Configure connection and storage before creating or resuming the one-time Owner login. Remove Minecraft prerequisites from setup and preserve established login credentials. Let staff preview and confirm roles from configured authentication sources using the existing account-link storage and game UUID mapping. Retain in-game code proof for players, add client-version and lobby guidance, and support NodePort passkey origins.
395 lines
17 KiB
Go
395 lines
17 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// Felis-nano: the multi-source hasJoined multiplexer behind player game-login.
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//
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// Velocity is pointed here with -Dmojang.sessionserver and issues the request itself, not
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// through authlib. On login it computes the serverId hash and GETs hasJoined; this
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// endpoint fans that query out to the configured Yggdrasil roots in priority order
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// (Mojang first, 正版优先) and returns the first source that validates. Each upstream
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// Yggdrasil runs its own serverId-hash check — the multiplexer only relays, it computes
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// no hashes.
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//
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// The one non-negotiable transform: a non-identity (third-party) source's UUID is
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// self-asserted, so its profile is rewritten into a per-source namespace
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// (canonical = UUIDv3(felisAuthNS, tag+":"+nativeID)) BEFORE it leaves the resolver.
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// Mojang stays identity. This makes the reclaim invariant — "the genuine Mojang player
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// has a DIFFERENT UUID from any squatter" — true by construction, not assumed: MD5
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// preimage resistance means no third-party source can mint a Mojang-space UUID, and the
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// per-tag namespace means two sources cannot collide onto one identity. Every downstream
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// key (account_links, username_blacklist, owner checks) then sees one canonical UUID.
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//
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// One consequence a backend operator meets: a chat-session key a third-party source signed
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// over its native UUID cannot verify against the canonical one, even on a backend that
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// trusts that source's key. Such players' chat can only be accepted unsigned.
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// felisAuthNS is the fixed UUIDv3 namespace every third-party profile is rewritten
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// under (see the rewrite rationale above). Derived from the project name, not a magic
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// literal, so its origin is self-documenting; the exact value only has to be stable.
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var felisAuthNS = uuid.NewSHA1(uuid.NameSpaceURL, []byte("nano.felis.lolicon.best/auth-source"))
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// authHTTPClient calls the upstream Yggdrasil roots. The timeout bounds one login
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// against a hung source; the resolver moves on to the next source on any failure.
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// One shared client, sequential priority scan — a third-party login costs one
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// wasted Mojang round-trip; add parallel fan-out only if login latency bites.
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var authHTTPClient = &http.Client{
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Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
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Transport: upstreamTransport,
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// A redirect is not a hasJoined answer. Following one would let a configured root point
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// this host at any URL it can reach — this listener included, where each hop re-runs the
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// whole source scan inside the same login's timeout. The 3xx is returned as-is and the
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// resolver skips that source like any other non-200.
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CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse },
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}
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// upstreamTransport caps response headers, which the 64 KiB body limit does not cover. The
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// default allows 1 MiB, so a root that sends that much and then stalls the body pins a few
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// MiB per in-flight login for the whole timeout, and enough parallel logins OOM the host
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// for every source. Real roots answer in well under 1 KiB of headers.
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var upstreamTransport = func() *http.Transport {
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t := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
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t.MaxResponseHeaderBytes = 16 << 10
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return t
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}()
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// AuthSource is one upstream Yggdrasil root in the multiplexer's priority list (config
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// order = priority). URL is the full hasJoined endpoint the query string is appended to.
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// Identity marks the authoritative source (Mojang) whose UUIDs are trusted as-is; every
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// other source is rewritten into felisAuthNS. Prefix is the in-game rename applied to a
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// player of this source who is holding a Mojang player's name (see prefixedName); it is
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// unused on the identity source, whose players are never renamed.
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type AuthSource struct {
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Tag string
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Prefix string
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URL string
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APIURL string // optional Yggdrasil API root for role lookup
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Identity bool
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}
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// sessionProfile is the Mojang hasJoined contract. properties is relayed verbatim
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// (json.RawMessage) so a source's signed textures survive the multiplexer untouched, and
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// it is always emitted as an array: Velocity's GameProfile parser throws on a missing or
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// null properties key, while a Yggdrasil root may legitimately send [] or omit it for a
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// player with no skin.
