audit-fixes-20260922
63
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Lemon-miaow
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90ccbfede4 |
fix(restore): replace a finished Job so retries enqueue; replicate felis-config
An E2E audit on a live install found that a FAILED restore held its deterministic Job name for the rest of the 10-minute TTL, so the next restore answered 202 'restoring' while nothing ran (ErrAlreadyExists was treated as success unconditionally). K8sJobs now inspects the colliding Job: in-flight still coalesces, finished (succeeded or failed) is deleted and replaced. The minecraft-namespace Role gains jobs:get/delete for exactly that replacement. The same audit found the backup Job mounts the felis-config Secret but the installer only provisions it in the control namespace, so every backup Job stranded on FailedMount. felis setup now replicates it into the minecraft namespace beside the service-token and forwarding secrets. |
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Lemon-miaow
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a05edc934c |
chore: gofmt the tree, clear staticcheck, add a CI gofmt gate
Nine files had drifted from gofmt and nothing checked; nine staticcheck findings were live (three dead symbols, capitalization, a redundant Sprintf, two literal-to-conversion sites, a nil test context). Fix all of them and make CI fail on unformatted Go so this cannot re-drift. |
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 flyemoji
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c2a5645c55 |
fix: keep internal section numbers out of runtime messages
Four messages that reach an operator or an API client cited sections of a specification nobody outside the project can read: - the unimplemented archive store error from config load - the running-server cap refusal, from both the user wake and the internal wake - the missing memory ceiling guard, in the API and in felis apply The references are gone and the wording is otherwise unchanged. Each message still says what went wrong and, where there is one, what to do about it. The test for the archive store message checks for the tarLocal remediation, which is still there. |
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flyemoji
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59ec23d4a8 |
test(nano): cover the nano delivery path and its loopback default
felis nano serves the same hasJoined handler as felis api, but behind nanoStubRepo, which implements only the bar-list lookup and embeds a nil Repo for everything else. Only the full-api path was tested, against a complete fake store, so a second store call added to handleHasJoined would pass CI and panic on every nano login. The loopback default of -listen, the one thing keeping nano from being an open auth relay, was not pinned either. The default moves into a nanoDefaultListen constant, and two tests cover the path. One serves a login through api.HasJoinedHandler with nanoStubRepo and a fake identity source and expects the profile back. The other requires the default to parse as a loopback IP. Taking the bar-list method off the stub makes the first panic on the nil Repo; defaulting to 0.0.0.0:8081 or :8081 fails the second. |
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flyemoji
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8e9c8ca4e6 |
fix(nano): say that [server] listen is ignored instead of defaulting it
LoadNano filled in [server] listen = "0.0.0.0:8080" when it was unset, and a test pinned that value, but felis nano never reads it: it binds the -listen flag, which the installer sets from FELIS_NANO_LISTEN. An operator moving nano off loopback by writing [server] listen in its config got connection refused from the proxy and no hint that the key did nothing. LoadNano no longer sets the default, and nano prints a line naming the ignored value and the address it actually binds whenever the key is set. It is a warning rather than a load error so a full felis.toml copied onto a nano host keeps starting. The assertion that pinned the unused default is removed along with it. The new test runs cmdNano against a config that sets [server] listen and one that does not, with an unbindable -listen so it returns after loading. The first must warn and the second must not; with the old default restored, the second prints a warning about 0.0.0.0:8080. |
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flyemoji
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1d6c73007e |
fix(nano): drain in-flight logins on shutdown
The installer and the config template tell the operator to run systemctl restart felis-nano after editing the source list. nano had no signal handling, so SIGTERM killed it mid-request: a login waiting on an upstream had its connection reset, and Velocity disconnected that player with "authentication servers are down". felis api already drains on shutdown; nano did not. nano now listens itself, serves until SIGINT or SIGTERM, then shuts the server down gracefully with a 30-second limit. That outlasts the source scan of any realistic list, at five seconds per source, and stays well inside systemd's default 90-second stop timeout. The new test holds a request inside the handler, cancels the serve context, and checks that serveNano is still running 200 ms later, that the held request then gets its answer, and that serveNano returns 0. Replacing the graceful shutdown with Close fails it. |
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flyemoji
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fa3eda5228 |
fix(nano): quote and cap the request log line
felis nano logged every request with the raw RequestURI and %s. That text is the caller's: a right-to-left override reordered the line as displayed, an invalid UTF-8 byte made journald store the entry as a binary blob that journalctl -f shows as "[N blob data]", and a query near net/http's one-megabyte limit became a one-megabyte log line. The URI is now capped at 256 bytes, several times a real hasJoined query, and printed with %q, so control, bidi and invalid bytes appear escaped. The handler assembly moved into nanoHandler so the logged handler can be tested on its own; cmdNano serves it unchanged. The new test sends a query carrying U+202E, a 0x9b byte and 4 KiB of padding, and expects a valid UTF-8 line with the override escaped and no more than twice the cap. Restoring the old unquoted line fails it. |
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flyemoji
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2180e77cf5 |
chore: drop tool-name markers from source comments
Seventeen comments opened with a tag naming the tool that wrote them. The tag goes and each comment keeps its reasoning, now starting as a plain sentence. None of the reasoning changes. The AGENTS.md note in .gitignore drops the story of how the file got into the tree and keeps the one fact a reader needs: its advice to run go fmt is destructive on this CRLF working tree. Comments only; no code, build or test changes. |
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flyemoji
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8fe255e38f |
fix(api): relay Mojang logins when no auth source is configured
felis api wired the hasJoined multiplexer only when felis.toml had at least one [[auth_source]]. With none, the source list stayed nil and every hasJoined answer was a 204. That was harmless while nothing pointed at the route, but the installer now starts Velocity with -Dmojang.sessionserver aimed at felis-api unconditionally, and the generated felis.toml tells the operator to delete the LittleSkin block for a Mojang-only server. Doing exactly that turned every login away, premium accounts included, and felis-api logged nothing about it. Always build the list through authSourcesFromConfig, which prepends Mojang in code, so an empty config is a Mojang-only relay. felis nano already behaves this way with the same file. The new test pins authSourcesFromConfig itself: Mojang first, the only Identity source, and still present when nothing is configured. Marking a configured source Identity makes it fail. The call site in cmdAPI is now a single unconditional assignment and has no unit test of its own. |
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flyemoji
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800a9042a1 |
test: use placeholder domains in setup and system-server tests
Three tests carried the maintainer's production root domain, a personal mailbox and the public IP of a live demo host as fixture values. None of them needs the value to be real: the re-domain test only needs two different roots, and the setup flow only needs a well-formed address. Swap them for the placeholders the rest of the suite already uses (mc.example.net, [email protected]), and move the "before" root in the re-domain test to 203.0.113.10.nip.io. That address is from the RFC 5737 documentation range, so the stale install the test models still has an IP-derived hostname, which is the case the refresh exists for. |
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flyemoji
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4e5a809dad |
docs(nano): drop the promise of a felis setup --nano that should not exist
