820 lines
31 KiB
TypeScript
820 lines
31 KiB
TypeScript
import type {
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AccessResult,
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ApiError,
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AutostartPolicy,
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BackupView,
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BanlistResult,
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Build,
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CreateServerRequest,
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CreateUserRequest,
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FleetServer,
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Identity,
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KickResult,
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LinkResult,
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LinkStatus,
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BindResult,
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PatchUserRequest,
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PlayersResult,
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QuotaInput,
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QuotaView,
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ServerFileEntry,
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ServerJob,
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ServerInfo,
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ServerStatus,
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SessionView,
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UserDetail,
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UserView,
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WhitelistImage,
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WhitelistResult,
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Submission,
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UpdateWindow,
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DBBackupStatus,
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} from "./types";
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import { loadConfig } from "./config";
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import i18next from "i18next";
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// Typed client for the felis-api external face (spec §7). Credentials are sent so
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// the upstream Zero-Trust / Access cookie rides along; the panel never holds a
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// service token, and the RCON password is never requested (spec §8).
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function isApiError(x: unknown): x is { error: { code: string; message: string } } {
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return (
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typeof x === "object" &&
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x !== null &&
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"error" in x &&
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typeof (x as { error: unknown }).error === "object"
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);
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}
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// A locked session — one that still owes the forced onboarding (passkey
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// enrollment) — gets `403 setup_required` from every protected route. Rendered as
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// a generic permission error that reads as "you may not do this", when the truth
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// is "one step remains and completing it unlocks the app" (#8). api.ts cannot
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// navigate (no router here), so it announces the code on a window event; the
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// App-shell listener routes the person to /setup, which resumes from the session
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// without needing a token. Non-browser callers keep the plain error.
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export const SETUP_REQUIRED_EVENT = "felis:setup-required";
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function announceSetupRequired(err: ApiError): void {
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if (err.status !== 403 || err.code !== "setup_required") return;
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if (typeof window === "undefined") return;
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window.dispatchEvent(new Event(SETUP_REQUIRED_EVENT));
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}
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async function request<T>(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {
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const { apiBase } = await loadConfig();
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const res = await fetch(`${apiBase}${path}`, {
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method,
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credentials: "include",
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headers: body ? { "Content-Type": "application/json" } : undefined,
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body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
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});
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const text = await res.text();
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const parsed: unknown = text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
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if (!res.ok) {
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const err: ApiError = {
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status: res.status,
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code: isApiError(parsed) ? parsed.error.code : "error",
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message: isApiError(parsed) ? parsed.error.message : res.statusText,
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};
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announceSetupRequired(err);
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throw err;
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}
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return parsed as T;
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}
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async function requestRaw<T>(
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method: string,
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path: string,
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body: Blob,
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headers?: Record<string, string>,
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): Promise<T> {
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const { apiBase } = await loadConfig();
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const res = await fetch(`${apiBase}${path}`, {
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method,
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credentials: "include",
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headers,
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body,
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});
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const text = await res.text();
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const parsed: unknown = text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
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if (!res.ok) {
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const err: ApiError = {
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status: res.status,
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code: isApiError(parsed) ? parsed.error.code : "error",
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message: isApiError(parsed) ? parsed.error.message : res.statusText,
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};
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announceSetupRequired(err);
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throw err;
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}
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return parsed as T;
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}
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// Setup bootstrap (spec §B). The one-time token from `felis setup` is redeemed for
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// a lockdown session; the response (and /setup/status) reports which onboarding
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// steps remain so the Setup wizard can drive email verification + passkey enrollment.
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export interface SetupState {
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user_id: string;
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username: string;
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role: string;
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email: string | null;
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email_verified: boolean;
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has_passkey: boolean;
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setup_required: boolean;
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}
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export const api = {
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// Session doors (spec §B). The product is passwordless: a session is minted only
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// by passkey, email-OTP, bind code, or the op-login vouch flow below. Every door
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// sets an HttpOnly cookie as a side effect and may 403 `local_auth_disabled` on a
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// Zero-Trust-only deployment.
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// logout is idempotent server-side (clears the session row + cookie); calling it
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// without a session still resolves 200. After it, refreshing /me yields 401, which
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// the tier model reads as `unauthenticated` and routes back to /login.