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type sessionProfile struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Properties []json.RawMessage `json:"properties"`
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}
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// HasJoinedHandler returns an http.Handler serving only the Felis-nano hasJoined
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// multiplexer route (GET /session/minecraft/hasJoined), for a standalone host that
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// federates logins without standing up the full felis-api. sources is the priority list
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// (put the Mojang identity source first for 正版优先); repo backs the reclaim blacklist
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// gate — a stub that never bars is fine for a host without the reclaim DB. The full
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// felis-api mounts the same handler through its internal-face route table instead.
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func HasJoinedHandler(sources []AuthSource, repo Repo) http.Handler {
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a := &API{AuthSources: sources, Repo: repo}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /session/minecraft/hasJoined", a.handleHasJoined)
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return mux
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}
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// handleHasJoined is the multi-source session verifier (Felis-nano). It is a Public
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// internal-face route: Velocity speaks the vanilla sessionserver protocol and sends no
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// service token. A rejected login is 204 No Content — exactly what Mojang returns for an
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// invalid session, which Velocity answers with its online-mode-only kick.
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func (a *API) handleHasJoined(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Velocity sends no body. When a request declares one anyway, net/http tries to drain it
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// before writing any answer, so one that never arrives holds the connection with no
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// timeout: ReadHeaderTimeout stopped at the headers. Marking the reply as the last one on
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// this connection skips the drain.
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if r.ContentLength != 0 {
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w.Header().Set("Connection", "close")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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q := r.URL.Query()
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username, serverID, ip := q.Get("username"), q.Get("serverId"), q.Get("ip")
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if username == "" || serverID == "" ||
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len(username) > maxHasJoinedParam || len(serverID) > maxHasJoinedParam || len(ip) > maxHasJoinedParam {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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prof, src, failed := a.resolveHasJoined(r.Context(), username, serverID, ip)
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if prof == nil {
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// With a source down, "nobody knows this player" is not established: its player may
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// be the one logging in. 503 makes Velocity report the auth servers as down and log
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// the status, where a 204 would tell that player their account is offline-mode.
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if failed {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Canonicalize identity. A trusted (Mojang) source keeps its UUID; a self-asserted
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// source is rewritten into felisAuthNS so it can never land in Mojang's UUID space
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// nor onto another source's. resolveHasJoined has already screened both shapes and
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// skipped unusable ones as failed; the two guards below are the last line before
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// anything leaves, kept even though nothing reaches them.
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canonical, err := canonicalProfileUUID(src, prof.ID)
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if err != nil {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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if !src.Identity {
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// A third-party source is untrusted input, its name included: nothing stops a
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// hostile or sloppy root from answering with "§4admin", an empty string, or 200
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// characters, all of which must not be relayed straight into the proxy's player
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// list. Screened in resolveHasJoined; this is the last-line guard.
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if !mcUsernameRe.MatchString(prof.Name) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Give a Mojang player's name back to the Mojang player. The UUID rewrite above
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// already keeps the two apart as identities, but the proxy's player registry is
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// keyed on the NAME (Velocity: "You are already connected to this proxy!"), so
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// without this they cannot even be online at the same time. Renaming only on an
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// actual collision leaves the ordinary third-party player's name untouched.
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if isPremiumName(r.Context(), prof.Name) {
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prof.Name = prefixedName(src.Prefix, prof.Name)
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}
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}
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// Bar gate at the single chokepoint every login crosses, so a reclaimed squatter
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// stays out even on a consumer with no limbo plugin. Keyed on the dashed canonical
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// UUID — the same form Repo.ReclaimUsername stores.
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barred, err := a.Repo.IsUsernameBlacklisted(r.Context(), canonical.String())
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, r, err)
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return
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}
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if barred {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Emit the canonical UUID undashed — the 32-hex form Velocity's GameProfile expects.
