e521cf5976224589ad3e1b76a21e5fa7c7a4d805
214
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 flyemoji
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5d4f3063a9 |
feat(operator): make any Paper image joinable behind the forwarding proxy
Velocity modern forwarding is proxy-WIDE. A backend that cannot verify the signed handshake does not degrade -- it rejects every login the proxy forwards. Until now the only backends that could verify it were the two images Felis builds itself (deploy/limbo, deploy/lobby), which read FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET in their own entrypoints. An arbitrary Paper image a user brings does not, so it passed admission, started, reported Ready, and was UNJOINABLE. The platform's answer was to recommend the lobby image as a base for a user's own world (0018_recommended_images.sql), which was never a good base -- it carries the /menu plugin whose job is to TRANSFER a joining player away, the exact opposite of a server you mean to stay on. The fix configures forwarding from OUTSIDE the image instead of requiring it inside. The operator now injects a root `felis init-forwarding` initContainer into every user server; it writes the proxies.velocity block into config/paper-global.yml and forces online-mode=false in server.properties on the /data PVC before the main container starts. The image needs no forwarding logic of its own, so the joinable set stops being "images that self-configure forwarding" and becomes every Paper-family image the platform runs. buildStatefulSet gates the injection on the ABSENCE of the system-role label: the Felis-built system servers already consume the secret in their entrypoints and the login gate is a limbo, not Paper. It is also gated on a non-empty felis image name -- the operator Deployment passes its own image as FELIS_IMAGE, and an operator without it skips the injection rather than failing, because a cluster whose proxy is not in modern mode has nothing to configure. The init runs as root deliberately. The world volume's ownership comes from the storage provisioner and the main container runs as whatever UID its image declares, so root is the only UID that can reliably write these files; it then chmods them 0666/0777 so that non-root main container can rewrite them on boot. The privilege is bounded -- the init exits before the server container starts and the server container keeps its own UID. The alternative, an fsGroup on the pod, is noted in the code as the upgrade path if the init ever stops running as root. The writer merges rather than overwrites, both because Paper expands paper-global.yml to its full default tree on first boot and because the panel file editor may edit either file between boots. It sets proxies.velocity.* and the single online-mode key and leaves every other setting alone. It is a no-op on an empty secret, for the same reason the env var is optional: a proxy that is not in modern mode provisions no Secret, and wedging every server's init on a missing optional value would be worse than the status quo. felis-paper (deploy/paper) is the platform's plain-Paper expression of that base and 0019 seeds it recommended: same PAPER_JAR_URL the lobby build already resolves, no /menu plugin, no forwarding gate, and a correctly-escaped RCON channel so the console, the online-player list and permission commands work out of the box. 0018's row is left in place -- an admin who kept it can keep it; this only adds the better default beside it. Three fixes ride along, each of which the 1.8 path hit in practice. bootstrap pins ViaVersion's serverside-blockconnections off. ConnectionData.init() only builds its block-connection provider when Via's lowest supported protocol is below 1.13; under modern forwarding the Velocity injector reports 393, so init() returns early, blockConnectionProvider stays null, and the first 1.12.2->1.13 chunk rewrite dereferences it -- a 1.8 client takes an NPE on the first chunk it is sent and never finishes joining. Every call site is behind isServersideBlockConnections(), so switching it off skips all of them, at a cosmetic pre-1.13 cost: fences and glass panes stop drawing connected. ViaVersion ships the option ON, so a fresh install shipped that NPE. Seeding a file with this one key suffices -- Config#loadConfig parses the bundled default as the base map and merges the on-disk file over it, so every other option stays current across version bumps. The absence of "Loading block connection mappings" in the log is NOT evidence this worked: init() gates on the protocol version too, and that half fails on its own, so the line is missing either way. The config value is the only evidence, which is what the test asserts. The Velocity unit gains -Dfelis.legacy-forwarding.servers=legacy18. A protocol-47 backend sits behind ViaVersion, which strips modern forwarding's login-plugin-message when it down-translates the proxy->backend pipeline to 47 -- the packet is registered from 1.13 and has nowhere to go. Only the handshake address field survives Via, so the Felis fork forwards the named servers BungeeCord-style while every other backend keeps modern+secret untouched. v1 hardcodes the one legacy backend; rendering the list from the MinecraftServer CRs is the upgrade path. deploy/lobby's set_prop escapes the value before substituting it. The RCON password is operator-provisioned arbitrary bytes, and a '|', '\' or '&' in one corrupts a bare `sed s|...|...|` and silently kills the key -- taking the console, the online-player list and permission commands with it. deploy/paper was written with the escaping, so the lobby gets the same rather than leaving the sibling caller broken. Verified: the full Go suite passes on Windows and on Fedora 44 (go1.26.4), where TestWriteForwardingFileModes actually runs its POSIX mode assertions instead of skipping. The new tests cover the initContainer's image, root UID, world mount and secret env; the merge preserving unrelated config trees; the properties upsert including the commented-key case; and the bootstrap script both writing the Via key and still calling the function that writes it. Not verified: the initContainer has never run in a real cluster, and the felis-paper image is code-only here as the other game-stack images are -- no Go CI builds them. The ViaVersion pin is the one piece with live evidence, and that evidence is what it was written from. Before it, a client was cut within a second of "logged in with entity id" on legacy18 while the proxy logged the NPE above -- REMAP OF LEVEL_CHUNK chained into Protocol1_8To1_9's MAP_BULK_CHUNK. It was applied by hand to the running proxy on 2026-07-24 at 14:47 and only then written back into bootstrap. At 14:48:14 the same player joined real Paper 1.8.8 through the fork, issued commands, approved an op-login from in-game at 14:50:39, and held the connection until 15:30:09 -- 42 minutes. Neither session says which client version it was. The proxy never logged a protocol number. It bounds above at 1.16.4, from the viabackwards "(1.17->1.16.4) ... for 1.16 players and below" warning that fired for that player on the lobby leg, and no lower -- Via floors every handshake to the proxy's 393, so anything from 47 up is admissible. Reading Protocol1_8To1_9 in the stack as a client-version tell is backwards: that chain runs on the BACKEND leg, up-translating the 47 server's chunks to the floor. What the NPE proves is that the pin was load-bearing, not who was holding the mouse. That is one hand-run session on one host, and it is not a cell. The 393->47 leg has one now, in Felis-Legacy -- FL-009 puts a genuine protocol-47 client on a stock Paper 1.8.8 behind this proxy and flips this same option: on it, cut 0.2s after JoinGame with the fault above; off, holds. No automated test in THIS repository exercises the leg. |
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flyemoji
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37ab87f07c |
docs(mail): say plainly what a green SMTP self-test does not prove
The Ping comment claimed the self-test could not produce a false negative and left the impression it therefore proved deliverability. It does not, and the distinction is the whole trap: a relay that gates sender identity at end-of-DATA gates it on the way OUT. Fastmail answers 250 for [email protected] addressed to the account's own mailbox and 551 5.7.1 "Not authorised to send from this header address" for that same From addressed to anyone else — and only the account's exact authorized identity passes the second one, another local-part on the same domain is refused too. So a green Ping means connect, TLS, AUTH and message shape are good, and nothing more; the operator still has to have authorized From as a sending identity with their provider, and the first real OTP is what proves they did. Addressing the self-test somewhere external would not fix it either — the only mailbox an operator can reliably check is usually inside the same account — so the honest move is to scope the claim rather than buy false confidence with a bigger probe. |
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flyemoji
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a8c4077202 |
fix(api): log the panic value and stack behind the opaque 500
withRecover turned a panicking handler into a 500 envelope and threw the panic away. The client is meant to get an opaque "internal error" — that part is right — but nothing was written server-side, so a recovered panic was an untraceable 500: an operator holding "internal error" has no message, no stack and no request to grep for, and diagnosis degrades into guessing against a live install. That is what it cost during the email-OTP report. The panic value, a stack and the method+path are now logged first, keyed by the same request_id writeError already stamps on unmapped errors, so the client envelope and the server log can be joined. The test pins all three markers plus the unchanged 500/"panic" response, because a silent recover looks exactly like a working one from the outside. |
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flyemoji
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c4c964578e |
fix(setup): stop the forced-onboarding gate trapping players who have no email
setup_required is what the SPA polls to decide whether the onboarding wall is still owed, and it disagreed with the middleware that actually enforces the wall. requireOnboarded lifts on a verified email OR an enrolled passkey; setup_required answered `u.Email == "" || !hasPasskey`. A console-tier player joins through the bind-code door with no email at all — by design, there is no SMTP at that point — so the email term never clears and the SPA keeps them on the setup screen forever, even after they enroll the passkey that already unlocked the API for them. The predicate now lives in one place (setupRequired) and both endpoints call it, so the next edit to the unlock condition cannot drift them apart again. Keying it on EmailVerified rather than email presence is the deliberate part: presence is exactly the term that trapped the no-email player, and it was also wrong on its own terms — an unverified address is not an authentication factor, so it was never what the lockdown could safely lift on. Also lands the regression test for the mechanism behind the live claim-403 report: /me/servers answers 200 for a bind-onboarded player (which is why the dashboard renders the 认领 button at all) while claim, wake and status all answer 403 with code "setup_required" — i.e. the refusal comes from requireOnboarded before the handler, not from isOwnerOrAdmin inside it, which would have said "forbidden". Enrolling a passkey and changing nothing else lifts all three, which isolates the gate as the sole cause. The backend authz is correct; the button that leads a locked-down player into a 403 is the frontend's to hide. |
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flyemoji
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694e3cb800 |
feat(rcon): provision per-server RCON so the console, player list and permissions work
A server created through the panel never had RCON. CreateServer built a
MinecraftServerSpec without a Rcon block at all, so the field took its zero value
and every downstream consumer read Enabled=false. Nothing failed loudly: the
operator skips the probe when RCON is off and marks the server Ready on pod
readiness alone, so the panel showed "运行中" for a server the control plane could
not talk to. Everything that rides the write channel (spec §8 写=RCON) was dead —
the online-player list returned nothing because Status.Players is only ever
sampled by the probe, and console writes answered 503 ErrConsoleUnavailable
because internal/api/console.go refuses when Enabled is false.
