flyemoji
a8c4077202
withRecover turned a panicking handler into a 500 envelope and threw the panic away. The client is meant to get an opaque "internal error" — that part is right — but nothing was written server-side, so a recovered panic was an untraceable 500: an operator holding "internal error" has no message, no stack and no request to grep for, and diagnosis degrades into guessing against a live install. That is what it cost during the email-OTP report. The panic value, a stack and the method+path are now logged first, keyed by the same request_id writeError already stamps on unmapped errors, so the client envelope and the server log can be joined. The test pins all three markers plus the unchanged 500/"panic" response, because a silent recover looks exactly like a working one from the outside.
601 lines
25 KiB
Go
601 lines
25 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"errors"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// captureMailer is the OTPMailer seam under test: it records the last code so a
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// test can read the digits that production would only ever email out of band.
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type captureMailer struct {
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email, code string
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calls int
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err error
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}
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func (m *captureMailer) SendOTP(_ context.Context, email, code string) error {
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m.calls++
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if m.err != nil {
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return m.err
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}
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m.email, m.code = email, code
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return nil
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}
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// TestEmailOTPVertical walks the whole §B2 email-proof slice across the external
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// face: a player asks for a code, the platform delivers it (here, into the test
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// mailer), the player types it back, and only then does the user row flip verified.
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// It proves the digits never ride the HTTP response and that both halves audit.
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func TestEmailOTPVertical(t *testing.T) {
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const email = "[email protected]"
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user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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// Seed the staff/user row the verify path flips, keyed (in the fake) by username
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// but matched by ID — exactly how PGRepo updates users by id.
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repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]"}
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mailer := &captureMailer{}
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api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
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api.Mailer = mailer
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eh := api.ExternalHandler()
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// 1) start mints + delivers a code. The response says "sent" and when it expires
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// — but NEVER the code itself.
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w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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b := acctBody(t, w)
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if b["sent"] != true {
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t.Errorf("start body sent = %v, want true", b["sent"])
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}
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if _, leaked := b["code"]; leaked {
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t.Error("start response must NEVER carry the code")
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}
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if s, _ := b["expires_at"].(string); s == "" {
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t.Error("start must report expires_at")
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}
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if mailer.calls != 1 || mailer.email != email {
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t.Fatalf("mailer not invoked for %s: calls=%d email=%q", email, mailer.calls, mailer.email)
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}
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code := mailer.code
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if len(code) != otpCodeDigits {
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t.Fatalf("delivered code %q: len = %d, want %d", code, len(code), otpCodeDigits)
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}
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// Only the hash is persisted — the plaintext must not be findable in the store.
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for _, o := range repo.otps {
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if o.codeHash == code {
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t.Error("store holds the plaintext code, not its hash")
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}
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}
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// 2) the player submits the code. The email is written and verified flips true.
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w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+code+`"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("verify: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if vb := acctBody(t, w); vb["verified"] != true || vb["email"] != email {
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t.Fatalf("verify body = %v, want verified:true email:%s", vb, email)
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}
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if su := repo.staff["player"]; !su.EmailVerified || su.Email != email {
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t.Fatalf("user row not flipped: verified=%v email=%q", su.EmailVerified, su.Email)
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}
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// Both halves are audited by the principal's Access email.
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if n := len(repo.audits); n != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("want 2 audits (otp_sent, verified), got %d: %+v", n, repo.audits)
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}
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if repo.audits[0].Action != "account.email.otp_sent" || repo.audits[0].Actor != "[email protected]" {
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t.Errorf("first audit = %+v, want account.email.otp_sent by [email protected]", repo.audits[0])
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}
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if repo.audits[1].Action != "account.email.verified" || repo.audits[1].Actor != "[email protected]" {
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t.Errorf("second audit = %+v, want account.email.verified by [email protected]", repo.audits[1])
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}
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// 3) the code is single-use: re-submitting the consumed code now fails.