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logout: () => request<{ ok: boolean }>("POST", "/auth/logout"),
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bind: (code: string) =>
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request<BindResult>("POST", "/auth/bind", { code }),
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authEmailStart: (email: string) =>
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request<{ sent: boolean; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/auth/email/start", { email }),
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authEmailVerify: (email: string, code: string) =>
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request<{ user_id: string; role: string }>("POST", "/auth/email/verify", { email, code }),
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authPasskeyLoginBegin: (email: string) =>
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request<any>("POST", "/auth/passkey/login/begin", { email }),
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authPasskeyLoginFinish: (email: string, assertion: any) =>
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request<any>("POST", "/auth/passkey/login/finish", { email, assertion }),
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authPasskeyDiscoverableBegin: () =>
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request<any>("POST", "/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/begin", {}),
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authPasskeyDiscoverableFinish: (login_id: string, assertion: any) =>
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request<any>("POST", "/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/finish", { login_id, assertion }),
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// Op-login (spec §B): the staff door. start mails an OTP to a staff address and
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// returns a request handle; an online admin vouches in-game with
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// `/felis web op approve <request_id>`; the panel polls status until approved,
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// then finish redeems {request_id, code} into a session. start answers 202 with a
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// request_id for ANY well-formed address (anti-enumeration), so the UI just waits.
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opLoginStart: (email: string) =>
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request<{ request_id: string; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/auth/op-login/start", { email }),
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opLoginStatus: (id: string) =>
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request<{ approved: boolean }>("GET", `/auth/op-login/status/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`),
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opLoginFinish: (request_id: string, code: string) =>
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request<{ user_id: string; role: string }>("POST", "/auth/op-login/finish", {
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request_id,
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code,
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}),
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// Setup bootstrap (spec §B). redeem consumes the one-time token from the setup URL
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// and mints a lockdown session (Public); status re-reads progress for a reload
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// mid-wizard (SetupAllowed — the surviving session, no token needed).
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setupRedeem: (token: string) =>
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request<SetupState>("POST", "/auth/setup/redeem", { token }),
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setupStatus: () =>
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request<SetupState>("GET", "/auth/setup/status"),
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// Identity (spec §7 GET /me) — the tier keystone. is_admin is server-computed
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// (Principal.IsAdmin); the panel reads it but re-deriving admin-ness is the
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// backend's job. Drives nav + route guards only; every admin route 403s on its
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// own regardless of what the panel renders.
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me: () => request<Identity>("GET", "/me"),
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myServers: () =>
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request<{ servers: ServerInfo[] }>("GET", "/me/servers").then((r) => r.servers ?? []),
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// fleet is the SysAdmin cockpit's fleet-wide read (admin-tier GET /fleet): every
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// server's CRD lifecycle view plus its owner. It 403s for a non-admin principal —
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// the panel only renders the cockpit link behind is_admin, and the route guards
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// again server-side regardless of what the UI shows.
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fleet: () =>
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request<{ servers: FleetServer[] }>("GET", "/fleet").then((r) => r.servers ?? []),
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status: (name: string) => request<ServerStatus>("GET", `/servers/${name}/status`),
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wake: (name: string) =>
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request<{ name: string; desiredState: string }>("POST", `/servers/${name}/wake`),
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stop: (name: string) =>
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request<{ name: string; desiredState: string }>("POST", `/servers/${name}/stop`),
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claim: (name: string) =>
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request<{ name: string; claimed: boolean }>("POST", `/servers/${name}/claim`),
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/** sendCommand runs one RCON command against a running server (spec §8 写=RCON).
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* The backend strips a leading "/", rejects control characters (newline → 400)
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* and caps the command at 1000 bytes. The reply is the server's plain-text
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* response body. */
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sendCommand: (name: string, command: string) =>
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request<{ output: string }>("POST", `/servers/${name}/command`, { command }),
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// Access control (spec §7 access). The backend translates these STRUCTURED fields
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// into RCON commands — every field is charset-validated server-side before it is
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// concatenated, so there is no free-text injection surface. All are owner-or-admin
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// gated and require the server to be Running (409 `not_running` otherwise), so the
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// panel only exposes them on a running server. The reply's `output` is the raw RCON
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// text, surfaced verbatim as confirmation.
