The web face has always granted staff the run of the fleet (isOwnerOrAdmin
passes an admin for stop/command/console/access on any node), but the
internal face explicitly had "no admin tier": a linked administrator in game
could only wake servers they owned or that autostartPolicy permitted. The
only way to manage another player's (or an unclaimed) server from inside the
game was to claim it — seizing ownership and burning the admin's own quota.
Give authorizeWakeByUUID the admin tier on the same trust anchor the op-login
approve already uses: verified online-mode UUID -> account link -> stored
role. A linked staff member now wakes ANY node under any policy (so
`/felis go` works fleet-wide without claiming); the owner bypass and the
policy gates are unchanged, and an unlinked UUID still fails safe.
Centralize the staff-role rule while at it: staffRole(role) in auth.go
(admin, plus owner as its superset) now backs Principal.IsAdmin, the session
ViaAdminAccess grading, the op-login approve gate and the new wake tier.
That also fixes a real hole in the approve gate, which required role=admin
exactly: an Owner manually promoted to role='owner' per migration 0011's
upgrade note would have been refused by their own in-game approval door.
The lobby menu still renders "Claim & Start" on ownerless tiles — claiming
becomes optional for staff rather than the only entry — so the velocity
plugin needs no change.
Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
flyemoji
Lemon-miaow