Files
Felis/internal/api/handlers_backups_test.go
T
flyemoji b508fccc6f feat(api): add felis-api service with permissions, modpack lane, and fleet read
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
2026-06-26 23:32:38 +09:00

294 lines
11 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"felis.lolicon.best/internal/apis/felis/v1alpha1"
)
// TestListBackups exercises GET /api/v1/backups (spec §7): admin sees every
// present backup, a regular user sees only the worlds they formerly owned, and
// expired/deleted backups are never listed. It also asserts the opaque
// backup_ref never reaches the wire (spec §286 principle).
func TestListBackups(t *testing.T) {
mk := func() *API {
repo := newFakeRepo()
repo.backups = []fakeBackup{
{view: BackupView{ID: "b1", ServerName: "alpha", FormerOwner: "owner1",
Status: "present", Reason: "inactive_15d", SizeBytes: 100,
CreatedAt: time.Unix(1_699_000_000, 0), ExpiresAt: time.Unix(1_706_000_000, 0)}, ref: "ref-b1"},
{view: BackupView{ID: "b2", ServerName: "beta", FormerOwner: "owner2",
Status: "present", Reason: "manual", SizeBytes: 200,
CreatedAt: time.Unix(1_699_500_000, 0), ExpiresAt: time.Unix(1_706_000_000, 0)}, ref: "ref-b2"},
{view: BackupView{ID: "b3", ServerName: "gamma", FormerOwner: "owner1",
Status: "deleted", Reason: "manual", SizeBytes: 50,
CreatedAt: time.Unix(1_698_000_000, 0), ExpiresAt: time.Unix(1_705_000_000, 0)}, ref: "ref-b3"},
}
return newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
}
list := func(t *testing.T, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) []BackupView {
t.Helper()
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Backups []BackupView `json:"backups"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("body not JSON: %v (%s)", err, w.Body.String())
}
return resp.Backups
}
ids := func(vs []BackupView) map[string]bool {
m := map[string]bool{}
for _, v := range vs {
m[v.ID] = true
}
return m
}
t.Run("admin sees all present, not deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
api := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "admin1", Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true}}
got := ids(list(t, do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/backups", "", nil)))
if !got["b1"] || !got["b2"] || got["b3"] || len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("admin scope = %v, want {b1,b2}", got)
}
})
t.Run("user sees only own former-owned present backups", func(t *testing.T) {
api := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "owner1", Role: "user"}}
got := ids(list(t, do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/backups", "", nil)))
// b2 belongs to owner2; b3 is owner1's but deleted — neither is visible.
if !got["b1"] || got["b2"] || got["b3"] || len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("owner1 scope = %v, want {b1}", got)
}
})
t.Run("user with no backups -> empty array, never null", func(t *testing.T) {
api := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "stranger", Role: "user"}}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/backups", "", nil)
vs := list(t, w)
if vs == nil || len(vs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("empty scope = %v, want a non-nil empty slice", vs)
}
})
t.Run("backup_ref never serialized", func(t *testing.T) {
api := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "admin1", Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true}}
body := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/backups", "", nil).Body.String()
if strings.Contains(body, "backup_ref") || strings.Contains(body, "ref-b") {
t.Fatalf("response leaked the internal backup_ref: %s", body)
}
})
}
// TestRestoreBackup exercises POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/restore-backup (spec §7,
// §466). The default server is stopped, owned by owner1 who is also the backup's
// former_owner, with one present backup and a wired fakeRestorer. Subtests
// override only what they need. The focus is the layered authorization (owner +
// former-owner), the stopped gate, the 404/503 surface, and that restore is an
// async 202 kick-off.
