivy := corev1.Container{
Name: ContainerTrivy,
Image: p.TrivyImage,
Args: []string{
"image",
"--exit-code", "1",
"--severity", "CRITICAL",
"--no-progress",
"--insecure",
p.ImageRef,
},
Resources: corev1.ResourceRequirements{Limits: limits, Requests: limits},
SecurityContext: sec,
}
job := &batchv1.Job{
ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
Name: BuildJobName(p.BuildID),
Namespace: p.Namespace,
Labels: buildLabels(p),
},
Spec: batchv1.JobSpec{
// A poisoned build must not loop — one shot, then a terminal verdict.
BackoffLimit: int32Ptr(0),
ActiveDeadlineSeconds: int64Ptr(deadline),
Template: corev1.PodTemplateSpec{
ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{Labels: buildLabels(p)},
Spec: corev1.PodSpec{
RestartPolicy: corev1.RestartPolicyNever,
ServiceAccountName: p.ServiceAccount,
AutomountServiceAccountToken: boolPtr(false),
InitContainers: []corev1.Container{kaniko},
Containers: []corev1.Container{trivy},
},
},
},
}
return job, nil
}
// NetPolParams parameterises the build-namespace egress lock.
type NetPolParams struct {
Namespace string
RegistryNamespace string
RegistryPort int32
// PackageSourceCIDRs is an optional, explicit allowlist of external package
// mirrors (spec §16: egress 仅 registry + 包源). Empty means the most
// locked-down default — no internet egress at all (默认拒外网).
PackageSourceCIDRs []string
}
// BuildNetworkPolicy renders the default-deny egress policy for build Pods
// (spec §16, §21: build ns egress 仅放 registry + 包源,默认拒外网). It selects
// build Pods by the managed-by label, denies all ingress, and allows egress
// only to DNS, the internal registry, and any explicitly configured package
// mirrors. There is deliberately no allow-all egress rule.
func BuildNetworkPolicy(p NetPolParams) *networkingv1.NetworkPolicy {
port := p.RegistryPort
if port == 0 {
port = 5000
}
dnsUDP := corev1.ProtocolUDP
dnsTCP := corev1.ProtocolTCP
dns53 := intstr.FromInt32(53)
regPort := intstr.FromInt32(port)
egress := []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyEgressRule{
// DNS resolution: port-restricted to 53, so this is not an open-internet
// hole — name resolution only.
{
Ports: []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyPort{
{Protocol: &dnsUDP, Port: &dns53},
{Protocol: &dnsTCP, Port: &dns53},
},
},
// The internal registry, selected by the namespace's immutable
// kubernetes.io/metadata.name label, on the registry port only.
{
To: []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyPeer{{
NamespaceSelector: &metav1.LabelSelector{
MatchLabels: map[string]string{"kubernetes.io/metadata.name": p.RegistryNamespace},
},
}},
Ports: []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyPort{
{Protocol: &dnsTCP, Port: &regPort},
},
},
}
// Explicit package-mirror CIDRs, when configured. No CIDR ⇒ no internet.
for _, cidr := range p.PackageSourceCIDRs {
egress = append(egress, networkingv1.NetworkPolicyEgressRule{
To: []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyPeer{{
IPBlock: &networkingv1.IPBlock{CIDR: cidr},
}},
})
}
return &networkingv1.NetworkPolicy{
ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
Name: "felis-build-egress",
Namespace: p.Namespace,
Labels: map[string]string{
LabelManagedBy: managedByValue,
LabelComponent: componentValue,
},
},
Spec: networkingv1.NetworkPolicySpec{
PodSelector: metav1.LabelSelector{
MatchLabels: map[string]string{LabelManagedBy: managedByValue},
},
PolicyTypes: []networkingv1.PolicyType{
networkingv1.PolicyTypeIngress,
networkingv1.PolicyTypeEgress,
},
// Empty Ingress slice = deny all ingress: nothing connects to a
// build Pod.
Ingress: []networkingv1.NetworkPolicyIngressRule{},
Egress: egress,
},
}
}
// BuildServiceAccount renders the weak build SA (spec §16, §21). It is the most
// dangerous identity in the platform if mis-scoped, so it is created bare: no
// secrets, token auto-mounting disabled, and — by virtue of having no Role or
// RoleBinding anywhere — zero K8s API permissions. Its only capability is
// network reachability to push to the registry, which RBAC does not grant.
func BuildServiceAccount(namespace, name string) *corev1.ServiceAccount {
return &corev1.ServiceAccount{
ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{
Name: name,
Namespace: namespace,
Labels: map[string]string{
LabelManagedBy: managedByValue,
LabelComponent: componentValue,
},
},
AutomountServiceAccountToken: boolPtr(false),
}
}
// resourceLimits parses the CPU/memory limits into a ResourceList.
func resourceLimits(cpu, mem string) (corev1.ResourceList, error) {
if cpu == "" {
cpu = defaultCPULimit
}
if mem == "" {
mem = defaultMemLimit
}
cpuQty, err := resource.ParseQuantity(cpu)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build: invalid cpu limit %q: %w", cpu, err)
}
memQty, err := resource.ParseQuantity(mem)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build: invalid memory limit %q: %w", mem, err)
}
return corev1.ResourceList{
corev1.ResourceCPU: cpuQty,
corev1.ResourceMemory: memQty,
}, nil
}
func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { return &b }
func int32Ptr(i int32) *int32 { return &i }
func int64Ptr(i int64) *int64 { return &i }