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prof.ID = hex.EncodeToString(canonical[:])
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if prof.Properties == nil {
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prof.Properties = []json.RawMessage{} // a nil slice would marshal as null
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, prof)
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}
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// maxHasJoinedParam bounds each query value before it is forwarded to every source. What
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// Velocity sends fits with room to spare: a login name of at most 16 characters, a signed
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// SHA-1 hex serverId of at most 41, a textual IP address. Only a direct caller sends more.
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const maxHasJoinedParam = 64
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// mcUsernameRe is Minecraft's username charset — the trust boundary on a third-party
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// source's self-asserted profile name.
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var mcUsernameRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_]{3,16}$`)
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// mcUsernameMax is the protocol's username length ceiling, which prefixedName must respect.
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const mcUsernameMax = 16
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// prefixedName is the squatter rename: ("LS", "steve") → "LS_steve". The base name is
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// TRUNCATED to fit rather than the rename being skipped when it would not fit — skipping is
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// what would silently hand a 14-character premium name back to the squatter.
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//
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// Two players of one source whose names agree on their first mcUsernameMax-len(prefix)-1
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// characters truncate onto the same in-game name, as does a prefixed name that happens to be
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// a premium name itself. Both cost an "already connected" bounce, not an identity: the UUID
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// rewrite is what keeps players apart, and it does not depend on the name at all. Add a
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// disambiguating suffix only if real players actually collide.
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func prefixedName(prefix, name string) string {
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p := prefix + "_"
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if keep := mcUsernameMax - len(p); len(name) > keep {
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name = name[:keep]
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}
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return p + name
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}
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// canonicalProfileUUID is shared by game login and staff-initiated role binding.
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// Keep the source's native ID byte-for-byte: existing third-party identities use it.
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func canonicalProfileUUID(src AuthSource, nativeID string) (uuid.UUID, error) {
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if src.Identity {
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return uuid.Parse(nativeID)
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}
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return uuid.NewMD5(felisAuthNS, []byte(src.Tag+":"+nativeID)), nil
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}
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// mojangProfileAPI answers the one question that decides a rename: is this username
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// registered to a Mojang account? A var, not a const, so a test can point it at a stub
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// instead of the real Mojang.
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var mojangProfileAPI = "https://api.mojang.com/users/profiles/minecraft/"
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// profileHTTPClient is deliberately more impatient than authHTTPClient: the name lookup is a
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// SECOND Mojang round-trip on a third-party login (the identity leg already spent one), and
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// api.mojang.com is exactly what is unreliable from the networks these servers sit on. A
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// slow answer counts as taken instead of holding the login open.
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var profileHTTPClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second, Transport: upstreamTransport}
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// A name's premium status changes on human timescales, not per login, so it is cached — but
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// asymmetrically, because the two directions have very different costs. "Taken" changes
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// only when its owner renames away, and a stale "taken" costs a third-party player nothing
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// but a prefix. "Free" can stop being true the moment someone buys that name, and a stale
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// "free" is the dangerous one: it leaves a squatter holding a name its real owner has just
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// bought. So a "free" answer is trusted for minutes and a "taken" answer for a day.
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const (
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premiumTakenTTL = 24 * time.Hour
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premiumFreeTTL = 10 * time.Minute
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premiumCacheMax = 4096
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)
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type premiumEntry struct {
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taken bool
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at time.Time
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}
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var premiumNames = struct {
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sync.Mutex
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m map[string]premiumEntry
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}{m: make(map[string]premiumEntry)}
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// isPremiumName reports whether username belongs to a real Mojang account — which is what
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// makes a third-party player holding it a squatter. A lookup failure fails CLOSED (assume
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// premium → rename the third-party player), even over an expired "free": the name may have
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// been bought since, and a Mojang outage must not let a squatter keep it. Being wrong that
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// way costs a cosmetic prefix; being wrong the other way bounces the name's actual owner off
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// the proxy.