nano.go's package comment told the reader that `felis setup --nano` installs the multiplexer as a service. No such flag has ever existed -- `felis setup` defines only -config and -dev -- so anyone following the comment gets "flag provided but not defined: -nano" and exit 2. Adding the flag was the obvious reading, and it is the wrong one. setup does not install anything selectively: it re-images the host by running the full bootstrap TUI, and no install-mode parameter is threaded anywhere -- nothing in Go reads or writes FELIS_INSTALL_MODE, which is a shell variable bootstrap.sh consumes on its own. So `--nano` could only mean one of two things. Re-run the installer in nano mode, which is what pointing at the installer already does. Or convert a provisioned full host into a nano one, which means tearing down k3s, Postgres and the proxy -- an uninstall, not a flag. setup's --dev already settled this shape once. It looked like a channel selector, silently installed release, and the fix was to refuse it and name the installer rather than pretend to choose. The same answer applies here, so the comment now names the real entry point -- the installer's `[2] Felis-nano` prompt, or FELIS_INSTALL_MODE=nano -- and records why there is no flag, so the next reader does not reopen it. No refusing --nano flag is added: --dev exists because it used to be a silent no-op that people passed, and nothing has ever accepted --nano, so flag's own "not defined" error is already the correct and clearer failure. |
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flyemoji
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71e1664c36 |
build: pin line endings to LF so the embedded bootstrap.sh ships without CRs
The repository had no .gitattributes. With core.autocrlf=true a Windows checkout handed deploy/bootstrap.sh 2374 CRs, and bootstrap_asset.go embeds that file from the working tree verbatim, so a dev-built felis piped a CRLF script into `bash -s` on the target host. CI builds on Linux, which is why released binaries were clean and only local builds carried it. eol=lf is global rather than scoped to *.sh because go:embed reaches further than the installer: deploy/*/Dockerfile, deploy/*/entrypoint.sh, plugins/*/src, the migrations and internal/panel/static are all compiled in and read on Linux. *.bat is the one exception, for the gradle wrappers' Windows launchers. Renormalizing the index touched exactly one tracked file, cmd/felis/version.go, and only its line endings: `git diff --cached --ignore-cr-at-eol` reports nothing outside .gitattributes itself. TestBootstrapPinsViaBlockConnectionsOff used to strip \r\n before asserting, with a comment stating that the repository pinned no eol attribute. That is no longer true, and the stripping hid the regression this commit prevents. It now asserts the absence of CRs, so losing the attribute reports itself as line endings rather than as a missing serverside-blockconnections pin. Closes #5 |
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flyemoji
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5d4f3063a9 |
feat(operator): make any Paper image joinable behind the forwarding proxy
Velocity modern forwarding is proxy-WIDE. A backend that cannot verify the signed handshake does not degrade -- it rejects every login the proxy forwards. Until now the only backends that could verify it were the two images Felis builds itself (deploy/limbo, deploy/lobby), which read FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET in their own entrypoints. An arbitrary Paper image a user brings does not, so it passed admission, started, reported Ready, and was UNJOINABLE. The platform's answer was to recommend the lobby image as a base for a user's own world (0018_recommended_images.sql), which was never a good base -- it carries the /menu plugin whose job is to TRANSFER a joining player away, the exact opposite of a server you mean to stay on. The fix configures forwarding from OUTSIDE the image instead of requiring it inside. The operator now injects a root `felis init-forwarding` initContainer into every user server; it writes the proxies.velocity block into config/paper-global.yml and forces online-mode=false in server.properties on the /data PVC before the main container starts. The image needs no forwarding logic of its own, so the joinable set stops being "images that self-configure forwarding" and becomes every Paper-family image the platform runs. buildStatefulSet gates the injection on the ABSENCE of the system-role label: the Felis-built system servers already consume the secret in their entrypoints and the login gate is a limbo, not Paper. It is also gated on a non-empty felis image name -- the operator Deployment passes its own image as FELIS_IMAGE, and an operator without it skips the injection rather than failing, because a cluster whose proxy is not in modern mode has nothing to configure. The init runs as root deliberately. The world volume's ownership comes from the storage provisioner and the main container runs as whatever UID its image declares, so root is the only UID that can reliably write these files; it then chmods them 0666/0777 so that non-root main container can rewrite them on boot. The privilege is bounded -- the init exits before the server container starts and the server container keeps its own UID. The alternative, an fsGroup on the pod, is noted in the code as the upgrade path if the init ever stops running as root. The writer merges rather than overwrites, both because Paper expands paper-global.yml to its full default tree on first boot and because the panel file editor may edit either file between boots. It sets proxies.velocity.* and the single online-mode key and leaves every other setting alone. It is a no-op on an empty secret, for the same reason the env var is optional: a proxy that is not in modern mode provisions no Secret, and wedging every server's init on a missing optional value would be worse than the status quo. felis-paper (deploy/paper) is the platform's plain-Paper expression of that base and 0019 seeds it recommended: same PAPER_JAR_URL the lobby build already resolves, no /menu plugin, no forwarding gate, and a correctly-escaped RCON channel so the console, the online-player list and permission commands work out of the box. 0018's row is left in place -- an admin who kept it can keep it; this only adds the better default beside it. Three fixes ride along, each of which the 1.8 path hit in practice. bootstrap pins ViaVersion's serverside-blockconnections off. ConnectionData.init() only builds its block-connection provider when Via's lowest supported protocol is below 1.13; under modern forwarding the Velocity injector reports 393, so init() returns early, blockConnectionProvider stays null, and the first 1.12.2->1.13 chunk rewrite dereferences it -- a 1.8 client takes an NPE on the first chunk it is sent and never finishes joining. Every call site is behind isServersideBlockConnections(), so switching it off skips all of them, at a cosmetic pre-1.13 cost: fences and glass panes stop drawing connected. ViaVersion ships the option ON, so a fresh install shipped that NPE. Seeding a file with this one key suffices -- Config#loadConfig parses the bundled default as the base map and merges the on-disk file over it, so every other option stays current across version bumps. The absence of "Loading block connection mappings" in the log is NOT evidence this worked: init() gates on the protocol version too, and that half fails on its own, so the line is missing either way. The config value is the only evidence, which is what the test asserts. The Velocity unit gains -Dfelis.legacy-forwarding.servers=legacy18. A protocol-47 backend sits behind ViaVersion, which strips modern forwarding's login-plugin-message when it down-translates the proxy->backend pipeline to 47 -- the packet is registered from 1.13 and has nowhere to go. Only the handshake address field survives Via, so the Felis fork forwards the named servers BungeeCord-style while every other backend keeps modern+secret untouched. v1 hardcodes the one legacy backend; rendering the list from the MinecraftServer CRs is the upgrade path. deploy/lobby's set_prop escapes the value before substituting it. The RCON password is operator-provisioned arbitrary bytes, and a '|', '\' or '&' in one corrupts a bare `sed s|...|...|` and silently kills the key -- taking the console, the online-player list and permission commands with it. deploy/paper was written with the escaping, so the lobby gets the same rather than leaving the sibling caller broken. Verified: the full Go suite passes on Windows and on Fedora 44 (go1.26.4), where TestWriteForwardingFileModes actually runs its POSIX mode assertions instead of skipping. The new tests cover the initContainer's image, root UID, world mount and secret env; the merge preserving unrelated config trees; the properties upsert including the commented-key case; and the bootstrap script both writing the Via key and still calling the function that writes it. Not verified: the initContainer has never run in a real cluster, and the felis-paper image is code-only here as the other game-stack images are -- no Go CI builds them. The ViaVersion pin is the one piece with live evidence, and that evidence is what it was written from. Before it, a client was cut within a second of "logged in with entity id" on legacy18 while the proxy logged the NPE above -- REMAP OF LEVEL_CHUNK chained into Protocol1_8To1_9's MAP_BULK_CHUNK. It was applied by hand to the running proxy on 2026-07-24 at 14:47 and only then written back into bootstrap. At 14:48:14 the same player joined real Paper 1.8.8 through the fork, issued commands, approved an op-login from in-game at 14:50:39, and held the connection until 15:30:09 -- 42 minutes. Neither session says which client version it was. The proxy never logged a protocol number. It bounds above at 1.16.4, from the viabackwards "(1.17->1.16.4) ... for 1.16 players and below" warning that fired for that player on the lobby leg, and no lower -- Via floors every handshake to the proxy's 393, so anything from 47 up is admissible. Reading Protocol1_8To1_9 in the stack as a client-version tell is backwards: that chain runs on the BACKEND leg, up-translating the 47 server's chunks to the floor. What the NPE proves is that the pin was load-bearing, not who was holding the mouse. That is one hand-run session on one host, and it is not a cell. The 393->47 leg has one now, in Felis-Legacy -- FL-009 puts a genuine protocol-47 client on a stock Paper 1.8.8 behind this proxy and flips this same option: on it, cut 0.2s after JoinGame with the fault above; off, holds. No automated test in THIS repository exercises the leg. |