The whole RCON machinery already existed — builders gate the service port,
container port, preStop save-and-stop hook and the RCON_* env on Spec.Rcon,
the reconciler probes and reports, console.go dials, the NetworkPolicy opens
25575 to {api, operator}. The only thing missing was that nobody ever turned it
on or created a password. This wires the three layers that were absent.
Provisioning lives in the operator, not in felis-api. felis-api holds secrets:get
and not create, and giving it create solely to mint a password it immediately
stops caring about (console.go re-reads the Secret at command time) would widen
the API's powers for nothing. The operator already reads every Secret in the
namespace, so adding create there grants no read it did not have. It also makes
provisioning declarative: a Secret deleted by hand comes back on the next pass, a
controller reference garbage-collects it with the server so no delete path has to
remember it, and a server that predates RCON only needs spec.rcon filled in for
the password to appear. The name comes from naming.RconSecretName so felis-api,
`felis setup` and the operator cannot drift apart on it.
RCON is enabled per system service rather than by default, because enabling it on
a backend that serves no RCON listener is destructive rather than merely useless:
the operator gates readiness on the probe, so such a server never leaves Starting
and is eventually marked Failed. The login limbo is exactly that backend
(LOOHP/Limbo has no RCON) and it is the front door, so it stays off; the lobby
runs Paper and is administered through the panel like any other server, so it is
on.
Paper only reads RCON settings from server.properties, so the operator's injected
RCON_PASSWORD did nothing on its own — felis-lobby's entrypoint now writes the
three keys on every boot. Rewriting them each time makes the copy in the world
volume derived state rather than the source of truth, so an owner who edits them
through the panel's file editor cannot lock the control plane out of their own
server. Without a password it sets enable-rcon=false and warns rather than
refusing to start: unlike the forwarding secret, a missing RCON password degrades
the server rather than making it unsafe.
That password landing in server.properties is a §286 exposure (RCON 密码绝不下发
前端), since server.properties is readable through the file editor. It is redacted
on read rather than the file being denied outright the way config/paper-global.yml
is: the forwarding secret is cluster-wide material that merely happens to sit in
the volume, whereas server.properties is the single most-edited config an owner
has, and hiding one line should not cost them MOTD, difficulty and view-distance.
The write path is deliberately left alone — the boot-time rewrite restores the
real value, which is what makes redacting rather than denying safe here.
Also guards idle auto-stop on Rcon.Enabled. Status.Players is only meaningful
when the probe ran; with RCON off it keeps its zero value, which that branch would
have read as "empty" and used to stop a server full of people. AutoStopEnabled is
not currently settable through any path, so this is a latent footgun rather than a
live bug, but it is one line and the alternative is discovering it in production.
Checks: the operator provisions a missing Secret with a 32-hex-char password and a
controller reference, and does not rotate an existing one; idle auto-stop stays
inert without RCON; the editor redacts rcon.password from the world root's
server.properties while leaving the rest of the file (and a plugin's own nested
copy) intact; login has RCON off and lobby has it on with the shared secret name;
CreateServer sets the block. That last one departs from K8sCluster being
integration-tested against a live cluster: this defect was a struct literal
missing a field, it shipped, and a fake client is enough to pin a struct literal.
Existing servers are NOT migrated by this change — CreateServer only covers new
ones and ensureSystemServers is create-if-absent, so a `felis setup` re-run will
not touch an existing lobby. A deployed install additionally needs the
felis-lobby image rebuilt and re-imported for the entrypoint change, and its pods
recreated, before the RCON keys reach server.properties.
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flyemoji
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b3989fa4af |
fix(mail): prove SMTP deliverability before saving, and stop losing the relay
A live install passed the SMTP setup screen and then failed every one-time
code with a bare `internal error`. Four separate defects had to line up for
that, and each is fixed here.
The relay was configured with `from = noreply@<domain-A>` on an account
authenticated as `<user>@<domain-B>`. Providers that validate sender identity
— Fastmail among them — answer MAIL FROM with an unconditional 250 and only
refuse at end-of-DATA. Ping stopped at NOOP, so it never saw the refusal: the
wizard reported success, wrote the config, rolled felis-api, and every OTP
afterwards died at w.Close().
Ping now runs the same transaction a real code takes — connect, (STARTTLS,)
AUTH, MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA — delivering one self-test message to the From
address, and SendOTP and Ping share deliver() so the check cannot drift from
the thing it checks. The self-test recipient cannot cause a false negative:
an authenticated submission relay accepts RCPT for any destination by
definition, while the sender identity it does validate is exactly what we
want tested. The setup screen now says a message will be sent, names the
address it went to, and warns that From must be an address the account is
allowed to send as.
A relay refusal also answered 500 `internal`, which reads as a broken panel
and sends the operator hunting through handler code instead of their [smtp]
block. It is now 502 `mail_undeliverable`, mapped inside deliverOTP so all
four doors that mail a code (onboarding, email login, op-login, migrate
step-up) answer alike. The relay's own text stays out of the response — it
can name the SMTP account, and these routes are reachable by any signed-in
player — and goes to the log instead.
writeError logged nothing when it collapsed an unmapped error to 500, so an
operator holding an `internal error` had nothing to grep for and diagnosis
degraded into guessing against a live install. It now logs the method, path,
wrapped chain and the same request_id the caller is shown.