func TestRestoreBackup(t *testing.T) {
owner := &Principal{UserID: "owner1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
mk := func() (*API, *fakeRepo, *fakeCluster, *fakeRestorer) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
repo.byName["survival"] = &ServerRecord{Name: "survival", OwnerID: "owner1"}
repo.backups = []fakeBackup{
{view: BackupView{ID: "bk1", ServerName: "survival", FormerOwner: "owner1",
Status: "present", Reason: "inactive_15d", SizeBytes: 1024,
CreatedAt: time.Unix(1_699_000_000, 0), ExpiresAt: time.Unix(1_706_000_000, 0)}, ref: "world-archive-ref"},
}
cl := newFakeCluster()
cl.byName["survival"] = &ServerInfo{Name: "survival", Phase: "Stopped",
Ready: false, DesiredState: string(v1alpha1.DesiredStopped)}
restorer := &fakeRestorer{}
api := newTestAPI(repo, cl)
api.Restorer = restorer
return api, repo, cl, restorer
}
const path = "/api/v1/servers/survival/restore-backup"
t.Run("former owner restores -> 202 + restorer + audit", func(t *testing.T) {
api, repo, _, restorer := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Status string `json:"status"`
BackupID string `json:"backup_id"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("body not JSON: %v (%s)", err, w.Body.String())
}
if resp.Name != "survival" || resp.Status != "restoring" || resp.BackupID != "bk1" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected response %+v", resp)
}
if restorer.calls != 1 || restorer.gotName != "survival" || restorer.gotRef != "world-archive-ref" {
t.Fatalf("restorer saw (calls=%d,%q,%q), want (1,survival,world-archive-ref)",
restorer.calls, restorer.gotName, restorer.gotRef)
}
if len(repo.audits) != 1 || repo.audits[0].Action != "backup.restore" || repo.audits[0].Actor != "[email protected]" {
t.Fatalf("audit not written as expected: %+v", repo.audits)
}
})
t.Run("admin restores another's world -> 202", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, restorer := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "admin1", Email: "[email protected]",
Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true}}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if restorer.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("admin restore reached restorer %d times, want 1", restorer.calls)
}
})
t.Run("non-owner -> 403, no restore", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, restorer := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "stranger", Role: "user"}}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 403", w.Code)
}
if restorer.calls != 0 {
t.Fatal("a forbidden caller must not start a restore")
}
})
t.Run("current owner who is not former_owner -> 403, no restore", func(t *testing.T) {
// The leak guard: user "newowner" re-claimed survival (so they pass the
// owner gate), but the backup belongs to "olduser". They must NOT be able to
// resurrect another person's world.
api, repo, _, restorer := mk()
repo.byName["survival"].OwnerID = "newowner"
repo.backups[0].view.FormerOwner = "olduser"
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "newowner", Role: "user"}}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 403 (former-owner leak guard)", w.Code)
}
if restorer.calls != 0 {
t.Fatal("restoring another owner's world must not reach the restorer")
}
})
t.Run("unknown server -> 404", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, _ := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/servers/missing/restore-backup", "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
}
})
t.Run("no present backup -> 404 no_backup", func(t *testing.T) {
api, repo, _, restorer := mk()
repo.backups = nil
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound || decodeErr(t, w) != "no_backup" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if restorer.calls != 0 {
t.Fatal("no backup must not reach the restorer")
}
})
t.Run("only a deleted backup -> 404 no_backup", func(t *testing.T) {
api, repo, _, _ := mk()
repo.backups[0].view.Status = "deleted"
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound || decodeErr(t, w) != "no_backup" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("running server -> 409 not_stopped, no restore", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, cl, restorer := mk()
cl.byName["survival"].Ready = true
cl.byName["survival"].DesiredState = string(v1alpha1.DesiredRunning)
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusConflict || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_stopped" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if restorer.calls != 0 {
t.Fatal("a running server must not be restored into")
}
})
t.Run("starting server -> 409 not_stopped", func(t *testing.T) {
// desiredState=Running but not yet Ready: the world PVC is already mounted by
// the starting pod, so the stopped gate must still refuse.
api, _, cl, _ := mk()
cl.byName["survival"].Ready = false
cl.byName["survival"].DesiredState = string(v1alpha1.DesiredRunning)
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusConflict || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_stopped" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("nil Restorer -> 503 restore_unavailable", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, _ := mk()
api.Restorer = nil
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "restore_unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("restorer failure -> 500, not audited", func(t *testing.T) {
api, repo, _, restorer := mk()
restorer.err = errors.New("kick-off failed")
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 500 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if len(repo.audits) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a failed restore must not be audited: %+v", repo.audits)
}
})
t.Run("restorer reports unknown server -> 404", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, restorer := mk()
restorer.err = ErrNotFound
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
}
})
t.Run("invalid server name -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
api, _, _, _ := mk()
api.External = staticExternal{p: owner}
w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/servers/X/restore-backup", "", nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400", w.Code)
}
})
}