Unverified Commit e108a370 authored by Minseong Choi's avatar Minseong Choi 💬
Browse files

feat(cli): break-glass emergency console TUI

Add `felis breakGlass`, a root-only interactive TUI that provisions or
resets the Owner account directly against Postgres and enables local
password login. It is the local-root recovery path that bypasses web
Zero Trust by design - used to bootstrap the first Owner credential and
to recover when the web login is unreachable.

- Bare `felis` prints CLI usage only; breakGlass is the sole subcommand
  that enters a TUI rather than running as a CLI.
- Refuses to run unless euid is 0 (try: sudo felis breakGlass); on
  non-Unix platforms the euid check also refuses.
- Generates a one-time Owner password, sets must_change_password, and
  prints a durable summary (username, one-time password, op.console
  login URL derived from the configured root domain) after the
  alt-screen TUI is torn down.

Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store.
parent af14f02f
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+425 −0
Changes for cmd/felis/breakglass.go: 425 added lines, 0 removed lines.
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package main

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/rand"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"flag"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"os"
	"strings"

	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/api"
	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/config"
	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/store"

	"github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/textinput"
	tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea"
	"github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss"
	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)

// `felis breakGlass` is the local break-glass emergency console (spec §B). Its
// authority is local root, so it legitimately BYPASSES the web Zero-Trust + Passkey
// path: critical recovery runs direct-to-Postgres. The thin-thread operation it
// ships here is the one that bootstraps everything else — provision (or reset) the
// single Owner account and turn local-password login on — so that even with the web
// auth path unconfigured an operator can get into op.console. It is a genuine
// interactive TUI, NOT a CLI: bare `felis` prints CLI usage, while `felis breakGlass`
// opens this full-screen console. It refuses to run unless euid is 0 (sudo/root).
//
// The richer break-glass operations (OP create, halt, sync, S3) land in a later
// phase; this file is intentionally scoped to the one provisioning operation that
// makes the local-auth thin thread reachable.

// localAuthEnabledSettingKey is the platform_settings key the live API reads to
// decide whether local-password sessions are honored. It MUST match the
// (unexported) localAuthEnabledKey the api package consults per-request; the VM
// smoke test (login after break-glass) is what guarantees they stay in sync.
const localAuthEnabledSettingKey = "local_auth_enabled"

// bootstrapPasswordAlphabet excludes visually ambiguous glyphs (0/O, 1/I/l) so a
// human can transcribe the one-time password off a terminal without error.
const bootstrapPasswordAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz23456789"

// ownerStore is the minimal repo surface break-glass provisioning needs.
// *api.PGRepo satisfies it; the unit tests drive a fake, so the core provisioning
// logic is exercised without a database or a terminal.
type ownerStore interface {
	UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error
	SetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) error
}

// cmdBreakGlass is the `felis breakGlass` entrypoint: the root gate, config load,
// database open, and the interactive TUI. Everything below runBreakGlassTUI is
// I/O at the edge; the provisioning logic itself is plain functions over
// ownerStore so it stays testable off a terminal.
func cmdBreakGlass(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("breakGlass", flag.ContinueOnError)
	fs.SetOutput(stderr)
	cfgPath := fs.String("config", "/etc/felis/felis.toml", "path to felis.toml")
	if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
		return 2
	}

	// Root gate. The break-glass console's whole authority model is "you already
	// have local root", so anything less is refused rather than degraded. On
	// non-Unix os.Geteuid() returns -1, which also refuses — correct, since this is
	// a Linux-VM recovery tool.
	if os.Geteuid() != 0 {
		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "felis breakGlass: refused — the break-glass emergency console must run as root (try: sudo felis breakGlass)")
		return 1
	}

	cfg, err := config.Load(*cfgPath)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "felis breakGlass: %v\n", err)
		return 1
	}

	ctx := context.Background()
	drv, err := store.Open(ctx, cfg.Database.URL)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "felis breakGlass: open database: %v\n", err)
		return 1
	}
	defer drv.Close()

	repo := api.NewPGRepo(drv.DB())
	res, err := runBreakGlassTUI(ctx, repo, cfg.Server.RootDomain)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "felis breakGlass: %v\n", err)
		return 1
	}

	if !res.provisioned {
		fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "felis breakGlass: cancelled — no changes made.")
		return 0
	}

