fix(migrate): 迁移确认只对做确认的会话在 10 分钟内有效，签发和兑换迁移码都给源账户邮箱发通知

docs/openapi.yaml

@@ -5104,9 +5104,12 @@ paths:
       description: >
         Read-only. Returns the live migration whose source is the authenticated
         principal, if any, so the web onboarding can resume the flow: whether a
-        confirmation step-up is still needed, which factor confirmed it, the named
-        target, and the one-time code's expiry once issued. active:false when the
-        caller has no live migration.
+        confirmation step-up is still needed, which factor confirmed it and until
+        when, the named target, and the one-time code's expiry once issued. The
+        step-up counts only for the session that gave it and for 10 minutes, so a
+        confirmation made in another session, one that lapsed, and a code that
+        expired unspent all read as initiated. active:false when the caller has no
+        live migration.
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
@@ -5128,6 +5131,10 @@ paths:
                   confirm_factor:
                     type: string
                     enum: [passkey, email_otp]
+                  confirm_expires_at:
+                    type: string
+                    format: date-time
+                    description: Present while state is confirmed; the code must be issued before it.
                   code_expires_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
@@ -5335,10 +5342,13 @@ paths:
       operationId: migrateIssueCode
       summary: Name the target account and mint the one-time migration code (spec §B3 inherit).
       description: >
-        For a confirmed migration, binds the named target account and mints a single
-        one-time code (only its hash is stored) that the target must redeem while logged
-        in AS that target — an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. The target
-        must exist and be neither disabled nor soft-deleted, and cannot be the source.
+        For a migration confirmed by a step-up in this same session within the last
+        10 minutes, binds the named target account and mints a single one-time code
+        (only its hash is stored) that the target must redeem while logged in AS that
+        target — an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. The target must exist
+        and be neither disabled nor soft-deleted, and cannot be the source. The
+        source's verified address is sent a notice naming the target and the expiry,
+        and another when the code is redeemed.
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: app
       security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
@@ -5377,7 +5387,9 @@ paths:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
         '409':
-          description: The migration has not been confirmed by a step-up yet (not_confirmed).
+          description: >
+            No step-up from this session within the last 10 minutes, or a code is
+            already out (not_confirmed).
           content:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }

internal/api/account_notice.go

@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 // Account change notices tell the owner of an account, at the verified address,
-// that a way into it was just added, removed or moved: a passkey registered or
-// removed, the email replaced (that notice goes to the OLD address, which is the
-// one the owner still reads if someone else made the change). They carry the time
-// and the source address and say what to do if the change was not theirs.
+// that a way into it, or what it owns, was just added, removed or moved: a passkey
+// registered or removed, the email replaced (that notice goes to the OLD address,
+// which is the one the owner still reads if someone else made the change), a
+// migration code issued against it or redeemed. They carry the time and the source
+// address and say what to do if the change was not theirs.
 // Best effort, like the lock notice: the change already happened.
 
 // notifyAccountChange mails one notice to the given address.
@@ -91,9 +92,58 @@ func (a *API) noticeIP(r *http.Request) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// notifyMigrateCodeIssued tells the source account's owner that a code now stands to
+// hand its servers to target. A code the owner did not issue still has to be redeemed,
+// and running /felis migrate again voids it.
+func (a *API) notifyMigrateCodeIssued(r *http.Request, to, target string, expires time.Time) {
+	exp := expires.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST")
+	subject, body := renderNotice(
+		"已签发迁移码", "migration code issued",
+		"你的 Felis 账户刚刚签发了迁移码。账户「"+target+"」在 "+exp+" 前兑换后，你名下的全部服务器会转给它，本账户随即停用。",
+		"A migration code was just issued on your Felis account. If the account \""+target+"\" redeems it before "+exp+", every server you own moves to it and this account is retired.",
+		"请立即在游戏里重新执行 /felis migrate 让这个迁移码作废，再登录 Felis 在账户页退出其它设备，然后联系服务器管理员。",
+		"run /felis migrate in game right away to void this code, sign in to Felis and sign out other devices on the Account page, then contact the server operator.",
+		a.now(), a.noticeIP(r))
+	a.notifyAccountChange(r, to, subject, body)
+}
+
+// notifyMigrateRedeemed tells the retired source account where its servers went. The
+// account can no longer sign in, so the notice goes to the address it had proved.
+func (a *API) notifyMigrateRedeemed(r *http.Request, sourceUserID string, target *Principal, moved []string) {
+	src, err := a.Repo.UserDetail(r.Context(), sourceUserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("auth: migration notice to the source account was not sent (request_id=%s): %v",
+			requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), err)
+		return
+	}
+	if !src.EmailVerified {
+		return
+	}
+	zhWhat := "你的 Felis 账户刚刚迁移给了账户「" + target.Username + "」，本账户已停用，所有登录已退出。"
+	enWhat := "Your Felis account was just migrated to the account \"" + target.Username + "\". This account is retired and every device was signed out."
+	if len(moved) > 0 {
+		list := strings.Join(moved, ", ")
+		zhWhat += fmt.Sprintf("转过去的 %d 台服务器：%s。", len(moved), list)
+		enWhat += fmt.Sprintf(" The %d servers that moved: %s.", len(moved), list)
+	}
+	subject, body := renderNotice("服务器已迁出", "servers migrated away", zhWhat, enWhat,
+		"请立即联系服务器管理员。", "contact the server operator right away.",
+		a.now(), a.noticeIP(r))
+	a.notifyAccountChange(r, src.Email, subject, body)
+}
+
 // accountChangeNotice renders a bilingual notice. zhUndo/enUndo name the step
 // that reverses the change, for the "if this wasn't you" line.
 func accountChangeNotice(zhTitle, enTitle, zhWhat, enWhat, zhUndo, enUndo string, at time.Time, ip string) (subject, body string) {
+	return renderNotice(zhTitle, enTitle, zhWhat, enWhat,
+		"请立即登录 Felis，在账户页"+zhUndo+"并退出其它设备，然后联系服务器管理员。",
+		"sign in to Felis now, "+enUndo+" and sign out other devices on the Account page, then contact the server operator.",
+		at, ip)
+}
+
+// renderNotice lays out a bilingual notice; zhIfNot/enIfNot finish the "if this
+// wasn't you" line.
+func renderNotice(zhTitle, enTitle, zhWhat, enWhat, zhIfNot, enIfNot string, at time.Time, ip string) (subject, body string) {
 	when := at.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST")
 	zhIP, enIP := ip, ip
 	if ip == "" {
@@ -103,13 +153,13 @@ func accountChangeNotice(zhTitle, enTitle, zhWhat, enWhat, zhUndo, enUndo string
 	body = fmt.Sprintf(`%s
 时间：%s
 来源 IP：%s
-如果不是你本人操作，请立即登录 Felis，在账户页%s并退出其它设备，然后联系服务器管理员。
+如果不是你本人操作，%s
 