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if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+code+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
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t.Fatalf("replay of consumed code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// TestWithRecoverLogsPanicStack pins the observability contract: a recovered panic
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// must still leave the client an opaque 500 "panic", but the panic value, a stack,
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// and the request path MUST be logged first — otherwise a 500 like the email-OTP
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// report is untraceable (an operator has nothing to grep for). Regression guard for
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// the silent recover that cost a live debugging session.
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func TestWithRecoverLogsPanicStack(t *testing.T) {
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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old := log.Writer()
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log.SetOutput(&buf)
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defer log.SetOutput(old)
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h := withRequestID(withRecover(http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
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panic("boom-xyz")
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})))
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", nil))
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if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError || errCode(w.Body.Bytes()) != "panic" {
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t.Fatalf("recovered response = %d %q, want 500 panic (%s)", w.Code, errCode(w.Body.Bytes()), w.Body.String())
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}
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logged := buf.String()
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// The panic value, a real stack (debug.Stack always opens with "goroutine"), and
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// the path — the three things a grep needs to find and place the fault.
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for _, want := range []string{"boom-xyz", "goroutine", "/api/v1/account/email/start"} {
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if !strings.Contains(logged, want) {
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t.Fatalf("panic log missing %q; got:\n%s", want, logged)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestEmailOTPStartValidation covers the mint-side input gate and the no-mailer
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// fallback (the demo path): a malformed address never mints, and a nil Mailer still
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// persists a code (logged server-side) so the verify flow stays exercisable.
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func TestEmailOTPStartValidation(t *testing.T) {
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user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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mk := func(repo *fakeRepo) http.Handler {
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api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
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return api.ExternalHandler() // no Mailer wired → demo fallback
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}
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bad := map[string]string{
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"missing email": `{}`,
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"empty email": `{"email":""}`,
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"whitespace email": `{"email":" "}`,
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"no at-sign": `{"email":"notanemail"}`,
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"at-sign at edge": `{"email":"@example.net"}`,
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"no dot in domain": `{"email":"a@bcd"}`,
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"two at-signs": `{"email":"a@[email protected]"}`,
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"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`,
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"trailing at": `{"email":"player@"}`,
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}
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for name, body := range bad {
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t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", body, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if len(repo.otps) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("a rejected start must not mint a code, got %d", len(repo.otps))
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}
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})
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}
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t.Run("no mailer still persists a code (demo fallback)", func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if len(repo.otps) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 persisted code, got %d", len(repo.otps))
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}
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})
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}
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// TestEmailOTPStartRateLimited closes the email-bomb vector: handleEmailOTPStart is
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// an authenticated primitive that mails arbitrary addresses, so a resend cooldown
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// bounds it on both the caller (a fan-out across many addresses) and the recipient
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// (a convergence of many accounts on one mailbox).
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func TestEmailOTPStartRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
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const emailA, emailB = "[email protected]", "[email protected]"
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u1 := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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u2 := &Principal{UserID: "u2", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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start := func(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
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return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, nil)
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}
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t.Run("same caller and recipient is throttled, then recovers after the cooldown", func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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mailer := &captureMailer{}
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api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: u1}
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api.Mailer = mailer
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clock := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)
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api.Now = func() time.Time { return clock }
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eh := api.ExternalHandler()
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("first send: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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// An immediate resend is refused with 429 — and mints/mails nothing.
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
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t.Fatalf("immediate resend: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if mailer.calls != 1 {
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t.Errorf("mailer calls = %d, want 1 (the throttled resend must not mail)", mailer.calls)
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}
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if len(repo.otps) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("persisted codes = %d, want 1 (the throttled resend must not mint)", len(repo.otps))
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}
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// Once the cooldown elapses the same address may be mailed again.