Finally, write_felis_toml regenerated the config wholesale and never emitted
[smtp], so re-running the installer — the documented way to update felis-api —
silently erased a working relay and reverted OTP delivery to the no-Mailer
path, logging codes instead of sending them. It now carries the block forward,
cached on first read because the host toml is clobbered before the pod toml is
written. Same defect family as the root_domain loss fixed in
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flyemoji
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646d514a65 |
test(updates): pin the ordering of a dev build's own version stamp
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flyemoji
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c4300cb005 |
feat(updater): authenticate GitHub polling and track the real release repo
felis-api's coord was the placeholder "felis/felis", which resolves against nothing on real GitHub. It is now MliroLirrorsIngenuity/Felis — the same slug deploy/bootstrap.sh clones from — so update reporting for the control plane itself is live rather than parked. That repo is private today, so the github source gained an optional token, read from FELIS_GITHUB_TOKEN: the variable bootstrap already needs, so an operator sets one value once. It comes from the environment and is never compiled in. A constant would be committed to the very repository it protects, ship inside every felis binary where strings(1) recovers it, reach every node the image is imported onto, and need a rebuild and a redeploy to rotate. Empty stays the correct posture for the other tracked components — k3s and cloudflared are public — and an empty token sends no Authorization header at all rather than an empty one. GitHub answers 404, not 401 or 403, for a private repo the caller cannot see, so "no token" and "no stable release published yet" arrive as the same status. On an unauthenticated 404 the error now names both causes and the variable that fixes the actionable one. With a token already set that hint would be wrong, so it is suppressed. Tests pin both halves: the Bearer header is sent only when the token is set, and the diagnostic names the variable only when it is not. doc.go's CAVEATS bullet still described the coord as a placeholder and the component as "dark at runtime". Both were true only until this change; it now records the real condition, which is that the component resolves like the others but needs a credential while the repo is private. |
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flyemoji
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659c8e5e9f |
feat(bootstrap): install the published release build instead of compiling on the host
deploy/bootstrap.sh now resolves the newest published GitHub release, downloads
the binary CI built for that tag, and builds a thin image around it. Compiling
on the target host becomes the fallback and the opt-in, not the default.
The panel is not a separate artifact. The Dockerfile copies panel/dist into
internal/panel/static before the go build, so the control plane — panel and
backend — ships as ONE file. The release channel therefore downloads exactly
one asset, felis-linux-<arch>, and needs no registry, no Go toolchain and no
checkout on the host.
The Minecraft game stack (limbo, lobby, the Velocity plugin) is still always
built locally. game_stack_source now keys on HAVE_PREBUILT_BINARY — the same
flag build_image uses — so on any prebuilt path it unpacks the tar embedded in
that binary instead of trusting a checkout an earlier install left behind.
Trusting the checkout would build the plugin from an old commit against a
freshly downloaded control plane: a silent version skew across the plugin/API
boundary.
Channels:
(default) newest published release, downloaded
FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev clone main and compile
FELIS_REF=<ref> pins the tree, forces the source path
The download is best-effort. A tag whose assets are not uploaded yet, an
architecture with no published asset, or an asset that fails validation each
warn and fall back to compiling THE SAME TAG from source — never a different
commit.
The ref is resolved right after install_base, the first point curl exists and
well before docker and k3s, so a missing FELIS_GITHUB_TOKEN or an unpublished
release costs the operator seconds instead of a k3s install they then have to
unwind. It is skipped on exactly the paths that never consume the result: the
TUI, which rebuilds the binary it is already running, and FELIS_SKIP_FETCH,
which builds whatever is staged. Resolving anyway would set FELIS_VERSION to
the newest tag and stamp a staged tree as that release.
The asset is staged next to HOST_BIN rather than in TMPDIR. Validation EXECUTES
it, and /tmp is noexec on CIS-hardened images, where the exec dies 126, the
check reads it as a bad asset, and every such host silently falls back to the
full on-host compile this path exists to avoid. It also keeps a private-repo
artifact out of a world-readable 1777 directory.
git_auth, which supplies the token to git for a private-repo clone, passes an EMPTY
credential.helper before the inline one. credential.helper is multi-valued: a bare
`-c credential.helper=...` APPENDS to whatever the host has configured rather than
replacing it, and an empty value is git's documented list reset. Without it, on a host
with a persistent helper (Git for Windows ships `manager` at SYSTEM scope) two things
go wrong. Git runs `credential approve` automatically after a successful clone and
feeds every helper in the list, so a `store` helper writes the PAT to
~/.git-credentials in cleartext — the token outlives the install, in a file bootstrap
never created and never cleans up. And because the inline helper is LAST, a
pre-existing helper answers `fill` first, so a stale cached credential can win and the
clone authenticates as the wrong account — surfacing as exactly the 404-on-private-repo
the surrounding code works hard to explain. Reproduced both against a real clone, and
confirmed the reset closes both.
internal/panel parses the new stamp. The dev channel now emits "<tag>+g<sha>", which
matched neither describeSuffix ("-N-g<sha>") nor releaseTag, so a dev build fell through
to the default case and the version badge rendered the entire stamp as the release with
no commit. A devSuffix case handles it; the git-describe case stays for hand-rolled
`-ldflags "-X main.version=$(git describe)"` builds. Table test covers both forms plus
the release, dirty and unstamped cases.
CRD application no longer branches on the install path: it is always
`felis bootstrap-assets crd`. That output is byte-identical to deploy/crd/ —
bootstrap_asset.go embeds that very file — and needs no checkout, so one source
replaces a branch whose two arms had to be kept in agreement by hand.
Dockerfile gains a FELIS_VERSION build arg wired into -X main.version, declared
after `go mod download` so a version bump does not invalidate that layer. Both
build stages are pinned to $BUILDPLATFORM so a multi-platform buildx run never
emulates them: the panel's output is architecture-independent and the Go stage
cross-compiles via TARGETARCH. The final stage stays on the target platform and
is COPY-only, which BuildKit performs without QEMU.
.github/workflows/release.yml publishes on a vX.Y.Z tag: vet, tests, then one
buildx run producing both architectures through the repo Dockerfile. Not a bare
`go build` — internal/panel/static holds a tracked placeholder index.html so the
//go:embed compiles without node, which means a direct build succeeds and
quietly ships a release whose panel is that placeholder.
The stamp is asserted end to end, because it fails silently: an unstamped binary
reports "dev", which the updater refuses to compare, disabling update reporting
for every install built from that release. The arm64 artifact is checked by ELF
machine type rather than by running it — runners have binfmt registered, so
executing an amd64 binary misnamed arm64 would succeed.
Prerelease tags are flagged explicitly. The trigger glob is v*, gh does not read
semver out of a tag name, and an RC published as a full release becomes
/releases/latest — the single endpoint the default channel installs from and
`felis update` polls.
No SHA256SUMS. A checksum fetched over the same TLS session, with the same
credential, from the same host as the binary adds no trust root; signing is the
real answer and is a separate decision.
Not verified: the download -> validate -> image -> k3s path has never run on a
host against a real published release, because no tag exists yet. The shell
logic around it is verified out of tree; the network and exec behaviour is not.
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flyemoji
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fe4c92c1c5 |
feat(files): add the server file editor
Give an owner a way to repair the one failure no other endpoint covers: a
server that will not boot because a single line of server.properties or a
plugin's YAML is wrong. Until now that needed a human with cluster access.
felis-api cannot touch a world in-process — the world PVC is ReadWriteOnce
and its lifecycle belongs to the operator's StatefulSet — so the work runs
as a one-shot Job, and the server must be stopped first because a running
one holds the volume. That is the same constraint that shapes restore and
backup, and the handlers enforce the stopped gate the same way.
What is different is that the caller wants the OUTPUT, not just the side
effect. The Job prints its result to stdout and felis-api reads it back
through the pods/log subresource, which needs no permission felis-api does
not already hold: jobs:create, pods:list, pods/log:get. No pods/exec, no
pods/portforward, not even pods:get. The price is latency — every operation
is a Pod schedule — which is why this is a repair tool and not a file
manager.
Containment is structural, not textual. Every filesystem access goes through
os.Root, the stdlib's escape-proof directory handle, which resolves each
component against the open root descriptor and refuses "..", absolute paths,
and symlinks leading outside. The string-prefix check used elsewhere is not
reused here: it validates a path as text and then opens it as a path, and a
world directory holds attacker-influenced content, so a symlink swapped in
between those two steps is a live threat rather than a theoretical one.
os.Root has no such window because the check and the open are one operation.
The Job's isolation is a strict subset of a restore Pod's: the weak
felis-restore SA with its token auto-mount disabled, exactly one volume (the
world PVC, mounted read-only for list and read so two of the three
operations cannot mutate anything), no Secret, no ConfigMap, no database
URL, non-root with an fsGroup matching the operator's so a written file is
readable by the server that later mounts it, and backoffLimit 0 so a failed
write is never silently retried as a second write.