 %s
 Time: %s
 From IP: %s
-If this wasn't you, sign in to Felis now, %s and sign out other devices on the Account page, then contact the server operator.
-`, zhWhat, when, zhIP, zhUndo, enWhat, when, enIP, enUndo)
+If this wasn't you, %s
+`, zhWhat, when, zhIP, zhIfNot, enWhat, when, enIP, enIfNot)
 	return subject, body
 }
 

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -1310,22 +1310,24 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) SetUserDisabled(_ context.Context, userID string, disabled bo
 // fakeMigration mirrors an account_migrations row through its state machine. Zero
 // times mean the corresponding NULL column (not yet confirmed / no code issued).
 type fakeMigration struct {
-	id            string
-	sourceUserID  string
-	targetUserID  string
-	state         string
-	confirmFactor string
-	confirmedAt   time.Time
-	codeHash      string
-	codeExpiresAt time.Time
-	redeemedAt    time.Time
-	createdAt     time.Time
+	id             string
+	sourceUserID   string
+	targetUserID   string
+	state          string
+	confirmFactor  string
+	confirmSession string
+	confirmedAt    time.Time
+	codeHash       string
+	codeExpiresAt  time.Time
+	redeemedAt     time.Time
+	createdAt      time.Time
 }
 
 func (m *fakeMigration) view() *MigrationView {
 	v := &MigrationView{
 		ID: m.id, SourceUserID: m.sourceUserID, TargetUserID: m.targetUserID,
-		State: m.state, ConfirmFactor: m.confirmFactor, CreatedAt: m.createdAt,
+		State: m.state, ConfirmFactor: m.confirmFactor, ConfirmSession: m.confirmSession,
+		CreatedAt: m.createdAt,
 	}
 	if !m.confirmedAt.IsZero() {
 		t := m.confirmedAt
@@ -1373,21 +1375,29 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) MigrationForSource(_ context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*
 	return nil, ErrNotFound
 }
 
-func (f *fakeRepo) ConfirmMigration(_ context.Context, sourceUserID, factor string, now time.Time) error {
+func (f *fakeRepo) ConfirmMigration(_ context.Context, sourceUserID, factor, session string, now time.Time) error {
 	for _, m := range f.migrations {
-		if m.sourceUserID == sourceUserID && m.state == "initiated" {
+		if m.sourceUserID != sourceUserID {
+			continue
+		}
+		lapsed := m.state == "confirmed" && (m.confirmSession != session || !m.confirmedAt.After(now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow)))
+		expired := m.state == "code_issued" && !m.codeExpiresAt.After(now)
+		if m.state == "initiated" || lapsed || expired {
 			m.state = "confirmed"
 			m.confirmFactor = factor
+			m.confirmSession = session
 			m.confirmedAt = now
+			m.targetUserID, m.codeHash, m.codeExpiresAt = "", "", time.Time{}
 			return nil
 		}
 	}
 	return ErrConflict
 }
 
-func (f *fakeRepo) IssueMigrationCode(_ context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+func (f *fakeRepo) IssueMigrationCode(_ context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, session, codeHash string, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
 	for _, m := range f.migrations {
-		if m.sourceUserID == sourceUserID && m.state == "confirmed" {
+		if m.sourceUserID == sourceUserID && m.state == "confirmed" &&
+			m.confirmSession == session && m.confirmedAt.After(now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow)) {
 			m.state = "code_issued"
 			m.targetUserID = targetUserID
 			m.codeHash = codeHash

internal/api/handlers_account_migrate.go

@@ -28,16 +28,21 @@ import (
 //	                                         (reauth.go).
 //	3. web      issue code + name target  → handleMigrateIssueCode: the source names the
 //	                                         target account by id and mints a one-time code
-//	                                         ('code_issued').
+//	                                         ('code_issued'). Only the session that gave the
+//	                                         step-up may, within migrateConfirmWindow of it,
+//	                                         and the source's mailbox is told.
 //	4. web      target redeems code       → handleMigrateRedeem: the target, logged in as
 //	                                         itself, submits the code; ownership of the
 //	                                         source's servers moves to the target and the
-//	                                         source is retired ('redeemed').
+//	                                         source is retired ('redeemed'), and told so.
 //
 // The code is bound to the named target at issue AND the redeemer must authenticate AS
-// that target, so an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. Only server ownership
-// moves — the mc_uuid link and web credentials (email, passkeys) stay with their
-// accounts; moving credentials would make migrate a credential-theft primitive.
+// that target, so an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. Binding the step-up to
+// its session and a short window keeps a confirmation from outliving the moment: any
+// other live session of the source (a shared machine, a stolen cookie) meets the
+// step-up again instead of a door left open. Only server ownership moves — the mc_uuid
+// link and web credentials (email, passkeys) stay with their accounts; moving
+// credentials would make migrate a credential-theft primitive.
 //
 // CODE-ONLY (Java/Velocity, not represented here): the /felis migrate command that calls
 // handleMigrateStart, and the web forms that drive steps 2–4.
@@ -53,8 +58,30 @@ const (
 	// migrateCodeTTL bounds the one-time code the source hands to the target. Short
 	// enough that a leaked code is useless soon, long enough to switch accounts and type.
 	migrateCodeTTL = 10 * time.Minute
+	// migrateConfirmWindow is how long the step-up lets the session that gave it issue
+	// the code. Enough to paste the target's account id.
+	migrateConfirmWindow = 10 * time.Minute
 )
 