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clock = clock.Add(otpResendCooldown + time.Second)
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("post-cooldown send: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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})
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t.Run("one caller cannot fan out across addresses", func(t *testing.T) {
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api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: u1}
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api.Mailer = &captureMailer{}
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eh := api.ExternalHandler()
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("send to A: code = %d, want 202", w.Code)
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}
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// A different recipient, same caller, same instant: the per-caller key throttles.
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if w := start(eh, emailB); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("fan-out to B: code = %d, want 429", w.Code)
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}
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})
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t.Run("many callers cannot converge on one recipient", func(t *testing.T) {
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api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: u1}
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api.Mailer = &captureMailer{}
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eh := api.ExternalHandler()
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("u1 send to A: code = %d, want 202", w.Code)
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}
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// A different caller targeting the same address, same instant: the per-recipient
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// key throttles even though u2 has never sent before.
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api.External = staticExternal{p: u2}
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if w := start(eh, emailA); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
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t.Fatalf("u2 converge on A: code = %d, want 429", w.Code)
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}
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})
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}
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// TestEmailOTPVerifyRejections is the redeem-side failure matrix. The expired and
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// locked cases plant rows directly: the test clock is frozen, so an already-expired
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// or already-exhausted row is the only way to reach those branches deterministically.
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func TestEmailOTPVerifyRejections(t *testing.T) {
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user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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mk := func(repo *fakeRepo) http.Handler {
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api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
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return api.ExternalHandler()
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}
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// live seeds an unconsumed onboarding code for u1 with the given hash/expiry.
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live := func(repo *fakeRepo, id, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time, attempts int) {
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repo.otps[id] = &fakeEmailOTP{
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id: id, userID: "u1", email: "[email protected]", codeHash: codeHash,
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purpose: otpPurposeOnboard, attempts: attempts,
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expiresAt: expiresAt, createdAt: expiresAt,
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}
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}
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t.Run("empty code -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
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w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":""}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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})
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t.Run("whitespace code -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
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w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":" "}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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})
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t.Run("unknown field -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
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w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"token":"123456"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("strict decode must reject unknown field, code = %d", w.Code)
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}
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})
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t.Run("no live code -> 400 invalid_code", func(t *testing.T) {
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w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"000000"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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})
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t.Run("expired code -> 400 invalid_code, not consumed", func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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// One second before the frozen test clock (time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)).
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live(repo, "ex", otpCodeHash("424242"), time.Unix(1_699_999_999, 0), 0)
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w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"424242"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if repo.otps["ex"].consumed {
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t.Error("an expired code must not be consumed")
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}
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})
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t.Run("wrong code -> 400 invalid_code, attempt charged, not consumed", func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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live(repo, "wr", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), 0)
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w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"654321"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if repo.otps["wr"].attempts != 1 {
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t.Errorf("a wrong guess must cost one attempt, got %d", repo.otps["wr"].attempts)
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}
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if repo.otps["wr"].consumed {
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t.Error("a wrong guess must not consume the code")
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}
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})
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t.Run("exhausted code -> 429 otp_locked", func(t *testing.T) {
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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// Attempt budget already spent: even the correct code must be refused.
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live(repo, "lk", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), otpMaxAttempts)
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w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"123456"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_locked" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_locked", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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})
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}
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// TestEmailOTPBruteForceLockout drives the lockout end-to-end through the handler:
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// wrong guesses are charged one at a time until the budget is spent, after which
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// even the correct code is refused with 429 — the brute-force ceiling in action.
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func TestEmailOTPBruteForceLockout(t *testing.T) {
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user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
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repo := newFakeRepo()
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mailer := &captureMailer{}
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api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
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api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
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api.Mailer = mailer
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eh := api.ExternalHandler()
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if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("start: code = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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good := mailer.code
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// Exhaust the budget with wrong guesses; each is a plain invalid_code.
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for i := 0; i < otpMaxAttempts; i++ {
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w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"000000"}`, nil)
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// "000000" could, with 1-in-a-million odds, equal the real code; guard that.