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/** accessWhitelistList reads the server's whitelist. This GET ALSO requires a
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* Running server (the readiness gate covers the read, not just the writes), so
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* callers must gate the fetch on phase === "Running". */
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accessWhitelistList: (name: string) =>
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request<WhitelistResult>("GET", `/servers/${name}/access/whitelist`),
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accessWhitelist: (name: string, action: "add" | "remove", player: string) =>
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request<AccessResult>("POST", `/servers/${name}/access/whitelist`, {
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action,
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player,
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}),
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/** accessBanList reads the server's ban list. Like accessWhitelistList this GET
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* requires a Running server (the readiness gate covers the read too), so callers
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* gate the fetch on phase === "Running". */
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accessBanList: (name: string) =>
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request<BanlistResult>("GET", `/servers/${name}/access/ban`),
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accessBan: (name: string, action: "ban" | "pardon", player: string) =>
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request<AccessResult>("POST", `/servers/${name}/access/ban`, {
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action,
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player,
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}),
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/** accessPlayers reads WHO is online (the only source of names — status carries
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* the count alone). Like accessWhitelistList this GET requires a Running server,
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* so callers gate the fetch on phase === "Running". */
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accessPlayers: (name: string) =>
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request<PlayersResult>("GET", `/servers/${name}/access/players`),
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accessKick: (name: string, player: string) =>
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request<KickResult>("POST", `/servers/${name}/access/kick`, { player }),
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accessLuckPermsInfo: (name: string, player: string) =>
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request<{
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player: string;
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groups: string[];
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permissions: { node: string; value: boolean; world?: string }[];
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output: string;
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}>("GET", `/servers/${name}/access/luckperms/${player}`),
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accessPermission: (
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name: string,
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action: "set" | "unset",
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player: string,
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node: string,
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value?: boolean,
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world?: string
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) =>
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request<AccessResult & { node: string; value?: boolean; world?: string }>(
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"POST",
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`/servers/${name}/access/permission`,
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{ action, player, node, value, world }
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),
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accessGroup: (
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name: string,
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action: "add" | "remove",
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player: string,
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group: string
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) =>
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request<AccessResult & { group: string }>(
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"POST",
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`/servers/${name}/access/group`,
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{ action, player, group }
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),
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listImages: () =>
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request<{ images: WhitelistImage[] }>("GET", "/images").then((r) => r.images ?? []),
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addImage: (imageRef: string) =>
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request<WhitelistImage>("POST", "/images", { image_ref: imageRef }),
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removeImage: (imageRef: string) =>
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request<void>("DELETE", `/images?ref=${encodeURIComponent(imageRef)}`),
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buildImage: (req: { image_ref: string; dockerfile: string; context_ref: string; base_image?: string }) =>
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request<Build>("POST", "/images/build", req),
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getBuild: (id: string) =>
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request<Build>("GET", `/images/build/${id}`),
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cancelBuild: (id: string) =>
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request<Build>("POST", `/images/build/${id}/cancel`),
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createServer: (req: CreateServerRequest) =>
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request<{ name: string; subdomain: string; desiredState: string }>(
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"POST",
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"/servers",
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req,
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),
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patchServer: (name: string, req: {
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displayName?: string;
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autostartPolicy?: AutostartPolicy;
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image?: string;
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memory?: string;
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resources?: {
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cpu?: string;
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cpuRequest?: string;
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memory?: string;
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memoryRequest?: string;
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};
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}) =>
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request<{ name: string; desiredState: string }>(
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"PATCH",
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`/servers/${name}`,
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req,
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),
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// World backups (spec §7). listBackups is the app-tier read: an admin sees every
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// present backup, a user only the backups of worlds they formerly owned — the
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// scope is decided server-side from the principal, not by any client filter, so a
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// user cannot widen it. Only present (restorable) rows come back, newest first;
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// there is no per-server backups endpoint, so the panel filters by server_name
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// client-side and the first matching row is the one a restore would recover.