Two limits on the surface are worth stating plainly, because the mount is
the server's whole working directory rather than a config subtree:
* A write accepts arbitrary bytes at any path, so an owner can place a
loadable plugin jar. This is deliberate — it is what a hosting panel's
file manager does, scoped to a server the caller already owns and
already drives through /command — but it is the one owner-tier route
that lands executable code in a backend pod, since images are
admin-only and modpack submissions need an admin verdict.
* config/paper-global.yml is refused on read. felis-lobby's entrypoint
writes FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET into it on every boot, and that value is
identical on every backend, so reading it from a server you own would
hand you the handshake key for everyone else's. It is the only path in
the mount that is not the caller's own data, and therefore the only
denial. The comparison is on the cleaned path, or ./config/... would
walk straight through it.
Writing that file is still allowed: it leaks nothing, and the entrypoint
rewrites it whole on every boot regardless.
The write body's content field is a *[]byte rather than a []byte for the
reason permissionRequest.Value is a *bool — a plain slice makes absent,
null, and empty indistinguishable, so a body of {} would decode to nil and
truncate the target to zero bytes while answering 200, destroying the very
config the caller opened the editor to repair.
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flyemoji
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05cb8f6320 |
feat(cli): report component updates and make the router a data table
Add `felis update`, which reports which platform components have newer versions available, and route `felis version`, which shipped implemented but unreachable. That bug is why the subcommand router is now a map rather than a switch. cmdVersion existed with nothing dispatching to it and no usage line, so `felis version` fell through to "unknown command" and no test noticed — a switch offers no way to enumerate what it routes, so the usage text and the router could not be compared. As data, they can: a test now walks the Commands: block and the table in both directions, failing an entry added to one without the other. bootstrap-assets stays deliberately undocumented and is listed as such, which makes its absence a decision rather than an oversight. The host gatherer answers the two seams NewSysGatherer leaves nil, for the one caller that can satisfy them without a cluster client. felis-api is answered from the running binary's own build stamp rather than the Deployment's image tag: deploy/bootstrap.sh builds the image from the same checkout it installs /usr/local/bin/felis from and stamps both with one git describe, so it is the same artifact, and it is the identity `felis version` reports. Reading the Deployment answers a slightly different question — what is rolled out — and stays the right seam for the in-cluster path. Velocity is read from the jar's own META-INF/MANIFEST.MF Implementation-Version, which is what the proxy reports about itself at runtime, because bootstrap installs the jar under a fixed name with no version in it. The filename extractor remains only as a fallback for a hand-placed velocity-3.5.1.jar. An unstamped local build reports "dev" and is refused with an actionable message rather than being treated as 0.0.0, which would make every release upstream look like an upgrade. The panel and the plugin jars have no version of their own on purpose: they are embedded in or built alongside the felis binary, so the felis version is theirs. |
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f36d5b87f6 |
feat(images): mark platform-curated images and seed the lobby
The create-server form has no way to tell a user which of the whitelisted images is a sensible starting point. Add 'recommended' as a third image_whitelist.source alongside 'built' and 'external', and seed it with the one image that has earned it. The marker is presentation only. ImageAdmitted still turns solely on enabled, so a recommended row is admitted by exactly the rule that governs every other row and carries no extra privilege; a test pins both halves, because the failure modes are silent and opposite — make admission source-aware and the curated images vanish from the form, or let curation bypass the disable switch and an admin who pulled an image finds it still creatable. Only one image is seeded, and the restraint is the point. Velocity runs proxy-wide modern forwarding, so a backend that cannot verify the signed handshake rejects every login the proxy sends it. The operator injects FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET into every backend but cannot make an image consume it. An arbitrary public Minecraft image therefore passes admission, builds, schedules, reports Ready — and then refuses every join, with nothing in the server's status explaining why. Exactly two images read that variable, deploy/limbo and deploy/lobby; limbo is the login gate and is nonsense as a base for a user's server, which leaves lobby. The list grows when Felis ships another forwarding-aware image, not before. AdmitBuiltImage now preserves a 'recommended' source through its ON CONFLICT path. Rebuilding a curated tag is the expected way to patch it, and that rebuild arrives through this exact path, so a blind SET source = 'built' would demote the curation on the first rebuild with nothing in the request saying so. AddExternalImage deliberately does not preserve it: an admin POSTing the ref is an explicit, named re-admission, and the 201 body reports the Image it constructed without re-reading the row, so a sticky source there would report a value the database does not hold. The migration is idempotent via ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, so an admin who disabled or re-pointed the row does not have that decision undone on the next apply. |
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d26acc20ae |
feat(api): let in-game staff manage any server without claiming it
The web face has always granted staff the run of the fleet (isOwnerOrAdmin passes an admin for stop/command/console/access on any node), but the internal face explicitly had "no admin tier": a linked administrator in game could only wake servers they owned or that autostartPolicy permitted. The only way to manage another player's (or an unclaimed) server from inside the game was to claim it — seizing ownership and burning the admin's own quota. Give authorizeWakeByUUID the admin tier on the same trust anchor the op-login approve already uses: verified online-mode UUID -> account link -> stored role. A linked staff member now wakes ANY node under any policy (so `/felis go` works fleet-wide without claiming); the owner bypass and the policy gates are unchanged, and an unlinked UUID still fails safe. Centralize the staff-role rule while at it: staffRole(role) in auth.go (admin, plus owner as its superset) now backs Principal.IsAdmin, the session ViaAdminAccess grading, the op-login approve gate and the new wake tier. That also fixes a real hole in the approve gate, which required role=admin exactly: an Owner manually promoted to role='owner' per migration 0011's upgrade note would have been refused by their own in-game approval door. The lobby menu still renders "Claim & Start" on ownerless tiles — claiming becomes optional for staff rather than the only entry — so the velocity plugin needs no change. |
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f0b79e9edd |
feat(mail): deliver email one-time codes over SMTP and add the setup email screen
Felis never actually sent mail: OTP codes for onboarding, email login and
op-login were only written to the felis-api log behind a "demo has no SMTP"
limitation, and the Settings/SMTP flow those comments promised was never
built. Combined with the bootstrap Owner's address being recorded unverified
(
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7860152f57 |
feat(auth)!: go fully passwordless and fix cross-check review findings
Remove password authentication everywhere; the only session doors are passkey (WebAuthn), email OTP, in-game bind codes, QR scan-login, and op-login vouching. Remediates the 33-finding cross-check review across backend, CLI, panel, plugins, and docs. Backend/CLI: - Drop password routes and fields from account/user/onboard/auth handlers; align tests (new account subtests, naming reserves "console", op-login/onboard/qr-login test updates). - Add migrations 0016_op_login.sql and 0017_drop_password.sql. - Thread panel/admin hostnames from hostcfg through api.go, setup_panel.go, tui_root.go and tui_preflight.go instead of hardcoding; bootstrap.sh writes panel-hostname/admin-hostname into felis.toml. - Reword breakglass and TUI copy for passwordless flows. Panel: - Delete the ChangePassword page and all password UI; align login/auth/api/types with the passwordless contract; add the migration and op-login approval flows. - i18n: convert ImageBuildPage durations/status badges and ServerLuckPerms strings to translation keys; drop 72 orphan keys per locale; unify the title as "Felis - Console". Plugins (all six rebuilt): - Velocity waiting router returns 503 at_capacity during wake; MOTD/control-channel copy and config comments. - Paper zh menu title; Limbo bind-code TTL 600s with panel_url preference; unified /link lines in fabric/forge/neoforge; shared link-client javadoc contract fixes. Docs: openapi.yaml, sequence-diagrams.md, deploy/limbo/README.md and plugins/README.md aligned with the implementation. BREAKING CHANGE: migration 0017 irreversibly drops users.password_hash and users.must_change_password; password login cannot be restored after migrating. |