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flyemoji
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a0064adfdd |
fix(setup): stop the login gate sending players to the old console after a re-domain
Changing root_domain updated felis.toml and the panel, but the login gate kept pointing players at the hostname it was created with. FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN and FELIS_PANEL_HOSTNAME are baked into the login MinecraftServer at provisioning time, FelisLimboPlugin reads them to build the link an unauthenticated player is told to open, and ensureSystemServers is create-if-absent — so nothing in the install ever rewrote them. On the demo host the CR still carried console.159.223.32.51.nip.io hours after the domain had moved to mc.flyemoji.network: every joining player was handed a link that bypasses the tunnel, hits the node directly and trips a certificate warning, on the one screen someone with no account is guaranteed to see. setup now converges these values on an existing system service instead of skipping it. Create-if-absent stays the rule for everything else, and the comment on it is still true — an operator's edits to a system service must survive a re-run. These three names are the exception because they are not the operator's to own: they are a copy of config that is wrong the moment config changes, and there is no other writer who could notice. The convergence is deliberately narrow. Only a name already present with a different value is rewritten, so env the operator added by hand is untouched and the rest of the spec — image, memory, storage — is not read at all. A derived name that is absent from the live object is left absent rather than added back: a deliberate removal and drift look identical from here, and re-adding it would mean fighting the operator on every run. The outcome string reports the refresh so a setup run does not silently rewrite the front door. This closes one surface of a re-domain, not the whole of it. The write-once panel certificate at deploy/bootstrap.sh keeps its old SANs, and so do the Velocity config and the forwarding material; the warning in bootstrap.sh that says so is still accurate. What changes is that the surface players actually walk through now catches up when setup is re-run. Checks: a login gate built with the old domain converges onto the new one and says so; an env var the operator added and a hand-raised javaMemory both survive that same run; and an install whose config already matches reports no refresh, so a routine setup does not read like a re-domain. The middle one is the one worth having — converging config must not turn into a licence to clobber the edits create-if-absent exists to protect. |
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flyemoji
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694e3cb800 |
feat(rcon): provision per-server RCON so the console, player list and permissions work
A server created through the panel never had RCON. CreateServer built a
MinecraftServerSpec without a Rcon block at all, so the field took its zero value
and every downstream consumer read Enabled=false. Nothing failed loudly: the
operator skips the probe when RCON is off and marks the server Ready on pod
readiness alone, so the panel showed "运行中" for a server the control plane could
not talk to. Everything that rides the write channel (spec §8 写=RCON) was dead —
the online-player list returned nothing because Status.Players is only ever
sampled by the probe, and console writes answered 503 ErrConsoleUnavailable
because internal/api/console.go refuses when Enabled is false.
The whole RCON machinery already existed — builders gate the service port,
container port, preStop save-and-stop hook and the RCON_* env on Spec.Rcon,
the reconciler probes and reports, console.go dials, the NetworkPolicy opens
25575 to {api, operator}. The only thing missing was that nobody ever turned it
on or created a password. This wires the three layers that were absent.
Provisioning lives in the operator, not in felis-api. felis-api holds secrets:get
and not create, and giving it create solely to mint a password it immediately
stops caring about (console.go re-reads the Secret at command time) would widen
the API's powers for nothing. The operator already reads every Secret in the
namespace, so adding create there grants no read it did not have. It also makes
provisioning declarative: a Secret deleted by hand comes back on the next pass, a
controller reference garbage-collects it with the server so no delete path has to
remember it, and a server that predates RCON only needs spec.rcon filled in for
the password to appear. The name comes from naming.RconSecretName so felis-api,
`felis setup` and the operator cannot drift apart on it.
RCON is enabled per system service rather than by default, because enabling it on
a backend that serves no RCON listener is destructive rather than merely useless:
the operator gates readiness on the probe, so such a server never leaves Starting
and is eventually marked Failed. The login limbo is exactly that backend
(LOOHP/Limbo has no RCON) and it is the front door, so it stays off; the lobby
runs Paper and is administered through the panel like any other server, so it is
on.
Paper only reads RCON settings from server.properties, so the operator's injected
RCON_PASSWORD did nothing on its own — felis-lobby's entrypoint now writes the
three keys on every boot. Rewriting them each time makes the copy in the world
volume derived state rather than the source of truth, so an owner who edits them
through the panel's file editor cannot lock the control plane out of their own
server. Without a password it sets enable-rcon=false and warns rather than
refusing to start: unlike the forwarding secret, a missing RCON password degrades
the server rather than making it unsafe.
That password landing in server.properties is a §286 exposure (RCON 密码绝不下发
前端), since server.properties is readable through the file editor. It is redacted
on read rather than the file being denied outright the way config/paper-global.yml
is: the forwarding secret is cluster-wide material that merely happens to sit in
the volume, whereas server.properties is the single most-edited config an owner
has, and hiding one line should not cost them MOTD, difficulty and view-distance.
The write path is deliberately left alone — the boot-time rewrite restores the
real value, which is what makes redacting rather than denying safe here.
Also guards idle auto-stop on Rcon.Enabled. Status.Players is only meaningful
when the probe ran; with RCON off it keeps its zero value, which that branch would
have read as "empty" and used to stop a server full of people. AutoStopEnabled is
not currently settable through any path, so this is a latent footgun rather than a
live bug, but it is one line and the alternative is discovering it in production.
Checks: the operator provisions a missing Secret with a 32-hex-char password and a
controller reference, and does not rotate an existing one; idle auto-stop stays
inert without RCON; the editor redacts rcon.password from the world root's
server.properties while leaving the rest of the file (and a plugin's own nested
copy) intact; login has RCON off and lobby has it on with the shared secret name;
CreateServer sets the block. That last one departs from K8sCluster being
integration-tested against a live cluster: this defect was a struct literal
missing a field, it shipped, and a fake client is enough to pin a struct literal.
Existing servers are NOT migrated by this change — CreateServer only covers new
ones and ensureSystemServers is create-if-absent, so a `felis setup` re-run will
not touch an existing lobby. A deployed install additionally needs the
felis-lobby image rebuilt and re-imported for the entrypoint change, and its pods
recreated, before the RCON keys reach server.properties.
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flyemoji
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b3989fa4af |
fix(mail): prove SMTP deliverability before saving, and stop losing the relay
A live install passed the SMTP setup screen and then failed every one-time
code with a bare `internal error`. Four separate defects had to line up for
that, and each is fixed here.
The relay was configured with `from = noreply@<domain-A>` on an account
authenticated as `<user>@<domain-B>`. Providers that validate sender identity
— Fastmail among them — answer MAIL FROM with an unconditional 250 and only
refuse at end-of-DATA. Ping stopped at NOOP, so it never saw the refusal: the
wizard reported success, wrote the config, rolled felis-api, and every OTP
afterwards died at w.Close().
Ping now runs the same transaction a real code takes — connect, (STARTTLS,)
AUTH, MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA — delivering one self-test message to the From
address, and SendOTP and Ping share deliver() so the check cannot drift from
the thing it checks. The self-test recipient cannot cause a false negative:
an authenticated submission relay accepts RCPT for any destination by
definition, while the sender identity it does validate is exactly what we
want tested. The setup screen now says a message will be sent, names the
address it went to, and warns that From must be an address the account is
allowed to send as.