+// migrationStage is where the caller on session stands in m at now: the stored state,
+// except that a confirmation this session cannot use (another session's, or older
+// than migrateConfirmWindow) and a code that expired unspent put the caller back at
+// the step-up, "initiated". ConfirmMigration and IssueMigrationCode apply the same
+// rules in SQL.
+func migrationStage(m *MigrationView, session string, now time.Time) string {
+	switch m.State {
+	case "confirmed":
+		if m.ConfirmSession != session || m.ConfirmedAt == nil || !now.Before(m.ConfirmedAt.Add(migrateConfirmWindow)) {
+			return "initiated"
+		}
+	case "code_issued":
+		if m.CodeExpiresAt == nil || !now.Before(*m.CodeExpiresAt) {
+			return "initiated"
+		}
+	}
+	return m.State
+}
+
 // newMigrationID returns an opaque random row id (128 bits, hex) for an
 // account_migrations row, mirroring the other one-time-handle mints.
 func newMigrationID() (string, error) {
@@ -123,7 +150,9 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 }
 
 // handleMigrateStatus reports the caller's live migration for the web flow to drive its
-// next step (spec §B3, external app face). No migration in flight → {active:false}.
+// next step (spec §B3, external app face). No migration in flight → {active:false}. The
+// state is migrationStage's, so a confirmation made elsewhere or lapsed reads as
+// "initiated" and the panel asks for the step-up again.
 func (a *API) handleMigrateStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
 	m, err := a.Repo.MigrationForSource(r.Context(), p.UserID)
@@ -135,22 +164,24 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
-	resp := map[string]any{"active": true, "state": m.State}
-	if m.TargetUserID != "" {
-		resp["target_user_id"] = m.TargetUserID
-	}
-	if m.ConfirmFactor != "" {
+	stage := migrationStage(m, currentSessionHash(r), a.now())
+	resp := map[string]any{"active": true, "state": stage}
+	switch stage {
+	case "confirmed":
 		resp["confirm_factor"] = m.ConfirmFactor
-	}
-	if m.CodeExpiresAt != nil {
+		resp["confirm_expires_at"] = m.ConfirmedAt.Add(migrateConfirmWindow).UTC()
+	case "code_issued":
+		resp["confirm_factor"] = m.ConfirmFactor
+		resp["target_user_id"] = m.TargetUserID
 		resp["code_expires_at"] = m.CodeExpiresAt.UTC()
 	}
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
 }
 
-// requireInitiatedMigration loads the caller's live migration and requires it be in
-// 'initiated' — the only state from which step-up may run. It writes the right error and
-// returns ok=false when the caller should stop, so the confirm handlers stay flat.
+// requireInitiatedMigration loads the caller's live migration and requires migrationStage
+// to put the caller at 'initiated' — the only stage from which step-up may run. It writes
+// the right error and returns ok=false when the caller should stop, so the confirm
+// handlers stay flat.
 func (a *API) requireInitiatedMigration(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID string) (*MigrationView, bool) {
 	m, err := a.Repo.MigrationForSource(r.Context(), userID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -162,7 +193,7 @@ func (a *API) requireInitiatedMigration(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return nil, false
 	}
-	if m.State != "initiated" {
+	if migrationStage(m, currentSessionHash(r), a.now()) != "initiated" {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "already_confirmed",
 			"this migration has already been confirmed"))
 		return nil, false
@@ -229,7 +260,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	if !a.verifyStepUpOTP(w, r, p, otpPurposeMigrate, "migrate_confirm", code) {
 		return
 	}
-	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "email_otp", a.now()); err != nil {
+	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "email_otp", currentSessionHash(r), a.now()); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrConflict) {
 			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "already_confirmed",
 				"this migration has already been confirmed"))
@@ -283,7 +314,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateConfirmPasskeyFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 	if !a.finishStepUpPasskey(w, r, p, passkeyPurposeMigrate, "migrate_passkey", req.Assertion) {
 		return
 	}
-	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "passkey", a.now()); err != nil {
+	if err := a.Repo.ConfirmMigration(r.Context(), p.UserID, "passkey", currentSessionHash(r), a.now()); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrConflict) {
 			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "already_confirmed",
 				"this migration has already been confirmed"))
@@ -303,9 +334,11 @@ type migrateIssueCodeRequest struct {
 }
 
 // handleMigrateIssueCode binds the named target and mints the one-time migrate code
-// (spec §B3, external app face). Requires the migration to be 'confirmed' (step-up done).
-// The target must be a live account other than the source. The code is returned once,
-// out of band to the target; only its hash is stored.
+// (spec §B3, external app face). Requires the step-up done on this session within
+// migrateConfirmWindow. The target must be a live account other than the source. The
+// code is returned once, out of band to the target; only its hash is stored. The
+// source's verified address is told, so a code its owner did not issue does not go
+// unnoticed.
 func (a *API) handleMigrateIssueCode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
 	var req migrateIssueCodeRequest
@@ -333,9 +366,9 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateIssueCode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
-	if m.State != "confirmed" {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "not_confirmed",
-			"confirm the migration before issuing a code"))
+	session, now := currentSessionHash(r), a.now()
+	if migrationStage(m, session, now) != "confirmed" {
+		writeError(w, r, errMigrateNotConfirmed)
 		return
 	}
 	// The target must exist and be a live (non-deleted, non-disabled) account. Validate
@@ -359,20 +392,24 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateIssueCode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
-	expiresAt := a.now().Add(migrateCodeTTL)
-	if err := a.Repo.IssueMigrationCode(r.Context(), p.UserID, targetID, otpCodeHash(code), expiresAt); err != nil {
+	expiresAt := now.Add(migrateCodeTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.IssueMigrationCode(r.Context(), p.UserID, targetID, session, otpCodeHash(code), now, expiresAt); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrConflict) {
-			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "not_confirmed",
-				"confirm the migration before issuing a code"))
+			writeError(w, r, errMigrateNotConfirmed)
 			return
 		}
 		writeError(w, r, err)
 		return
 	}
 	a.audit(r, "account.migrate.code_issued", targetID)
+	a.notifyMigrateCodeIssued(r, verifiedEmail(p), target.Username, expiresAt)
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]any{"code": code, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC()})
 }
 
+// errMigrateNotConfirmed refuses a code to a caller without a usable step-up.
+var errMigrateNotConfirmed = newError(http.StatusConflict, "not_confirmed",
+	"confirm the migration on this browser first; a confirmation lasts 10 minutes")
+
 // migrateRedeemRequest is the redeem body: the one-time code the target received.
 type migrateRedeemRequest struct {
 	Code string `json:"code"`
@@ -408,6 +445,7 @@ func (a *API) handleMigrateRedeem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	a.audit(r, "account.migrate.redeemed", sourceUserID)
+	a.notifyMigrateRedeemed(r, sourceUserID, p, moved)
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
 		"migrated":      true,
 		"servers_moved": len(moved),

internal/api/handlers_account_migrate_test.go

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 )
 
 // Account-migration tests (spec §B3 inherit, scenario A) across BOTH faces. What they
@@ -24,13 +26,13 @@ import (
 //     target, the source is retired, and the code cannot be replayed.
 