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listBackups: () =>
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request<{ backups: BackupView[] }>("GET", "/backups").then((r) => r.backups ?? []),
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// restoreBackup starts an ASYNC restore of a server's world from a backup
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// (spec §7 POST restore-backup). It accepts an optional backupId in the body: when
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// absent the backend restores the latest backup and resolves its opaque ref
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// server-side — the client never names a backup by handle (spec §286).
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// Preconditions are enforced server-side and surfaced as codes: owner-or-admin +
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// former-owner match (403), a present backup must exist (404 no_backup), and the
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// server MUST be fully stopped (409 not_stopped) since the restore writes into
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// the live world volume. The reply is 202 {name, status:"restoring", backup_id} —
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// success means the restore Job was enqueued, not that the world is back yet.
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restoreBackup: (name: string, backupId?: string) =>
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request<{ name: string; status: string; backup_id: string }>(
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"POST",
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`/servers/${name}/restore-backup`,
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backupId ? { backup_id: backupId } : undefined,
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),
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// backupNow enqueues a manual backup (spec §7 POST backup). Preconditions are
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// enforced server-side and surfaced as codes: owner-or-admin (403) and the
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// server MUST be fully stopped (409 not_stopped — the world volume is RWO), so
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// callers gate the action on phase === "Stopped". The reply is 202
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// {name, status:"backing_up"}: the Job is enqueued, not done — watch
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// serverJobs for the outcome.
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backupNow: (name: string) =>
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request<{ name: string; status: string }>("POST", `/servers/${name}/backup`),
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// serverJobs lists the newest backup/restore Jobs of one server, newest first
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// (GET /servers/{name}/jobs). Owner-or-admin gated server-side; a Job's
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// failure text rides `message`. The backend answers 503 until the job-status
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// reader is wired, so callers should tolerate that error.
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serverJobs: (name: string) =>
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request<{ server: string; jobs: ServerJob[] }>(
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"GET",
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`/servers/${name}/jobs`,
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).then((r) => r.jobs ?? []),
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// Server file editor (spec §7). All three routes are owner-or-admin gated and
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// refuse with 409 not_stopped unless the server is fully stopped (the world
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// volume is RWO), so callers gate on phase === "Stopped". The path travels as a
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// query parameter — a file path contains "/" and never round-trips through a
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// path segment. Content is []byte on the wire, which Go's encoding/json renders
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// as base64, so it is binary-safe in both directions.
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listServerFiles: (name: string, path: string) =>
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request<{ path: string; entries: ServerFileEntry[]; truncated: boolean }>(
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"GET",
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`/servers/${name}/files?path=${encodeURIComponent(path)}`,
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),
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// readServerFile returns one file's bytes (base64). A file over the read
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// ceiling is a 413, never a silent truncation, because a later save of a
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// truncated body would destroy the rest of the file.
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readServerFile: (name: string, path: string) =>
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request<{ path: string; content: string }>(
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"GET",
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`/servers/${name}/file?path=${encodeURIComponent(path)}`,
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),
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// writeServerFile replaces a file's contents (creating it if absent). Sending
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// an explicit "" is a deliberate truncate; the wire field is required, but that
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// is enforced by the caller (this method always sends one).
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writeServerFile: (name: string, path: string, content: string) =>
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request<{ path: string; status: string }>(
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"PUT",
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`/servers/${name}/file?path=${encodeURIComponent(path)}`,
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{ content },
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),
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// Account linking (spec §10). Both are POST: start reports status from the
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// session principal (no body, side-effect-free), verify consumes a code the
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// player was shown in-game. The panel can never mint a code — that is the
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// internal in-game face — so there is no client method for it.
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linkStatus: () => request<LinkStatus>("POST", "/account/link/start"),
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linkVerify: (code: string) =>
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request<LinkResult>("POST", "/account/link/verify", { code }),
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emailStart: (email: string) =>
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request<{ sent: boolean; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/account/email/start", { email }),
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emailVerify: (code: string) =>
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request<{ verified: boolean; email: string }>("POST", "/account/email/verify", { code }),
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// setEmail records the caller's address WITHOUT an OTP round-trip (the setup
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// wizard's Step 1). The bootstrap has no SMTP, so email_verified stays false; a
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// later Settings/SMTP flow verifies it via emailStart/emailVerify.
