Console and build-log relays hold a Server-Sent Event connection open for the
life of a client's attachment; a stalled reader pins the relay goroutine plus
its upstream kube-apiserver follow. Without a bound, one authenticated
principal could open these repeatedly and accumulate leaked control-plane
connections.
Add a per-principal stream cap (streamLimiter) enforced before either relay
opens its follow stream, returning 429 too_many_streams past the limit.
cmd/felis wires it to 16; zero disables it, matching the "zero disables"
idiom of the other levers.
This bounds the blast radius of the stalled-stream leak; it does not close the
leak itself -- the per-write deadline that severs a stalled stream is a
separate change.
The three felis-api http.Servers (internal, external, https) were built with
only Addr and Handler, leaving ReadHeaderTimeout, IdleTimeout, and ReadTimeout
at zero. A zero ReadHeaderTimeout is a Slowloris hole — a client trickling
header bytes pins a connection indefinitely — and a zero IdleTimeout lets
kept-alive connections accumulate (gosec G112).
Route all three listeners through a newAPIServer factory that sets a 10s
ReadHeaderTimeout and a 120s IdleTimeout. WriteTimeout and ReadTimeout are
left unset on purpose: the external and https faces stream Server-Sent Events
(console / build logs) for the lifetime of a client attachment, and a
WriteTimeout would sever a healthy long-lived stream. Slowloris is closed by
ReadHeaderTimeout, which bounds only the header phase.
The public /auth/login route runs a full-cost bcrypt compare on every
request — including the anti-enumeration dummy-hash compare for an unknown
user — with no bound on how many run at once. A flood of concurrent logins
therefore pins every core in bcrypt, starving the rest of the API.
Cap the simultaneous compares with a small non-blocking concurrency limiter
(a buffered-channel semaphore): a login that cannot take a slot is shed with
429 auth_busy before the compare, rather than piling more work onto the
scheduler. The slot guards only the hash and is released the instant the
compare returns. It is a concurrency cap, not a per-account lockout, so it
never fences out the one admin trying to break-glass in, and the 429 lands
before any credential distinction so it leaks nothing about the username.
The cap follows the existing "zero disables" lever idiom (WakeCooldown,
MaxRunningServers); cmd/felis wires it to the core count (floored at 4).
Construct the go-webauthn verifier at the composition root and attach
it to the API when auth.panel_hostname is configured (RP id = panel
hostname, origin = https://<panel hostname>, display name Felis). When
the hostname is unset or the verifier fails to build it stays nil and
the passkey ceremony routes report 503, matching the existing
nil-when-unconfigured subsystem pattern. An admin passkey, if ever
added, is a separate relying party on the admin host and is
intentionally not wired here.
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
The platform package that places servers across nodes and wires the operator, build, restore, and reaper subsystems, plus cmd/felis, the single binary that runs them.
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