login/lobby carry reserved names, so every per-server route rejects them —
yet the cockpit offered claim/stop/wake and a console link on their rows,
each answering 400 bad_name. The fleet view now marks them (system:true,
shared naming.IsSystemServer) and the panel renders a plain label instead
of dead actions.
Two defects in the §9.3 quota path, both invisible to the hermetic suite:
- Audit #4's TOCTOU was real and documented: QuotaCheck and ClaimServer were
separate statements, so two concurrent claims by one user for two different
ownerless servers both read count < max_servers and both won. The gate now
lives inside ClaimServer, in the SAME transaction as the ownership write,
under pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(user_id)) — the aggregate read, the
four-dimension re-check (shared with QuotaCheck via one helper so the two
cannot drift), and the UPDATE are one serialized decision. The loser gets
ErrQuotaExceeded, which both claim handlers map to the same 403 the
sequential path gives; the server row is additionally taken FOR UPDATE so
same-server races still resolve to exactly one winner.
- The server PATCH path called UpdateServerResources(..., 0) for storage even
though a resources patch cannot change storage. The cached columns are the
ONLY input to the quota aggregate, so every resource patch silently dropped
that server's storage contribution from its owner's cap. The handler now
reads the current spec and passes storage through.
Red-then-green: the new pgint test drives two real concurrent claims against
max_servers=1 (before: both win; now: exactly one win + one gated 403, and the
DB shows one owned row); the hermetic suite pins the 403 mapping and the
storage-preserving cache write.
Nine files had drifted from gofmt and nothing checked; nine staticcheck
findings were live (three dead symbols, capitalization, a redundant
Sprintf, two literal-to-conversion sites, a nil test context). Fix all
of them and make CI fail on unformatted Go so this cannot re-drift.
Four messages that reach an operator or an API client cited sections
of a specification nobody outside the project can read:
- the unimplemented archive store error from config load
- the running-server cap refusal, from both the user wake and the
internal wake
- the missing memory ceiling guard, in the API and in felis apply
The references are gone and the wording is otherwise unchanged. Each
message still says what went wrong and, where there is one, what to
do about it. The test for the archive store message checks for the
tarLocal remediation, which is still there.
Remove password authentication everywhere; the only session doors are
passkey (WebAuthn), email OTP, in-game bind codes, QR scan-login, and
op-login vouching. Remediates the 33-finding cross-check review across
backend, CLI, panel, plugins, and docs.
Backend/CLI:
- Drop password routes and fields from account/user/onboard/auth
handlers; align tests (new account subtests, naming reserves
"console", op-login/onboard/qr-login test updates).
- Add migrations 0016_op_login.sql and 0017_drop_password.sql.
- Thread panel/admin hostnames from hostcfg through api.go,
setup_panel.go, tui_root.go and tui_preflight.go instead of
hardcoding; bootstrap.sh writes panel-hostname/admin-hostname
into felis.toml.
- Reword breakglass and TUI copy for passwordless flows.
Panel:
- Delete the ChangePassword page and all password UI; align
login/auth/api/types with the passwordless contract; add the
migration and op-login approval flows.
- i18n: convert ImageBuildPage durations/status badges and
ServerLuckPerms strings to translation keys; drop 72 orphan keys
per locale; unify the title as "Felis - Console".
Plugins (all six rebuilt):
- Velocity waiting router returns 503 at_capacity during wake;
MOTD/control-channel copy and config comments.
- Paper zh menu title; Limbo bind-code TTL 600s with panel_url
preference; unified /link lines in fabric/forge/neoforge; shared
link-client javadoc contract fixes.
Docs: openapi.yaml, sequence-diagrams.md, deploy/limbo/README.md and
plugins/README.md aligned with the implementation.
BREAKING CHANGE: migration 0017 irreversibly drops
users.password_hash and users.must_change_password; password login
cannot be restored after migrating.
Add per-user resource quota enforcement across all four dimensions:
max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, and max_storage_gb.
- Migration 0013: add cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb, cached_storage_mb
columns to servers table for pure-SQL per-owner aggregation
- SeedServer now writes resource cache alongside server row
- QuotaCheck replaces QuotaAvailable at claim time, checking all four caps
against the owning user's cumulative usage
- handlePatchServer checks owner's quota before allowing memory/resource
changes on owned servers; unowned servers skip the gate
- handleInternalClaim mirrors the full quota check
- UpdateServerResources keeps the cache in sync after spec mutations
- Reaper zeros resource cache on ReleaseWorld so released resources
are not counted against a former owner
- quantityToMilli/quantityToMB helpers convert K8s quantities to
quota-comparable integers
19 test packages pass.
Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
QuotaAvailable and ClaimServer run as two separate statements, so the
count read is not serialized against a concurrent claim's UPDATE: two
claims by one user for two different ownerless servers can both pass the
gate and both succeed, leaving the user one server over quota. It is low
severity — quota over-provisioning under a deliberate burst, not an
authorization, ownership, or isolation break, since each server is still
claimed atomically via UPDATE ... WHERE owner_id IS NULL.
Closing it requires Postgres transaction semantics (advisory-xact-lock on
the user, or SERIALIZABLE with retry) folding the gate into a single repo
method — verifiable only against a real Postgres, not the hermetic
fakeRepo suite. Documented at QuotaAvailable with back-references from the
two claim gates (handleClaim and the internal UUID claim) rather than
patched blind.
A wake refused by the §9.1 running-server cap returns 503, but the
per-server cooldown was recorded before the cap check ran. A player
held because the cluster was momentarily full would then also have to
wait out the wake cooldown once a slot freed, even though their refused
wake never actually flipped desiredState.
Split cooldownLimiter.allow into allowed (peek, no record) and record
(commit). Both wake paths now consult allowed for the 429, then call
record only after SetDesiredState succeeds — so neither a 503
at_capacity nor a SetDesiredState error consumes the cooldown. The
split is safe against the running cap, which counts CRD truth via
ListServers and is independent of the limiter.
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
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