package operator import ( "testing" "felis.lolicon.best/internal/apis/felis/v1alpha1" "felis.lolicon.best/internal/naming" corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1" ) // findEnv returns the env var with the given name, or nil. func findEnv(env []corev1.EnvVar, name string) *corev1.EnvVar { for i := range env { if env[i].Name == name { return &env[i] } } return nil } // By default readiness is a plain TCP check on the game port (spec §5). func TestReadinessProbeDefaultsToTCP(t *testing.T) { p := readinessProbe(&v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{}) if p.TCPSocket == nil || p.HTTPGet != nil { t.Fatalf("default probe should be TCPSocket, got %+v", p.ProbeHandler) } if p.TCPSocket.Port.IntVal != GamePort { t.Errorf("TCP probe port = %d, want %d", p.TCPSocket.Port.IntVal, GamePort) } } // When a server declares an HTTP health port, readiness gates on an HTTP GET so // an RCON-less loader's own "started" signal (felis-limbo) marks it Ready. func TestReadinessProbeHTTPWhenHealthPortSet(t *testing.T) { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Spec.Startup.HealthHTTPPort = 8080 p := readinessProbe(s) if p.HTTPGet == nil || p.TCPSocket != nil { t.Fatalf("expected HTTPGet probe, got %+v", p.ProbeHandler) } if p.HTTPGet.Port.IntVal != 8080 { t.Errorf("HTTP probe port = %d, want 8080", p.HTTPGet.Port.IntVal) } if p.HTTPGet.Path != "/healthz" { t.Errorf("HTTP probe path = %q, want default /healthz", p.HTTPGet.Path) } } func TestReadinessProbeHTTPCustomPath(t *testing.T) { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Spec.Startup.HealthHTTPPort = 9000 s.Spec.Startup.HealthHTTPPath = "/ready" p := readinessProbe(s) if p.HTTPGet == nil || p.HTTPGet.Path != "/ready" || p.HTTPGet.Port.IntVal != 9000 { t.Fatalf("custom HTTP probe wrong: %+v", p.HTTPGet) } } // A user server (no system-role label) gets the forwarding-config initContainer, // running the felis image as root and mounting the world volume. A system server // and a build with no felis image name get none. func TestBuildStatefulSetForwardingInitContainer(t *testing.T) { user := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} user.Spec.Storage.Size = "1Gi" sts, err := buildStatefulSet(user, 1, "felis:demo") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("buildStatefulSet: %v", err) } inits := sts.Spec.Template.Spec.InitContainers if len(inits) != 1 { t.Fatalf("want 1 initContainer, got %d", len(inits)) } ic := inits[0] if ic.Image != "felis:demo" { t.Errorf("init image = %q, want felis:demo", ic.Image) } if ic.SecurityContext == nil || ic.SecurityContext.RunAsUser == nil || *ic.SecurityContext.RunAsUser != 0 { t.Errorf("init must run as root, got %+v", ic.SecurityContext) } mounted := false for _, vm := range ic.VolumeMounts { if vm.Name == dataVolumeName && vm.MountPath == dataMountPath { mounted = true } } if !mounted { t.Errorf("init must mount the world volume at %s, got %+v", dataMountPath, ic.VolumeMounts) } // The whole point of the initContainer is to write the forwarding config, which it // cannot do without the secret: a missing Env here makes `init-forwarding` no-op and // the server Ready-but-unjoinable — the exact silent failure the feature removes. // Same secretKeyRef rule as the main container (optional so a non-modern proxy still // schedules), so assert it, not just the image/root/mount above. fwd := findEnv(ic.Env, envForwardingSecret) if fwd == nil { t.Fatalf("init must carry %s or it writes no forwarding config", envForwardingSecret) } if fwd.ValueFrom == nil || fwd.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef == nil { t.Fatalf("%s on init must be a secretKeyRef, got %+v", envForwardingSecret, fwd) } if ref := fwd.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef; ref.Name != naming.ForwardingSecretName || ref.Key != naming.ForwardingSecretKey { t.Errorf("init %s secretKeyRef = %s/%s, want %s/%s", envForwardingSecret, ref.Name, ref.Key, naming.ForwardingSecretName, naming.ForwardingSecretKey) } // No felis image name → nothing to run. noImg, _ := buildStatefulSet(user, 1, "") if len(noImg.Spec.Template.Spec.InitContainers) != 0 { t.Error("no felis image must yield no initContainer") } // System server handles forwarding in its own entrypoint. sys := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} sys.Spec.Storage.Size = "1Gi" sys.Labels = map[string]string{v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole: "lobby"} sysSts, _ := buildStatefulSet(sys, 1, "felis:demo") if len(sysSts.Spec.Template.Spec.InitContainers) != 0 { t.Error("system server must get no forwarding initContainer") } } // The system-role label travels onto the pod: the platform's NetworkPolicies select // on it (felis-login-to-internal-api opens 8081 only to name=login AND // system-role=login), and a pod without it would be fenced off the one service it // exists to call. The selector stays the immutable labelsFor subset, so existing // StatefulSets roll instead of failing to update. func TestBuildStatefulSetCopiesSystemRoleOntoPods(t *testing.T) { login := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} login.Name = naming.SystemLoginServer login.Labels = map[string]string{v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole: naming.SystemLoginServer} sts, err := buildStatefulSet(login, 1, "felis:demo") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("buildStatefulSet: %v", err) } pod := sts.Spec.Template.Labels