Files
Felis/internal/api/handlers_auth_options.go

100 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// Pre-session identifier-first discovery (spec §B, #71). Given a typed email, this
// Public door reports which console login methods the account can use, so the SPA's
// identifier-first form can prompt for the right authenticator (a passkey assertion,
// or "we'll email you a code") instead of guessing.
//
// It is the deliberate counter-slice to the anti-enumeration login doors
// (handlers_auth_email.go, handlers_passkey.go): those refuse to disclose whether an
// address has an account precisely because THIS endpoint is the one sanctioned place
// existence is revealed. An empty methods array means "no (verified) account, or
// none of its methods is available on this install". That makes it a
// mass-enumeration surface by design — an accepted product decision, the
// same one the email door's header records. The handler sends no mail and mutates
// nothing, so a per-recipient cooldown would merely block a legitimate retry; what
// bounds enumeration is the per-client-address token bucket shared by every public
// auth door (throttleAuthDoor in ratelimit.go).
//
// It never reveals STAFFNESS. Methods are computed by the SAME rule for every resolved
// account — no role branch, no operator hint — so a staff email and a player email in
// the same credential state return byte-identical bodies. The console doors' own
// post-redemption staff refusal is not previewed here: a staff caller is told
// email_otp is available and is turned away only later, at op.console's Zero-Trust
// gate. Staffness is thus invisible by construction, with no side channel to regress.
type authOptionsRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
}
// handleAuthOptions resolves the typed email and returns the console login methods it
// can use. Public, pre-session, gated on local_auth_enabled like its sibling doors.
func (a *API) handleAuthOptions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
"session login is disabled"))
return
}
if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
writeError(w, r, err)
return
}
var req authOptionsRequest
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
writeError(w, r, err)
return
}
email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
return
}
// methods is initialised non-nil so the no-account branch marshals as [] (not null).
methods := []string{}
u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
// The sanctioned existence oracle: an unknown (or not-yet-verified) address is
// not disguised — it honestly reports no methods.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"methods": methods})
return
case err != nil:
writeError(w, r, err)
return
}
// Compute methods identically for EVERY resolved account. There is deliberately no
// branch on u.Role: a staff address must be indistinguishable from a player address
// in the same credential state, so the response carries nothing account-identifying.
//
// Advertise passkey only when a verifier is actually wired: both login halves 503
// passkey_unavailable when a.Passkey is nil regardless of enrolled credentials, so
// options must not offer a method the finish door would immediately reject.
if a.Passkey != nil {
creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, r, err)
return
}
if len(creds) > 0 {
methods = append(methods, "passkey")
}
}
// Email-OTP login works for any resolved verified account (UserByEmail resolves only
// email_verified rows), so it is on offer whenever a relay can mail the code; with
// none the email door answers 503 mail_unavailable, so it is left out like an
// unwired passkey verifier.
if a.Mailer != nil {
methods = append(methods, "email_otp")
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"methods": methods})
}