Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
handleChangePassword revoked other sessions but never cleared webauthn_credentials, and enrollment needs no step-up. A passkey planted through a transiently-hijacked session needs no password, so it survived the reset + session-revoke as a standing login foothold. Add DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser and call it in the change-password remediation so every passkey is unbound alongside the session revoke. Removing zero rows is a successful no-op. Email-OTP remains the fallback factor, so this never locks anyone out; the user re-enrolls a passkey afterward if they want one.
Enrollment set no AuthenticatorSelection, so user verification defaulted to preferred (not enforced), and the UV/backup flags the ceremony reported were discarded. Set UserVerification=required so a bound passkey always proves possession AND user (a UV-incapable device falls back to email-OTP), and capture user_verified/backup_eligible/backup_state through VerifiedCredential -> PasskeyCredential -> webauthn_credentials (migration 0009) so a future login path can enforce UV per credential. Adds a negative test proving a presence-only authenticator is rejected, and asserts the roundtrip records UV=true.
Adds POST /api/v1/auth/bind, the one public pre-account entrypoint of the
player console (console.<root_domain>). An account-less player redeems the
one-time Bind Code minted in the in-game Login Lobby; in a single step the
platform creates a role=user player, links it to the verified in-game UUID,
and mints a host-only felis_session. Login is thus not forced at the edge
while operations stay app-authenticated.
The operator console (op.console.<root_domain>) is unaffected and stays
behind Zero Trust: a code whose UUID resolves to a staff (role=admin)
account is refused with 403 (ErrPlayerBindForbidden) without consuming the
code, so the public door provably never yields an admin principal — the
session it mints carries ViaAdminAccess=false and is host-only to console,
never sent to op.console.
Repo layer: new RedeemPlayerBindCode on the Repo interface, implemented on
PGRepo (single tx: resolve code, create-or-fetch the player, consume) and
the test fake. The returning-player branch is idempotent and is a deliberate
standing "log in via the game" door, not just first-time onboarding.
Honest labeling:
- ORACLE-VERIFIED (Go): account/session logic — role=user, refuse-staff,
idempotent create-or-fetch, single-use code, and the op.console redline
(player session rejected on admin routes). Covered by handlers_onboard_test
and the OpenAPI parity gate.
- INTEGRATION-dependent: the endpoint's security rests on the Bind Code having
been minted against an online-mode-Yggdrasil-authenticated UUID, a
precondition that lives in velocity/Java and is not verifiable from this
repo (CODE-ONLY). The Go layer proves the logic, not that identity guarantee.
- No app-level attempt cap: rate-limiting is deferred to the edge as for the
public /auth/login; the ~1e12 keyspace, single use and short TTL make a
blind app-level cap non-critical.
Phase 6 WebAuthn bind, enrollment-only slice (spec section 14). Adds the data
layer an already-authenticated principal needs to bind and manage passkeys:
- migration 0007: webauthn_credentials (one bound passkey per row, public
attestation material only) and webauthn_challenges (server-stashed ceremony
state between begin and finish, single-use via consumed_at). Both rows are
bound to a known user_id; there is no usernameless login lookup, since the
assertion/login path is a deferred slice.
- PasskeyCredential type and five Repo methods (create/consume challenge,
create/list/delete credential) with the PG semantics the handlers rely on:
supersede-prior-live on begin, expiry-before-consume single-use on finish,
credential_id UNIQUE -> ErrConflict, owner-scoped delete -> ErrNotFound.
- ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid sentinel for a missing/expired/consumed ceremony.
When the configured third-party Yggdrasil and the official Mojang service
issue the same username under different UUIDs, the non-genuine squatter is
displaced in favour of the real Mojang owner (正版优先). This adds the
Go-verifiable data layer of that flow on the internal (velocity) face.
- migration 0006: username_blacklist (barred squatter UUIDs) and
player_data_holds (the displaced account's 30-day data stash), both keyed
by mc_uuid so the genuine Mojang player — identical username, different
UUID — is never caught by the bar.
- POST /api/v1/internal/player/reclaim bars the squatter UUID and stashes
its data in one transaction (all-or-nothing). It is idempotent on a
retried callback and returns the hold's effective expiry — the first
reclaim's window, never a fresh now()+30d — so the rejected player is told
the truth about how long their data is kept.
- GET /api/v1/internal/player/blacklist/{mc_uuid} is the login-gate check
velocity calls to reject a barred squatter before admitting them.