	// The TUI runs on the alternate screen, which is torn down on exit and takes the
	// in-console password display with it. Re-print a durable summary to the normal
	// screen so the one-time bootstrap password survives in scrollback long enough
	// for the operator to log in. It is shown, never persisted: only the bcrypt hash
	// reached the database.
	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "\nfelis breakGlass: Owner account %q provisioned; local-password login is ENABLED.\n", res.username)
	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "One-time bootstrap password (you MUST change it on first login):\n\n    %s\n\n", res.password)
	if res.rootDomain != "" {
		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Log in at https://op.console.%s with that username and password.\n", res.rootDomain)
	}
	return 0
}

// newOwnerID returns a fresh, unguessable id for the Owner row. It mirrors the
// crypto/rand hex idiom used elsewhere (internal/submit, internal/build): 16 bytes
// give uuid-equivalent entropy and the value is path/argv-safe lowercase hex. A
// fresh id per run is fine because UpsertOwner preserves the existing id on a
// username conflict, so a reset keeps live sessions valid.
func newOwnerID() string {
	var b [16]byte
	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
		// crypto/rand only fails on a broken entropy source. Refuse rather than mint a
		// predictable id for a privileged account.
		return ""
	}
	return "usr-" + hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
}

// generateBootstrapPassword returns a fresh one-time password from the unambiguous
// alphabet. It rejection-samples to avoid modulo bias, so every position is uniform
// over the alphabet. 20 chars over a 57-symbol alphabet is ~116 bits — far more than
// the must-change credential needs, and it is rotated on first login regardless.
func generateBootstrapPassword() (string, error) {
	const n = 20
	// Largest multiple of the alphabet size that fits in a byte; bytes at or above it
	// are discarded so the surviving values map uniformly (no modulo bias).
	limit := byte(256 - (256 % len(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet)))
	out := make([]byte, 0, n)
	var b [1]byte
	for len(out) < n {
		if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("generate bootstrap password: %w", err)
		}
		if b[0] >= limit {
			continue
		}
		out = append(out, bootstrapPasswordAlphabet[int(b[0])%len(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet)])
	}
	return string(out), nil
}

// provisionOwner mints or resets the single Owner account direct-to-Postgres and
// returns the one-time bootstrap password to display. The account is created with
// must_change_password=true, which is load-bearing: it is what arms the API's
// lockdown middleware so the Owner can do nothing but change the password on first
// login. The returned plaintext exists ONLY to be shown once on this terminal — it
// is never logged or persisted; only its bcrypt hash reaches the database.
func provisionOwner(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email string) (string, error) {
	username = strings.TrimSpace(username)
	if username == "" {
		return "", errors.New("username is required")
	}
	id := newOwnerID()
	if id == "" {
		return "", errors.New("generate owner id: entropy source failed")
	}
	password, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("hash bootstrap password: %w", err)
	}
	if err := s.UpsertOwner(ctx, id, username, strings.TrimSpace(email), string(hash), true); err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("write owner: %w", err)
	}
	return password, nil
}

// enableLocalAuth flips the runtime local_auth_enabled toggle on
// direct-to-Postgres. It is the second load-bearing write of break-glass: without
// it handleLogin returns 403 and the freshly provisioned Owner cannot log in, so a
// successful provisionOwner with local auth off is not a usable thin thread.
func enableLocalAuth(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore) error {
	// The setting is read back with json.Unmarshal into a bool, so the stored jsonb
	// value must be the literal true.
	if err := s.SetSetting(ctx, localAuthEnabledSettingKey, []byte("true")); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("enable local auth: %w", err)
	}
	return nil
}

// ---- interactive TUI (the untested shell over the tested core) ----

// breakGlassResult is what the TUI hands back to cmdBreakGlass for the durable
// post-exit summary. provisioned is false on cancel.
type breakGlassResult struct {
	provisioned bool
	username    string
	password    string
	rootDomain  string
}

type bgState int

const (
	stateForm bgState = iota
	stateWorking
	stateDone
	stateError
)

// provisionedMsg is delivered to the model when the background provisioning
// command finishes.
type provisionedMsg struct {
	password string
	err      error
}

var (
	bgTitleStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Foreground(lipgloss.Color("15")).Background(lipgloss.Color("88")).Padding(0, 1)
	bgLabelStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true)
	bgHintStyle  = lipgloss.NewStyle().Faint(true)
	bgErrStyle   = lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Foreground(lipgloss.Color("9"))
	bgOKStyle    = lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Foreground(lipgloss.Color("10"))
	bgPwStyle    = lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Foreground(lipgloss.Color("0")).Background(lipgloss.Color("11")).Padding(0, 1)
	bgBoxStyle   = lipgloss.NewStyle().Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()).Padding(1, 3)
)

