Add the insert-only Operator-creation path to the break-glass console
(felis breakGlass). An Operator is an additional staff admin: role=admin
with must_change_password=true, identical in shape to the Owner, since
Felis has no separate operator DB role (migration 0003).
Unlike the Owner upsert, provisioning is insert-only -- a username already
taken returns ErrConflict (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING + zero RowsAffected)
rather than silently resetting a live account, so adding an Operator can
never clobber the Owner's or another Operator's credential. A typed
password is used as-is; an empty one is replaced with a generated
one-time credential returned for display. Operator-add does not touch
local_auth_enabled -- that global gate belongs to the Owner thread alone.
Accountability is recorded best-effort under a break_glass.operator_create
audit action, written only after a successful provision.
The TUI menu router that reaches this path is deferred; this lands the
fully unit-testable logic layer (provisionOperator, performAddOperator,
auditAddOperator) with the PGRepo insert kept integration-only.
- Convert CRLF to LF across Go, panel, and plugin files
- Add Cloudflare API token template URL to breakGlass TUI edge intro
- Verify API token in cfsetup before creating tunnel, DNS, or Access app
Add an optional edge-setup flow to the `felis breakGlass` sudo TUI,
reachable as an independent peer of Owner provisioning through a new
top-level menu (so reaching it never forces an Owner password reset).
The flow drives the operator's own Cloudflare consent (interactive
`cloudflared tunnel login`, suspending the alt-screen, plus an API
token) and then calls cfsetup to stand up a Tunnel routing the
configured admin and panel hosts and a fail-closed Access application.
It stays gated shut unless an admin hostname is configured and the
operator is logged in (edgeReady), and refuses empty or bare-domain
credentials before any side effect. On success the TUI surfaces the
issued Access aud and an explicit ACTION REQUIRED note; it never edits
felis.toml. The live cloudflared and Cloudflare API calls are
integration-only and exercised against a real account.
Root is machine authority, not a human identity, so `felis breakGlass`
now also records WHICH SysAdmin broke the glass. Even under
`sudo felis breakGlass` an account and password are entered in the TUI;
the root gate is necessary but no longer sufficient for accountability.
The console resolves one of three modes up front and audits the
difference:
- bootstrap (no staff account exists yet): the typed credential mints
the first Owner; the act is attributed to the OS user ($SUDO_USER,
else root) and recorded verified:false.
- recovery (an admin already exists): the operator authenticates as an
existing admin via bcrypt; the verified identity is the accountable
actor and the row is recorded verified:true.
- root override (the typed credential did not verify): a deliberate
OVERRIDE token proceeds under local-root authority, attributed to the
OS user and recorded verified:false. Break-glass never refuses -
recovering when no admin password can be produced is its whole job.
Attribution is best-effort, not proof (whoever runs this is root and can
edit Postgres directly); the audit row is honest about which it is.
- internal/api: AuditEntry gains an optional jsonb Payload (nil maps to
SQL NULL, so existing callers are unaffected); PGRepo.Audit writes it
and a new PGRepo.AdminExists drives the bootstrap-vs-recovery switch.
- the accountability row is written the instant the credential changes,
before local auth is enabled, so a failed toggle write can never leave
a reset credential with no "who did it" record.
- local_auth_enabled is now one exported api.LocalAuthEnabledKey shared
by the break-glass writer and the per-request reader, replacing two
drifting copies of the literal.
- break-glass password entry reuses the panel's 8-72-byte rule so a
credential set here is never later rejected by web change-password.
Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store: auth match/non-match,
the three audit modes and their payloads, that a dead audit sink does
not fail the recovery, that the audit precedes the toggle write, and a
headless drive of the TUI state machine asserting no credential reaches
provisioning without a verified admin or an explicit OVERRIDE.
Add `felis breakGlass`, a root-only interactive TUI that provisions or
resets the Owner account directly against Postgres and enables local
password login. It is the local-root recovery path that bypasses web
Zero Trust by design - used to bootstrap the first Owner credential and
to recover when the web login is unreachable.
- Bare `felis` prints CLI usage only; breakGlass is the sole subcommand
that enters a TUI rather than running as a CLI.
- Refuses to run unless euid is 0 (try: sudo felis breakGlass); on
non-Unix platforms the euid check also refuses.
- Generates a one-time Owner password, sets must_change_password, and
prints a durable summary (username, one-time password, op.console
login URL derived from the configured root domain) after the
alt-screen TUI is torn down.
Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store.
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
Go's flag.Parse stops at the first non-flag token, so a -config given as 'felis migrate up -config path' was silently dropped and the default path used instead. Pull the up verb off the front, then parse the remaining flags so the configured path is honored.
The platform package that places servers across nodes and wires the operator, build, restore, and reaper subsystems, plus cmd/felis, the single binary that runs them.