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if good == "000000" {
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t.Skip("astronomically unlucky code collision; rerun")
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}
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
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t.Fatalf("guess %d: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", i, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// Budget spent: the CORRECT code is now locked out, not accepted.
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w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+good+`"}`, nil)
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if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_locked" {
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t.Fatalf("post-lockout correct code: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_locked", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// TestEmailOTPSupersede proves a re-request invalidates the prior code: only the
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// newest live code for (user, purpose) can be redeemed, so an intercepted-then-
|
|
// reissued code cannot be used after the player asks again.
|
|
func TestEmailOTPSupersede(t *testing.T) {
|
|
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
|
|
repo := newFakeRepo()
|
|
mailer := &captureMailer{}
|
|
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
|
|
api.Mailer = mailer
|
|
// A re-request is a fresh send, so it must clear the resend cooldown: advance the
|
|
// clock past it between the two starts (supersede is orthogonal to the throttle).
|
|
clock := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)
|
|
api.Now = func() time.Time { return clock }
|
|
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
|
|
first := mailer.code
|
|
clock = clock.Add(otpResendCooldown + time.Second)
|
|
do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
|
|
second := mailer.code
|
|
|
|
if first == second {
|
|
t.Skip("rng produced identical codes; rerun")
|
|
}
|
|
// Only the second code survives.
|
|
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+first+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("superseded code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+second+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("current code: code = %d body %s, want 200", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEmailOTPFaceSeparation enforces that both halves are web-only: they require a
|
|
// logged-in principal the internal (service-token) face never carries, so crossing
|
|
// the face boundary must 404, not silently work.
|
|
func TestEmailOTPFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
|
|
api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
|
|
ih := api.InternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("start on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"123456"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("verify on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEmailOTPMailerError pins the delivery-failure path: a Mailer that errors
|
|
// surfaces as a 5xx (the code was persisted but never delivered), and the failure
|
|
// is NOT audited as a successful send.
|
|
func TestEmailOTPMailerError(t *testing.T) {
|
|
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
|
|
repo := newFakeRepo()
|
|
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
|
|
api.Mailer = &captureMailer{err: errors.New("smtp down")}
|
|
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
|
|
if w.Code < 500 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("mailer error: code = %d, want 5xx (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
for _, a := range repo.audits {
|
|
if a.Action == "account.email.otp_sent" {
|
|
t.Error("a failed delivery must not be audited as otp_sent")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// flakyMailer fails its first SendOTP, then succeeds, so a test can observe whether
|
|
// a failed delivery left the cooldown consumed (a retry would be wrongly throttled)
|
|
// or released (the retry is admitted, as it must be).
|
|
type flakyMailer struct {
|
|
calls int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *flakyMailer) SendOTP(_ context.Context, _, _ string) error {
|
|
m.calls++
|
|
if m.calls == 1 {
|
|
return errors.New("smtp down")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEmailOTPStartFailedDeliveryReleasesCooldown covers the new reserve→rollback
|
|
// path: a send that reserves the cooldown but then fails to deliver must release it,
|
|
// so the very next attempt at the same instant is admitted rather than 429'd. Without
|
|
// the deferred release a transient SMTP blip would lock a player out for the whole
|
|
// window — strictly worse than the throttle is meant to be.
|
|
func TestEmailOTPStartFailedDeliveryReleasesCooldown(t *testing.T) {
|
|
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
|
|
mailer := &flakyMailer{}
|
|
api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
|
|
api.Mailer = mailer
|
|
api.Now = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0) } // frozen: same window
|
|
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code < 500 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("first send (mailer fails): code = %d, want 5xx (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
// Same instant, same caller and recipient: had the failed send burned the window
|
|
// this would be a 429. The rollback frees it, so the retry delivers.
|
|
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
|
|
t.Fatalf("retry after failed delivery: code = %d, want 202 (the failed send must release the cooldown) (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
if mailer.calls != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("mailer calls = %d, want 2 (one failed, one delivered)", mailer.calls)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// leakyMailer fails with the shape a real relay error carries: the SMTP account
|
|
// and the relay's numeric refusal are both in the text.
