package api import ( "errors" "net/http" "strings" "felis.lolicon.best/internal/apis/felis/v1alpha1" "felis.lolicon.best/internal/naming" ) // handleListBackups lists the world backups visible to the caller (spec §7 GET // /api/v1/backups; world_backups in §22). It is app-tier: an admin sees every // present backup; a regular user sees only the backups of worlds they formerly // owned. The scope is decided here from the Principal and enforced by which Repo // query runs (AllBackups vs BackupsForUser) — there is no client-supplied filter // a user could widen, so "a user cannot see another's backups" is a property of // the query, not of request parsing. func (a *API) handleListBackups(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { p := principalFromContext(r.Context()) var ( backups []BackupView err error ) if p.IsAdmin() { backups, err = a.Repo.AllBackups(r.Context()) } else { backups, err = a.Repo.BackupsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID) } if err != nil { writeError(w, r, err) return } if backups == nil { backups = []BackupView{} } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"backups": backups}) } // handleRestoreBackup starts restoring a server's world from a backup (spec §7 // POST /servers/{name}/restore-backup; spec §466). It accepts an optional JSON // body with a backup_id; when absent it restores the latest backup for the server // (backward-compatible default). The authorization is deliberately stricter than // ordinary owner-or-admin, in this order: // // ① name validation // ② ServerByName — an unknown server is 404 // ③ owner-or-admin, else 403. A released world's server row is unowned // (owner_id NULL → OwnerID ""), so this also enforces "重新 claim": a former // owner must re-claim the server before they can restore into it. // ④ if the optional backup_id is supplied the handler resolves the specific // backup; otherwise it picks the most recent present backup, else // 404 no_backup // ⑤ cross-server guard: a backup requested by id must belong to the server in // the path — restoring server A's backup onto server B would be a data leak // ⑥ former-owner match: a non-admin may restore ONLY a world they formerly // owned. The current-owner gate in ③ is not enough — user B who // re-claims a released server could otherwise resurrect user A's world (the // backup still carries former_owner=A), a data leak. Admin skips this check. // ⑦ stopped gate: the world PVC must be free, so restore is refused unless the // server is fully stopped. // ⑧ hand off to the Restorer. Restore is asynchronous (a restore Job, like an // image build Job), so success means "enqueued" and the handler answers 202. // // The opaque backup_ref is resolved server-side from the backup and handed to the // Restorer directly; the client never names a backup by handle (spec §286 // principle). func (a *API) handleRestoreBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { p := principalFromContext(r.Context()) name := r.PathValue("name") if err := naming.ValidateServerName(name); err != nil { writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_name", "invalid server name: %v", err)) return } // Ownership: owner or admin, mirroring handleStop. An unknown server is 404; an // unowned (released) server fails the owner check for everyone but admin, which // is exactly the "must re-claim first" rule. rec, err := a.Repo.ServerByName(r.Context(), name) if err != nil { a.writeLookupError(w, r, err) return } if !a.isOwnerOrAdmin(p, rec) { writeError(w, r, errForbidden) return } // Optional backup_id in the JSON body; absent → LatestBackup (backward compat). var body struct { BackupID string `json:"backup_id"` } if strings.HasPrefix(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "application/json") { if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body); err != nil { writeError(w, r, err) return } } // Resolve the backup record. When backup_id is specified the handler resolves // that exact backup; otherwise it picks the most recent present one. var backup *BackupRecord if body.BackupID != "" { backup, err = a.Repo.BackupByID(r.Context(), body.BackupID) if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) { writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "no_backup", "no matching backup exists")) return } writeError(w, r, err) return } // Cross-server guard: the backup must belong to the server named in the path. if backup.ServerName != name { writeError(w, r, errForbidden) return } } else { backup, err = a.Repo.LatestBackup(r.Context(), name) if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) { writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "no_backup", "no restorable backup exists for this server")) return } writeError(w, r, err) return } } // A non-admin may restore only a world they formerly owned (spec §466). Without // this a fresh claimant of a released server could resurrect the previous // owner's world data. if !p.IsAdmin() && backup.FormerOwner != p.UserID { writeError(w, r, errForbidden) return } // Stopped gate: the world PVC must be free for the restore to write into it. // Refuse unless the server is fully stopped — Ready means it is up, and any // desiredState other than Stopped means it is up or coming up and still owns the // RWO volume (spec §141 readiness is an RCON probe; DesiredStopped is the // intent). This yields a specific 409 instead of a restore Job that cannot mount. info, err := a.Cluster.GetServer(r.Context(), name) if err != nil { a.writeLookupError(w, r, err) return } if info.Ready || info.DesiredState != string(v1alpha1.DesiredStopped) { writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "not_stopped", "stop the server before restoring a backup")) return } // Restorer is optional: when unwired the endpoint reports 503 rather than // panicking, so the authorization boundary above is exercised even before the // restore-Job executor is wired (see Restorer). if a.Restorer == nil { writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "restore_unavailable", "restore subsystem is not configured")) return } if err := a.Restorer.Restore(r.Context(), name, backup.BackupRef); err != nil { // ErrNotFound (server vanished from the execution backend) → 404; else 500. a.writeLookupError(w, r, err) return } a.audit(r, p.Email, "backup.restore", name) writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{ "name": name, "status": "restoring", "backup_id": backup.ID, }) }