 // migrateEnv wires the migration doors over one shared fakeRepo: a capturing mailer (so a
-// test can read the OTP that production only ever emails) and a fake passkey verifier
+// test can read the OTP that production only ever emails, and the notices) and a fake passkey verifier
 // primed with fixed options + a verified assertion. mk builds a face for a given
 // principal — the internal handler ignores it, each external handler is scoped to one
 // caller — so a test can drive the source and the target (and an interloper) against the
 // same store.
-func migrateEnv(repo *fakeRepo) (mk func(*Principal) *API, mailer *captureMailer, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {
-	mailer = &captureMailer{}
+func migrateEnv(repo *fakeRepo) (mk func(*Principal) *API, mailer *noticeMailer, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {
+	mailer = &noticeMailer{}
 	v = &fakePasskeyVerifier{
 		options:   json.RawMessage(`{"publicKey":{"challenge":"bWlncmF0ZQ"}}`),
 		assertion: VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-1", UserVerified: true},
@@ -137,6 +139,11 @@ func TestMigrateVertical(t *testing.T) {
 	if w := do(ehTgt, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/redeem", `{"code":"`+mcode+`"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
 		t.Fatalf("replay of spent code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
 	}
+
+	// 6) the source never proved its address, so no notice went there.
+	if len(mailer.notices) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("notices to an unverified address = %q, want none", mailer.notices)
+	}
 }
 
 // TestMigrateForcePasskey pins the contract's "若有 Passkey 强制 Passkey": an account with
@@ -347,3 +354,117 @@ func TestMigrateGuards(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("issue with unknown target: code = %d body %s, want 400 target_not_found", w.Code, w.Body.String())
 	}
 }
+
+// TestMigrateConfirmHoldsForOneSessionBriefly pins who may issue the code: only the
+// browser session that gave the step-up, and only for migrateConfirmWindow. Any other
+// live session of the source, or the same one later, meets the step-up again; a code
+// that expires unspent does too. The source's mailbox hears about each code and about
+// the redeem.
+func TestMigrateConfirmHoldsForOneSessionBriefly(t *testing.T) {
+	const uuid = "77777777-7777-7777-7777-777777777777"
+	src := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Username: "old", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true, Role: "user", ViaSession: true}
+	tgt := &Principal{UserID: "u2", Username: "new", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true, Role: "user", ViaSession: true}
+
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.seedUser(UserView{ID: "u1", Username: "old", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true, Role: "user"})
+	repo.seedUser(UserView{ID: "u2", Username: "new", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true, Role: "user"})
+	repo.links[uuid] = "u1"
+	repo.byName["alpha"] = &ServerRecord{Name: "alpha", OwnerID: "u1"}
+	repo.passkeyCreds["row1"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "row1", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "cred-1", PublicKey: "k", UserVerified: true, CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+
+	mk, mail, _ := migrateEnv(repo)
+	now := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)
+	external := func(p *Principal) http.Handler {
+		a := mk(p)
+		a.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
+		return a.ExternalHandler()
+	}
+	ehSrc, ehTgt := external(src), external(tgt)
+	onA := map[string]string{"Content-Type": "application/json", "Cookie": sessionCookieName + "=cookie-a"}
+	onB := map[string]string{"Content-Type": "application/json", "Cookie": sessionCookieName + "=cookie-b"}
+
+	confirm := func(h map[string]string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		if w := do(ehSrc, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/confirm/passkey/begin", "", h); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("passkey begin: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := do(ehSrc, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/confirm/passkey/finish",
+			`{"assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, h); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("passkey finish: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	status := func(h map[string]string) map[string]any {
+		t.Helper()
+		return acctBody(t, do(ehSrc, "GET", "/api/v1/account/migrate", "", h))
+	}
+	issue := func(h map[string]string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(ehSrc, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/issue-code", `{"target_user_id":"u2"}`, h)
+	}
+	refused := func(what string, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
+		t.Helper()
+		if w.Code != http.StatusConflict || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_confirmed" {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: code = %d body %s, want 409 not_confirmed", what, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+
+	if w := startMigrate(t, mk(src).InternalHandler(), uuid); w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	confirm(onA)
+	if st := status(onA); st["state"] != "confirmed" || st["confirm_expires_at"] != now.Add(migrateConfirmWindow).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339) {
+		t.Fatalf("status on a after its confirmation = %v, want confirmed until +%v", st, migrateConfirmWindow)
+	}
+	if st := status(onB); st["state"] != "initiated" {
+		t.Fatalf("status on b = %v, want initiated: b has not confirmed", st)
+	}
+	refused("issue from b", issue(onB))
+	refused("issue with no session", issue(jsonHeader))
+
+	now = now.Add(migrateConfirmWindow)
+	refused("issue from a once its window closed", issue(onA))
+	refused("issue to an unknown account from a once its window closed",
+		do(ehSrc, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/issue-code", `{"target_user_id":"ghost"}`, onA))
+	if st := status(onA); st["state"] != "initiated" {
+		t.Fatalf("status on a after its window = %v, want initiated", st)
+	}
+	confirm(onA)
+	if len(mail.notices) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("notices before any code = %q, want none", mail.notices)
+	}
+	w := issue(onA)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("issue from a inside its window: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	first, _ := acctBody(t, w)["code"].(string)
+	exp := now.Add(migrateCodeTTL).UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 MST")
+	if len(mail.notices) != 1 || !strings.HasPrefix(mail.notices[0], "[email protected]|") ||
+		!strings.Contains(mail.notices[0], "「new」") || !strings.Contains(mail.notices[0], exp) ||
+		!strings.Contains(mail.notices[0], "/felis migrate") {
+		t.Fatalf("notices after the code = %q, want one to [email protected] naming new, %s and how to void it", mail.notices, exp)
+	}
+	if st := status(onA); st["state"] != "code_issued" || st["target_user_id"] != "u2" {
+		t.Fatalf("status after the code = %v, want code_issued for u2", st)
+	}
+
+	// The code expires unspent: back to the step-up, and the old code is dead.
+	now = now.Add(migrateCodeTTL)
+	if st := status(onA); st["state"] != "initiated" {
+		t.Fatalf("status after the code expired = %v, want initiated", st)
+	}
+	confirm(onA)
+	if w := do(ehTgt, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/redeem", `{"code":"`+first+`"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("redeem of the expired code: %d (%s), want 400", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	w = issue(onA)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("issue after the expired code: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	second, _ := acctBody(t, w)["code"].(string)
+	if w := do(ehTgt, "POST", "/api/v1/account/migrate/redeem", `{"code":"`+second+`"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("redeem: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if n := len(mail.notices); n != 3 || !strings.HasPrefix(mail.notices[2], "[email protected]|") ||
+		!strings.Contains(mail.notices[2], "「new」") || !strings.Contains(mail.notices[2], "alpha") {
+		t.Fatalf("notices after the redeem = %q, want a third to [email protected] naming new and alpha", mail.notices)
+	}
+}

