demo-up.sh collapses bootstrap -> build+import the limbo/lobby images -> wire [velocity] login_image/lobby_image into felis.host.toml -> felis setup into a single command, ending in the interactive Owner-creation TUI (the only step it cannot automate). Prefers prebuilt tars under deploy/images, else builds on the host, auto-resolving the LOOHP/Limbo CI jar and the latest stable Paper jar (all overridable by env); SKIP_BOOTSTRAP/SKIP_SETUP toggles for reruns.
The lobby image had never been built and two defects blocked it: the felis image .dockerignore excluded plugins/* and only re-included limbo/shared, so the lobby Dockerfile's COPY plugins/paper landed empty; and the plugin stage used eclipse-temurin:21-jdk, which ships no gradle (and the tree vendors no wrapper), failing with 'gradle: not found'. Re-include plugins/paper and build the paper plugin on gradle:8.14-jdk21, matching the limbo image. Verified: both images build and boot (limbo /healthz 200 on 25565; lobby reaches 'Done' with felis-paper enabled).
deploy/limbo assembles LOOHP/Limbo from its loose CI artifacts plus the felis-limbo plugin (and the shared link core), with an entrypoint that pins server-port to the operator's GamePort (25565) on every start. deploy/lobby carries the Paper + felis-paper hub image. .dockerignore re-includes plugins/limbo and plugins/shared so the plugin image build sees them.
The login limbo now performs the onboarding inside Limbo: on join it checks the collision blacklist, mints a bind code, opens a book linking the player to console.<root_domain> (guiding them to the system browser), polls link-status, and transfers to the lobby via BungeeCord Connect — fail-closed on blacklist, mint/transport error, or window elapse. FelisApiClient gains linkStatus/isBlacklisted on the existing internal transport.
WebAuthn is unusable inside the WeChat/QQ in-app WebViews, so a document navigation carrying those UAs is served a bilingual 'open in your system browser' interstitial instead of the passkey-centric SPA. API/config/health/asset requests pass through, and an ack cookie (ua_ack) lets a determined user or false-positive continue. Backend-only; the SPA is untouched.
setup builds the always-on, reaper-exempt login/lobby MinecraftServers (create-if-absent), bakes the login limbo's non-secret config (internal API URL, root domain, lobby name) into spec.env, and replicates the felis-service-token Secret from the control namespace into the minecraft namespace so the operator's namespace-local secretKeyRef on the login pod resolves.
InternalAPIBaseURL builds the felis-api internal-face DNS from SAAPI and the internal port for cross-namespace callers (the login limbo). The service-token Secret name/key now reference the shared naming constants so the Deployment wiring and the operator's login-pod injection cannot drift.
buildStatefulSet gates readiness on an HTTP probe when HealthHTTPPort is set (exposing it as a named container port). buildEnv injects FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN into the login server only — keyed off the reserved name so it can never leak into a user pod — sourced from a Secret via secretKeyRef, never inlined into the CRD.
StartupSpec.HealthHTTPPort/Path switch pod readiness from plain-TCP to an HTTP GET for RCON-less loaders (LOOHP/Limbo) that report 'started' only after the first tick. User servers now default FallbackServer to the login gate, never the lobby, so a stopped/starting backend keeps authentication in front of a fresh connection.
SystemLoginServer/SystemLobbyServer plus ValidateSystemServerName (format rule without the reservation check) let the platform provision the reserved login/lobby names users can never claim. ServiceTokenSecretName/Key are the one source of truth for the internal-API credential Secret, shared by the platform renderer and the operator's login-pod injection.
setup provisions the always-on login/lobby system services only when these image refs are set; empty means skip-and-say-so (the same fail-loud stance manifests takes), since no official LOOHP/Limbo image exists and a deployment must build its own.
handleChangePassword revoked other sessions but never cleared webauthn_credentials, and enrollment needs no step-up. A passkey planted through a transiently-hijacked session needs no password, so it survived the reset + session-revoke as a standing login foothold. Add DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser and call it in the change-password remediation so every passkey is unbound alongside the session revoke. Removing zero rows is a successful no-op. Email-OTP remains the fallback factor, so this never locks anyone out; the user re-enrolls a passkey afterward if they want one.
Enrollment set no AuthenticatorSelection, so user verification defaulted to preferred (not enforced), and the UV/backup flags the ceremony reported were discarded. Set UserVerification=required so a bound passkey always proves possession AND user (a UV-incapable device falls back to email-OTP), and capture user_verified/backup_eligible/backup_state through VerifiedCredential -> PasskeyCredential -> webauthn_credentials (migration 0009) so a future login path can enforce UV per credential. Adds a negative test proving a presence-only authenticator is rejected, and asserts the roundtrip records UV=true.
webauthn_credentials.user_id and webauthn_challenges.user_id referenced users(id) with the default ON DELETE NO ACTION, so a future user-delete would either fail or leave orphaned auth material. Recreate both FKs ON DELETE CASCADE: a bound passkey and a pending challenge are ephemeral and must not outlive the account. Scoped to the passkey tables only, not blanket, so retention-bearing child data (world_backups) is not swept away with an account.
The supersede DELETE in CreatePasskeyChallenge filtered consumed_at IS NULL, so it only reaped the prior LIVE challenge; the row that each finish stamps consumed_at on was left behind. A begin->finish loop therefore accumulated one dead row per cycle, unbounded. Drop the consumed_at clause so a fresh begin reaps ALL prior rows for (user, purpose), bounding the table at one row per (user, purpose) with zero net growth per cycle. Deleting an already-consumed row is safe: it has been redeemed and nothing reads it. The fake mirrors the widened supersede.
handlePasskeyRegisterFinish logged an empty target for account.passkey.registered, while the delete half logs the credential id. An operator auditing the log could see that a passkey was bound but not which one. Pass cred.ID as the audit target so bind and unbind are symmetric, and tighten the enrollment test to assert both halves name the credential id.
The MyServers query lists both a user's own servers and unclaimed (owner_id IS NULL) servers, but computed owned as s.owner_id = $1. For an ownerless row that comparison is SQL NULL, which fails to scan into the Go bool and 500s the whole listing. Wrap it in COALESCE(..., false) so an ownerless row reports owned=false while still surfacing as claimable.
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