// bgModel is the bubbletea model for the provisioning console. It is a pointer
// model so Update can mutate in place; the only field touched from the background
// command is read after the command returns via provisionedMsg.
type bgModel struct {
	ctx        context.Context
	store      ownerStore
	rootDomain string

	inputs  []textinput.Model
	focus   int
	state   bgState
	formErr string

	username string
	password string
	err      error
}

func newBGModel(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, rootDomain string) *bgModel {
	user := textinput.New()
	user.Placeholder = "owner"
	user.SetValue("owner")
	user.CharLimit = 64
	user.Width = 40
	user.Prompt = ""
	user.Focus()

	email := textinput.New()
	email.Placeholder = "(optional)"
	email.CharLimit = 254
	email.Width = 40
	email.Prompt = ""

	return &bgModel{
		ctx:        ctx,
		store:      s,
		rootDomain: rootDomain,
		inputs:     []textinput.Model{user, email},
		focus:      0,
		state:      stateForm,
	}
}

func (m *bgModel) Init() tea.Cmd { return textinput.Blink }

func (m *bgModel) focusInput(i int) tea.Cmd {
	if i < 0 {
		i = len(m.inputs) - 1
	}
	if i >= len(m.inputs) {
		i = 0
	}
	m.focus = i
	var cmd tea.Cmd
	for j := range m.inputs {
		if j == i {
			cmd = m.inputs[j].Focus()
		} else {
			m.inputs[j].Blur()
		}
	}
	return cmd
}

func (m *bgModel) updateInputs(msg tea.Msg) tea.Cmd {
	cmds := make([]tea.Cmd, len(m.inputs))
	for i := range m.inputs {
		m.inputs[i], cmds[i] = m.inputs[i].Update(msg)
	}
	return tea.Batch(cmds...)
}

func (m *bgModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
	switch msg := msg.(type) {
	case provisionedMsg:
		if msg.err != nil {
			m.state, m.err = stateError, msg.err
		} else {
			m.state, m.password = stateDone, msg.password
		}
		return m, nil

	case tea.KeyMsg:
		switch m.state {
		case stateDone, stateError:
			// Any key dismisses the terminal screen.
			return m, tea.Quit
		case stateWorking:
			// Ignore input while the database write is in flight.
			return m, nil
		case stateForm:
			switch msg.String() {
			case "ctrl+c", "esc":
				return m, tea.Quit
			case "tab", "down":
				return m, m.focusInput(m.focus + 1)
			case "shift+tab", "up":
				return m, m.focusInput(m.focus - 1)
			case "enter":
				if strings.TrimSpace(m.inputs[0].Value()) == "" {
					m.formErr = "username is required"
					return m, m.focusInput(0)
				}
				m.username = strings.TrimSpace(m.inputs[0].Value())
				m.state, m.formErr = stateWorking, ""
				return m, provisionCmd(m.ctx, m.store, m.username, m.inputs[1].Value())
			}
		}
	}

	cmd := m.updateInputs(msg)
	return m, cmd
}

func (m *bgModel) View() string {
	var b strings.Builder
	b.WriteString(bgTitleStyle.Render("⚠  FELIS BREAK-GLASS — LOCAL EMERGENCY CONSOLE") + "\n\n")

	switch m.state {
	case stateForm:
		b.WriteString("Provision (or reset) the Owner account and enable local-password login.\n")
		b.WriteString("This writes directly to Postgres, bypassing the web Zero-Trust path.\n\n")
		b.WriteString(bgLabelStyle.Render("Owner username") + "\n")
		b.WriteString(m.inputs[0].View() + "\n\n")
		b.WriteString(bgLabelStyle.Render("Owner email (optional)") + "\n")
		b.WriteString(m.inputs[1].View() + "\n\n")
		if m.formErr != "" {
			b.WriteString(bgErrStyle.Render(m.formErr) + "\n\n")
		}
		b.WriteString(bgHintStyle.Render("tab/↑↓ move · enter provision · esc cancel") + "\n")

	case stateWorking:
		b.WriteString("Provisioning the Owner account…\n")