internal/api/pgrepo.go

@@ -2259,13 +2259,14 @@ func (p *PGRepo) StartMigration(ctx context.Context, id, sourceUserID string, no
 // ErrNotFound when none is in flight.
 func (p *PGRepo) MigrationForSource(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*MigrationView, error) {
 	const q = `SELECT id, source_user_id, COALESCE(target_user_id, ''), state,
-		COALESCE(confirm_factor, ''), confirmed_at, code_expires_at, created_at
+		COALESCE(confirm_factor, ''), COALESCE(confirm_session, ''), confirmed_at,
+		code_expires_at, created_at
 		FROM account_migrations
 		WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state <> 'redeemed'`
 	var v MigrationView
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, sourceUserID).Scan(
 		&v.ID, &v.SourceUserID, &v.TargetUserID, &v.State,
-		&v.ConfirmFactor, &v.ConfirmedAt, &v.CodeExpiresAt, &v.CreatedAt); {
+		&v.ConfirmFactor, &v.ConfirmSession, &v.ConfirmedAt, &v.CodeExpiresAt, &v.CreatedAt); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	case err != nil:
@@ -2274,15 +2275,20 @@ func (p *PGRepo) MigrationForSource(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*
 	return &v, nil
 }
 
-// ConfirmMigration advances 'initiated' → 'confirmed' for the source, stamping the
-// step-up factor + time. It only advances from 'initiated' (0 rows → ErrConflict), so
-// the step-up can never be replayed against a later state.
-func (p *PGRepo) ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor string, now time.Time) error {
+// ConfirmMigration moves the source's migration to 'confirmed', stamping the step-up
+// factor, time and session. It advances only from where migrationStage puts a caller
+// back at the step-up (0 rows → ErrConflict): 'initiated', a confirmation that lapsed
+// or belongs to another session, or a code that expired unspent, which it clears.
+func (p *PGRepo) ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor, session string, now time.Time) error {
 	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`UPDATE account_migrations
-		 SET state = 'confirmed', confirm_factor = $2, confirmed_at = $3
-		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state = 'initiated'`,
-		sourceUserID, factor, now)
+		 SET state = 'confirmed', confirm_factor = $2, confirmed_at = $3, confirm_session = $4,
+		     target_user_id = NULL, code_hash = NULL, code_expires_at = NULL
+		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND (
+		   state = 'initiated'
+		   OR (state = 'confirmed' AND (confirm_session IS DISTINCT FROM $4 OR confirmed_at <= $5))
+		   OR (state = 'code_issued' AND code_expires_at <= $3))`,
+		sourceUserID, factor, now, session, now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow))
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -2297,15 +2303,17 @@ func (p *PGRepo) ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor stri
 }
 
 // IssueMigrationCode advances 'confirmed' → 'code_issued', binding the target and
-// storing the one-time code hash + TTL. The caller has already validated the target is
-// a live account other than the source; the target FK is the backstop. Not-in-confirmed
-// → ErrConflict.
-func (p *PGRepo) IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+// storing the one-time code hash + TTL. The confirmation must be this session's and
+// younger than migrateConfirmWindow at now. The caller has already validated the
+// target is a live account other than the source; the target FK is the backstop.
+// Anything else → ErrConflict.
+func (p *PGRepo) IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, session, codeHash string, now, expiresAt time.Time) error {
 	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
 		`UPDATE account_migrations
 		 SET state = 'code_issued', target_user_id = $2, code_hash = $3, code_expires_at = $4
-		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state = 'confirmed'`,
-		sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash, expiresAt)
+		 WHERE source_user_id = $1 AND state = 'confirmed'
+		   AND confirm_session = $5 AND confirmed_at > $6`,
+		sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash, expiresAt, session, now.Add(-migrateConfirmWindow))
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

internal/api/repo.go

@@ -233,18 +233,20 @@ type NewOpLoginRequest struct {
 
 // MigrationView is the live account-migration for a source user (spec §B3 inherit,
 // scenario A): its state-machine position and the fields the web step-up, issue-code,
-// and status paths read. TargetUserID is empty until a code is issued; ConfirmFactor
-// and ConfirmedAt are empty/nil until the source completes step-up; CodeExpiresAt is
-// nil until code_issued.
+// and status paths read. TargetUserID is empty until a code is issued; ConfirmFactor,
+// ConfirmSession and ConfirmedAt are empty/nil until the source completes step-up;
+// CodeExpiresAt is nil until code_issued. ConfirmSession is the token hash of the
+// session that gave the step-up.
 type MigrationView struct {
-	ID            string
-	SourceUserID  string
-	TargetUserID  string
-	State         string
-	ConfirmFactor string
-	ConfirmedAt   *time.Time
-	CodeExpiresAt *time.Time
-	CreatedAt     time.Time
+	ID             string
+	SourceUserID   string
+	TargetUserID   string
+	State          string
+	ConfirmFactor  string
+	ConfirmSession string
+	ConfirmedAt    *time.Time
+	CodeExpiresAt  *time.Time
+	CreatedAt      time.Time
 }
 