Scope: velocity collision-routing, the limbo prompt, the authlib
dual-backend and the data-inherit flow are code-only (Java plus a QR-bound
device session a row cannot express) and are not part of this slice. Unit
tests cover the handlers and the in-memory repo contract; the Postgres SQL
path is exercised by integration only.
Capture which Yggdrasil authenticated an in-game UUID when a link code is
minted (spec §10 dual-Yggdrasil) and copy it onto the durable account_links
row at verify. The value originates in-game — the web verify side never sees
the authentication — so it threads through account_link_codes, mirroring how
mc_uuid (not user_id) lives on a code.
- migration 0005: add link_auth_source enum + auth_source column on both
account_link_codes and account_links; DEFAULT 'mojang' backfills existing
rows and sets the Mojang-priority default for a mint that omits the field
- mint validates an explicit auth_source (unknown value -> 400); verify
surfaces it in the 200 body and refreshes it on idempotent re-verify
Forced web onboarding proves a player controls an email before it is
bound to their account. POST /api/v1/account/email/start mints a random
6-digit code, mails it (or logs it server-side when no Mailer is wired —
the demo has no SMTP), and POST /api/v1/account/email/verify redeems it,
flipping users.email_verified in the same transaction that consumes the
code.
Brute force is bounded two ways: a 10-minute TTL and a 5-attempt cap,
both enforced in the repo so the fake and Postgres agree. Only the
sha-256 of the code is stored; the digits live only in the email. Both
routes are app-tier external — verifying your own email is scoped to the
principal, never names another user.
Root is machine authority, not a human identity, so `felis breakGlass`
now also records WHICH SysAdmin broke the glass. Even under
`sudo felis breakGlass` an account and password are entered in the TUI;
the root gate is necessary but no longer sufficient for accountability.
The console resolves one of three modes up front and audits the
difference:
- bootstrap (no staff account exists yet): the typed credential mints
the first Owner; the act is attributed to the OS user ($SUDO_USER,
else root) and recorded verified:false.
- recovery (an admin already exists): the operator authenticates as an
existing admin via bcrypt; the verified identity is the accountable
actor and the row is recorded verified:true.
- root override (the typed credential did not verify): a deliberate
OVERRIDE token proceeds under local-root authority, attributed to the
OS user and recorded verified:false. Break-glass never refuses -
recovering when no admin password can be produced is its whole job.
Attribution is best-effort, not proof (whoever runs this is root and can
edit Postgres directly); the audit row is honest about which it is.
- internal/api: AuditEntry gains an optional jsonb Payload (nil maps to
SQL NULL, so existing callers are unaffected); PGRepo.Audit writes it
and a new PGRepo.AdminExists drives the bootstrap-vs-recovery switch.
- the accountability row is written the instant the credential changes,
before local auth is enabled, so a failed toggle write can never leave
a reset credential with no "who did it" record.
- local_auth_enabled is now one exported api.LocalAuthEnabledKey shared
by the break-glass writer and the per-request reader, replacing two
drifting copies of the literal.
- break-glass password entry reuses the panel's 8-72-byte rule so a
credential set here is never later rejected by web change-password.
Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store: auth match/non-match,
the three audit modes and their payloads, that a dead audit sink does
not fail the recovery, that the audit precedes the toggle write, and a
headless drive of the TUI state machine asserting no credential reaches
provisioning without a verified admin or an explicit OVERRIDE.
Add username+password login for Owner/Operator staff accounts on
op.console, the primary web login when Zero Trust is not in front of the
API. Three handlers form the whole surface: login mints a server-side
session cookie, logout revokes it idempotently, and change-password
re-verifies the current password before rotating the hash and clearing
must_change_password.
- Session cookies are HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax, host-only, stored
server-side as a SHA-256 hash with a 12h TTL.
- Login is anti-enumeration: every failure runs a uniform bcrypt compare
against a dummy hash and returns the same vague error.
- Credential-bearing writes require Content-Type: application/json,
returning 415 otherwise, to close the cross-site form-POST forgery
vector as a belt to the SameSite cookie.
- Local auth fails closed: login is rejected unless local_auth_enabled
is set, so a Zero-Trust-only deployment never accepts a local password.
- Extend the users table with a nullable password_hash and
must_change_password; staff are role=admin rows with a hash, players
are role=user rows with hash NULL.
- /me now reports must_change_password so the panel can force a
first-login change.
Covered by Go unit tests (handlers, content-type guard, anti-enumeration,
forced-change lockdown) and the OpenAPI route-parity gate.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
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