	case stateDone:
		b.WriteString(bgOKStyle.Render("✓ Owner provisioned · local-password login ENABLED") + "\n\n")
		box := bgLabelStyle.Render("username  ") + m.username + "\n" +
			bgLabelStyle.Render("password  ") + bgPwStyle.Render(m.password)
		b.WriteString(bgBoxStyle.Render(box) + "\n\n")
		b.WriteString(bgErrStyle.Render("Record this password now — it is shown only once.") + "\n")
		b.WriteString("You will be required to change it on first login.\n\n")
		if m.rootDomain != "" {
			b.WriteString("Log in at " + bgLabelStyle.Render("https://op.console."+m.rootDomain) + "\n\n")
		}
		b.WriteString(bgHintStyle.Render("press any key to exit") + "\n")

	case stateError:
		b.WriteString(bgErrStyle.Render("✗ Provisioning failed") + "\n\n")
		b.WriteString(m.err.Error() + "\n\n")
		b.WriteString(bgHintStyle.Render("press any key to exit") + "\n")
	}
	return b.String()
}

// provisionCmd runs the two load-bearing writes off the UI goroutine and reports
// the outcome back as a provisionedMsg. The Owner row is written first, then local
// auth is enabled. If enabling local auth fails, the message carries the error and
// Update routes to stateError: the generated plaintext in msg.password is dropped —
// never displayed and never stored anywhere — so a partial run leaks nothing. This
// is safe because the Owner row is unreachable for login while local_auth_enabled is
// unset, and re-running break-glass is idempotent (UpsertOwner is ON CONFLICT, so it
// overwrites the hash and re-issues a fresh password) and converges the toggle.
func provisionCmd(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email string) tea.Cmd {
	return func() tea.Msg {
		pw, err := provisionOwner(ctx, s, username, email)
		if err == nil {
			err = enableLocalAuth(ctx, s)
		}
		return provisionedMsg{password: pw, err: err}
	}
}

// runBreakGlassTUI drives the bubbletea program and projects the final model onto a
// breakGlassResult. It is the thin, untested shell; the logic it invokes
// (provisionOwner / enableLocalAuth) is unit-tested directly.
func runBreakGlassTUI(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, rootDomain string) (breakGlassResult, error) {
	final, err := tea.NewProgram(newBGModel(ctx, s, rootDomain), tea.WithAltScreen()).Run()
	if err != nil {
		return breakGlassResult{}, err
	}
	m, ok := final.(*bgModel)
	if !ok {
		return breakGlassResult{}, errors.New("unexpected final model")
	}
	if m.state == stateError {
		return breakGlassResult{}, m.err
	}
	return breakGlassResult{
		provisioned: m.state == stateDone,
		username:    m.username,
		password:    m.password,
		rootDomain:  rootDomain,
	}, nil
}
+207 −0
Changes for cmd/felis/breakglass_test.go: 207 added lines, 0 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
package main

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)

// fakeOwnerStore records what break-glass provisioning writes, so the core logic
// is exercised without a database or a terminal.
type fakeOwnerStore struct {
	upserts   []upsertCall
	settings  map[string][]byte
	upsertErr error
	setErr    error
}

type upsertCall struct {
	id, username, email, passwordHash string
	mustChange                        bool
}

func (f *fakeOwnerStore) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
	if f.upsertErr != nil {
		return f.upsertErr
	}
	f.upserts = append(f.upserts, upsertCall{id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange})
	return nil
}

func (f *fakeOwnerStore) SetSetting(_ context.Context, key string, value []byte) error {
	if f.setErr != nil {
		return f.setErr
	}
	if f.settings == nil {
		f.settings = map[string][]byte{}
	}
	f.settings[key] = value
	return nil
}

func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
	ctx := context.Background()

	t.Run("happy path mints a must-change admin with a verifiable hash", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
		pw, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "[email protected]")
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
		}
		if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
			t.Fatalf("want 1 upsert, got %d", len(f.upserts))
		}
		got := f.upserts[0]
		if got.username != "owner" {
			t.Errorf("username = %q, want owner", got.username)
		}
		if got.email != "[email protected]" {
			t.Errorf("email = %q, want [email protected]", got.email)
		}
		// must_change_password=true is load-bearing: it arms the API lockdown so the
		// Owner can do nothing but change the password on first login.
		if !got.mustChange {
			t.Error("mustChange = false, want true (forced first-login change)")
		}
		if !strings.HasPrefix(got.id, "usr-") {
			t.Errorf("id = %q, want usr- prefix", got.id)
		}
		// The plaintext is returned only to be shown; only the hash is stored. The
		// returned password must verify against the stored hash.
		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(got.passwordHash), []byte(pw)) != nil {
			t.Error("returned password does not verify against the stored hash")
		}
		if pw == got.passwordHash {
			t.Error("stored hash equals plaintext — password was not hashed")
		}
	})