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func isPremiumName(ctx context.Context, username string) bool {
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key := strings.ToLower(username)
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premiumNames.Lock()
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cached, hit := premiumNames.m[key]
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premiumNames.Unlock()
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if hit && time.Since(cached.at) < premiumTTL(cached.taken) {
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return cached.taken
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}
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taken, err := lookupPremiumName(ctx, username)
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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premiumNames.Lock()
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// Bounded by dropping the whole map rather than evicting LRU. Any third-party source that
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// validates a login mints an entry, so a hostile one can force clears; that costs repeat
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// lookups, or a fail-closed prefix while Mojang is unreachable, never an identity. This
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// is a backstop against an unbounded map, not a cache policy worth tuning.
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if len(premiumNames.m) >= premiumCacheMax {
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clear(premiumNames.m)
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}
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premiumNames.m[key] = premiumEntry{taken: taken, at: time.Now()}
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premiumNames.Unlock()
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return taken
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}
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func premiumTTL(taken bool) time.Duration {
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if taken {
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return premiumTakenTTL
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}
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return premiumFreeTTL
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}
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// lookupPremiumName asks Mojang whether a name is registered: 200 = it is, 404 (204 on the
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// legacy endpoint) = it is free. Anything else is an ERROR, never a "no" — a 429 or a 503
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// must not read as "this name is unowned"; see isPremiumName's fail-closed rule.
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func lookupPremiumName(ctx context.Context, username string) (bool, error) {
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, mojangProfileAPI+url.PathEscape(username), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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resp, err := profileHTTPClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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switch resp.StatusCode {
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case http.StatusOK:
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return true, nil
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case http.StatusNotFound, http.StatusNoContent:
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return false, nil
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}
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return false, fmt.Errorf("mojang profile api: %s", resp.Status)
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}
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// resolveHasJoined queries each configured source in priority order and returns the
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// first that validates the session (200 with a profile). 204 is "not my player". Any other
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// outcome (unreachable, another status, a body that is not a profile, or a profile this
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// multiplexer will not emit) skips the source too, but is logged with its tag and reported
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// as failed: otherwise a dead or mistyped source looks exactly like a player it does not
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// know, and nobody finds out.
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func (a *API) resolveHasJoined(ctx context.Context, username, serverID, ip string) (prof *sessionProfile, src AuthSource, failed bool) {
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for _, src := range a.AuthSources {
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u := src.URL + "?username=" + url.QueryEscape(username) + "&serverId=" + url.QueryEscape(serverID)
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if ip != "" {
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u += "&ip=" + url.QueryEscape(ip)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, u, nil)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q: %v", src.Tag, err)
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failed = true
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continue
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}
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resp, err := authHTTPClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q: %v", src.Tag, err)
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failed = true
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continue
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}
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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resp.Body.Close()
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switch {
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case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNoContent:
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case resp.StatusCode >= 300 && resp.StatusCode < 400:
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q answered %s with Location %q; redirects are not followed, so set its url to the final endpoint", src.Tag, resp.Status, resp.Header.Get("Location"))
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failed = true
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default:
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q answered %s", src.Tag, resp.Status)
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failed = true
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}
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continue
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}
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var p sessionProfile
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err = json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<16)).Decode(&p)
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resp.Body.Close()
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if err != nil || p.ID == "" {
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q answered 200 without a usable profile (err=%v)", src.Tag, err)
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failed = true
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continue
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}
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// Screen what a 200 is allowed to mean BEFORE it can win. A profile this
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// multiplexer will not emit — an identity UUID that does not parse, a third-party
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// name outside the Minecraft charset — is the same class as a body that is not a
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// profile: skip, log, count as failed. Letting it win would stop the ladder on one
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// sloppy root (every source behind it silently unreachable) and read as "nobody
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// knows this player" to Velocity while a source had actually answered.
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if src.Identity {
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if _, perr := uuid.Parse(p.ID); perr != nil {
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log.Printf("hasJoined: identity source %q answered 200 with an unparseable profile id %q", src.Tag, p.ID)
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failed = true
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continue
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}
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} else if !mcUsernameRe.MatchString(p.Name) {
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log.Printf("hasJoined: source %q answered 200 with an unusable profile name %q", src.Tag, p.Name)
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failed = true
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continue
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}
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return &p, src, failed
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}
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return nil, AuthSource{}, failed
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}
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