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87279a1366 |
fix(setup): record email unverified so onboarding works without SMTP
At bootstrap there is no SMTP, so the old /setup flow was unreachable: it requested an emailed OTP that could never arrive. Setup now records the Owner's email address unverified (no OTP round-trip) and requires a passkey, deferring SMTP configuration to a later Settings page. Setup completes on email-recorded + passkey-enrolled, and the lockdown lifts on the passkey, not on email_verified: a passkey is the Owner's only pre-SMTP login credential (email-OTP login refuses admin accounts). The record-email endpoint (POST /account/email) now clears email_verified in the same write. Only VerifyEmailOTP, which proves control of the address, may set that flag; recording a fresh unproven address must never leave a stale email_verified=true asserting a proof the user never gave. The change strictly tightens the invariant, so no existing reader breaks. Remove the dead ErrEmailTaken path and its documented 409: no migration puts a unique index on users.email and the codebase does not enforce email uniqueness, so the unique-violation branch was unreachable and the 409 an impossible response. The /setup route (Setup.tsx, setEmail helper, setup i18n copy) is rewritten to match: record-email, mandatory passkey, no skip-for-now. The SMTP settings page and post-setup configure-SMTP nudge are deferred. |
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93190e7a5b |
fix(cfsetup): regenerate missing tunnel credentials on re-bootstrap
cloudflared writes the tunnel credentials JSON only at `tunnel create`. An idempotent re-run against a tunnel that already exists — or a reset + re-bootstrap where the old box's ~/.cloudflared was wiped but the Cloudflare-side tunnel survived — finds no local credentials file, and the connector crash-loops with "Tunnel credentials file doesn't exist". A tunnel that never comes up leaves op.console unreachable, so the one-time setup link minted just before it ages out (30-min TTL) unredeemed. CreateTunnel now resolves the tunnel id on both paths (fresh create and already-exists) and routes through ensureCredentials, which re-fetches the token with `cloudflared tunnel token --cred-file` (authenticating via cert.pem, preserving the same id / DNS / Access) when the file is absent. The secret is written to the file, not stdout, and the file is chmod 0600 so it is not left world-readable next to cert.pem. The self-heal is unconditional on re-bootstrap: Setup gates on Pre.check() (cert.pem present) before CreateTunnel, so the token re-fetch always has its cert.pem authority. |
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60732a6283 |
feat(operator): gate op.console to staff and land owner setup there
The operator console (op.console.<root>) requires internal permission verification on top of Zero-Trust: a passkey is not access. requireExternal now refuses any non-admin principal arriving on the admin host, before any handler, so op.console is staff-only at the door rather than per-route — including on the passwordless demo face where Cloudflare Access is not in front. The gate is inert on the player console (console.<root>). Owner first-run setup is staff onboarding, so `felis setup` mints the one-time setup URL on op.console.<root>/setup (was console.<root>). The passkey verifier lists both console and op.console in RPOrigins so the one-time binding asserts on either face under the shared console.<root> RP-ID. Session admin-access now includes role=owner, not only admin: the owner is a superset of admin, so excluding it left IsOwner() unreachable through a passwordless session. No path assigns role=owner yet — this is forward consistency. The bootstrap summary now names console.<root> the player panel and op.console.<root> the operator console where the Owner runs setup, fixing text that told operators not to run setup there. Tests: op.console door gate (non-admin refused, player console unaffected, admin passes) and owner session admin-access; the setup-bind default-host test follows the move to op.console. |
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9ea35304e3 |
fix(setup): source the console host from the panel hostname, not op.console
The owner setup URL and the limbo login link were built from the admin host (op.console.<root>, with an op.console.localhost fallback) and a hardcoded console.<root>, so an operator who set a custom panel_hostname got an unreachable setup link and a wrong login target. Thread the resolved panel host (defaultPanelHostname) through performSetupMCBind, the MC-bind TUI, and the login system-server env (new FELIS_PANEL_HOSTNAME); the limbo plugin prefers it and keeps console.<root> only as the fallback for an older operator whose env predates it. This also matters for security: the only wired WebAuthn verifier is scoped to the panel host, so passkey enrollment must land on the panel face, never op.console. While here, the limbo login handler checks link status before minting a bind code: an already-linked player is sent straight to the lobby instead of being shown a useless code. |
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b5cd4501e5 |
fix(passkey): serve flat WebAuthn options to register and username login
go-webauthn marshals CredentialCreation/CredentialAssertion as {"publicKey": {...}},
but the panel's register (Account.tsx) and username-first login (Login.tsx) read the
options flat (options.challenge, options.user.id), so base64urlToBytes(undefined) threw
"Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'replace')" and neither ceremony could
start. Strip the envelope in the register-begin and username-login-begin handlers via a
small unwrapPublicKey helper; discoverable login keeps the envelope because it reads
options.publicKey.* plus a top-level options.login_id. The begin tests now feed a wrapped
body and assert the handlers return it flat, so they genuinely exercise the unwrap.
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dab8fc214b | feat(setup): bind owner through login gate | ||
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5dc8eb92a8 | feat(operator): secure system server workloads | ||
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fd062882ed |
feat(nano): give a Mojang player's name back to them, by prefixing the squatter
A premium player and a third-party player sharing a username could not both be online. Whichever logged in second was kicked with "You are already connected to this proxy!" -- even though the UUID rewrite had already made them two distinct players on the backend. Velocity's player registry is keyed on the NAME (lowercased), not the UUID, so two identities holding one name are one player as far as the proxy is concerned, and the reclaim invariant the rewrite buys is invisible to it. The fix needs no plugin and no state, because Velocity honours the name in the hasJoined RESPONSE rather than pinning the one the client sent at login-start -- established by a real login, not by reading the source. So the multiplexer hands back a different name and the collision is simply gone. A third-party player whose name belongs to a Mojang account now joins as PREFIX_name (LS_steve). Everyone else keeps their own name: the rename fires only on an actual collision, decided by asking api.mojang.com whether the name is registered. The name's owner is never the one renamed, which is 正版优先 falling out for free -- the identity source is never rewritten, so there is no policy to encode and no 30-day hold to track. The premium-name answer is cached asymmetrically, because the two directions have very different costs. "Taken" is nearly permanent (Mojang does not recycle names) and is trusted for a day; "free" can stop being true the moment someone buys that name, and a stale "free" leaves a squatter holding a name its real owner has just bought, so it is trusted for ten minutes. A lookup that fails with nothing cached fails CLOSED -- assume premium, rename the third-party player: a Mojang outage must not become an opportunity to hold someone else's name, and being wrong that way costs a cosmetic prefix while being wrong the other way bounces the name's owner off the proxy. The lookup gets its own 2s client rather than sharing the 5s auth client, since it is a SECOND Mojang round-trip on a login that already spent one. prefix is a required, unique, 1-4 character config field rather than something derived from the tag, because it is player-visible and no derivation can know that "littleskin" is meant to read LS. Two sources sharing a prefix would rewrite their same-named players onto one name, so uniqueness is enforced case-insensitively -- the proxy folds case, and