A relay refusal also answered 500 `internal`, which reads as a broken panel
and sends the operator hunting through handler code instead of their [smtp]
block. It is now 502 `mail_undeliverable`, mapped inside deliverOTP so all
four doors that mail a code (onboarding, email login, op-login, migrate
step-up) answer alike. The relay's own text stays out of the response — it
can name the SMTP account, and these routes are reachable by any signed-in
player — and goes to the log instead.
writeError logged nothing when it collapsed an unmapped error to 500, so an
operator holding an `internal error` had nothing to grep for and diagnosis
degraded into guessing against a live install. It now logs the method, path,
wrapped chain and the same request_id the caller is shown.
Finally, write_felis_toml regenerated the config wholesale and never emitted
[smtp], so re-running the installer — the documented way to update felis-api —
silently erased a working relay and reverted OTP delivery to the no-Mailer
path, logging codes instead of sending them. It now carries the block forward,
cached on first read because the host toml is clobbered before the pod toml is
written. Same defect family as the root_domain loss fixed in
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flyemoji
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ecbeb20761 |
fix(bootstrap): reuse the installed root domain instead of re-deriving it
detect_node_ip recomputed FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN from scratch on every run and fell back to <node-ip>.nip.io. Nothing read the domain back out of the felis.toml an earlier run wrote, so it survived only as long as the operator kept passing the same environment. That made re-running the installer destructive on any install with a real domain, and re-running it is not optional: it is the only way to move felis-api to a newer release, which is what `felis update` points operators at. A bare re-run rewrote root_domain, panel_hostname and admin_hostname to nip.io names while ensure_panel_tls_cert returned early on the certificate it had already written, leaving the console serving a cert for hostnames it no longer answered to -- with no re-domain flow to recover through. Precedence is now explicit FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN, then the domain the last run persisted, then the nip.io default. First installs are unaffected. Deliberate re-domains still work, because there is no other route to one, but they now warn that the write-once certificate is not reissued and that the proxy and login config carry the old name too. Secrets were never exposed to this: load_or_make_secrets has always sourced secrets.env before generating anything. The domain was the one piece of install identity with no read-back. The channel is deliberately left alone. FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP is not persisted either, but defaulting a re-run to the release channel installs a working build rather than breaking one, so cmd/felis/update.go states that instead. Its warning about the domain went with the bug and would now be false. Verified against the shipped function text: the ladder holds for a fresh host, a re-run with and without the variable set, a re-domain, and a felis.toml whose root_domain is missing or empty. Reverting the one line reproduces the nip.io overwrite. |
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flyemoji
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f7815629bf |
fix(update): say that setup cannot move felis-api to a newer release
`felis update` offers `sudo felis setup` for every planner-backed target and closed with a trailer calling setup idempotent. That is true for velocity -- install_velocity re-resolves the newest build of the pinned minor on each run -- and misleading for felis-api, which both --panel and --plugins resolve to. setup hands bootstrap the binary it is itself running and takes the bootstrap_from_tui arm, which skips the release lookup. The run rebuilds the image and rolls the deployment off that SAME binary: it reports success and leaves the version exactly where it was. An operator following this guidance to apply a felis-api update would watch it appear to work and then see the same version reported again. Only the bootstrap installer moves felis-api, and naming it is where this gets dangerous, so the warning ships with it. The installer is not an updater. Every run re-derives FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN through detect_node_ip and defaults it to <node-ip>.nip.io; nothing reads the domain back out of the felis.toml an earlier run wrote. A bare re-run -- which is exactly what README documents, with no environment at all -- rewrites root-domain, panel-hostname and admin-hostname to nip.io names, while ensure_panel_tls_cert returns early on the certificate it already wrote and keeps serving the old hostnames. The console then fails to match its own certificate, and there is no re-domain flow to recover with. Persisted secrets are not at risk: load_or_make_secrets sources secrets.env before it generates anything. felis update stays report-only, so no command changed; only the claim about what the offered one accomplishes, and the conditions under which the alternative is safe to run. Tested four ways, because the scoping and the warning are both the point: --panel carries the caveat AND names FELIS_ROOT_DOMAIN, --velocity keeps the ordinary trailer without either, and --mc, which offers no command at all, gets neither. |
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8b25114fb4 |
fix(update): say that setup cannot move felis-api to a newer release
`felis update` offers `sudo felis setup` for every planner-backed target and closed with a trailer calling setup idempotent. That is true for velocity -- install_velocity re-resolves the newest build of the pinned minor on each run -- and misleading for felis-api, which both --panel and --plugins resolve to. setup hands bootstrap the binary it is itself running and takes the bootstrap_from_tui arm, which skips the release lookup. The run rebuilds the image and rolls the deployment off that SAME binary: it reports success and leaves the version exactly where it was. An operator following this guidance to apply a felis-api update would watch it appear to work and then see the same version reported again. The report now says so, scoped to runs that actually offered a felis-api target, and points at the bootstrap installer -- the path that resolves and downloads a release. felis update stays report-only, so no command changed; only the claim about what the offered one accomplishes. Tested three ways, because the scoping is the whole point: --panel carries the caveat, --velocity keeps the ordinary trailer without it, and --mc, which offers no command at all, gets neither. |
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8675cda001 |
fix(setup): refuse --dev rather than silently installing the release channel
`felis setup --dev` promised "install the dev channel (main HEAD)" and installed release: the flag only exported FELIS_CHANNEL, a variable nothing in the tree reads. deploy/bootstrap.sh reads FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP. Renaming the variable would have been a worse bug than the dead one, because it would look wired. setup runs bootstrap with FELIS_BOOTSTRAP_FROM_TUI=1, and on that arm every reader of FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP is unreachable: the channel case and its validation live in resolve_install_ref, which the TUI path skips outright, and use_release_binary is only consulted by the elif that `if bootstrap_from_tui` already short-circuited. setup re-images the host from the felis binary it is itself running; there is no channel to pick. So the flag refuses, exits 2 and names FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev on the installer, which is the mechanism that does work. Refusing beats defaulting: the operator asked for dev, and release is the one answer they did not want. The refusal precedes the root check, or an unprivileged operator gets told about sudo instead of about the channel. channelName had no other caller and goes with it. Nothing else referenced --dev -- no doc, no script, no test -- so this removes a promise the tree only ever made to itself. |
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659c8e5e9f |
feat(bootstrap): install the published release build instead of compiling on the host
deploy/bootstrap.sh now resolves the newest published GitHub release, downloads
the binary CI built for that tag, and builds a thin image around it. Compiling
on the target host becomes the fallback and the opt-in, not the default.
The panel is not a separate artifact. The Dockerfile copies panel/dist into
internal/panel/static before the go build, so the control plane — panel and
backend — ships as ONE file. The release channel therefore downloads exactly
one asset, felis-linux-<arch>, and needs no registry, no Go toolchain and no
checkout on the host.
The Minecraft game stack (limbo, lobby, the Velocity plugin) is still always
built locally. game_stack_source now keys on HAVE_PREBUILT_BINARY — the same
flag build_image uses — so on any prebuilt path it unpacks the tar embedded in
that binary instead of trusting a checkout an earlier install left behind.
Trusting the checkout would build the plugin from an old commit against a
freshly downloaded control plane: a silent version skew across the plugin/API
boundary.
Channels:
(default) newest published release, downloaded
FELIS_VERSION_BOOTSTRAP=dev clone main and compile
FELIS_REF=<ref> pins the tree, forces the source path
The download is best-effort. A tag whose assets are not uploaded yet, an
architecture with no published asset, or an asset that fails validation each
warn and fall back to compiling THE SAME TAG from source — never a different
commit.
The ref is resolved right after install_base, the first point curl exists and
well before docker and k3s, so a missing FELIS_GITHUB_TOKEN or an unpublished
release costs the operator seconds instead of a k3s install they then have to
unwind. It is skipped on exactly the paths that never consume the result: the
TUI, which rebuilds the binary it is already running, and FELIS_SKIP_FETCH,
which builds whatever is staged. Resolving anyway would set FELIS_VERSION to
the newest tag and stamp a staged tree as that release.
