withRecover turned a panicking handler into a 500 envelope and threw the panic away. The client is meant to get an opaque "internal error" — that part is right — but nothing was written server-side, so a recovered panic was an untraceable 500: an operator holding "internal error" has no message, no stack and no request to grep for, and diagnosis degrades into guessing against a live install. That is what it cost during the email-OTP report. The panic value, a stack and the method+path are now logged first, keyed by the same request_id writeError already stamps on unmapped errors, so the client envelope and the server log can be joined. The test pins all three markers plus the unchanged 500/"panic" response, because a silent recover looks exactly like a working one from the outside.
157 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
157 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"runtime/debug"
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)
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// withRequestID assigns a request id (honoring a WELL-FORMED inbound X-Request-Id)
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// and echoes it on the response and into the context for the error envelope.
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//
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// A caller-supplied id is honored for cross-service tracing, but only after
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// validation: the id is echoed to the client, embedded in the error envelope, AND
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// persisted verbatim into audit_logs.request_id, so an unvalidated one is an
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// audit-integrity vector — an arbitrarily long value bloats the audit row and a
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// stray control byte could smuggle a forged line into a log sink. A rejected id is
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// replaced with a fresh server-minted one: that one request loses its inbound trace
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// link, which is strictly better than storing attacker-controlled text.
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func withRequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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id := r.Header.Get("X-Request-Id")
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if !validRequestID(id) {
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id = newRequestID()
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}
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w.Header().Set("X-Request-Id", id)
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKeyRequestID, id)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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// maxRequestIDLen caps an inbound X-Request-Id we are willing to echo and persist.
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// 64 characters comfortably fits a UUID or a typical distributed-trace id while
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// bounding what reaches audit_logs.request_id.
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const maxRequestIDLen = 64
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// validRequestID reports whether an inbound X-Request-Id is safe to echo and store:
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// non-empty, within maxRequestIDLen, and restricted to an unambiguous, log-safe
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// charset (ASCII alphanumerics plus '-', '_', '.'). The byte-length check bounds it
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// regardless of encoding, and the charset excludes whitespace, CR/LF, and every
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// other control or multibyte rune, so nothing that survives can pollute a log line
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// or the audit row.
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func validRequestID(id string) bool {
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if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDLen {
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return false
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}
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for _, c := range id {
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switch {
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case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z', c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z', c >= '0' && c <= '9':
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case c == '-', c == '_', c == '.':
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// withRecover turns a panicking handler into a 500 envelope instead of a
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// dropped connection.
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//
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// The client gets an opaque "internal error", but the panic value and stack are
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// logged FIRST, keyed by the same request_id — the same contract writeError keeps
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// for unmapped errors (see errors.go). Without it a recovered panic is an
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// untraceable 500: an operator holding "internal error" has nothing to grep for,
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// and diagnosis degrades into guessing against a live install.
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func withRecover(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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defer func() {
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if rec := recover(); rec != nil {
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log.Printf("api: %s %s: panic (request_id=%s): %v\n%s",
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r.Method, r.URL.Path, requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), rec, debug.Stack())
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writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "panic", "internal error"))
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}
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}()
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// requireInternal enforces service-token auth for the internal face. It never
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// applies Zero Trust (spec §14 red line).
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func (a *API) requireInternal(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := a.Internal.Authenticate(r); err != nil {
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writeError(w, r, errUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// requireExternal enforces Access-JWT auth for the external face and stashes the
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// resolved Principal in the request context.
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func (a *API) requireExternal(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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p, err := a.External.Authenticate(r)
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if err != nil || p == nil {
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writeError(w, r, errUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// op.console door gate: the operator console is staff-only, so a request that
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// arrives on the admin host from a non-admin principal is refused HERE, before
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// any handler. Authentication alone (a player's passkey/email/bind session) is
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// not access — internal permission is verified on top of it, so possessing a
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// valid credential never "lets you in" to op.console. On the player console
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// (console.<root_domain>) hostIsAdminConsole is false, so this is inert; in
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// production Cloudflare Access already blocks non-staff at the edge and this is
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// the defense-in-depth backstop for the passwordless (no-Zero-Trust) face.
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if hostIsAdminConsole(r, a.RootDomain, a.AdminHostname) && !p.IsAdmin() {
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writeError(w, r, errForbidden)
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKeyPrincipal, p)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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// adminOnly gates an external-face handler on the admin Zero-Trust path. The
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// Access middleware has already authenticated; this enforces that admin-tier
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// operations both carry role=admin AND arrived via admin.* (spec §14).
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func (a *API) adminOnly(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if p := principalFromContext(r.Context()); !p.IsAdmin() {
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writeError(w, r, errForbidden)
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return
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}
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next(w, r)
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}
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}
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// ownerOnly gates a handler on the owner role — the single platform-level
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// identity above admin. It is stricter than adminOnly: a plain admin with
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// role=admin and valid admin Access path is still refused here. The owner
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// arrives through the same admin Zero-Trust path, so adminOnly is not a
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// prerequisite (the two guards are orthogonal).
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func (a *API) ownerOnly(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if p := principalFromContext(r.Context()); !p.IsOwner() {
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writeError(w, r, errForbidden)
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return
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}
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next(w, r)
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}
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}
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// newRequestID returns a short random hex id. crypto/rand never fails on the
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// platforms we target; on the impossible error path we fall back to a constant
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// so a request still gets a (non-unique) id rather than crashing.
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func newRequestID() string {
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var b [8]byte
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if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
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return "req-unknown"
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
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}
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