Use shared action buttons and default to the login space. Allow staff to save startup-only experience settings while running and request a durable restart through the existing operator flow.
Grant the API PVC list permission needed to detect retained worlds before server creation, and show internal failures with a request ID. Cover permission, maintenance, restart and UI behavior with regression checks.
A server whose world PVC does not exist yet (never started) or no longer exists
(the world was already reaped) accepted the backup/restore POST, answered 202,
and the Job sat Pending on the missing claim until its deadline with nothing
recorded anywhere — a silent no-op from the operator's seat. The live drill on
the reaped `resolvecheck` world reproduced exactly that.
Both handlers now read the world PVC (Cluster.WorldVolumeExists, over the same
naming.WorldPVCName the Jobs mount) and answer a specific 409 no_world_volume
with "start it once to create it, then retry". The felis-api Role gains the
matching get-only PVC grant — the first live run surfaced the missing RBAC as a
403 behind a 500, so the fix ships with it.
Live (auditfix38): resolvecheck -> 409 no_world_volume on both faces; test-one
(which has a world) still backs up through the new gate end to end.
login/lobby carry reserved names, so every per-server route rejects them —
yet the cockpit offered claim/stop/wake and a console link on their rows,
each answering 400 bad_name. The fleet view now marks them (system:true,
shared naming.IsSystemServer) and the panel renders a plain label instead
of dead actions.
UserByMCUUID now resolves only live accounts: claim, menu, wake
authorization, op-login vouch and the QR link-status poll treat a
disabled or soft-deleted link holder exactly like an unlinked UUID
instead of a retired identity. VerifyLinkCode lets a soft-deleted
link be taken over by a fresh in-game code (the deleted account is
gone, e.g. a migrated source), while a disabled holder still 409s so
the lockout is not bypassable; failed attempts still do not consume
the code. Fake repo and pgint coverage pin both branches.
Two defects in the §9.3 quota path, both invisible to the hermetic suite:
- Audit #4's TOCTOU was real and documented: QuotaCheck and ClaimServer were
separate statements, so two concurrent claims by one user for two different
ownerless servers both read count < max_servers and both won. The gate now
lives inside ClaimServer, in the SAME transaction as the ownership write,
under pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(user_id)) — the aggregate read, the
four-dimension re-check (shared with QuotaCheck via one helper so the two
cannot drift), and the UPDATE are one serialized decision. The loser gets
ErrQuotaExceeded, which both claim handlers map to the same 403 the
sequential path gives; the server row is additionally taken FOR UPDATE so
same-server races still resolve to exactly one winner.
- The server PATCH path called UpdateServerResources(..., 0) for storage even
though a resources patch cannot change storage. The cached columns are the
ONLY input to the quota aggregate, so every resource patch silently dropped
that server's storage contribution from its owner's cap. The handler now
reads the current spec and passes storage through.
Red-then-green: the new pgint test drives two real concurrent claims against
max_servers=1 (before: both win; now: exactly one win + one gated 403, and the
DB shows one owned row); the hermetic suite pins the 403 mapping and the
storage-preserving cache write.
Found live while verifying the admin email-edit fix: the Owner account could
not load /api/v1/users at all. Root cause: migration 0011 adds the 'owner'
role and gates every user-administration route on it, but NOTHING ever wrote
it. break-glass (UpsertOwner), the setup MC-bind (CompleteOwnerSetup), and the
re-provision path all forced 'admin', so in a fresh install the entire
owner tier — list/create/edit/disable/delete users, quotas, sessions — was
unreachable. The role was a dead letter in the other direction too: staff
predicates that predate the role did not know it.
- UpsertOwner and CompleteOwnerSetup now write role='owner'; the username-
conflict arm re-asserts it, which is also the documented pre-0011 promotion
path ("re-provision via break-glass"). InsertOperator stays plain 'admin'.
- Staff doors learn the role: op-login start/finish admit the Owner; the
player email door refuses it like any staff account; the in-game approver
check already used staffRole.
- Reclaim protection: IsProtectedAdminLink (and the break-glass bootstrap
switch AdminExists) count admin OR owner — the Owner must never be displaced
by a Mojang-priority reclaim.
- Panel guards make migration 0011's claim true now that owner rows exist: an
owner can never be demoted, deleted, or disabled through the API (only the
local break-glass console resets the identity); username/email edits still
work.
Tests: pgint pins both provisioning paths, the protected-link predicate and
the reset/promote semantics; hermetic suites cover the owner-admitting staff
door, the owner-refusing player door, the three panel guards, and break-glass
attribution.
UpdateUser wrote a new address but kept email_verified, so patching a verified
account asserted a proof of an address nobody had proven — and the
pre-session login mails and resolves on exactly that flag, so a typo'd edit
could hand the account's sign-in codes to the wrong mailbox.
Changing the address now clears the flag in the same write; a no-op patch that
passes the same value keeps it. The fake mirrors the semantics, and the pgint
suite pins both halves (same value keeps proof, new value drops it).
The design has claimed since migration 0010 that at most one account can hold
a PROVEN email address, with ErrEmailTaken as the 409 a second verifier sees.
Neither half ever shipped: no migration created users_verified_email_unique,
and VerifyEmailOTP had no guard at all — the sentinel was defined but never
returned, so two accounts could both verify one address. The damage is not
cosmetic: the pre-session login resolves accounts BY verified email, so the
duplicate decided which identity a mailed sign-in code belonged to.
- Migration 0020 creates the partial unique index (lower(email) WHERE
email_verified) the comments have been citing — the database-level backstop.
- VerifyEmailOTP now refuses the take-over with ErrEmailTaken BEFORE consuming
the code (the address, not the code, is the problem), charges no attempt,
and maps a lost cross-user race (unique violation) to the same answer.
- The verify handler answers 409 email_taken instead of a generic 500.
Covered by the pgint suite (sequential double-verify refused with the code
still live, a direct duplicate write still loses to the index, the refused
account can still prove its own address) and a hermetic 409 case.
Lemon-miaow