The asset is staged next to HOST_BIN rather than in TMPDIR. Validation EXECUTES
it, and /tmp is noexec on CIS-hardened images, where the exec dies 126, the
check reads it as a bad asset, and every such host silently falls back to the
full on-host compile this path exists to avoid. It also keeps a private-repo
artifact out of a world-readable 1777 directory.
git_auth, which supplies the token to git for a private-repo clone, passes an EMPTY
credential.helper before the inline one. credential.helper is multi-valued: a bare
`-c credential.helper=...` APPENDS to whatever the host has configured rather than
replacing it, and an empty value is git's documented list reset. Without it, on a host
with a persistent helper (Git for Windows ships `manager` at SYSTEM scope) two things
go wrong. Git runs `credential approve` automatically after a successful clone and
feeds every helper in the list, so a `store` helper writes the PAT to
~/.git-credentials in cleartext — the token outlives the install, in a file bootstrap
never created and never cleans up. And because the inline helper is LAST, a
pre-existing helper answers `fill` first, so a stale cached credential can win and the
clone authenticates as the wrong account — surfacing as exactly the 404-on-private-repo
the surrounding code works hard to explain. Reproduced both against a real clone, and
confirmed the reset closes both.
internal/panel parses the new stamp. The dev channel now emits "<tag>+g<sha>", which
matched neither describeSuffix ("-N-g<sha>") nor releaseTag, so a dev build fell through
to the default case and the version badge rendered the entire stamp as the release with
no commit. A devSuffix case handles it; the git-describe case stays for hand-rolled
`-ldflags "-X main.version=$(git describe)"` builds. Table test covers both forms plus
the release, dirty and unstamped cases.
CRD application no longer branches on the install path: it is always
`felis bootstrap-assets crd`. That output is byte-identical to deploy/crd/ —
bootstrap_asset.go embeds that very file — and needs no checkout, so one source
replaces a branch whose two arms had to be kept in agreement by hand.
Dockerfile gains a FELIS_VERSION build arg wired into -X main.version, declared
after `go mod download` so a version bump does not invalidate that layer. Both
build stages are pinned to $BUILDPLATFORM so a multi-platform buildx run never
emulates them: the panel's output is architecture-independent and the Go stage
cross-compiles via TARGETARCH. The final stage stays on the target platform and
is COPY-only, which BuildKit performs without QEMU.
.github/workflows/release.yml publishes on a vX.Y.Z tag: vet, tests, then one
buildx run producing both architectures through the repo Dockerfile. Not a bare
`go build` — internal/panel/static holds a tracked placeholder index.html so the
//go:embed compiles without node, which means a direct build succeeds and
quietly ships a release whose panel is that placeholder.
The stamp is asserted end to end, because it fails silently: an unstamped binary
reports "dev", which the updater refuses to compare, disabling update reporting
for every install built from that release. The arm64 artifact is checked by ELF
machine type rather than by running it — runners have binfmt registered, so
executing an amd64 binary misnamed arm64 would succeed.
Prerelease tags are flagged explicitly. The trigger glob is v*, gh does not read
semver out of a tag name, and an RC published as a full release becomes
/releases/latest — the single endpoint the default channel installs from and
`felis update` polls.
No SHA256SUMS. A checksum fetched over the same TLS session, with the same
credential, from the same host as the binary adds no trust root; signing is the
real answer and is a separate decision.
Not verified: the download -> validate -> image -> k3s path has never run on a
host against a real published release, because no tag exists yet. The shell
logic around it is verified out of tree; the network and exec behaviour is not.
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fe4c92c1c5 |
feat(files): add the server file editor
Give an owner a way to repair the one failure no other endpoint covers: a
server that will not boot because a single line of server.properties or a
plugin's YAML is wrong. Until now that needed a human with cluster access.
felis-api cannot touch a world in-process — the world PVC is ReadWriteOnce
and its lifecycle belongs to the operator's StatefulSet — so the work runs
as a one-shot Job, and the server must be stopped first because a running
one holds the volume. That is the same constraint that shapes restore and
backup, and the handlers enforce the stopped gate the same way.
What is different is that the caller wants the OUTPUT, not just the side
effect. The Job prints its result to stdout and felis-api reads it back
through the pods/log subresource, which needs no permission felis-api does
not already hold: jobs:create, pods:list, pods/log:get. No pods/exec, no
pods/portforward, not even pods:get. The price is latency — every operation
is a Pod schedule — which is why this is a repair tool and not a file
manager.
Containment is structural, not textual. Every filesystem access goes through
os.Root, the stdlib's escape-proof directory handle, which resolves each
component against the open root descriptor and refuses "..", absolute paths,
and symlinks leading outside. The string-prefix check used elsewhere is not
reused here: it validates a path as text and then opens it as a path, and a
world directory holds attacker-influenced content, so a symlink swapped in
between those two steps is a live threat rather than a theoretical one.
os.Root has no such window because the check and the open are one operation.
The Job's isolation is a strict subset of a restore Pod's: the weak
felis-restore SA with its token auto-mount disabled, exactly one volume (the
world PVC, mounted read-only for list and read so two of the three
operations cannot mutate anything), no Secret, no ConfigMap, no database
URL, non-root with an fsGroup matching the operator's so a written file is
readable by the server that later mounts it, and backoffLimit 0 so a failed
write is never silently retried as a second write.
Two limits on the surface are worth stating plainly, because the mount is
the server's whole working directory rather than a config subtree:
* A write accepts arbitrary bytes at any path, so an owner can place a
loadable plugin jar. This is deliberate — it is what a hosting panel's
file manager does, scoped to a server the caller already owns and
already drives through /command — but it is the one owner-tier route
that lands executable code in a backend pod, since images are
admin-only and modpack submissions need an admin verdict.
* config/paper-global.yml is refused on read. felis-lobby's entrypoint
writes FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET into it on every boot, and that value is
identical on every backend, so reading it from a server you own would
hand you the handshake key for everyone else's. It is the only path in
the mount that is not the caller's own data, and therefore the only
denial. The comparison is on the cleaned path, or ./config/... would
walk straight through it.
Writing that file is still allowed: it leaks nothing, and the entrypoint
rewrites it whole on every boot regardless.
The write body's content field is a *[]byte rather than a []byte for the
reason permissionRequest.Value is a *bool — a plain slice makes absent,
null, and empty indistinguishable, so a body of {} would decode to nil and
truncate the target to zero bytes while answering 200, destroying the very
config the caller opened the editor to repair.