if pod[v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole] != naming.SystemLoginServer { t.Errorf("pod labels = %v, want %s=%s", pod, v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole, naming.SystemLoginServer) } for k, v := range sts.Spec.Selector.MatchLabels { if pod[k] != v { t.Errorf("selector %s=%s does not match the pod template", k, v) } } if _, ok := sts.Spec.Selector.MatchLabels[v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole]; ok { t.Error("the system role must stay out of the (immutable) selector") } user := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} user.Name = "survival" userSts, _ := buildStatefulSet(user, 1, "felis:demo") if _, ok := userSts.Spec.Template.Labels[v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole]; ok { t.Errorf("a user server pod must carry no system role, got %v", userSts.Spec.Template.Labels) } } // A server with a health port also exposes it as a named container port so the // kubelet can reach it. func TestBuildStatefulSetAddsHealthPort(t *testing.T) { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Spec.Storage.Size = "1Gi" s.Spec.Startup.HealthHTTPPort = 8080 sts, err := buildStatefulSet(s, 1, "") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("buildStatefulSet: %v", err) } found := false for _, port := range sts.Spec.Template.Spec.Containers[0].Ports { if port.Name == "health" && port.ContainerPort == 8080 { found = true } } if !found { t.Error("health container port 8080 not exposed") } } // The login system server (and ONLY it) receives the service token, sourced from a // Secret via secretKeyRef — never a literal — so its felis-limbo plugin can // authenticate to the felis-api internal face. func TestBuildEnvInjectsServiceTokenForLogin(t *testing.T) { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Name = naming.SystemLoginServer s.Labels = map[string]string{v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole: naming.SystemLoginServer} tok := findEnv(buildEnv(s), envServiceToken) if tok == nil { t.Fatalf("%s not injected for the login server", envServiceToken) } if tok.Value != "" { t.Errorf("%s carries a literal value %q — it must be a secretKeyRef", envServiceToken, tok.Value) } if tok.ValueFrom == nil || tok.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef == nil { t.Fatalf("%s must be sourced from a secretKeyRef", envServiceToken) } ref := tok.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef if ref.Name != naming.ServiceTokenSecretName || ref.Key != naming.ServiceTokenSecretKey { t.Errorf("secretKeyRef = %s/%s, want %s/%s", ref.Name, ref.Key, naming.ServiceTokenSecretName, naming.ServiceTokenSecretKey) } } // A user server must NOT receive the service token. This includes a legacy, // unlabeled server named "login" that predates the reserved-name rule. func TestBuildEnvWithholdsServiceTokenFromUserServers(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { name string labels map[string]string }{ {name: "survival"}, {name: "creative"}, {name: naming.SystemLobbyServer, labels: map[string]string{v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole: naming.SystemLobbyServer}}, {name: naming.SystemLoginServer}, {name: naming.SystemLoginServer, labels: map[string]string{v1alpha1.LabelSystemRole: naming.SystemLobbyServer}}, } for _, tt := range tests { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Name = tt.name s.Labels = tt.labels if tok := findEnv(buildEnv(s), envServiceToken); tok != nil { t.Errorf("%s labels=%v: service token leaked into a non-system login server", tt.name, tt.labels) } } } // Every backend receives the Velocity modern-forwarding secret — system and user alike. // This is the opposite rule from the service token, and deliberately so: Velocity's // forwarding mode is proxy-wide, so a backend without the secret cannot verify the // signed handshake and rejects every login the proxy sends it. It is also what makes a // backend's view of a player's UUID trustworthy (Mojang-verified via the signed payload, // not offline-derived from the username) — the premise the Owner bind rests on. // Sourced from a Secret, never a literal, and optional so a cluster whose proxy is not // in modern mode still schedules its pods. func TestBuildEnvInjectsForwardingSecretIntoEveryBackend(t *testing.T) { for _, name := range []string{naming.SystemLoginServer, naming.SystemLobbyServer, "survival"} { s := &v1alpha1.MinecraftServer{} s.Name = name fwd := findEnv(buildEnv(s), envForwardingSecret) if fwd == nil { t.Errorf("%s: %s not injected — the backend would reject every proxied login", name, envForwardingSecret) continue } if fwd.Value != "" { t.Errorf("%s: %s carries a literal value %q — it must be a secretKeyRef", name, envForwardingSecret, fwd.Value) continue } if fwd.ValueFrom == nil || fwd.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef == nil { t.Errorf("%s: %s must be sourced from a secretKeyRef", name, envForwardingSecret) continue } ref := fwd.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef if ref.Name != naming.ForwardingSecretName || ref.Key != naming.ForwardingSecretKey { t.Errorf("%s: secretKeyRef = %s/%s, want %s/%s", name, ref.Name, ref.Key, naming.ForwardingSecretName, naming.ForwardingSecretKey) } if ref.Optional == nil || !*ref.Optional { t.Errorf("%s: secretKeyRef must be optional, or a cluster without the Secret wedges every pod in CreateContainerConfigError", name) } } }