 // Repo is the business-layer data access the API depends on. It is an interface
@@ -762,17 +764,20 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// gate each step on the correct prior state.
 	MigrationForSource(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID string) (*MigrationView, error)
 	// ConfirmMigration records that the source proved control via a FRESH step-up
-	// (factor 'passkey' | 'email_otp'), advancing 'initiated' → 'confirmed'. It only
-	// advances from 'initiated'; any other current state (or no migration) → ErrConflict,
-	// so a confirmed/code_issued/redeemed migration can never be re-confirmed and the
-	// step-up cannot be replayed. now stamps confirmed_at.
-	ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor string, now time.Time) error
+	// (factor 'passkey' | 'email_otp') on the session whose token hash is session,
+	// advancing to 'confirmed'. It advances only from where migrationStage puts the
+	// caller back at the step-up: 'initiated', a 'confirmed' that lapsed
+	// (migrateConfirmWindow) or belongs to another session, or a 'code_issued' whose
+	// code expired at now, which it clears. A live confirmation of this session, a live
+	// code, a redeemed migration or none → ErrConflict. now stamps confirmed_at.
+	ConfirmMigration(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, factor, session string, now time.Time) error
 	// IssueMigrationCode binds the named target and stores the one-time code hash,
-	// advancing 'confirmed' → 'code_issued'. targetUserID must be a live account other
-	// than the source (validated by the caller before this call); the target FK also
-	// guarantees the row exists. codeHash is the sha-256 of the code; expiresAt is its
-	// TTL. A migration not in 'confirmed' → ErrConflict.
-	IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error
+	// advancing 'confirmed' → 'code_issued'. The confirmation must be session's and
+	// younger than migrateConfirmWindow at now. targetUserID must be a live account
+	// other than the source (validated by the caller before this call); the target FK
+	// also guarantees the row exists. codeHash is the sha-256 of the code; expiresAt is
+	// its TTL. Anything else → ErrConflict.
+	IssueMigrationCode(ctx context.Context, sourceUserID, targetUserID, session, codeHash string, now, expiresAt time.Time) error
 	// RedeemMigration is the ATOMIC transfer: keyed by (codeHash, targetUserID) it
 	// finds the 'code_issued', unexpired migration whose named target is exactly the
 	// redeeming user, re-points every server owned by the source to the target, retires

internal/pgint/accounts_test.go

@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ func startToCode(t *testing.T, sourceID, targetID, codeHash string, now, expires
 	if err := repo.StartMigration(ctx, "mig-"+suffix(t), sourceID, now); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("StartMigration: %v", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, sourceID, "passkey", now); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, sourceID, "passkey", "sess-src", now); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ConfirmMigration: %v", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, sourceID, targetID, codeHash, expiresAt); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, sourceID, targetID, "sess-src", codeHash, now, expiresAt); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("IssueMigrationCode: %v", err)
 	}
 }
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func TestMigrationStateMachine(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := repo.MigrationForSource(ctx, src.ID); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrNotFound) {
 		t.Fatalf("status before start = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", t0); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-src", t0); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
 		t.Fatalf("confirm before start = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
 	}
 	if err := repo.StartMigration(ctx, "mig1-"+sfx, src.ID, t0); err != nil {
@@ -92,23 +92,23 @@ func TestMigrationStateMachine(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil || m.ID != "mig1-"+sfx || m.State != "initiated" || m.TargetUserID != "" || m.ConfirmedAt != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("after start = %+v, %v; want mig1 initiated, no target, unconfirmed", m, err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "h-skip", t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "sess-src", "h-skip", t0, t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
 		t.Fatalf("issue before confirm = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "email_otp", t0); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "email_otp", "sess-src", t0); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ConfirmMigration: %v", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", t0.Add(time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-src", t0.Add(time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
 		t.Fatalf("second confirm = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
 	}
 	m, err = repo.MigrationForSource(ctx, src.ID)
 	if err != nil || m.State != "confirmed" || m.ConfirmFactor != "email_otp" || m.ConfirmedAt == nil || !m.ConfirmedAt.Equal(t0) {
 		t.Fatalf("after confirm = %+v, %v; want confirmed by email_otp at %v", m, err, t0)
 	}
-	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "h-first", t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "sess-src", "h-first", t0, t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("IssueMigrationCode: %v", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, bystander.ID, "h-again", t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, bystander.ID, "sess-src", "h-again", t0, t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
 		t.Fatalf("second issue = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
 	}
 	m, err = repo.MigrationForSource(ctx, src.ID)
@@ -130,10 +130,10 @@ func TestMigrationStateMachine(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("code from the superseded attempt = %v, want ErrLinkCodeInvalid", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", t0); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-src", t0); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("confirm the restart: %v", err)
 	}
-	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "h-second", t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "sess-src", "h-second", t0, t0.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("issue the restart: %v", err)
 	}
 	for _, bad := range []struct {
@@ -204,6 +204,76 @@ func TestMigrationStateMachine(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// The step-up lets only the session that gave it issue the code, and only for
+// migrateConfirmWindow (10 minutes). Another session, or the same one later, starts over
+// at the step-up; so does a code that expired unspent, which the new confirmation clears.
+func TestMigrationConfirmBelongsToOneSessionBriefly(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	src := newUser(t, "user", "migw-src")
+	dst := newUser(t, "user", "migw-dst")
+	t0 := mustNow().Truncate(time.Second)
+	const window = 10 * time.Minute
+	if err := repo.StartMigration(ctx, "migw-"+suffix(t), src.ID, t0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StartMigration: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-a", t0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm on a: %v", err)
+	}
+	if m, err := repo.MigrationForSource(ctx, src.ID); err != nil || m.ConfirmSession != "sess-a" {
+		t.Fatalf("after confirm on a = %+v, %v; want it recorded against sess-a", m, err)
+	}
+	for _, bad := range []struct {
+		what, session string
+		at            time.Time
+	}{
+		{"another session", "sess-b", t0.Add(time.Minute)},
+		{"a caller with no session", "", t0.Add(time.Minute)},
+		{"the same session once the window closed", "sess-a", t0.Add(window)},
+	} {
+		if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, bad.session, "h-"+bad.session, bad.at, bad.at.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+			t.Fatalf("issue from %s = %v, want ErrConflict", bad.what, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-a", t0.Add(window-time.Second)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm again on a while its confirmation holds = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
+	}
+
+	// Another session proves a factor of its own and takes the confirmation over.
+	t1 := t0.Add(time.Minute)
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "email_otp", "sess-b", t1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm on b: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "sess-a", "h-a", t1, t1.Add(10*time.Minute)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("issue from a after b confirmed = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
+	}
+	issueAt := t1.Add(window - time.Second)
+	if err := repo.IssueMigrationCode(ctx, src.ID, dst.ID, "sess-b", "h-b", issueAt, issueAt.Add(10*time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue from b inside its window: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// A live code stands until it expires; then a new step-up clears it.
+	expiry := issueAt.Add(10 * time.Minute)
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-a", expiry.Add(-time.Second)); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm over a live code = %v, want ErrConflict", err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-a", expiry); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm once the code expired: %v", err)
+	}
+	m, err := repo.MigrationForSource(ctx, src.ID)
+	if err != nil || m.State != "confirmed" || m.ConfirmSession != "sess-a" || m.TargetUserID != "" || m.CodeExpiresAt != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("after confirming over the expired code = %+v, %v; want confirmed on a, no target, no code", m, err)
+	}
+	var hash sql.NullString
+	if err := db.QueryRow(`SELECT code_hash FROM account_migrations WHERE id = $1`, m.ID).Scan(&hash); err != nil || hash.Valid {
+		t.Fatalf("code hash after the new confirmation = %v, %v; want NULL", hash, err)
+	}
+
+	// The same session's own confirmation lapses too, and a fresh one replaces it.
+	if err := repo.ConfirmMigration(ctx, src.ID, "passkey", "sess-a", expiry.Add(window)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("confirm again on a after its window: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // Racing redeems of one code move the servers once; racing starts for one source
 // all succeed and leave one live attempt.
 func TestMigrationUnderConcurrency(t *testing.T) {