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setEmail: (email: string) =>
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request<{ email: string }>("POST", "/account/email", { email }),
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passkeyRegisterBegin: () =>
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request<any>("POST", "/account/passkey/register/begin"),
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passkeyRegisterFinish: (name: string, attestation: any) =>
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request<any>("POST", "/account/passkey/register/finish", { name, attestation }),
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passkeyList: () =>
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request<{ credentials: any[] }>("GET", "/account/passkey/credentials"),
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passkeyDelete: (id: string) =>
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request<void>("DELETE", `/account/passkey/credentials/${id}`),
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// Account migration (spec §B3 inherit). Started in-game with /felis migrate; the
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// web side then drives: status → step-up confirm (passkey when enrolled, email-OTP
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// otherwise) → issue-code (source names the target account and reads the one-time
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// code) → redeem (the TARGET account spends the code; the source's servers move to
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// it and the source is retired).
|
|
migrateStatus: () =>
|
|
request<{
|
|
active: boolean;
|
|
state?: string;
|
|
target_user_id?: string;
|
|
confirm_factor?: string;
|
|
code_expires_at?: string;
|
|
}>("GET", "/account/migrate"),
|
|
|
|
migrateConfirmOTPStart: () =>
|
|
request<{ sent: boolean; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/account/migrate/confirm/otp/start"),
|
|
|
|
migrateConfirmOTPVerify: (code: string) =>
|
|
request<{ confirmed: boolean }>("POST", "/account/migrate/confirm/otp/verify", { code }),
|
|
|
|
migrateConfirmPasskeyBegin: () =>
|
|
request<any>("POST", "/account/migrate/confirm/passkey/begin"),
|
|
|
|
migrateConfirmPasskeyFinish: (assertion: any) =>
|
|
request<{ confirmed: boolean }>("POST", "/account/migrate/confirm/passkey/finish", {
|
|
assertion,
|
|
}),
|
|
|
|
migrateIssueCode: (target_user_id: string) =>
|
|
request<{ code: string; expires_at: string }>("POST", "/account/migrate/issue-code", {
|
|
target_user_id,
|
|
}),
|
|
|
|
migrateRedeem: (code: string) =>
|
|
request<{ migrated: boolean; servers_moved: number; servers: string[] }>(
|
|
"POST",
|
|
"/account/migrate/redeem",
|
|
{ code },
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
listSubmissions: () =>
|
|
request<{ submissions: Submission[] }>("GET", "/submissions").then((r) => r.submissions ?? []),
|
|
|
|
approveSubmission: (id: string) =>
|
|
request<Submission>("POST", `/submissions/${id}/approve`),
|
|
|
|
rejectSubmission: (id: string, reason: string) =>
|
|
request<Submission>("POST", `/submissions/${id}/reject`, { reason }),
|
|
|
|
// Retire a submission outright (row + uploaded context) — the review queue's
|
|
// lifecycle valve, the only way an upload is reclaimed from the PVC.
|
|
deleteSubmission: (id: string) => request<Submission>("DELETE", `/submissions/${id}`),
|
|
|
|
// The reviewer's read path to the uploaded build context: the executed
|
|
// Dockerfile lives inside the tarball, so approving without this would be
|
|
// blind. The body is the attacker-supplied archive — download it, never
|
|
// render it — which the API's attachment disposition enforces.
|
|
downloadSubmissionContext: async (id: string): Promise<void> => {
|
|
const { apiBase } = await loadConfig();
|
|
const res = await fetch(`${apiBase}/submissions/${id}/context`, {
|
|
method: "GET",
|
|
credentials: "include",
|
|
});
|
|
if (!res.ok) {
|
|
let code = "error";
|
|
let message = res.statusText;
|
|
try {
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(await res.text()) as unknown;
|
|
if (isApiError(parsed)) {
|
|
code = parsed.error.code;
|
|
message = parsed.error.message;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
/* non-JSON error body (e.g. an ingress page): keep the status line */
|
|
}
|
|
const err: ApiError = { status: res.status, code, message };
|
|
announceSetupRequired(err);
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
const blob = await res.blob();
|
|
const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
|
|
const link = document.createElement("a");
|
|
link.href = url;
|
|
link.download = `${id}-context.tar.gz`;
|
|
link.click();
|
|
URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
listMySubmissions: () =>
|
|
request<{ submissions: Submission[] }>("GET", "/me/submissions").then((r) => r.submissions ?? []),
|
|
|
|
createSubmission: (displayName: string) =>
|
|
request<Submission>("POST", "/me/submissions", { display_name: displayName }),
|
|
|
|
uploadSubmissionContext: (id: string, file: Blob) =>
|
|
requestRaw<Submission>("POST", `/me/submissions/${id}/context`, file, {
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/x-gzip",
|
|
}),
|
|
|
|
// Retract the caller's own pending submission (and its uploaded context), which
|
|
// frees their pending slot and storage budget. Reviewed submissions are frozen.