LS/ls would collide there while reading as distinct here. Also close a pre-existing hole on the path this touches: a third-party source's profile name was relayed verbatim, so a hostile or sloppy Yggdrasil root could put "§4admin", an empty string, or 200 characters straight into the proxy's player list. The name is now checked against the Minecraft username charset and a bad one is a 204, the same way a bad UUID already was. Verified end to end on the deploy host (Velocity 3.5.1 + Paper 26.2), both branches: premium FLYEMOJ1 -> 195fadbd-f72e-4b9b-9f8f-f92586fe16ad, name unchanged LittleSkin FLYEMOJ1 -> LS_FLYEMOJ1, f1b7b6ae-f250-348a-b069-a2ec0fcae668 both online at once, zero "already connected" rejections LittleSkin FelisNyaTest01 -> joins as FelisNyaTest01, no prefix, UUID still v3 The last line is the one that matters: an ordinary third-party player collides with nobody and keeps their name, while the rewrite that keeps identities apart still ran. Paper's "LS_FLYEMOJ1 (formerly known as li_FLYEMOJ1) joined the game" is the other half of it -- the rename moved the player's display name and their playerdata came along untouched, because every server-side key is the UUID and the UUID does not depend on the name. Known ceiling, left alone deliberately: two players of one source whose names agree on their first 16-len(prefix)-1 characters truncate onto the same in-game name, and a prefixed name may itself happen to be a premium name. Both cost an "already connected" bounce, not an identity -- the UUID rewrite does not depend on the name at all. BREAKING CHANGE: every [[auth_source]] now requires prefix = "XX" (1-4 letters or digits, unique across sources). An existing nano felis.toml without it fails to load with an error naming the field, rather than silently keeping the collision. |
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d177428fb0 |
feat(felis): add felis nano — Yggdrasil hasJoined multiplexer without a control plane
`felis nano` serves the vanilla sessionserver protocol (GET /session/minecraft/hasJoined) as a federating multiplexer over Mojang plus any number of third-party Yggdrasil roots, with no k3s, Postgres, or panel — a MultiLogin-style auth front-end delivered as a subcommand of the single felis binary rather than a separate build. - config.LoadNano reads only [[auth_source]] blocks; it skips the database.url / root_domain / archive requirements the full server needs. Zero sources is valid (Mojang-only). - Mojang is prepended in code (Identity:true), never from config, so it is always the sole identity root. Third-party profiles are rewritten to canonical = UUIDv3(felisAuthNS, tag+":"+nativeID). - validateAuthSources rejects unknown keys, duplicate tags, and scheme-less URLs — a malformed nano config fails loud at load. - Reuses api.HasJoinedHandler with a stub Repo (no blacklist backend); a rejected login is a 204, matching the vanilla sessionserver. - nano.go binds the -listen flag and ignores [server] listen in config. Verified on WSL (go1.26.4): go build/vet/test ./... green; a runtime smoke against the template config returns 204 on a miss and logs "Mojang + 0 third-party source(s)"; a duplicate-tag config exits non-zero citing "unique". |
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ecea20ee7c |
feat(nano): configure hasJoined auth sources via [[auth_source]], Mojang-anchored
Step 2 of Felis-nano: a [[auth_source]] array-of-tables (tag + full hasJoined url, config order = priority) supplies the multiplexer's third-party Yggdrasil roots; cmd/felis prepends Mojang as the sole code-owned identity anchor and wires them into API.AuthSources. With no sources configured the endpoint stays inert (204s), unchanged from step 1. The config deliberately has no identity/trusted field: Mojang is the only source whose self-asserted UUIDs are trusted verbatim, so no misconfiguration can reopen the impersonation hole the per-source UUID rewrite closes. An identity= key is an unknown key and Load rejects it. Validate adds two fail-fast guards: unique tags (namespace collision) and a scheme-qualified url (else the source is silently dead, never validating any login). |
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ff550c41ef | feat(nano): federating hasJoined multiplexer with per-source UUID namespacing | ||
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85b8a92a0e |
test(api): pin restore's owner gate against a superseded former owner
handleRestoreBackup's owner-or-admin gate was not pinned by any test: the former-owner gate backstopped every non-owner case the suite exercised, so a broken owner gate would not redden. Add the mirror of the former-owner test — a released former owner (still the backup's former_owner, no longer the current owner) must get 403 — the sole subtest that fails when the owner gate is disabled. Found by the round-2 backup/restore mutation audit; production code unchanged. |
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fc748d3462 |
feat(breakglass): add "back up a world now" console peer (§B4 Sync)
Adds a break-glass console operation that snapshots a stopped world by calling the felis-api internal face while the API is alive, rather than rendering the backup Job locally: the Job needs felis-api deployment coordinates the console does not hold. The peer resolves the felis-api-internal ClusterIP Service + service token from the control namespace, POSTs the internal backup endpoint with the operator os_user for audit attribution, and maps 409/503/404 to friendly outcome cards. Core decision logic lives in backupnow.go (unit-tested against a fake client + httptest); tui_backupnow.go is the untested bubbletea glue mirroring tui_halt.go. |
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2ba994889e |
fix(platform): front the felis-api internal face on its own ClusterIP Service
The login limbo pod dials FELIS_API_BASE_URL = felis-api.<ns>.svc:8081 (the internal face, service-token auth) to mint bind codes and poll link status, but the only Service named felis-api is the external NodePort face and declares only port 443. A Service answers only on its declared ports, so felis-api:8081 had no backend and every login-pod internal call silently failed to connect. Render a separate ClusterIP Service felis-api-internal for port 8081 and repoint InternalAPIBaseURL at it. A second port on the NodePort Service is not an option: Type=NodePort allocates a node port for every declared port with no per-port opt-out, so it would publish the no-Zero-Trust internal face on every node's external IP. A distinct ClusterIP Service keeps 8081 in-cluster only, reachable by the login pod via DNS and by the on-node break-glass console via the ClusterIP (exported as APIInternalServiceName / APIInternalPort). Manifest-level fix; the live packet path is pending real-cluster verification. |
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f2fc57cad9 |
feat(api): add internal-face break-glass world backup endpoint (§B4 Sync)
Add POST /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup so the on-node break-glass
console can snapshot a stopped world while felis-api is alive. It goes through
the API (not direct-to-CRD like halt) because rendering the backup Job needs
deployment coordinates (FELIS_IMAGE, FELIS_BACKUP_PVC) only felis-api holds.
Service-token auth (no Principal); the middleware IS the authorization, since
the operator already has root on the node. Refactor the RWO stopped-gate,
optional-Backuper 503, async hand-off and audit+202 into a shared enqueueBackup
tail so the external (owner/admin) and internal (break-glass) faces cannot
diverge on the security-critical stopped-gate. The internal audit is attributed
to break-glass/internal so a console-initiated backup is distinguishable from an
owner self-service one.
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7a7c0d53ab |
feat(api): add on-demand world backup endpoint and Job executor (§B4 Sync)
Add POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/backup: an owner or admin snapshots a
stopped server's world into the archive store on demand, recorded as a
first-class world_backups row (reason `manual`) — restorable by the
existing restore path and expired by the reaper's retention pass, so it
never leaks as an orphan archive. This is the break-glass "Sync" op,
resolved as immediate/on-demand backup.
felis-api cannot archive in-process (the world PVC is RWO, held by the
operator StatefulSet), so the work hands off to a one-shot Kubernetes Job
(new internal/backupjob) that mounts the world PVC read-only and the
backup PVC read-write, plus the felis config Secret so it self-records
its row atomically like the reaper. The Pod mirrors restore's weak-SA
isolation (SA token un-mounted, non-root, read-only rootfs, drop ALL);
the one reviewed departure is that config-Secret mount, frozen by
jobspec_test.go. Handler answers 202 backing_up; gated on the server
being Stopped (RWO world PVC), owner-or-admin, and FELIS_IMAGE +
FELIS_BACKUP_PVC being wired (else 503 backup_unavailable).
Each request mints a unique Job name (backup-<server>-<rand>) so a repeat
on-demand backup produces a fresh archive rather than colliding with a
just-finished Job still inside its TTL window and silently no-op'ing the
retry.