internal/store/migrations/0033_migration_confirm_session.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-- The migration step-up counts for the session that gave it, and only for a few
+-- minutes (migrateConfirmWindow in handlers_account_migrate.go). confirm_session is
+-- that session's token hash ('' for a caller the proxy authenticates on every
+-- request). Another signed-in session of the source account, or the same one later,
+-- must prove a factor again before it can issue the code that hands the servers away.
+ALTER TABLE account_migrations ADD COLUMN confirm_session text;

panel/src/i18n/resources/en-US/account.json

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
   "migration_confirm_otp_btn": "Send a code to my email",
   "migration_issue_title": "Name the destination account",
   "migration_issue_desc": "Paste the Account ID shown on the destination account's own page here, then issue a one-time transfer code.",
+  "migration_issue_deadline": "Issue it before {{time}}. The confirmation counts only in this browser; after that, confirm again. A verified email on this account gets a notice once the code is issued.",
   "migration_target_placeholder": "Destination Account ID",
   "migration_issuing": "Issuing…",
   "migration_issue_btn": "Issue code",

panel/src/i18n/resources/en-US/errors.json

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
   "backup_unavailable": "Backups aren't available right now.",
   "account_retired": "This account has been retired — sign in with the account it was migrated to.",
   "no_migration": "There is no migration in progress.",
-  "not_confirmed": "This migration hasn't been confirmed yet.",
+  "not_confirmed": "Confirm it's you in this browser first. A confirmation lasts 10 minutes.",
   "already_confirmed": "This migration has already been confirmed.",
   "invalid_target": "The migration target must be a different account.",
   "target_not_found": "No account matches that migration target.",

panel/src/i18n/resources/zh-CN/account.json

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
   "migration_confirm_otp_btn": "发送验证码到我的邮箱",
   "migration_issue_title": "指定目标账户",
   "migration_issue_desc": "将目标账户本页面显示的「账户 ID」粘贴到此处，然后签发一次性转移码。",
+  "migration_issue_deadline": "请在 {{time}} 前签发。确认只在当前浏览器有效，过时需要重新确认。签发后，已验证的邮箱会收到一封通知。",
   "migration_target_placeholder": "目标账户 ID",
   "migration_issuing": "签发中…",
   "migration_issue_btn": "签发转移码",

panel/src/i18n/resources/zh-CN/errors.json

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
   "backup_unavailable": "备份功能当前不可用。",
   "account_retired": "该账户已退役——请使用迁移后的账户登录。",
   "no_migration": "当前没有进行中的迁移。",
-  "not_confirmed": "该迁移尚未完成确认。",
+  "not_confirmed": "请先在当前浏览器完成身份确认，确认 10 分钟内有效。",
   "already_confirmed": "该迁移已经确认过了。",
   "invalid_target": "迁移目标账户不能与来源账户相同。",
   "target_not_found": "找不到迁移目标账户。",

panel/src/lib/api.ts

@@ -744,6 +744,7 @@ export const api = rejectingSync({
       state?: string;
       target_user_id?: string;
       confirm_factor?: string;
+      confirm_expires_at?: string;
       code_expires_at?: string;
     }>("GET", "/account/migrate"),
 

panel/src/lib/openapi.gen.ts

@@ -1701,7 +1701,7 @@ export interface paths {
         };
         /**
          * Report the caller's active account-migration and where it is in the flow (spec §B3 inherit, web side).
-         * @description Read-only. Returns the live migration whose source is the authenticated principal, if any, so the web onboarding can resume the flow: whether a confirmation step-up is still needed, which factor confirmed it, the named target, and the one-time code's expiry once issued. active:false when the caller has no live migration.
+         * @description Read-only. Returns the live migration whose source is the authenticated principal, if any, so the web onboarding can resume the flow: whether a confirmation step-up is still needed, which factor confirmed it and until when, the named target, and the one-time code's expiry once issued. The step-up counts only for the session that gave it and for 10 minutes, so a confirmation made in another session, one that lapsed, and a code that expired unspent all read as initiated. active:false when the caller has no live migration.
          */
         get: operations["migrateStatus"];
         put?: never;
@@ -1803,7 +1803,7 @@ export interface paths {
         put?: never;
         /**
          * Name the target account and mint the one-time migration code (spec §B3 inherit).
-         * @description For a confirmed migration, binds the named target account and mints a single one-time code (only its hash is stored) that the target must redeem while logged in AS that target — an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. The target must exist and be neither disabled nor soft-deleted, and cannot be the source.
+         * @description For a migration confirmed by a step-up in this same session within the last 10 minutes, binds the named target account and mints a single one-time code (only its hash is stored) that the target must redeem while logged in AS that target — an intercepted code is useless to anyone else. The target must exist and be neither disabled nor soft-deleted, and cannot be the source. The source's verified address is sent a notice naming the target and the expiry, and another when the code is redeemed.
          */
         post: operations["migrateIssueCode"];
         delete?: never;
@@ -7049,6 +7049,11 @@ export interface operations {
                         target_user_id?: string;
                         /** @enum {string} */
                         confirm_factor?: "passkey" | "email_otp";
+                        /**
+                         * Format: date-time
+                         * @description Present while state is confirmed; the code must be issued before it.
+                         */
+                        confirm_expires_at?: string;
                         /** Format: date-time */
                         code_expires_at?: string;
                     };
@@ -7315,7 +7320,7 @@ export interface operations {
                     "application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
                 };
             };
-            /** @description The migration has not been confirmed by a step-up yet (not_confirmed). */
+            /** @description No step-up from this session within the last 10 minutes, or a code is already out (not_confirmed). */
             409: {
                 headers: {
                     [name: string]: unknown;

panel/src/pages/Account.test.tsx

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
   passkeyList: vi.fn(),
   passkeyDelete: vi.fn(),
   listMySessions: vi.fn(),
+  migrateStatus: vi.fn(),
+  migrateIssueCode: vi.fn(),
   identity: null as Identity | null,
 }));
 
