Files
Felis/internal/api/errors.go
T
flyemoji fe2ece08cc feat(api): add public Bind-Code onboarding for the player console
Adds POST /api/v1/auth/bind, the one public pre-account entrypoint of the
player console (console.<root_domain>). An account-less player redeems the
one-time Bind Code minted in the in-game Login Lobby; in a single step the
platform creates a role=user player, links it to the verified in-game UUID,
and mints a host-only felis_session. Login is thus not forced at the edge
while operations stay app-authenticated.

The operator console (op.console.<root_domain>) is unaffected and stays
behind Zero Trust: a code whose UUID resolves to a staff (role=admin)
account is refused with 403 (ErrPlayerBindForbidden) without consuming the
code, so the public door provably never yields an admin principal — the
session it mints carries ViaAdminAccess=false and is host-only to console,
never sent to op.console.

Repo layer: new RedeemPlayerBindCode on the Repo interface, implemented on
PGRepo (single tx: resolve code, create-or-fetch the player, consume) and
the test fake. The returning-player branch is idempotent and is a deliberate
standing "log in via the game" door, not just first-time onboarding.

Honest labeling:
- ORACLE-VERIFIED (Go): account/session logic — role=user, refuse-staff,
  idempotent create-or-fetch, single-use code, and the op.console redline
  (player session rejected on admin routes). Covered by handlers_onboard_test
  and the OpenAPI parity gate.
- INTEGRATION-dependent: the endpoint's security rests on the Bind Code having
  been minted against an online-mode-Yggdrasil-authenticated UUID, a
  precondition that lives in velocity/Java and is not verifiable from this
  repo (CODE-ONLY). The Go layer proves the logic, not that identity guarantee.
- No app-level attempt cap: rate-limiting is deferred to the edge as for the
  public /auth/login; the ~1e12 keyspace, single use and short TTL make a
  blind app-level cap non-critical.
2026-07-01 18:00:13 +09:00

116 lines
5.6 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
)
// Sentinel errors the repository and cluster layers return so handlers can map
// domain outcomes onto HTTP status codes without leaking driver details.
var (
// ErrNotFound means the requested server / record does not exist.
ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
// ErrConflict means an atomic precondition failed (e.g. claim lost the race).
ErrConflict = errors.New("conflict")
// ErrLinkCodeInvalid means an account-link code is unknown or expired (spec
// §10). It is a client error (the verify endpoint exists; the code is bad), so
// handlers map it to 400, not 404.
ErrLinkCodeInvalid = errors.New("link code invalid or expired")
// ErrConsoleUnavailable means the RCON write channel could not be reached —
// the dial timed out, was refused, or the password was rejected (spec §8).
// Because readiness IS an RCON probe (spec §141: phase=Running ⟺ RCON
// answers), a reachable failure here is a transient/racy "the server isn't
// actually up", not a server bug. Handlers map it to 503, not 500, so the
// caller is told to wake/retry rather than shown an opaque internal error.
ErrConsoleUnavailable = errors.New("server console is unavailable")
// ErrOTPInvalid means an email one-time code is unknown, expired, already
// consumed, or did not match (spec §B2 onboarding). Like ErrLinkCodeInvalid it
// is a client error — the verify endpoint exists; the code is bad — so handlers
// map it to 400, not 404. A wrong-but-not-yet-locked guess collapses to it too,
// so the response never distinguishes "no such code" from "wrong digits".
ErrOTPInvalid = errors.New("email code invalid or expired")
// ErrOTPLocked means the live email code has exhausted its attempt budget: too
// many wrong guesses (spec §B2). It is distinct from ErrOTPInvalid so handlers
// can answer 429 (back off / request a new code) rather than inviting another
// guess against a code that will never accept one.
ErrOTPLocked = errors.New("email code locked: too many attempts")
// ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid means a passkey enrollment ceremony cannot be
// finished: there is no live (unconsumed, unexpired) challenge for the caller and
// purpose (Phase 6 WebAuthn bind). Like ErrOTPInvalid it is a client error — the
// finish endpoint exists; the ceremony state is gone (never begun, already
// consumed, or expired) — so handlers map it to 400, not 404.
ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid = errors.New("passkey challenge invalid or expired")
// ErrPlayerBindForbidden means a public Bind-Code redemption resolved to a STAFF
// account (role=admin), which the player-console bootstrap refuses (console-tier
// access model). Operators authenticate at op.console behind Zero Trust, never via
// the account-less console.<root_domain> door, so the public bootstrap provably
// never mints a session for an admin identity. It is distinct from ErrConflict so
// the handler answers 403 (wrong door) rather than 409 (already linked).
ErrPlayerBindForbidden = errors.New("bind code belongs to a staff account")
)
// apiError is a handler-level error carrying an HTTP status and a stable,
// machine-readable code. The error envelope matches the platform convention:
//
// {"error": {"code": "...", "message": "...", "request_id": "..."}}
type apiError struct {
status int
code string
msg string
}
func (e *apiError) Error() string { return e.msg }
// newError builds an apiError with a formatted message.
func newError(status int, code, format string, a ...any) *apiError {
return &apiError{status: status, code: code, msg: fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)}
}
// Common errors reused across handlers.
var (
errUnauthorized = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "authentication required")
errForbidden = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not permitted")
errBadRequest = newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request")
// errInvalidCredentials is the single, deliberately vague answer to any failed
// local-password login (spec §B): unknown username, player row, or wrong
// password all collapse to it so the response never reveals which usernames
// carry a password. The anti-enumeration dummy-hash compare keeps the timing
// uniform alongside it (handlers_auth.go).
errInvalidCredentials = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "invalid username or password")
// errPasswordChangeRequired fences a staff principal that still owes a
// first-login password change to the change-password surface. The lockdown
// middleware returns it from every authenticated route except the opt-out set
// (change-password / logout / me), so a half-onboarded account cannot act until
// it sets its own password.
errPasswordChangeRequired = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "password_change_required",
"change your password before continuing")
)
// writeJSON writes v as an indented JSON body with the given status.
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
_ = enc.Encode(v)
}
// writeError renders err as the standard error envelope. Non-apiError values
// collapse to a 500 so driver/internal details never reach the client.
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
var ae *apiError
if !errors.As(err, &ae) {
ae = newError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
}
body := map[string]any{
"error": map[string]string{
"code": ae.code,
"message": ae.msg,
"request_id": requestIDFromContext(r.Context()),
},
}
writeJSON(w, ae.status, body)
}