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fdb6efbd88 |
feat(account): migrate a live account's owned servers to a new account (§B3 inherit)
Old account runs /felis migrate in-game to open a migration, proves control via a fresh web step-up (passkey forced when enrolled, else email-OTP), names the target and mints a one-time code. The target redeems it while authenticated AS that target: in one transaction the source's owned servers re-point to the target and the source is retired (sessions revoked, disabled, soft-deleted), which also spends the code so it cannot be replayed. Only server ownership moves; the mc_uuid link and web credentials stay with the source, so migrate is not a credential-theft primitive. - 0015 migration: account_migrations state machine (initiated -> confirmed -> code_issued -> redeemed), one live migration per source - Repo/PGRepo: Start/ForSource/Confirm/IssueCode/Redeem - 8 routes (1 internal /felis side, 7 web) with openapi parity - passkey step-up runs the same clone-signal (sign-count) check as the login door - code bound to the named target at issue and at redeem Quota is grandfathered at redeem: no per-target quota re-check when servers move. |
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7becb38488 |
fix(api): implement /readyz with real DB + K8s API + CRD checks (§7)
Previously /readyz only verified Repo != nil && Cluster != nil — a process-liveness check, not a dependency-health check. The spec requires the readyz probe to verify DB, K8s API, and CRD informer are live before declaring the pod ready. - Repo interface gains Ping(context.Context) error - Cluster interface gains Ping(context.Context) error - PGRepo.Ping delegates to sql.DB.PingContext - K8sCluster.Ping lists MinecraftServer CRDs (Limit=1) in the configured namespace, exercising both the API and CRD informer - handleReadyz iterates ping checks; any failure returns 503 with the failing dependency name in the error message - fakeRepo and fakeCluster gain configurable pingErr for hermetic test coverage of the failure paths New test: TestReadyzPingsDependencies verifies 200 when healthy, 503 when DB or K8s API is down. |
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7f7e459746 |
fix(operator): enforce startup and readiness timeouts (§5, §8)
Previously a server whose pod was ready but RCON probe kept failing would stay in Starting phase forever. The CRD defines TimeoutSeconds and ReadinessTimeoutSeconds but the reconciler never checked them. - PodNotReady path: if the pod stays not-ready past timeoutSeconds (default 300s), transition to Failed - RCON unreachable path: if RCON stays unreachable past readinessTimeoutSeconds (default 300s), transition to Failed - Helper methods startupTimedOut/readinessTimedOut compare StartRequestedAt against the respective timeout, falling back to 300s defaults when unset - 2 new tests: ReadinessTimeoutConvertsToFailed, StartupTimeoutConvertsToFailed Fixes the scenario where a broken backend (bad jar, crash-looping process) would permanently occupy a Starting server slot. |
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9e1df12975 |
feat(passkey): advance sign_count, reject clone-warned assertions
Both login doors (username-first and discoverable) now run a shared applyAssertionCounter after a verified assertion. A signature-counter regression — go-webauthn's CloneWarning, the possible-cloned-authenticator signal — is refused fail-closed with the same opaque passkey_login_invalid envelope any other finish failure returns (no clone oracle to a prober) and audited distinctly as auth.passkey_clone_rejected under the resolved account. A clean assertion advances the stored sign_count to the asserted value and stamps last_used_at, before any session is minted. Counter-less/synced authenticators report 0 and never warn, so they pass through and simply re-stamp 0; the check gates only counter-keeping hardware authenticators, where a rollback is the meaningful signal. Email-OTP and username-first passkey remain fallbacks, so a rejected clone is never bricked. Adds Repo.AdvanceCredentialSignCount (pgrepo UPDATE by credential_id) and surfaces CloneWarning from the internal/passkey adapter's FinishLogin/FinishDiscoverableLogin. Proven by real-crypto adapter tests (a counter regression still verifies but flags CloneWarning), handler tests (advance-and-stamp on success, fail-closed on clone), and a symmetric test on each door so both call sites of the shared helper are covered. |
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0dbd557a7a |
fix(store): renumber discoverable-login migration 0013 -> 0014
A resource-cache migration (0013_resource_cache.sql) was merged onto main concurrently and also claimed version 0013. LoadMigrations rejects any duplicate migration version, so the app would refuse to boot with both files present. Renumber the discoverable-login migration to 0014. The two migrations touch disjoint objects (0013 ALTERs servers to add cached_* columns; this one CREATEs webauthn_discoverable_challenges), so their relative order does not matter, and the table name is unchanged -- no Go reference moves. Renaming a just-published migration is safe here because neither version has been applied to a persistent database yet: there is no schema_migrations row for version 13 to reconcile. This is a pre-application renumber, not a history rewrite of an already-applied migration. |
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154002edf3 |
docs(auth): cite MultiLogin reference for UUID-keyed reclaim split
Anchor the username-collision reclaim's UUID-keyed, proxy-detected design to the multi-Yggdrasil reference: CaaMoe/MultiLogin v6 binds identity as serviceId+online-UUID via "identity cards" that decouple the in-game name from online identity — keyed by UUID, never by name. Note that §B3's Mojang-priority reclaim goes beyond the common "protect the first-bound name" behavior by evicting a squatter once the genuine Mojang owner appears and stashing the squatter's data for the code-only inherit path. |
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ec468baef9 |
feat(auth): add discoverable (usernameless) passkey login
A from-zero login door: the browser calls navigator.credentials.get() with an empty allowCredentials, the authenticator returns an assertion carrying the resident credential's userHandle, and the server resolves the account from that handle alone — nothing is typed or client-named. Routes (both Public): POST /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/begin POST /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/finish Begin stashes the ceremony SessionData server-side keyed by an opaque login_id under a global cap; finish consumes it single-use, hands the authenticator-revealed userHandle to a UserByID resolver, and mints a session only for the account the assertion actually verified to. Every finish rejection — no live challenge, expired, bad assertion, unresolvable handle — collapses to one passkey_login_invalid envelope, so finish is never an existence/state oracle. SignCount is surfaced but not yet consumed, exactly as the username-first door, so the from-zero path offers no clone-detection bypass. The discoverable VERIFY path is Oracle-verified end to end against a virtual authenticator (internal/passkey): it resolves the account from the signed userHandle, fails closed when the handle names no account, and rejects an assertion signed by a credential not bound to the resolved user — the impersonation guard unique to usernameless login. Enrollment now requests a resident key (authenticatorSelection.residentKey=preferred), the only server-side half a unit test can pin. Whether an authenticator actually stores a resident key is a device property no test can reach, so this door is INERT for a credential until its owner enrolls a NEW passkey against these options; "preferred" (not "required") preserves the no-lockout fallback to username-first + email-OTP. |
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flyemoji
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7db57b9fff |
feat(updater): add VersionGatherer extraction core and CLI gather seam
Give the Runner a way to read each component's CURRENT version so it can be compared against the release sources already wired. Three pure extractors turn raw system text into an updates.Version, each fail-closed: - versionFromCLI — a `<tool> --version` banner (k3s, cloudflared) - versionFromImageRef — a container image tag (felis-api) - versionFromJarName — a proxy jar filename (velocity) sysGatherer routes each Topology component to the right extractor over an injected seam; every path is exercised with a fake runner, mirroring how the release sources are proven against httptest. The load-bearing case is k3s: its Git tag "v1.36.2+k3s1" parses stable, but a registry cannot store '+', so the same build ships as image tag "v1.36.2-k3s1", which parses as a prerelease unless repaired. versionFromImageRef normalizes "-k3sN"/"-rke2rN" back to "+", so an image read and a CLI read agree instead of the image masquerading as a prerelease and being barred from comparison. Honest runtime state after this slice — a green suite is not "the updater runs against real infra": only the CLI seam (execRunner) is wired, so of the four tracked components just cloudflared is live end to end (gatherable AND Scheduled/appliable). k3s is CLI-gatherable but Notify-only. felis-api and velocity are NOT yet runtime-gatherable: their producing seams — a k8s read of the control-plane Deployment image, and an off-cluster jar inspection — are left nil, so both surface an explicit "gather seam not wired" error rather than a wrong version. felis-api self-update is therefore not functional yet. Remaining integration (tracked in doc.go): the two producing seams, the concrete Notifier (SMTP + in-game), the Applier (image bump, cloudflared swap), the `felis update` CLI + CronJob entry point, and the runtime append of the Pinned Minecraft fleet. |
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Lemon-miaow
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e574749877 |
feat(api): enforce CPU/memory/storage quotas (spec §9.3, §22)
Add per-user resource quota enforcement across all four dimensions: max_servers, max_cpu_milli, max_memory_mb, and max_storage_gb. - Migration 0013: add cached_cpu_milli, cached_memory_mb, cached_storage_mb columns to servers table for pure-SQL per-owner aggregation - SeedServer now writes resource cache alongside server row - QuotaCheck replaces QuotaAvailable at claim time, checking all four caps against the owning user's cumulative usage - handlePatchServer checks owner's quota before allowing memory/resource changes on owned servers; unowned servers skip the gate - handleInternalClaim mirrors the full quota check - UpdateServerResources keeps the cache in sync after spec mutations - Reaper zeros resource cache on ReleaseWorld so released resources are not counted against a former owner - quantityToMilli/quantityToMB helpers convert K8s quantities to quota-comparable integers 19 test packages pass. |
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Lemon-miaow
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91bfa27e8c |
feat(operator): implement idle auto-stop (spec §8)
Adds empty-server auto-stop to the reconciler. When Idle.AutoStopEnabled is true and the RCON player tally is zero for EmptySecondsBeforeStop seconds, the operator flips desiredState to Stopped, which triggers the normal graceful-shutdown path. - Add EmptySince status field to track empty duration - Clear EmptySince on stop and when players return - Reuse existing RCON probe's player count (zero extra network cost) - 4 new test cases covering timestamp, timeout, player-join reset, and disabled-by-default |
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flyemoji
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7d27640c07 |
feat(updater): add GitHub Releases source and route felis-api/k3s/cloudflared
Give RoutingSource its second upstream so every non-pinned component now
resolves a real latest-stable: Velocity via PaperMC (already wired), and
felis-api, k3s and cloudflared via the GitHub REST API.