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05cb8f6320 |
feat(cli): report component updates and make the router a data table
Add `felis update`, which reports which platform components have newer versions available, and route `felis version`, which shipped implemented but unreachable. That bug is why the subcommand router is now a map rather than a switch. cmdVersion existed with nothing dispatching to it and no usage line, so `felis version` fell through to "unknown command" and no test noticed — a switch offers no way to enumerate what it routes, so the usage text and the router could not be compared. As data, they can: a test now walks the Commands: block and the table in both directions, failing an entry added to one without the other. bootstrap-assets stays deliberately undocumented and is listed as such, which makes its absence a decision rather than an oversight. The host gatherer answers the two seams NewSysGatherer leaves nil, for the one caller that can satisfy them without a cluster client. felis-api is answered from the running binary's own build stamp rather than the Deployment's image tag: deploy/bootstrap.sh builds the image from the same checkout it installs /usr/local/bin/felis from and stamps both with one git describe, so it is the same artifact, and it is the identity `felis version` reports. Reading the Deployment answers a slightly different question — what is rolled out — and stays the right seam for the in-cluster path. Velocity is read from the jar's own META-INF/MANIFEST.MF Implementation-Version, which is what the proxy reports about itself at runtime, because bootstrap installs the jar under a fixed name with no version in it. The filename extractor remains only as a fallback for a hand-placed velocity-3.5.1.jar. An unstamped local build reports "dev" and is refused with an actionable message rather than being treated as 0.0.0, which would make every release upstream look like an upgrade. The panel and the plugin jars have no version of their own on purpose: they are embedded in or built alongside the felis binary, so the felis version is theirs. |
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f0b79e9edd |
feat(mail): deliver email one-time codes over SMTP and add the setup email screen
Felis never actually sent mail: OTP codes for onboarding, email login and
op-login were only written to the felis-api log behind a "demo has no SMTP"
limitation, and the Settings/SMTP flow those comments promised was never
built. Combined with the bootstrap Owner's address being recorded unverified
(
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7860152f57 |
feat(auth)!: go fully passwordless and fix cross-check review findings
Remove password authentication everywhere; the only session doors are passkey (WebAuthn), email OTP, in-game bind codes, QR scan-login, and op-login vouching. Remediates the 33-finding cross-check review across backend, CLI, panel, plugins, and docs. Backend/CLI: - Drop password routes and fields from account/user/onboard/auth handlers; align tests (new account subtests, naming reserves "console", op-login/onboard/qr-login test updates). - Add migrations 0016_op_login.sql and 0017_drop_password.sql. - Thread panel/admin hostnames from hostcfg through api.go, setup_panel.go, tui_root.go and tui_preflight.go instead of hardcoding; bootstrap.sh writes panel-hostname/admin-hostname into felis.toml. - Reword breakglass and TUI copy for passwordless flows. Panel: - Delete the ChangePassword page and all password UI; align login/auth/api/types with the passwordless contract; add the migration and op-login approval flows. - i18n: convert ImageBuildPage durations/status badges and ServerLuckPerms strings to translation keys; drop 72 orphan keys per locale; unify the title as "Felis - Console". Plugins (all six rebuilt): - Velocity waiting router returns 503 at_capacity during wake; MOTD/control-channel copy and config comments. - Paper zh menu title; Limbo bind-code TTL 600s with panel_url preference; unified /link lines in fabric/forge/neoforge; shared link-client javadoc contract fixes. Docs: openapi.yaml, sequence-diagrams.md, deploy/limbo/README.md and plugins/README.md aligned with the implementation. BREAKING CHANGE: migration 0017 irreversibly drops users.password_hash and users.must_change_password; password login cannot be restored after migrating. |
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60732a6283 |
feat(operator): gate op.console to staff and land owner setup there
The operator console (op.console.<root>) requires internal permission verification on top of Zero-Trust: a passkey is not access. requireExternal now refuses any non-admin principal arriving on the admin host, before any handler, so op.console is staff-only at the door rather than per-route — including on the passwordless demo face where Cloudflare Access is not in front. The gate is inert on the player console (console.<root>). Owner first-run setup is staff onboarding, so `felis setup` mints the one-time setup URL on op.console.<root>/setup (was console.<root>). The passkey verifier lists both console and op.console in RPOrigins so the one-time binding asserts on either face under the shared console.<root> RP-ID. Session admin-access now includes role=owner, not only admin: the owner is a superset of admin, so excluding it left IsOwner() unreachable through a passwordless session. No path assigns role=owner yet — this is forward consistency. The bootstrap summary now names console.<root> the player panel and op.console.<root> the operator console where the Owner runs setup, fixing text that told operators not to run setup there. Tests: op.console door gate (non-admin refused, player console unaffected, admin passes) and owner session admin-access; the setup-bind default-host test follows the move to op.console. |
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9ea35304e3 |
fix(setup): source the console host from the panel hostname, not op.console
The owner setup URL and the limbo login link were built from the admin host (op.console.<root>, with an op.console.localhost fallback) and a hardcoded console.<root>, so an operator who set a custom panel_hostname got an unreachable setup link and a wrong login target. Thread the resolved panel host (defaultPanelHostname) through performSetupMCBind, the MC-bind TUI, and the login system-server env (new FELIS_PANEL_HOSTNAME); the limbo plugin prefers it and keeps console.<root> only as the fallback for an older operator whose env predates it. This also matters for security: the only wired WebAuthn verifier is scoped to the panel host, so passkey enrollment must land on the panel face, never op.console. While here, the limbo login handler checks link status before minting a bind code: an already-linked player is sent straight to the lobby instead of being shown a useless code. |
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be0c4c41f4 | feat(bootstrap): install authenticated game stack | ||
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dab8fc214b | feat(setup): bind owner through login gate | ||
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5dc8eb92a8 | feat(operator): secure system server workloads | ||
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fd062882ed |
feat(nano): give a Mojang player's name back to them, by prefixing the squatter
A premium player and a third-party player sharing a username could not both be online. Whichever logged in second was kicked with "You are already connected to this proxy!" -- even though the UUID rewrite had already made them two distinct players on the backend. Velocity's player registry is keyed on the NAME (lowercased), not the UUID, so two identities holding one name are one player as far as the proxy is concerned, and the reclaim invariant the rewrite buys is invisible to it. The fix needs no plugin and no state, because Velocity honours the name in the hasJoined RESPONSE rather than pinning the one the client sent at login-start -- established by a real login, not by reading the source. So the multiplexer hands back a different name and the collision is simply gone. A third-party player whose name belongs to a Mojang account now joins as PREFIX_name (LS_steve). Everyone else keeps their own name: the rename fires only on an actual collision, decided by asking api.mojang.com whether the name is registered. The name's owner is never the one renamed, which is 正版优先 falling out for free -- the identity source is never rewritten, so there is no policy to encode and no 30-day hold to track. The premium-name answer is cached asymmetrically, because the two directions have very different costs. "Taken" is nearly permanent (Mojang does not recycle names) and is trusted for a day; "free" can stop being true the moment someone buys that name, and a stale "free" leaves a squatter holding a name its real owner has just bought, so it is trusted for ten minutes. A lookup that fails with nothing cached fails CLOSED -- assume premium, rename the third-party player: a Mojang outage must not become an opportunity to hold someone else's name, and being wrong that way costs a cosmetic prefix while being wrong the other way bounces the name's owner off the proxy. The lookup gets its own 2s client rather than sharing the 5s auth client, since it is a SECOND Mojang round-trip on a login that already spent one. prefix is a required, unique, 1-4 character config field rather than something derived from the tag, because it is player-visible and no derivation can know that "littleskin" is meant to read LS. Two sources sharing a prefix would rewrite their same-named players onto one name, so uniqueness is enforced case-insensitively -- the proxy folds case, and LS/ls would collide there while reading as distinct here. Also close a pre-existing hole on the path this touches: a third-party source's profile name was relayed verbatim, so a hostile or sloppy Yggdrasil root could put "§4admin", an empty string, or 200 characters straight into the proxy's player list. The name is now checked against the Minecraft username charset and a bad one is a 204, the same way a bad UUID already was. Verified end to end on the deploy host (Velocity 3.5.1 + Paper 26.2), both branches: premium FLYEMOJ1 -> 195fadbd-f72e-4b9b-9f8f-f92586fe16ad, name unchanged LittleSkin FLYEMOJ1 -> LS_FLYEMOJ1, f1b7b6ae-f250-348a-b069-a2ec0fcae668 both online at once, zero "already connected" rejections LittleSkin FelisNyaTest01 -> joins as FelisNyaTest01, no prefix, UUID still v3 The last line is the one that matters: an ordinary third-party player collides with nobody and keeps their name, while the rewrite that keeps identities apart still ran. Paper's "LS_FLYEMOJ1 (formerly known as li_FLYEMOJ1) joined the game" is the other half of it -- the rename moved the player's display name and their playerdata came along untouched, because every server-side key is the UUID and the UUID does not depend on the name. Known ceiling, left alone deliberately: two players of one source whose names agree on their first 16-len(prefix)-1 characters truncate onto the same in-game name, and a prefixed name may itself happen to be a premium name. Both cost an "already connected" bounce, not an identity -- the UUID rewrite does not depend on the name at all. BREAKING CHANGE: every [[auth_source]] now requires prefix = "XX" (1-4 letters or digits, unique across sources). An existing nano felis.toml without it fails to load with an error naming the field, rather than silently keeping the collision. |
