A from-zero login door: the browser calls navigator.credentials.get() with an empty allowCredentials, the authenticator returns an assertion carrying the resident credential's userHandle, and the server resolves the account from that handle alone — nothing is typed or client-named. Routes (both Public): POST /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/begin POST /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/finish Begin stashes the ceremony SessionData server-side keyed by an opaque login_id under a global cap; finish consumes it single-use, hands the authenticator-revealed userHandle to a UserByID resolver, and mints a session only for the account the assertion actually verified to. Every finish rejection — no live challenge, expired, bad assertion, unresolvable handle — collapses to one passkey_login_invalid envelope, so finish is never an existence/state oracle. SignCount is surfaced but not yet consumed, exactly as the username-first door, so the from-zero path offers no clone-detection bypass. The discoverable VERIFY path is Oracle-verified end to end against a virtual authenticator (internal/passkey): it resolves the account from the signed userHandle, fails closed when the handle names no account, and rejects an assertion signed by a credential not bound to the resolved user — the impersonation guard unique to usernameless login. Enrollment now requests a resident key (authenticatorSelection.residentKey=preferred), the only server-side half a unit test can pin. Whether an authenticator actually stores a resident key is a device property no test can reach, so this door is INERT for a credential until its owner enrolls a NEW passkey against these options; "preferred" (not "required") preserves the no-lockout fallback to username-first + email-OTP.
120 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
120 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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)
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// Sentinel errors the repository and cluster layers return so handlers can map
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// domain outcomes onto HTTP status codes without leaking driver details.
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var (
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// ErrNotFound means the requested server / record does not exist.
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ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
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// ErrConflict means an atomic precondition failed (e.g. claim lost the race).
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ErrConflict = errors.New("conflict")
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// ErrLinkCodeInvalid means an account-link code is unknown or expired (spec
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// §10). It is a client error (the verify endpoint exists; the code is bad), so
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// handlers map it to 400, not 404.
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ErrLinkCodeInvalid = errors.New("link code invalid or expired")
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// ErrConsoleUnavailable means the RCON write channel could not be reached —
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// the dial timed out, was refused, or the password was rejected (spec §8).
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// Because readiness IS an RCON probe (spec §141: phase=Running ⟺ RCON
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// answers), a reachable failure here is a transient/racy "the server isn't
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// actually up", not a server bug. Handlers map it to 503, not 500, so the
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// caller is told to wake/retry rather than shown an opaque internal error.
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ErrConsoleUnavailable = errors.New("server console is unavailable")
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// ErrOTPInvalid means an email one-time code is unknown, expired, already
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// consumed, or did not match (spec §B2 onboarding). Like ErrLinkCodeInvalid it
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// is a client error — the verify endpoint exists; the code is bad — so handlers
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// map it to 400, not 404. A wrong-but-not-yet-locked guess collapses to it too,
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// so the response never distinguishes "no such code" from "wrong digits".
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ErrOTPInvalid = errors.New("email code invalid or expired")
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// ErrOTPLocked means the live email code has exhausted its attempt budget: too
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// many wrong guesses (spec §B2). It is distinct from ErrOTPInvalid so handlers
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// can answer 429 (back off / request a new code) rather than inviting another
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// guess against a code that will never accept one.
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ErrOTPLocked = errors.New("email code locked: too many attempts")
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// ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid means a passkey enrollment ceremony cannot be
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// finished: there is no live (unconsumed, unexpired) challenge for the caller and
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// purpose (Phase 6 WebAuthn bind). Like ErrOTPInvalid it is a client error — the
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// finish endpoint exists; the ceremony state is gone (never begun, already
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// consumed, or expired) — so handlers map it to 400, not 404.
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ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid = errors.New("passkey challenge invalid or expired")
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// ErrPlayerBindForbidden means a public Bind-Code redemption resolved to a STAFF
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// account (role=admin), which the player-console bootstrap refuses (console-tier
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// access model). Operators authenticate at op.console behind Zero Trust, never via
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// the account-less console.<root_domain> door, so the public bootstrap provably
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// never mints a session for an admin identity. It is distinct from ErrConflict so
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// the handler answers 403 (wrong door) rather than 409 (already linked).
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ErrPlayerBindForbidden = errors.New("bind code belongs to a staff account")
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// ErrEmailTaken means a verified email would collide with another account's
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// already-verified address (spec §B email-first login foundation, migration 0010).
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// VerifyEmailOTP returns it — WITHOUT consuming the code, since the address, not
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// the code, is the problem — when a DIFFERENT user has already proven the same
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// address case-insensitively. It is the clean, application-level counterpart of
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// the users_verified_email_unique index: a sequential double-verify meets this
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// guard and gets a 409 instead of a raw unique-violation 500. Distinct from
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// ErrConflict so the message can name the cause (the email is spoken for).
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ErrEmailTaken = errors.New("email already verified on another account")
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// ErrTooManyDiscoverableChallenges means the non-user-keyed discoverable ("usernameless")
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// login challenge store is at its hard cap of live rows (task #40, migration 0013).
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// Unlike the user-keyed enrollment/login challenges — which self-bound via a per-user
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// supersede — a from-zero begin has no principal to key a fair per-caller limit on, so the
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// table is capped globally and a begin over the cap is refused. Distinct from the other
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// sentinels so the handler answers 429 (a transient "too busy, retry" — the cap self-clears
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// as challenges expire), never a 400 that invites an immediate retry.
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ErrTooManyDiscoverableChallenges = errors.New("too many discoverable login challenges in flight")
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)
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// apiError is a handler-level error carrying an HTTP status and a stable,
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// machine-readable code. The error envelope matches the platform convention:
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//
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// {"error": {"code": "...", "message": "...", "request_id": "..."}}
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type apiError struct {
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status int
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code string
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msg string
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}
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func (e *apiError) Error() string { return e.msg }
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// newError builds an apiError with a formatted message.
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func newError(status int, code, format string, a ...any) *apiError {
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return &apiError{status: status, code: code, msg: fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)}
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}
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// Common errors reused across handlers.
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var (
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errUnauthorized = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "authentication required")
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errForbidden = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not permitted")
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errBadRequest = newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request")
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)
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// writeJSON writes v as an indented JSON body with the given status.
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
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enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
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_ = enc.Encode(v)
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}
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// writeError renders err as the standard error envelope. Non-apiError values
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// collapse to a 500 so driver/internal details never reach the client.
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
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var ae *apiError
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if !errors.As(err, &ae) {
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ae = newError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal error")
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}
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body := map[string]any{
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"error": map[string]string{
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"code": ae.code,
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"message": ae.msg,
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"request_id": requestIDFromContext(r.Context()),
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},
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}
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writeJSON(w, ae.status, body)
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}
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