Use shared action buttons and default to the login space. Allow staff to save startup-only experience settings while running and request a durable restart through the existing operator flow.
Grant the API PVC list permission needed to detect retained worlds before server creation, and show internal failures with a request ID. Cover permission, maintenance, restart and UI behavior with regression checks.
A server whose world PVC does not exist yet (never started) or no longer exists
(the world was already reaped) accepted the backup/restore POST, answered 202,
and the Job sat Pending on the missing claim until its deadline with nothing
recorded anywhere — a silent no-op from the operator's seat. The live drill on
the reaped `resolvecheck` world reproduced exactly that.
Both handlers now read the world PVC (Cluster.WorldVolumeExists, over the same
naming.WorldPVCName the Jobs mount) and answer a specific 409 no_world_volume
with "start it once to create it, then retry". The felis-api Role gains the
matching get-only PVC grant — the first live run surfaced the missing RBAC as a
403 behind a 500, so the fix ships with it.
Live (auditfix38): resolvecheck -> 409 no_world_volume on both faces; test-one
(which has a world) still backs up through the new gate end to end.
A server created through the panel never had RCON. CreateServer built a
MinecraftServerSpec without a Rcon block at all, so the field took its zero value
and every downstream consumer read Enabled=false. Nothing failed loudly: the
operator skips the probe when RCON is off and marks the server Ready on pod
readiness alone, so the panel showed "运行中" for a server the control plane could
not talk to. Everything that rides the write channel (spec §8 写=RCON) was dead —
the online-player list returned nothing because Status.Players is only ever
sampled by the probe, and console writes answered 503 ErrConsoleUnavailable
because internal/api/console.go refuses when Enabled is false.
The whole RCON machinery already existed — builders gate the service port,
container port, preStop save-and-stop hook and the RCON_* env on Spec.Rcon,
the reconciler probes and reports, console.go dials, the NetworkPolicy opens
25575 to {api, operator}. The only thing missing was that nobody ever turned it
on or created a password. This wires the three layers that were absent.
Provisioning lives in the operator, not in felis-api. felis-api holds secrets:get
and not create, and giving it create solely to mint a password it immediately
stops caring about (console.go re-reads the Secret at command time) would widen
the API's powers for nothing. The operator already reads every Secret in the
namespace, so adding create there grants no read it did not have. It also makes
provisioning declarative: a Secret deleted by hand comes back on the next pass, a
controller reference garbage-collects it with the server so no delete path has to
remember it, and a server that predates RCON only needs spec.rcon filled in for
the password to appear. The name comes from naming.RconSecretName so felis-api,
`felis setup` and the operator cannot drift apart on it.
RCON is enabled per system service rather than by default, because enabling it on
a backend that serves no RCON listener is destructive rather than merely useless:
the operator gates readiness on the probe, so such a server never leaves Starting
and is eventually marked Failed. The login limbo is exactly that backend
(LOOHP/Limbo has no RCON) and it is the front door, so it stays off; the lobby
runs Paper and is administered through the panel like any other server, so it is
on.
Paper only reads RCON settings from server.properties, so the operator's injected
RCON_PASSWORD did nothing on its own — felis-lobby's entrypoint now writes the
three keys on every boot. Rewriting them each time makes the copy in the world
volume derived state rather than the source of truth, so an owner who edits them
through the panel's file editor cannot lock the control plane out of their own
server. Without a password it sets enable-rcon=false and warns rather than
refusing to start: unlike the forwarding secret, a missing RCON password degrades
the server rather than making it unsafe.
That password landing in server.properties is a §286 exposure (RCON 密码绝不下发
前端), since server.properties is readable through the file editor. It is redacted
on read rather than the file being denied outright the way config/paper-global.yml
is: the forwarding secret is cluster-wide material that merely happens to sit in
the volume, whereas server.properties is the single most-edited config an owner
has, and hiding one line should not cost them MOTD, difficulty and view-distance.
The write path is deliberately left alone — the boot-time rewrite restores the
real value, which is what makes redacting rather than denying safe here.
Also guards idle auto-stop on Rcon.Enabled. Status.Players is only meaningful
when the probe ran; with RCON off it keeps its zero value, which that branch would
have read as "empty" and used to stop a server full of people. AutoStopEnabled is
not currently settable through any path, so this is a latent footgun rather than a
live bug, but it is one line and the alternative is discovering it in production.
Checks: the operator provisions a missing Secret with a 32-hex-char password and a
controller reference, and does not rotate an existing one; idle auto-stop stays
inert without RCON; the editor redacts rcon.password from the world root's
server.properties while leaving the rest of the file (and a plugin's own nested
copy) intact; login has RCON off and lobby has it on with the shared secret name;
CreateServer sets the block. That last one departs from K8sCluster being
integration-tested against a live cluster: this defect was a struct literal
missing a field, it shipped, and a fake client is enough to pin a struct literal.
Existing servers are NOT migrated by this change — CreateServer only covers new
ones and ensureSystemServers is create-if-absent, so a `felis setup` re-run will
not touch an existing lobby. A deployed install additionally needs the
felis-lobby image rebuilt and re-imported for the entrypoint change, and its pods
recreated, before the RCON keys reach server.properties.
Previously /readyz only verified Repo != nil && Cluster != nil — a
process-liveness check, not a dependency-health check. The spec
requires the readyz probe to verify DB, K8s API, and CRD informer
are live before declaring the pod ready.
- Repo interface gains Ping(context.Context) error
- Cluster interface gains Ping(context.Context) error
- PGRepo.Ping delegates to sql.DB.PingContext
- K8sCluster.Ping lists MinecraftServer CRDs (Limit=1) in the
configured namespace, exercising both the API and CRD informer
- handleReadyz iterates ping checks; any failure returns 503 with
the failing dependency name in the error message
- fakeRepo and fakeCluster gain configurable pingErr for hermetic
test coverage of the failure paths
New test: TestReadyzPingsDependencies verifies 200 when healthy,
503 when DB or K8s API is down.
StartupSpec.HealthHTTPPort/Path switch pod readiness from plain-TCP to an HTTP GET for RCON-less loaders (LOOHP/Limbo) that report 'started' only after the first tick. User servers now default FallbackServer to the login gate, never the lobby, so a stopped/starting backend keeps authentication in front of a fresh connection.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
Lemon-miaow
flyemoji