@@ -21,7 +23,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/api", async (importOriginal) => {
     api: {
       ...actual.api,
       linkStatus: () => Promise.resolve({ linked: true }),
-      migrateStatus: () => Promise.resolve({ active: false }),
+      migrateStatus: mocks.migrateStatus,
+      migrateIssueCode: mocks.migrateIssueCode,
       passkeyList: mocks.passkeyList,
       passkeyDelete: mocks.passkeyDelete,
       listMySessions: mocks.listMySessions,
@@ -69,6 +72,9 @@ beforeEach(() => {
   mocks.passkeyDelete.mockReset();
   mocks.listMySessions.mockReset();
   mocks.listMySessions.mockResolvedValue([thisMac]);
+  mocks.migrateStatus.mockReset();
+  mocks.migrateStatus.mockResolvedValue({ active: false });
+  mocks.migrateIssueCode.mockReset();
   mocks.identity = identity(true);
 });
 
@@ -178,3 +184,25 @@ describe("Account passkey delete", () => {
     expect(mocks.listMySessions).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 });
+
+describe("Account migration", () => {
+  it("shows until when the confirmation holds, and asks for it again once issuing is refused", async () => {
+    mocks.passkeyList.mockResolvedValue({ credentials: [] });
+    const until = "2026-09-27T10:10:00Z";
+    mocks.migrateStatus
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ active: true, state: "confirmed", confirm_factor: "email_otp", confirm_expires_at: until })
+      .mockResolvedValue({ active: true, state: "initiated" });
+    mocks.migrateIssueCode.mockRejectedValue({ status: 409, code: "not_confirmed", message: "confirm first" });
+    renderAccount();
+
+    const deadline = t("account:migration_issue_deadline", { time: new Date(until).toLocaleTimeString() });
+    expect(await screen.findByText(deadline)).toBeTruthy();
+    await userEvent.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText(t("account:migration_target_placeholder")), "u-2");
+    await userEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: t("account:migration_issue_btn") }));
+
+    expect(mocks.migrateIssueCode).toHaveBeenCalledWith("u-2");
+    expect(await screen.findByText(t("account:migration_confirm_title"))).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(screen.getByText(t("errors:not_confirmed"))).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(screen.queryByPlaceholderText(t("account:migration_target_placeholder"))).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

panel/src/pages/Account.tsx

@@ -666,10 +666,12 @@ function LinkForm({
  *  The flow is born in-game (/felis migrate proves the player) and driven here:
  *  status → step-up confirm (passkey when one is enrolled — the server 409s the
  *  OTP door in that case — else email-OTP) → issue-code (the source names the
- *  target account and reads a one-time code) → redeem (the TARGET account spends
- *  the code; the source's servers move over and the source is retired). Both
- *  roles render on every account: the redeem form is always offered, and the
- *  account id is always shown so a target can hand it to the source. */
+ *  target account and reads a one-time code; the confirmation counts only in this
+ *  browser and for 10 minutes, after which the status asks for it again) → redeem
+ *  (the TARGET account spends the code; the source's servers move over and the
+ *  source is retired). Both roles render on every account: the redeem form is
+ *  always offered, and the account id is always shown so a target can hand it to
+ *  the source. */
 function MigrationCard({ userId, hasPasskey }: { userId?: string; hasPasskey: boolean }) {
   const { t } = useTranslation("account");
   const mig = useAsync(() => api.migrateStatus(), []);
@@ -775,6 +777,10 @@ function MigrationCard({ userId, hasPasskey }: { userId?: string; hasPasskey: bo
                       e.preventDefault();
                       void run(async () => {
                         await api.migrateConfirmOTPVerify(otpCode.trim());
+                        // The code is spent; a later step-up (the confirmation lapsed)
+                        // starts from a fresh one.
+                        setOtpSent(false);
+                        setOtpCode("");
                         await mig.reload();
                       });
                     }}
@@ -795,19 +801,31 @@ function MigrationCard({ userId, hasPasskey }: { userId?: string; hasPasskey: bo
               </div>
             )}
 
-            {state === "confirmed" && !issued && (
+            {state === "confirmed" && (
               <form
                 className="space-y-2"
                 onSubmit={(e) => {
                   e.preventDefault();
                   void run(async () => {
-                    setIssued(await api.migrateIssueCode(targetId.trim()));
-                    await mig.reload();
+                    // Reload either way: a refusal usually means the confirmation
+                    // lapsed, and the status then asks for the step-up again.
+                    try {
+                      setIssued(await api.migrateIssueCode(targetId.trim()));
+                    } finally {
+                      await mig.reload();
+                    }
                   });
                 }}
               >
                 <p className="font-medium text-foreground">{t("migration_issue_title")}</p>
                 <p className="text-muted-foreground">{t("migration_issue_desc")}</p>
+                {mig.data?.confirm_expires_at && (
+                  <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                    {t("migration_issue_deadline", {
+                      time: new Date(mig.data.confirm_expires_at).toLocaleTimeString(),
+                    })}
+                  </p>
+                )}
                 <div className="flex gap-2 max-w-md">
                   <Input
                     value={targetId}
@@ -823,7 +841,7 @@ function MigrationCard({ userId, hasPasskey }: { userId?: string; hasPasskey: bo
               </form>
             )}
 
-            {issued && (
+            {issued && state === "code_issued" && (
               <div className="space-y-2">
                 <p className="font-medium text-foreground">{t("migration_code_title")}</p>
                 <code className="block w-fit rounded bg-muted px-3 py-2 font-mono text-base tracking-[0.2em] text-foreground select-all">