	t.Run("trims surrounding whitespace", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
		if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "  owner  ", "  [email protected]  "); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
		}
		if f.upserts[0].username != "owner" || f.upserts[0].email != "[email protected]" {
			t.Errorf("got username=%q email=%q, want trimmed", f.upserts[0].username, f.upserts[0].email)
		}
	})

	t.Run("rejects an empty username before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
		if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "   ", ""); err == nil {
			t.Fatal("want error for empty username")
		}
		if len(f.upserts) != 0 {
			t.Errorf("want no upsert on validation failure, got %d", len(f.upserts))
		}
	})

	t.Run("propagates a store error", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
		if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", ""); err == nil {
			t.Fatal("want error when the store fails")
		}
	})

	t.Run("two runs mint distinct passwords", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
		a, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "")
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
		b, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "")
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
		if a == b {
			t.Error("two provisions produced the same bootstrap password")
		}
	})
}

func TestEnableLocalAuth(t *testing.T) {
	f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
	if err := enableLocalAuth(context.Background(), f); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("enableLocalAuth: %v", err)
	}
	raw, ok := f.settings[localAuthEnabledSettingKey]
	if !ok {
		t.Fatalf("setting %q not written", localAuthEnabledSettingKey)
	}
	// Mirror how the live API parses the toggle (session.go localAuthEnabled): the
	// stored jsonb must round-trip to the bool true, or the gate fails closed and the
	// Owner can never log in.
	var enabled bool
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &enabled); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("setting value %q is not valid JSON: %v", raw, err)
	}
	if !enabled {
		t.Errorf("local_auth_enabled = false, want true")
	}
}

func TestGenerateBootstrapPassword(t *testing.T) {
	const want = 20
	pw, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("generateBootstrapPassword: %v", err)
	}
	if len(pw) != want {
		t.Errorf("length = %d, want %d", len(pw), want)
	}
	for _, c := range pw {
		if !strings.ContainsRune(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet, c) {
			t.Errorf("password contains out-of-alphabet rune %q", c)
		}
	}
	// bcrypt's hard limit is 72 bytes; a bootstrap password must stay well under it.
	if len(pw) > 72 {
		t.Errorf("length %d exceeds bcrypt's 72-byte limit", len(pw))
	}
	other, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if pw == other {
		t.Error("two calls produced the same password")
	}
}

func TestProvisionCmd(t *testing.T) {
	t.Run("performs both load-bearing writes", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
		msg := provisionCmd(context.Background(), f, "owner", "")()
		pm, ok := msg.(provisionedMsg)
		if !ok {
			t.Fatalf("got %T, want provisionedMsg", msg)
		}
		if pm.err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("provisionCmd error: %v", pm.err)
		}
		if pm.password == "" {
			t.Error("empty password in result")
		}
		if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
			t.Errorf("want 1 owner upsert, got %d", len(f.upserts))
		}
		if _, ok := f.settings[localAuthEnabledSettingKey]; !ok {
			t.Error("local auth was not enabled — login would 403")
		}
	})

	t.Run("does not enable local auth if the owner write fails", func(t *testing.T) {
		f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
		msg := provisionCmd(context.Background(), f, "owner", "")()
		pm := msg.(provisionedMsg)
		if pm.err == nil {
			t.Fatal("want error when the owner write fails")
		}
		if len(f.settings) != 0 {
			t.Error("local auth should not be enabled when provisioning failed")
		}
	})
}
+3 −0
Changes for cmd/felis/run.go: 3 added lines, 0 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ Commands:
  restore           Extract a world archive into a world volume (internal Job entrypoint)
  manifests         Render the control-plane RBAC + NetworkPolicy install bundle as YAML
  apply             Apply a MinecraftServer manifest
  breakGlass        Open the local break-glass emergency console (TUI; requires root/sudo)

Run "felis <command> -h" for command-specific flags.
`
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ func run(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
		return cmdManifests(rest, stdout, stderr)
	case "apply":
		return notImplemented("apply", "MinecraftServer manifest apply", stderr)
	case "breakGlass":
		return cmdBreakGlass(rest, stdout, stderr)
	case "-h", "--help", "help":
		fmt.Fprint(stdout, usage)
		return 0