github.go queries /repos/{repo}/releases/latest (one request, rate-limit
friendly) and fails closed: a transport error, a non-200 status (404 = no
stable release), an undecodable body, a draft/prerelease flag, or an
unparseable / prerelease-parsing tag all return an error, never a zero
version. It sends the User-Agent GitHub requires (a UA-less request is
403'd) and tolerates the two live tag styles -- cloudflared's CalVer
"2026.6.1" and k3s's v-prefixed, build-tagged "v1.36.2+k3s1" -- while
String() keeps the raw tag for the report.
source.go routes sourceGitHub to it and drops the errGitHubNotWired stub;
velocity still routes to PaperMC.
Tests: github_test.go covers both tag styles, the User-Agent gate, and
fail-closed on 404 / prerelease-flag / unparseable tag, with fixtures
captured from api.github.com on 2026-07-05. runner_test.go now drives
PaperMC and GitHub through dual httptest servers end to end with no source
degrading to an error.
doc.go re-tiers the verification boundary: both release sources are now
built and live-grounded; the VersionGatherer's version-extraction core is
the next verifiable slice (logic over an exec seam, not pure I/O); the
genuine I/O remainder is the Notifier, Applier and felis update CLI/CronJob.
felis-api's coord is still a placeholder slug, so that component is dark at
runtime until a real repository is configured.
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flyemoji
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9896fe16c3 |
docs(updater): correct PaperMC UA/fixture overclaims, re-tier the boundary
An out-of-band curl of the live Fill v3 endpoint contradicted two claims the previous commit shipped and surfaced a mis-tiering: - User-Agent is NOT enforced: fill.papermc.io/v3/projects/velocity returned HTTP 200 to a bare curl UA. The comments claimed a generic UA "is refused" and the API "REQUIRES" a contact UA. Reword to what is true — PaperMC's usage policy asks for a descriptive UA and may block generic ones, but sending it is etiquette/defensive here, not a gate Felis depends on. - The test fixture's shape was invented, not captured: the real "versions" object groups the entire 3.x line under a single key "3.0.0", not the per-minor keys the fixture used. Replace it with the real body (keys and version strings as returned). The key-agnostic parser already produced the right answer, and an independent max-stable check confirms 3.4.0. - Re-tier doc.go: the GitHub Releases source is verifiable-here (the same httptest-testable shape as PaperMC), not integration remainder. It is why 3 of 4 components report "latest unknown" today and is the next verifiable slice — the release-source work is only ~half done until it exists. No production logic changed. WSL oracle: build + vet clean, internal/updater 10/10, full tree go test RC=0 (19 ok, 0 fail). |
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flyemoji
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96b3cc901c |
feat(updater): wire updates.Run to a caller with PaperMC v3 release discovery
internal/updates is a pure, fakes-tested decision core with no production caller, so nothing could produce its "版本号状态" report. Add internal/updater as that caller: - topology: the fixed platform components and their user-set policies (felis-api and cloudflared Scheduled+manageable; k3s Notify, high-blast-radius single node; velocity Notify, off-cluster and unmanageable). Minecraft is pinned by ABSENCE, never force-tracked here, appended from the live fleet at runtime. - PaperMC Fill v3 release source: the v2 API (api.papermc.io) was retired 2026-07-01 and returns HTTP 410, so this targets fill.papermc.io/v3, sends the required non-generic User-Agent, and returns the newest STABLE version, filtering the -SNAPSHOT/rc prereleases the plan would otherwise suppress. Its test fixture is captured from the live v3 response shape (2026-07-04). - RoutingSource: the single ReleaseSource updates.Run requires, dispatching velocity to PaperMC and returning errGitHubNotWired for the GitHub-backed components so they degrade to "latest unknown" honestly, never a fabricated one. - Runner: gather current versions (seam) -> assemble Components -> updates.Run -> Report; report-only when notifier and applier are nil. Verification boundary: the parse/plan/compose logic is unit-tested (httptest + fakes, fixture grounded in the live v3 shape). Live network/TLS/User-Agent enforcement, the GitHub Releases source, the concrete version gatherer, the notifier and applier, and the felis update CLI/CronJob remain integration work, enumerated in doc.go. |
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flyemoji
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c20b12c655 |
refactor(api): drop dead password-era ResetMailer, reconcile passkey-unbind docs
The passwordless migration left ResetMailer (SendPasswordReset) and its API field with zero callers and no wiring; the web console authenticates via email-OTP and passkey only. Remove both, plus the now-orphaned context import that the interface was the last user of in handlers_users.go.
Reconcile the DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser docs in repo.go and pgrepo.go: they claimed there was no production caller, but 2f22027 wired the owner-tier DELETE /users/{id}/passkeys. Both now note that a complete authenticator remediation pairs the unbind with a session revoke (unbinding alone leaves the live hijacked session; revoking alone leaves a re-enrollable credential), and the OpenAPI operation carries the same guidance in a new description. Reword the stale local-password test-fake header, since the passwordless fakes carry no must_change_password field.
No behavior change. gofmt, build, and the full test tree are green; OpenAPI parity and passkey-unbind tests pass; a grep confirms ResetMailer/SendPasswordReset are gone from the Go tree.
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flyemoji
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4f59d5128a |
feat(auth): add owner-tier passkey-unbind remediation endpoint
Add DELETE /api/v1/users/{id}/passkeys (owner-only) to unbind every passkey a
target account holds — the authenticator remediation that stops a passkey planted
or retained via a transiently-hijacked session from surviving as a standing login
foothold. It wires the previously-uncalled DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser and
is deliberately not a lockout: the account re-enters via the email-OTP door
(players) or op-login's in-game approval (staff), then re-enrolls. Documented in
the OpenAPI, so the served/documented parity gate covers it.
Remove RevokeUserSessionsExcept: a change-password-era orphan with no callers
since the passwordless migration. Its keep-one ("log out my other devices")
semantics is inherently self-service, and no such slice is on the roadmap; the
admin remediation path already uses RevokeAllUserSessions.
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flyemoji
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3b43f05a83 |
refactor(api): drop dead login concurrency limiter and reconcile passwordless comments
The passwordless migration (b330d77) removed the password-login route, leaving concurrencyLimiter — its bcrypt concurrency cap — with no caller, and scattered stale "local-password" / "change-password" references through the surviving auth code's comments. - Remove the dead concurrencyLimiter (type + newConcurrencyLimiter + acquire): no caller, no struct field, no test. Reword the one streamLimiter doc that contrasted against it. - Realign comments in repo.go, pgrepo.go, session.go, util.go to the passwordless reality: staff lookups feed email-OTP / passkey / setup redeem, not a password compare; RevokeUserSessionsExcept and DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser are retained (uncalled) for the P5 account-remediation path (#78); "local sessions" no longer implies a password. Comments and dead code only; no behavior change. Full WSL test tree green. |
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flyemoji
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0c1cc598c1 |
feat(auth): migrate console login to passwordless
Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
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Lemon-miaow
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3347cc05d5 | feat(panel): implement user management administration panel with sessions and minecraft link support | ||
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Lemon-miaow
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598f3d31f4 | feat(submit): local + S3 backends for modpack upload contexts, installer-selectable |