After the Cloudflare tunnel connector is installed and the origin has rolled
out, applyCloudflareEdge now fences the panel NodePort so the origin is
reachable only over loopback -- the hop the host-side connector uses -- and
never from a public interface. This closes the Access-bypass hole where a direct
https://<node-ip>:<nodeport>/ with the right Host header reached the origin
behind Cloudflare Access.
The fence is an nftables table hooked at prerouting priority -300 (raw), before
kube-proxy's NodePort DNAT (dstnat, -100), so it catches the packet on its
original destination port; a filter/INPUT rule would miss the DNAT'd, then
FORWARDed NodePort packet. Loopback is accepted first, so the connector origin
hop is untouched; the inet family fences a public IPv6 NodePort too.
It is gated on the connector actually serving (verifyConnectorServing polls
`cloudflared tunnel info`): fencing a dead tunnel would sever the only web path
to a still-up origin. If serving cannot be confirmed the port is left open (its
pre-tunnel state) and the failure is surfaced loudly. unfenceOriginNodePort is
the on-host break-glass reversal. The nft/cloudflared calls are INTEGRATION-ONLY;
the ruleset shape and the conn-count gate are pure and unit-tested.
KNOWN-LIMITATION: targets nftables; firewalld-native coordination is not yet
handled (a firewalld reload can flush the standalone table).