|
|
withdrawSubmission: (id: string) => request<Submission>("DELETE", `/me/submissions/${id}`),
|
|
|
|
getUpdateWindow: () => request<UpdateWindow>("GET", "/updates/window"),
|
|
|
|
setUpdateWindow: (window: UpdateWindow) => request<UpdateWindow>("PUT", "/updates/window", window),
|
|
|
|
// Freshness of the host's control-plane database backup (felis-db-backup.timer).
|
|
getDBBackup: () => request<DBBackupStatus>("GET", "/platform/db-backup"),
|
|
|
|
// ---- User admin (admin-tier, spec §7 user admin) ----
|
|
|
|
listUsers: (params?: {
|
|
query?: string;
|
|
role?: "admin" | "user";
|
|
disabled?: "true" | "false";
|
|
limit?: number;
|
|
offset?: number;
|
|
}) => {
|
|
const sp = new URLSearchParams();
|
|
if (params?.query) sp.set("query", params.query);
|
|
if (params?.role) sp.set("role", params.role);
|
|
if (params?.disabled) sp.set("disabled", params.disabled);
|
|
if (params?.limit) sp.set("limit", String(params.limit));
|
|
if (params?.offset) sp.set("offset", String(params.offset));
|
|
const qs = sp.toString();
|
|
return request<{ users: UserView[]; total: number }>(
|
|
"GET",
|
|
`/users${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`,
|
|
).then((r) => ({ users: r.users ?? [], total: r.total ?? 0 }));
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
getUser: (id: string) => request<UserDetail>("GET", `/users/${id}`),
|
|
|
|
createUser: (req: CreateUserRequest) =>
|
|
request<UserView>("POST", "/users", req),
|
|
|
|
patchUser: (id: string, patch: PatchUserRequest) =>
|
|
request<UserView>("PATCH", `/users/${id}`, patch),
|
|
|
|
deleteUser: (id: string) =>
|
|
request<{ deleted: boolean }>("DELETE", `/users/${id}`),
|
|
|
|
disableUser: (id: string, disabled: boolean) =>
|
|
request<{ id: string; disabled: boolean }>("POST", `/users/${id}/disable`, { disabled }),
|
|
|
|
getUserQuotas: (id: string) => request<QuotaView>("GET", `/users/${id}/quotas`),
|
|
|
|
setUserQuotas: (id: string, quotas: QuotaInput) =>
|
|
request<QuotaView>("PUT", `/users/${id}/quotas`, quotas),
|
|
|
|
listUserSessions: (id: string) =>
|
|
request<{ sessions: SessionView[] }>("GET", `/users/${id}/sessions`).then((r) => r.sessions ?? []),
|
|
|
|
revokeUserSessions: (id: string) =>
|
|
request<{ ok: boolean }>("DELETE", `/users/${id}/sessions`),
|
|
|
|
revokeUserSession: (id: string, hash: string) =>
|
|
request<{ ok: boolean }>("DELETE", `/users/${id}/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(hash)}`),
|
|
|
|
// unbindUserPasskeys severs EVERY passkey the user holds (owner-tier account
|
|
// remediation for a lost or compromised authenticator). It is deliberately not
|
|
// a lockout — the account keeps its other doors (email OTP, in-game op-login
|
|
// re-enrollment). Unbinding an account that holds no passkeys is a 200 no-op.
