feat(api): add internal-face break-glass world backup endpoint (§B4 Sync)

Add POST /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup so the on-node break-glass
console can snapshot a stopped world while felis-api is alive. It goes through
the API (not direct-to-CRD like halt) because rendering the backup Job needs
deployment coordinates (FELIS_IMAGE, FELIS_BACKUP_PVC) only felis-api holds.

Service-token auth (no Principal); the middleware IS the authorization, since
the operator already has root on the node. Refactor the RWO stopped-gate,
optional-Backuper 503, async hand-off and audit+202 into a shared enqueueBackup
tail so the external (owner/admin) and internal (break-glass) faces cannot
diverge on the security-critical stopped-gate. The internal audit is attributed
to break-glass/internal so a console-initiated backup is distinguishable from an
owner self-service one.

internal/api/api.go

@@ -266,6 +266,11 @@ func (a *API) internalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		// Principal); the external face carries the start/status/finish the op drives.
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/op-login/pending", h: a.handleOpLoginPending},
 		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/op-login/{id}/approve", h: a.handleOpLoginApprove},
+
+		// Break-glass backup (spec §B4 "Sync"): the on-node console POSTs here to
+		// snapshot a stopped world while the API is alive. Service-token auth (no
+		// Principal); the shared enqueueBackup tail enforces the RWO stopped-gate.
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup", h: a.handleInternalBackup},
 	}
 }
 

internal/api/handlers_backup_now_test.go

@@ -176,3 +176,81 @@ func TestBackupNow(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+// TestInternalBackup exercises POST /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup, the
+// break-glass console's face. It shares enqueueBackup with the external handler, so
+// the stopped-gate / 503 / async-202 behaviour is proven there; here the focus is the
+// internal-face difference: no Principal (service-token auth), no owner gate — even a
+// server owned by someone else backs up (the on-node operator is trusted) — and the
+// audit is attributed to "break-glass"/"internal", not an email/"external".
+func TestInternalBackup(t *testing.T) {
+	mk := func() (*API, *fakeRepo, *fakeCluster, *fakeBackuper) {
+		repo := newFakeRepo()
+		repo.byName["survival"] = &ServerRecord{Name: "survival", OwnerID: "someone-else"}
+		cl := newFakeCluster()
+		cl.byName["survival"] = &ServerInfo{Name: "survival", Phase: "Stopped",
+			Ready: false, DesiredState: string(v1alpha1.DesiredStopped)}
+		backuper := &fakeBackuper{}
+		api := newTestAPI(repo, cl)
+		api.Backuper = backuper
+		return api, repo, cl, backuper
+	}
+
+	const path = "/api/v1/internal/servers/survival/backup"
+
+	t.Run("stopped server -> 202 + backuper(currentOwner) + break-glass audit", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _, backuper := mk()
+		w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// No owner gate on the internal face: a server owned by someone else still backs
+		// up, and the recorded former owner is the server's CURRENT owner.
+		if backuper.calls != 1 || backuper.gotName != "survival" || backuper.gotFormerOwn != "someone-else" {
+			t.Fatalf("backuper saw (calls=%d,%q,%q), want (1,survival,someone-else)",
+				backuper.calls, backuper.gotName, backuper.gotFormerOwn)
+		}
+		if len(repo.audits) != 1 || repo.audits[0].Action != "backup.create" ||
+			repo.audits[0].Actor != "break-glass" || repo.audits[0].Source != "internal" {
+			t.Fatalf("audit not attributed to break-glass/internal: %+v", repo.audits)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("running server -> 409 not_stopped, no backup", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, cl, backuper := mk()
+		cl.byName["survival"].Ready = true
+		cl.byName["survival"].DesiredState = string(v1alpha1.DesiredRunning)
+		w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusConflict || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_stopped" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if backuper.calls != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("a running server holds the RWO world PVC — backup must be refused")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("nil Backuper -> 503 backup_unavailable", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _, _ := mk()
+		api.Backuper = nil
+		w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", path, "", jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "backup_unavailable" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unknown server -> 404", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _, _ := mk()
+		w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/internal/servers/missing/backup", "", jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("invalid server name -> 400 bad_name", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _, _ := mk()
+		w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/internal/servers/X/backup", "", jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_name" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+}

internal/api/handlers_backups.go

@@ -216,6 +216,41 @@ func (a *API) handleBackupNow(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	a.enqueueBackup(w, r, name, rec, p.Email, "external")
+}
+
+// handleInternalBackup is the internal-face backup trigger. The break-glass console
+// (root on the node, holding the service token) POSTs here to snapshot a stopped
+// world while felis-api is alive — it goes through the API rather than direct-to-CRD
+// like halt does, because rendering the backup Job needs deployment coordinates
+// (FELIS_IMAGE, FELIS_BACKUP_PVC) that only felis-api holds.
+//
+// There is no Principal: the service token is a trusted machine caller (auth.go), so
+// the requireInternal middleware IS the authorization — the operator already has root
+// on the node. It audits the action to "break-glass" so a console-initiated backup is
+// distinguishable from an owner's self-service one.
+func (a *API) handleInternalBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	name := r.PathValue("name")
+	if err := naming.ValidateServerName(name); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_name", "invalid server name: %v", err))
+		return
+	}
+
+	rec, err := a.Repo.ServerByName(r.Context(), name)
+	if err != nil {
+		a.writeLookupError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	a.enqueueBackup(w, r, name, rec, "break-glass", "internal")
+}
+
+// enqueueBackup is the shared tail of both backup faces: the RWO stopped-gate, the
+// optional-Backuper 503, the async hand-off, and the audit + 202. Both faces validate
+// the name and resolve rec themselves and differ only in how the caller is authorized
+// (Principal vs trusted service token) and the audit actor/source — keeping the
+// security-critical stopped-gate single-sourced so the two faces cannot diverge.
+func (a *API) enqueueBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, name string, rec *ServerRecord, actor, source string) {
 	// Stopped gate: the world PVC is RWO and held by a running server, so a backup
 	// Job cannot double-mount it (mirrors the restore gate). Ready means it is up;
 	// any desiredState other than Stopped means it owns the RWO volume.
@@ -244,7 +279,10 @@ func (a *API) handleBackupNow(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	a.audit(r, p.Email, "backup.create", name)
+	_ = a.Repo.Audit(r.Context(), AuditEntry{
+		Actor: actor, Source: source, Action: "backup.create",
+		ServerName: name, RequestID: requestIDFromContext(r.Context()),
+	})
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
 		"name":   name,
 		"status": "backing_up",