|
|
type leakyMailer struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (leakyMailer) SendOTP(_ context.Context, _, _ string) error {
|
|
return errors.New("smtp: auth as [email protected]: 535 5.7.8 bad credentials")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEmailOTPStartRelayRefusalIsNotInternalError pins both halves of the
|
|
// delivery-failure contract. A relay that refuses the message is not a bug in
|
|
// Felis, so it must not answer "internal error" — that reads as a broken panel
|
|
// and sends the operator hunting through handler code instead of their [smtp]
|
|
// block. And the relay's own text must not ride along on the wire: it names the
|
|
// SMTP account, while this route is reachable by any signed-in player.
|
|
func TestEmailOTPStartRelayRefusalIsNotInternalError(t *testing.T) {
|
|
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
|
|
api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
|
|
api.Mailer = leakyMailer{}
|
|
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusBadGateway {
|
|
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 502 (a relay refusal is not an internal error) (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
body := w.Body.String()
|
|
if !strings.Contains(body, "mail_undeliverable") {
|
|
t.Errorf("want a distinct machine code the panel can explain, got: %s", body)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, leak := range []string{"[email protected]", "535", "bad credentials"} {
|
|
if strings.Contains(body, leak) {
|
|
t.Errorf("relay text %q leaked to an unprivileged caller: %s", leak, body)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// gateMailer blocks every SendOTP until all concurrent callers have arrived, making
|
|
// any check-then-act window in the throttle deterministically observable instead of
|
|
// scheduler-dependent. It is the committed counterpart of the adversarial burst probe.
|
|
type gateMailer struct {
|
|
calls int64
|
|
entered chan struct{}
|
|
release chan struct{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *gateMailer) SendOTP(_ context.Context, _, _ string) error {
|
|
atomic.AddInt64(&m.calls, 1)
|
|
m.entered <- struct{}{}
|
|
<-m.release
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEmailOTPStartConcurrentBurstBounded is the regression guard for the email-bomb
|
|
// closure under concurrency. net/http serves each request on its own goroutine, so a
|
|
// throttle that peeks then records in two steps lets a burst of starts for one victim
|
|
// from one principal all slip through together. The atomic reserve admits exactly one;
|
|
// the rest get 429. (Runs without -race — the gate makes the race deterministic.)
|
|
func TestEmailOTPStartConcurrentBurstBounded(t *testing.T) {
|
|
const n = 8
|
|
mailer := &gateMailer{entered: make(chan struct{}, n), release: make(chan struct{})}
|
|
api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
|
|
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}}
|
|
api.Mailer = mailer
|
|
api.Now = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0) } // frozen: one shared window
|
|
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
|
|
|
|
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
|
codes := make([]int, n)
|
|
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
|
|
wg.Add(1)
|
|
go func(i int) {
|
|
defer wg.Done()
|
|
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
|
|
codes[i] = w.Code
|
|
}(i)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Drain whoever reached the mailer, then release them. A correct throttle admits
|
|
// exactly one; a buggy one lets several arrive before any records, and they pile
|
|
// up here within the deadline.
|
|
deadline := time.After(2 * time.Second)
|
|
reached := 0
|
|
loop:
|
|
for reached < n {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-mailer.entered:
|
|
reached++
|
|
case <-deadline:
|
|
break loop
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
close(mailer.release)
|
|
wg.Wait()
|
|
|
|
accepted := 0
|
|
for _, c := range codes {
|
|
if c == http.StatusAccepted {
|
|
accepted++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if got := atomic.LoadInt64(&mailer.calls); got != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("burst delivered %d mails for one victim from one account in one window; want exactly 1 (accepted=%d, reached=%d)", got, accepted, reached)
|
|
}
|
|
if accepted != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("burst accepted %d starts; want exactly 1 (the rest must be 429)", accepted)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|