|
|
unbindUserPasskeys: (id: string) =>
|
|
request<{ ok: boolean }>("DELETE", `/users/${id}/passkeys`),
|
|
|
|
linkAccount: (id: string, mcUuid: string, authSource?: string) =>
|
|
request<{ ok: boolean; mc_uuid: string; auth_source: string }>(
|
|
"POST",
|
|
`/users/${id}/links`,
|
|
{ mc_uuid: mcUuid, auth_source: authSource ?? "mojang" },
|
|
),
|
|
|
|
unlinkAccount: (id: string, mcUuid: string) =>
|
|
request<{ ok: boolean; mc_uuid: string }>(
|
|
"DELETE",
|
|
`/users/${id}/links/${encodeURIComponent(mcUuid)}`,
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* consoleStreamURL builds the §8 read-side SSE endpoint for a server. It mirrors
|
|
* request()'s `${apiBase}${path}` join, but is a plain string builder rather than
|
|
* a fetch: an EventSource is *constructed* from a URL (and carries the Access
|
|
* cookie via withCredentials), it is not requested through this module. The name
|
|
* is percent-encoded defensively — server names are validated `[a-z0-9-]`
|
|
* upstream, but the URL is built from a router param, so encoding keeps a stray
|
|
* value from breaking the URL.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function consoleStreamURL(apiBase: string, name: string): string {
|
|
return `${apiBase}/servers/${encodeURIComponent(name)}/console`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* buildLogsStreamURL builds the SSE endpoint for build logs.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function buildLogsStreamURL(apiBase: string, id: string): string {
|
|
return `${apiBase}/images/build/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/logs`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** humanizeError turns the stable error code into a user-facing line. */
|
|
export function humanizeError(e: unknown): string {
|
|
const t = i18next.getFixedT(null, "errors");
|
|
|
|
if (e && typeof e === "object" && "name" in e) {
|
|
const name = (e as any).name;
|
|
if (name === "NotAllowedError") {
|
|
return t("passkey_not_allowed");
|
|
}
|
|
if (name === "AbortError") {
|
|
return t("passkey_aborted");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const err = e as Partial<ApiError>;
|
|
switch (err.code) {
|
|
// Session doors (spec §B): every passwordless door 403s this when local
|
|
// sessions are disabled on a Zero-Trust-only deployment.
|
|
case "local_auth_disabled":
|
|
return t("local_auth_disabled");
|
|
case "staff_account":
|
|
return t("staff_account");
|
|
case "not_linked":
|
|
return t("not_linked");
|
|
case "invalid_code":
|
|
return t("invalid_code");
|
|
case "already_linked":
|
|
return t("already_linked");
|
|
case "otp_resend_cooldown":
|
|
return t("otp_resend_cooldown");
|
|
case "otp_locked":
|
|
return t("otp_locked");
|
|
case "otp_account_locked":
|
|
return t("otp_account_locked");
|
|
case "passkey_challenge_invalid":
|
|
return t("passkey_challenge_invalid");
|
|
case "invalid_attestation":
|
|
return t("invalid_attestation");
|
|
case "passkey_already_bound":
|
|
return t("passkey_already_bound");
|
|
case "passkey_unavailable":
|
|
return t("passkey_unavailable");
|
|
case "quota_exceeded":
|
|
return t("quota_exceeded");
|
|
case "already_claimed":
|
|
return t("already_claimed");
|
|
case "image_not_whitelisted":
|
|
return t("image_not_whitelisted");
|
|
case "subdomain_taken":
|
|
return t("subdomain_taken");
|
|
case "already_exists":
|
|
return t("already_exists");
|
|
case "cooldown":
|
|
return t("cooldown");
|
|
// Access control (spec §7): the server must be Running for any RCON-backed
|
|
// access change; the panel gates on phase, but a stale phase can still race.
|
|
case "not_running":
|
|
return t("not_running");
|
|
case "console_unavailable":
|
|
return t("console_unavailable");
|
|
// World restore (spec §7 restore-backup): the world volume must be free, so a
|
|
// running/starting server 409s not_stopped; no present backup 404s no_backup;
|
|
// the restore subsystem may be unwired (503 restore_unavailable).
|
|
case "no_backup":
|
|
return t("no_backup");
|
|
case "not_stopped":
|
|
return t("not_stopped");
|
|
// World-volume lock: a restore, backup or file write is running on this
|
|
// server's world, so a wake or a second world operation is refused until the
|
|
// Job finishes (internal/maintenance).
