Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
The per-write deadline that severs a stalled SSE reader was never cleared on
return. Server.WriteTimeout is deliberately unset -- a WriteTimeout would sever
a healthy long-lived stream -- and with it unset net/http never resets the
connection write deadline between keep-alive requests. So the deadline the last
writeChunk left set leaks onto the next request that reuses the pooled
connection and fails its first write for no reason. Clear it to the zero value
on return via a deferred rc.SetWriteDeadline; best-effort, a no-op on writers
without deadline support.
Also record honestly at the header flush that the connect-time stall stays
bounded only by the per-principal stream cap, not severed by this guard -- only
the mid-stream stall is closed. Adds a test pinning the clear (fails closed:
neutering the deferred clear leaves a +writeTimeout deadline set on return).
relayLogStream copied a pod-log follow to the client with a plain
flusher.Flush per event. On a client that stays connected but stops
reading (its TCP receive window shut), net/http buffers the small
"data:" line and only touches the socket at Flush, which then blocks
forever inside the write. The select's <-ctx.Done() branch is never
reached, because r.Context() cancels on an actual disconnect, not on a
stall, so the relay goroutine and its upstream apiserver follow leak for
the life of the process.
Route every event's write+flush through http.ResponseController with a
per-write deadline (writeTimeout, 30s): a stalled flush now returns
os.ErrDeadlineExceeded, the error plain http.Flusher.Flush swallows, and
the relay abandons the stream so the deferred cancel + src.Close release
the follow. SetWriteDeadline and rc.Flush are best-effort: a writer
without deadline support (httptest recorder; some HTTP/2 origins) ignores
the deadline and behaves exactly as before, so the guard degrades
gracefully.
This closes the leak the per-principal stream cap only bounded the blast
radius of. Verified by a deterministic test with a deadline-aware
ResponseWriter whose flush blocks until the deadline; the test times out
(fails closed) if the guard is removed.
Console and build-log relays hold a Server-Sent Event connection open for the
life of a client's attachment; a stalled reader pins the relay goroutine plus
its upstream kube-apiserver follow. Without a bound, one authenticated
principal could open these repeatedly and accumulate leaked control-plane
connections.
Add a per-principal stream cap (streamLimiter) enforced before either relay
opens its follow stream, returning 429 too_many_streams past the limit.
cmd/felis wires it to 16; zero disables it, matching the "zero disables"
idiom of the other levers.
This bounds the blast radius of the stalled-stream leak; it does not close the
leak itself -- the per-write deadline that severs a stalled stream is a
separate change.
The dual-faced felis-api: internal (service) and external (public/app/admin) routes behind a Zero-Trust guard. Includes the access domain (whitelist, ban, and LuckPerms permission/group control over the owner-gated RCON path), the modpack submission endpoints, and the admin-tier SysAdmin fleet read. Structured access fields are charset-validated before assembly so no field can splice a second RCON command.
Lemon-miaow
flyemoji