Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Lemon-miaow f8f112b8ca feat(api): 访问日志与 HTTP/运行时指标、安全响应头与面板 CSP、跨站写拦截、请求体读截止、SSE 定期重鉴权与续传、404/405/413 信封、status 按所有权裁剪、停机并发排空 2026-09-25 02:14:08 +08:00
Lemon-miaow 05e8c64e47 fix(imagepin): 带 digest 的镜像引用也向 registry 确认仍存在 2026-09-24 22:58:07 +08:00
Lemon-miaow 215bfd78d7 fix(images): 服务器镜像在创建时固定到仓库 digest,更换镜像需确认备份,安装器重建前先固定旧服并推送不可变版本标签 2026-09-24 16:57:38 +08:00
Lemon-miaow 857c73a66a fix(audit): 审计按账号 id 归属并记录来源 IP/UA,登录失败与限速入审计和指标,写入失败计数告警 2026-09-24 16:02:44 +08:00
Lemon-miaow 72c4aa3895 fix(submissions): surface each linked build's outcome to the submitter
/me/submissions (and the admin queue) now attach build_status/build_error by
a read-only Builder.Get — until now a failed build was visible only on the
admin-tier /images/build routes, so the person who submitted the modpack
never learned the build died. A missing build row renders as "no outcome";
any other lookup failure surfaces instead of being swallowed. The panel's
My Submissions page renders the outcome in the expanded row, localised.
2026-09-23 06:31:13 +08:00
flyemoji 3c1d64749f fix(api): cap concurrent SSE streams per principal
Console and build-log relays hold a Server-Sent Event connection open for the
life of a client's attachment; a stalled reader pins the relay goroutine plus
its upstream kube-apiserver follow. Without a bound, one authenticated
principal could open these repeatedly and accumulate leaked control-plane
connections.

Add a per-principal stream cap (streamLimiter) enforced before either relay
opens its follow stream, returning 429 too_many_streams past the limit.
cmd/felis wires it to 16; zero disables it, matching the "zero disables"
idiom of the other levers.

This bounds the blast radius of the stalled-stream leak; it does not close the
leak itself -- the per-write deadline that severs a stalled stream is a
separate change.
2026-07-01 22:04:19 +09:00
flyemoji b508fccc6f feat(api): add felis-api service with permissions, modpack lane, and fleet read
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
2026-06-26 23:32:38 +09:00