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b323975ddb |
fix(nano): -Dmojang.sessionserver takes the full hasJoined URL, not the base
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d417efc8bf |
fix(nano): make the installer work on EL10 and stop serving hasJoined to the world
Deploying `felis nano` to a real Rocky Linux 10 host surfaced four defects that no local check could see. Fixed together because they all sit on the same path from `curl|bash` to a running felis-nano.service. * docker killed the nano install on EL10. `acquire_nano_binary` pulled in docker purely to build the binary; on Rocky 10.2 the docker-ce el10 rpms install but dockerd refuses to start, so the install died at `systemctl enable --now docker`. nano needs one static binary, not an image, so the docker dependency is gone: fetch_source -> install_go_toolchain (pinned FELIS_GO_VERSION, default 1.26.4, amd64/arm64) -> build_nano_binary. * the built binary could not be exec'd by systemd (203/EXEC). The Go linker renames its output out of $TMPDIR, and a same-filesystem rename carries the source SELinux label, so `go build -o /usr/local/bin/felis` produced a binary labelled user_tmp_t rather than bin_t. root is unconfined and could run it by hand, which is what made this look fine, but the DynamicUser service could not. build_nano_binary now stages the output and installs it as a fresh file so the policy type transition labels it bin_t, with restorecon as a belt. * re-running the installer did not converge. `systemctl enable --now` is a no-op on an already-active unit, so a rebuilt binary was installed while the old process kept running. Now enable + restart. * the Velocity wiring comment in cmd/felis/nano.go was wrong. authlib appends /session/minecraft/hasJoined itself, so -Dmojang.sessionserver takes the base URL only, as the installer has always printed. Also bind to loopback by default. hasJoined is unauthenticated by protocol -- authlib speaks the vanilla sessionserver dialect and sends no token -- so a public bind is an open auth relay: anyone can point their own proxy at it and spend this host's egress IP on Mojang until Mojang rate-limits it and the operator's own players stop getting in. It is not an identity bypass (a caller still needs a serverId hash bound to their own server key, which the upstream Yggdrasil validates), but it is someone else's traffic on your address. FELIS_NANO_LISTEN and the -listen flag now default to 127.0.0.1:8081, which a same-host Velocity reaches unchanged; serving an off-host proxy is an explicit opt-in. configure_nano_firewall no longer opens a port for a loopback bind, and summary_nano prints the real bind address plus the relay warning. Verified on the target host: installs with no docker present, service active, binary labelled bin_t, `ss` shows LISTEN 127.0.0.1:8081, an external request is unreachable, and an in-host request returns 204 with the login logged. BREAKING CHANGE: felis nano defaults to 127.0.0.1:8081 instead of 0.0.0.0:8081. A Velocity proxy on another machine must now set FELIS_NANO_LISTEN (or -listen) to a reachable address, and should allow that port only from the proxy's IP. |
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d177428fb0 |
feat(felis): add felis nano — Yggdrasil hasJoined multiplexer without a control plane
`felis nano` serves the vanilla sessionserver protocol (GET /session/minecraft/hasJoined) as a federating multiplexer over Mojang plus any number of third-party Yggdrasil roots, with no k3s, Postgres, or panel — a MultiLogin-style auth front-end delivered as a subcommand of the single felis binary rather than a separate build. - config.LoadNano reads only [[auth_source]] blocks; it skips the database.url / root_domain / archive requirements the full server needs. Zero sources is valid (Mojang-only). - Mojang is prepended in code (Identity:true), never from config, so it is always the sole identity root. Third-party profiles are rewritten to canonical = UUIDv3(felisAuthNS, tag+":"+nativeID). - validateAuthSources rejects unknown keys, duplicate tags, and scheme-less URLs — a malformed nano config fails loud at load. - Reuses api.HasJoinedHandler with a stub Repo (no blacklist backend); a rejected login is a 204, matching the vanilla sessionserver. - nano.go binds the -listen flag and ignores [server] listen in config. Verified on WSL (go1.26.4): go build/vet/test ./... green; a runtime smoke against the template config returns 204 on a miss and logs "Mojang + 0 third-party source(s)"; a duplicate-tag config exits non-zero citing "unique". |
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ecea20ee7c |
feat(nano): configure hasJoined auth sources via [[auth_source]], Mojang-anchored
Step 2 of Felis-nano: a [[auth_source]] array-of-tables (tag + full hasJoined url, config order = priority) supplies the multiplexer's third-party Yggdrasil roots; cmd/felis prepends Mojang as the sole code-owned identity anchor and wires them into API.AuthSources. With no sources configured the endpoint stays inert (204s), unchanged from step 1. The config deliberately has no identity/trusted field: Mojang is the only source whose self-asserted UUIDs are trusted verbatim, so no misconfiguration can reopen the impersonation hole the per-source UUID rewrite closes. An identity= key is an unknown key and Load rejects it. Validate adds two fail-fast guards: unique tags (namespace collision) and a scheme-qualified url (else the source is silently dead, never validating any login). |
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fc748d3462 |
feat(breakglass): add "back up a world now" console peer (§B4 Sync)
Adds a break-glass console operation that snapshots a stopped world by calling the felis-api internal face while the API is alive, rather than rendering the backup Job locally: the Job needs felis-api deployment coordinates the console does not hold. The peer resolves the felis-api-internal ClusterIP Service + service token from the control namespace, POSTs the internal backup endpoint with the operator os_user for audit attribution, and maps 409/503/404 to friendly outcome cards. Core decision logic lives in backupnow.go (unit-tested against a fake client + httptest); tui_backupnow.go is the untested bubbletea glue mirroring tui_halt.go. |
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flyemoji
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7a7c0d53ab |
feat(api): add on-demand world backup endpoint and Job executor (§B4 Sync)
Add POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/backup: an owner or admin snapshots a
stopped server's world into the archive store on demand, recorded as a
first-class world_backups row (reason `manual`) — restorable by the
existing restore path and expired by the reaper's retention pass, so it
never leaks as an orphan archive. This is the break-glass "Sync" op,
resolved as immediate/on-demand backup.
felis-api cannot archive in-process (the world PVC is RWO, held by the
operator StatefulSet), so the work hands off to a one-shot Kubernetes Job
(new internal/backupjob) that mounts the world PVC read-only and the
backup PVC read-write, plus the felis config Secret so it self-records
its row atomically like the reaper. The Pod mirrors restore's weak-SA
isolation (SA token un-mounted, non-root, read-only rootfs, drop ALL);
the one reviewed departure is that config-Secret mount, frozen by
jobspec_test.go. Handler answers 202 backing_up; gated on the server
being Stopped (RWO world PVC), owner-or-admin, and FELIS_IMAGE +
FELIS_BACKUP_PVC being wired (else 503 backup_unavailable).
Each request mints a unique Job name (backup-<server>-<rand>) so a repeat
on-demand backup produces a fresh archive rather than colliding with a
just-finished Job still inside its TTL window and silently no-op'ing the
retry.
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flyemoji
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c2ee21ae05 |
feat(breakglass): add halt-a-server op to the recovery console (§B4)
Add a root-gated "Halt a running server" operation to the break-glass console. The operator picks a server from the live fleet and the console flips that MinecraftServer CRD's spec.desiredState to Stopped via a spec-only merge patch, disjoint from the operator's status writes, so it cannot race or clobber reconciliation. It is the panel-independent emergency stop for when the box still has root plus a kubeconfig. System servers (login/lobby) are allowed but flagged: a system tag in the picker and an explicit WARNING in the post-exit summary, since halting login takes the shared auth front door down with no fallback. Audit is best-effort so a halt still works with the audit sink down. Already-stopped is a distinct no-op. The core (halt.go) is unit-tested against a real controller-runtime fake client that applies the patch. |
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flyemoji
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0c1cc598c1 |
feat(auth): migrate console login to passwordless
Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.
- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
/auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
(migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.
Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).
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Lemon-miaow
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3347cc05d5 | feat(panel): implement user management administration panel with sessions and minecraft link support | ||
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Lemon-miaow
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598f3d31f4 | feat(submit): local + S3 backends for modpack upload contexts, installer-selectable | ||
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flyemoji
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f554d525d4 |
feat(cli): provision login/lobby system servers with login env and token replica
setup builds the always-on, reaper-exempt login/lobby MinecraftServers (create-if-absent), bakes the login limbo's non-secret config (internal API URL, root domain, lobby name) into spec.env, and replicates the felis-service-token Secret from the control namespace into the minecraft namespace so the operator's namespace-local secretKeyRef on the login pod resolves. |
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flyemoji
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3c1d64749f |
fix(api): cap concurrent SSE streams per principal
Console and build-log relays hold a Server-Sent Event connection open for the life of a client's attachment; a stalled reader pins the relay goroutine plus its upstream kube-apiserver follow. Without a bound, one authenticated principal could open these repeatedly and accumulate leaked control-plane connections. Add a per-principal stream cap (streamLimiter) enforced before either relay opens its follow stream, returning 429 too_many_streams past the limit. cmd/felis wires it to 16; zero disables it, matching the "zero disables" idiom of the other levers. This bounds the blast radius of the stalled-stream leak; it does not close the leak itself -- the per-write deadline that severs a stalled stream is a separate change. |
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flyemoji
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c6c0772a7a |
fix(api): set read/idle timeouts on the felis-api listeners
The three felis-api http.Servers (internal, external, https) were built with only Addr and Handler, leaving ReadHeaderTimeout, IdleTimeout, and ReadTimeout at zero. A zero ReadHeaderTimeout is a Slowloris hole — a client trickling header bytes pins a connection indefinitely — and a zero IdleTimeout lets kept-alive connections accumulate (gosec G112). Route all three listeners through a newAPIServer factory that sets a 10s ReadHeaderTimeout and a 120s IdleTimeout. WriteTimeout and ReadTimeout are left unset on purpose: the external and https faces stream Server-Sent Events (console / build logs) for the lifetime of a client attachment, and a WriteTimeout would sever a healthy long-lived stream. Slowloris is closed by ReadHeaderTimeout, which bounds only the header phase. |
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flyemoji
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7a51c1d9c3 |
fix(api): bound concurrent login bcrypt to shed CPU-pin floods
The public /auth/login route runs a full-cost bcrypt compare on every request — including the anti-enumeration dummy-hash compare for an unknown user — with no bound on how many run at once. A flood of concurrent logins therefore pins every core in bcrypt, starving the rest of the API. Cap the simultaneous compares with a small non-blocking concurrency limiter (a buffered-channel semaphore): a login that cannot take a slot is shed with 429 auth_busy before the compare, rather than piling more work onto the scheduler. The slot guards only the hash and is released the instant the compare returns. It is a concurrency cap, not a per-account lockout, so it never fences out the one admin trying to break-glass in, and the 429 lands before any credential distinction so it leaks nothing about the username. The cap follows the existing "zero disables" lever idiom (WakeCooldown, MaxRunningServers); cmd/felis wires it to the core count (floored at 4). |
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flyemoji
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e058a64a9b |
feat(edge): close the panel NodePort to the public after the tunnel is up
After the Cloudflare tunnel connector is installed and the origin has rolled out, applyCloudflareEdge now fences the panel NodePort so the origin is reachable only over loopback -- the hop the host-side connector uses -- and never from a public interface. This closes the Access-bypass hole where a direct https://<node-ip>:<nodeport>/ with the right Host header reached the origin behind Cloudflare Access. The fence is an nftables table hooked at prerouting priority -300 (raw), before kube-proxy's NodePort DNAT (dstnat, -100), so it catches the packet on its original destination port; a filter/INPUT rule would miss the DNAT'd, then FORWARDed NodePort packet. Loopback is accepted first, so the connector origin hop is untouched; the inet family fences a public IPv6 NodePort too. It is gated on the connector actually serving (verifyConnectorServing polls `cloudflared tunnel info`): fencing a dead tunnel would sever the only web path to a still-up origin. If serving cannot be confirmed the port is left open (its pre-tunnel state) and the failure is surfaced loudly. unfenceOriginNodePort is the on-host break-glass reversal. The nft/cloudflared calls are INTEGRATION-ONLY; the ruleset shape and the conn-count gate are pure and unit-tested. KNOWN-LIMITATION: targets nftables; firewalld-native coordination is not yet handled (a firewalld reload can flush the standalone table). |
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flyemoji
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fce0fceac4 |
feat(passkey): wire enrollment verifier into felis-api
Construct the go-webauthn verifier at the composition root and attach it to the API when auth.panel_hostname is configured (RP id = panel hostname, origin = https://<panel hostname>, display name Felis). When the hostname is unset or the verifier fails to build it stays nil and the passkey ceremony routes report 503, matching the existing nil-when-unconfigured subsystem pattern. An admin passkey, if ever added, is a separate relying party on the admin host and is intentionally not wired here. |
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flyemoji
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eb5875a699 |
feat(felis): add Operator break-glass op behind an operation menu
When a staff account already exists, the break-glass console now opens on a thin top-level menu (menuModel) where account operations are peers rather than tails of one wizard: provision/reset the Owner, or add an Operator. A fresh machine with no Owner skips the menu and goes straight to Owner bootstrap, since minting an Operator first would create a staff account the login gate rejects. The Operator path reuses ownerModel via a bgOperation discriminator. It is insert-only (performAddOperator -> InsertOperator), wraps a duplicate username as api.ErrConflict and routes back to the provision form for a retry rather than tearing down, and deliberately never flips the global local_auth toggle the way the Owner thread does. The post-exit summary and audit trail distinguish the two outcomes (isOperator); only the Owner provision claims local-password login was enabled. Tests cover the operator-model defaults, path selection (insert vs upsert and the local-auth gate), conflict-retry versus generic teardown, isOperator propagation, and the root menu routing for both fresh and admin-present machines. |
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flyemoji
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79eae7f669 |
feat(metrics): publish felis_servers_total from a fleet snapshot
A per-object reconcile cannot maintain felis_servers_total (spec §23): it sees one server per call, so it could never Set a correct fleet-wide gauge and inc/dec on transitions would drift on any missed event. Add a snapshot producer instead. metrics.SyncServerGauge Resets the GaugeVec then Sets one child per state, so a state that drains to zero reports 0 rather than a stale last value. operator.GaugeSyncer is a manager.Runnable that periodically Lists the fleet and republishes from it, defaulting an unset desiredState to Stopped. SyncOnce is exercised end-to-end against a fake client (List, default, republish); the ticker loop in Start is the only untested I/O edge. |
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flyemoji
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75642d90cf |
feat(metrics): add named felis_* Prometheus collectors
Introduce internal/metrics exposing the four metric families spec §23 mandates at minimum: felis_servers_total (gauge by desired state), felis_start_duration_seconds (histogram with Minecraft cold-start buckets), felis_image_build_failures_total and felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total (counters). Collectors are package-level vars so any subsystem records without an import cycle; Register wires them into a prometheus.Registerer and is idempotent. Wire registration into the operator against controller-runtime's global Registry, so /metrics on the manager's existing metrics endpoint carries the felis_* families. Instrument the reaper to increment felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total in lockstep with Summary.WorldsReaped, at the one point a world's PVC has actually been deleted. |