Capture which Yggdrasil authenticated an in-game UUID when a link code is
minted (spec §10 dual-Yggdrasil) and copy it onto the durable account_links
row at verify. The value originates in-game — the web verify side never sees
the authentication — so it threads through account_link_codes, mirroring how
mc_uuid (not user_id) lives on a code.
- migration 0005: add link_auth_source enum + auth_source column on both
account_link_codes and account_links; DEFAULT 'mojang' backfills existing
rows and sets the Mojang-priority default for a mint that omits the field
- mint validates an explicit auth_source (unknown value -> 400); verify
surfaces it in the 200 body and refreshes it on idempotent re-verify
Forced web onboarding proves a player controls an email before it is
bound to their account. POST /api/v1/account/email/start mints a random
6-digit code, mails it (or logs it server-side when no Mailer is wired —
the demo has no SMTP), and POST /api/v1/account/email/verify redeems it,
flipping users.email_verified in the same transaction that consumes the
code.
Brute force is bounded two ways: a 10-minute TTL and a 5-attempt cap,
both enforced in the repo so the fake and Postgres agree. Only the
sha-256 of the code is stored; the digits live only in the email. Both
routes are app-tier external — verifying your own email is scoped to the
principal, never names another user.
Root is machine authority, not a human identity, so `felis breakGlass`
now also records WHICH SysAdmin broke the glass. Even under
`sudo felis breakGlass` an account and password are entered in the TUI;
the root gate is necessary but no longer sufficient for accountability.
The console resolves one of three modes up front and audits the
difference:
- bootstrap (no staff account exists yet): the typed credential mints
the first Owner; the act is attributed to the OS user ($SUDO_USER,
else root) and recorded verified:false.
- recovery (an admin already exists): the operator authenticates as an
existing admin via bcrypt; the verified identity is the accountable
actor and the row is recorded verified:true.
- root override (the typed credential did not verify): a deliberate
OVERRIDE token proceeds under local-root authority, attributed to the
OS user and recorded verified:false. Break-glass never refuses -
recovering when no admin password can be produced is its whole job.
Attribution is best-effort, not proof (whoever runs this is root and can
edit Postgres directly); the audit row is honest about which it is.
- internal/api: AuditEntry gains an optional jsonb Payload (nil maps to
SQL NULL, so existing callers are unaffected); PGRepo.Audit writes it
and a new PGRepo.AdminExists drives the bootstrap-vs-recovery switch.
- the accountability row is written the instant the credential changes,
before local auth is enabled, so a failed toggle write can never leave
a reset credential with no "who did it" record.
- local_auth_enabled is now one exported api.LocalAuthEnabledKey shared
by the break-glass writer and the per-request reader, replacing two
drifting copies of the literal.
- break-glass password entry reuses the panel's 8-72-byte rule so a
credential set here is never later rejected by web change-password.
Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store: auth match/non-match,
the three audit modes and their payloads, that a dead audit sink does
not fail the recovery, that the audit precedes the toggle write, and a
headless drive of the TUI state machine asserting no credential reaches
provisioning without a verified admin or an explicit OVERRIDE.
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
The platform package that places servers across nodes and wires the operator, build, restore, and reaper subsystems, plus cmd/felis, the single binary that runs them.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
A user-directed extension over the build subsystem: an uploaded modpack stays in pending_review and is never built until an admin approves. Approval is a single-winner compare-and-swap that hands off to the image-build Job, keeping the mandatory vulnerability scan in front of any push.
Foundational libraries: deterministic resource naming, the RCON client, the Postgres store with embedded SQL migrations, configuration loading, and container image-build helpers.
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