feat(cli): break-glass emergency console TUI

Add `felis breakGlass`, a root-only interactive TUI that provisions or
resets the Owner account directly against Postgres and enables local
password login. It is the local-root recovery path that bypasses web
Zero Trust by design - used to bootstrap the first Owner credential and
to recover when the web login is unreachable.

- Bare `felis` prints CLI usage only; breakGlass is the sole subcommand
  that enters a TUI rather than running as a CLI.
- Refuses to run unless euid is 0 (try: sudo felis breakGlass); on
  non-Unix platforms the euid check also refuses.
- Generates a one-time Owner password, sets must_change_password, and
  prints a durable summary (username, one-time password, op.console
  login URL derived from the configured root domain) after the
  alt-screen TUI is torn down.

Covered by Go unit tests over a fake owner store.
This commit is contained in:
flyemoji committed 2026-06-27 04:23:21 +09:00
1 parent af14f02f38
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package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
// fakeOwnerStore records what break-glass provisioning writes, so the core logic
// is exercised without a database or a terminal.
type fakeOwnerStore struct {
upserts []upsertCall
settings map[string][]byte
upsertErr error
setErr error
}
type upsertCall struct {
id, username, email, passwordHash string
mustChange bool
}
func (f *fakeOwnerStore) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
if f.upsertErr != nil {
return f.upsertErr
}
f.upserts = append(f.upserts, upsertCall{id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange})
return nil
}
func (f *fakeOwnerStore) SetSetting(_ context.Context, key string, value []byte) error {
if f.setErr != nil {
return f.setErr
}
if f.settings == nil {
f.settings = map[string][]byte{}
}
f.settings[key] = value
return nil
}
func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
t.Run("happy path mints a must-change admin with a verifiable hash", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
pw, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "[email protected]")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
}
if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 upsert, got %d", len(f.upserts))
}
got := f.upserts[0]
if got.username != "owner" {
t.Errorf("username = %q, want owner", got.username)
}
if got.email != "[email protected]" {
t.Errorf("email = %q, want [email protected]", got.email)
}
// must_change_password=true is load-bearing: it arms the API lockdown so the
// Owner can do nothing but change the password on first login.
if !got.mustChange {
t.Error("mustChange = false, want true (forced first-login change)")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(got.id, "usr-") {
t.Errorf("id = %q, want usr- prefix", got.id)
}
// The plaintext is returned only to be shown; only the hash is stored. The
// returned password must verify against the stored hash.
if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(got.passwordHash), []byte(pw)) != nil {
t.Error("returned password does not verify against the stored hash")
}
if pw == got.passwordHash {
t.Error("stored hash equals plaintext — password was not hashed")
}
})
t.Run("trims surrounding whitespace", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, " owner ", " [email protected] "); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
}
if f.upserts[0].username != "owner" || f.upserts[0].email != "[email protected]" {
t.Errorf("got username=%q email=%q, want trimmed", f.upserts[0].username, f.upserts[0].email)
}
})
t.Run("rejects an empty username before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, " ", ""); err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error for empty username")
}
if len(f.upserts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("want no upsert on validation failure, got %d", len(f.upserts))
}
})
t.Run("propagates a store error", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
if _, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", ""); err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error when the store fails")
}
})
t.Run("two runs mint distinct passwords", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
a, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
b, err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if a == b {
t.Error("two provisions produced the same bootstrap password")
}
})
}
func TestEnableLocalAuth(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
if err := enableLocalAuth(context.Background(), f); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("enableLocalAuth: %v", err)
}
raw, ok := f.settings[localAuthEnabledSettingKey]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("setting %q not written", localAuthEnabledSettingKey)
}
// Mirror how the live API parses the toggle (session.go localAuthEnabled): the
// stored jsonb must round-trip to the bool true, or the gate fails closed and the
// Owner can never log in.
var enabled bool
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &enabled); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setting value %q is not valid JSON: %v", raw, err)
}
if !enabled {
t.Errorf("local_auth_enabled = false, want true")
}
}
func TestGenerateBootstrapPassword(t *testing.T) {
const want = 20
pw, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generateBootstrapPassword: %v", err)
}
if len(pw) != want {
t.Errorf("length = %d, want %d", len(pw), want)
}
for _, c := range pw {
if !strings.ContainsRune(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet, c) {
t.Errorf("password contains out-of-alphabet rune %q", c)
}
}
// bcrypt's hard limit is 72 bytes; a bootstrap password must stay well under it.
if len(pw) > 72 {
t.Errorf("length %d exceeds bcrypt's 72-byte limit", len(pw))
}
other, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if pw == other {
t.Error("two calls produced the same password")
}
}
func TestProvisionCmd(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("performs both load-bearing writes", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
msg := provisionCmd(context.Background(), f, "owner", "")()
pm, ok := msg.(provisionedMsg)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("got %T, want provisionedMsg", msg)
}
if pm.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("provisionCmd error: %v", pm.err)
}
if pm.password == "" {
t.Error("empty password in result")
}
if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
t.Errorf("want 1 owner upsert, got %d", len(f.upserts))
}
if _, ok := f.settings[localAuthEnabledSettingKey]; !ok {
t.Error("local auth was not enabled — login would 403")
}
})
t.Run("does not enable local auth if the owner write fails", func(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
msg := provisionCmd(context.Background(), f, "owner", "")()
pm := msg.(provisionedMsg)
if pm.err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error when the owner write fails")
}
if len(f.settings) != 0 {
t.Error("local auth should not be enabled when provisioning failed")
}
})
}