|
|
case "maintenance_in_progress":
|
|
return t("maintenance_in_progress");
|
|
case "no_world_volume":
|
|
return t("no_world_volume");
|
|
case "restore_unavailable":
|
|
return t("restore_unavailable");
|
|
// Server create/edit (spec §22): the portability regex + reservation list are
|
|
// enforced server-side, and the create form's own checks are weaker, so these
|
|
// refusals reach the dialog as-is.
|
|
case "bad_name":
|
|
return t("bad_name");
|
|
case "bad_subdomain":
|
|
return t("bad_subdomain");
|
|
case "at_capacity":
|
|
return t("at_capacity");
|
|
case "storage_immutable":
|
|
return t("storage_immutable");
|
|
// Email identity: the verified-email uniqueness index (migration 0020) plus
|
|
// VerifyEmailOTP's guard make a second verified holder impossible; the OTP
|
|
// relay can also refuse to deliver at all.
|
|
case "email_taken":
|
|
return t("email_taken");
|
|
case "mail_undeliverable":
|
|
return t("mail_undeliverable");
|
|
// File editor (spec §7): path/size refusals from the sandboxed job, plus the
|
|
// subsystem being unwired.
|
|
case "bad_path":
|
|
return t("bad_path");
|
|
case "too_large":
|
|
return t("too_large");
|
|
case "files_timeout":
|
|
return t("files_timeout");
|
|
case "files_unavailable":
|
|
return t("files_unavailable");
|
|
case "jobs_unavailable":
|
|
return t("jobs_unavailable");
|
|
// Builds, uploads and review: terminal-state conflicts and unwired subsystems.
|
|
case "already_terminal":
|
|
return t("already_terminal");
|
|
case "build_unavailable":
|
|
return t("build_unavailable");
|
|
case "build_logs_unavailable":
|
|
return t("build_logs_unavailable");
|
|
case "already_reviewed":
|
|
return t("already_reviewed");
|
|
case "submission_quota_exceeded":
|
|
return t("submission_quota_exceeded");
|
|
case "submission_cooldown":
|
|
return t("submission_cooldown");
|
|
case "submissions_unavailable":
|
|
return t("submissions_unavailable");
|
|
case "uploads_unavailable":
|
|
return t("uploads_unavailable");
|
|
case "backup_unavailable":
|
|
return t("backup_unavailable");
|
|
// Account migration + the re-auth steps it depends on: every refusal below is
|
|
// an expected outcome of the Account → migrate flow, not a fault.
|
|
case "account_retired":
|
|
return t("account_retired");
|
|
case "no_migration":
|
|
return t("no_migration");
|
|
case "not_confirmed":
|
|
return t("not_confirmed");
|
|
case "already_confirmed":
|
|
return t("already_confirmed");
|
|
case "invalid_target":
|
|
return t("invalid_target");
|
|
case "target_not_found":
|
|
return t("target_not_found");
|
|
case "target_unavailable":
|
|
return t("target_unavailable");
|
|
case "no_passkey":
|
|
return t("no_passkey");
|
|
case "passkey_required":
|
|
return t("passkey_required");
|
|
case "no_step_up_factor":
|
|
return t("no_step_up_factor");
|
|
case "passkey_login_failed":
|
|
return t("passkey_login_failed");
|
|
case "passkey_login_invalid":
|
|
return t("passkey_login_invalid");
|
|
case "too_many_challenges":
|
|
return t("too_many_challenges");
|
|
// Operator-login approvals, live streams, and the remaining auth doors.
|
|
case "op_login_invalid":
|
|
return t("op_login_invalid");
|
|
case "op_login_not_found":
|
|
return t("op_login_not_found");
|
|
case "too_many_streams":
|
|
return t("too_many_streams");
|
|
case "protected_admin":
|
|
return t("protected_admin");
|
|
case "auth_unavailable":
|
|
return t("auth_unavailable");
|
|
case "setup_token_invalid":
|
|
return t("setup_token_invalid");
|
|
default:
|
|
if (err.status === 401) return t("session_expired");
|
|
if (err.status === 403) return t("forbidden");
|
|
return err.message ?? t("generic");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|