feat(api): add player email OTP verification (spec §B2 onboarding)

Forced web onboarding proves a player controls an email before it is
bound to their account. POST /api/v1/account/email/start mints a random
6-digit code, mails it (or logs it server-side when no Mailer is wired —
the demo has no SMTP), and POST /api/v1/account/email/verify redeems it,
flipping users.email_verified in the same transaction that consumes the
code.

Brute force is bounded two ways: a 10-minute TTL and a 5-attempt cap,
both enforced in the repo so the fake and Postgres agree. Only the
sha-256 of the code is stored; the digits live only in the email. Both
routes are app-tier external — verifying your own email is scoped to the
principal, never names another user.
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flyemoji committed 2026-06-27 12:29:52 +09:00
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package api
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
)
// captureMailer is the OTPMailer seam under test: it records the last code so a
// test can read the digits that production would only ever email out of band.
type captureMailer struct {
email, code string
calls int
err error
}
func (m *captureMailer) SendOTP(_ context.Context, email, code string) error {
m.calls++
if m.err != nil {
return m.err
}
m.email, m.code = email, code
return nil
}
// TestEmailOTPVertical walks the whole §B2 email-proof slice across the external
// face: a player asks for a code, the platform delivers it (here, into the test
// mailer), the player types it back, and only then does the user row flip verified.
// It proves the digits never ride the HTTP response and that both halves audit.
func TestEmailOTPVertical(t *testing.T) {
const email = "[email protected]"
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
repo := newFakeRepo()
// Seed the staff/user row the verify path flips, keyed (in the fake) by username
// but matched by ID — exactly how PGRepo updates users by id.
repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]"}
mailer := &captureMailer{}
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
api.Mailer = mailer
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
// 1) start mints + delivers a code. The response says "sent" and when it expires
// — but NEVER the code itself.
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
b := acctBody(t, w)
if b["sent"] != true {
t.Errorf("start body sent = %v, want true", b["sent"])
}
if _, leaked := b["code"]; leaked {
t.Error("start response must NEVER carry the code")
}
if s, _ := b["expires_at"].(string); s == "" {
t.Error("start must report expires_at")
}
if mailer.calls != 1 || mailer.email != email {
t.Fatalf("mailer not invoked for %s: calls=%d email=%q", email, mailer.calls, mailer.email)
}
code := mailer.code
if len(code) != otpCodeDigits {
t.Fatalf("delivered code %q: len = %d, want %d", code, len(code), otpCodeDigits)
}
// Only the hash is persisted — the plaintext must not be findable in the store.
for _, o := range repo.otps {
if o.codeHash == code {
t.Error("store holds the plaintext code, not its hash")
}
}
// 2) the player submits the code. The email is written and verified flips true.
w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+code+`"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("verify: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if vb := acctBody(t, w); vb["verified"] != true || vb["email"] != email {
t.Fatalf("verify body = %v, want verified:true email:%s", vb, email)
}
if su := repo.staff["player"]; !su.EmailVerified || su.Email != email {
t.Fatalf("user row not flipped: verified=%v email=%q", su.EmailVerified, su.Email)
}
// Both halves are audited by the principal's Access email.
if n := len(repo.audits); n != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 audits (otp_sent, verified), got %d: %+v", n, repo.audits)
}
if repo.audits[0].Action != "account.email.otp_sent" || repo.audits[0].Actor != "[email protected]" {
t.Errorf("first audit = %+v, want account.email.otp_sent by [email protected]", repo.audits[0])
}
if repo.audits[1].Action != "account.email.verified" || repo.audits[1].Actor != "[email protected]" {
t.Errorf("second audit = %+v, want account.email.verified by [email protected]", repo.audits[1])
}
// 3) the code is single-use: re-submitting the consumed code now fails.
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+code+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("replay of consumed code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestEmailOTPStartValidation covers the mint-side input gate and the no-mailer
// fallback (the demo path): a malformed address never mints, and a nil Mailer still
// persists a code (logged server-side) so the verify flow stays exercisable.
func TestEmailOTPStartValidation(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
mk := func(repo *fakeRepo) http.Handler {
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
return api.ExternalHandler() // no Mailer wired → demo fallback
}
bad := map[string]string{
"missing email": `{}`,
"empty email": `{"email":""}`,
"whitespace email": `{"email":" "}`,
"no at-sign": `{"email":"notanemail"}`,
"at-sign at edge": `{"email":"@example.net"}`,
"no dot in domain": `{"email":"a@bcd"}`,
"two at-signs": `{"email":"a@[email protected]"}`,
"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`,
"trailing at": `{"email":"player@"}`,
}
for name, body := range bad {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", body, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if len(repo.otps) != 0 {
t.Errorf("a rejected start must not mint a code, got %d", len(repo.otps))
}
})
}
t.Run("no mailer still persists a code (demo fallback)", func(t *testing.T) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if len(repo.otps) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 persisted code, got %d", len(repo.otps))
}
})
}
// TestEmailOTPVerifyRejections is the redeem-side failure matrix. The expired and
// locked cases plant rows directly: the test clock is frozen, so an already-expired
// or already-exhausted row is the only way to reach those branches deterministically.
func TestEmailOTPVerifyRejections(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
mk := func(repo *fakeRepo) http.Handler {
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
return api.ExternalHandler()
}
// live seeds an unconsumed onboarding code for u1 with the given hash/expiry.
live := func(repo *fakeRepo, id, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time, attempts int) {
repo.otps[id] = &fakeEmailOTP{
id: id, userID: "u1", email: "[email protected]", codeHash: codeHash,
purpose: otpPurposeOnboard, attempts: attempts,
expiresAt: expiresAt, createdAt: expiresAt,
}
}
t.Run("empty code -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":""}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("whitespace code -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":" "}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("unknown field -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"token":"123456"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("strict decode must reject unknown field, code = %d", w.Code)
}
})
t.Run("no live code -> 400 invalid_code", func(t *testing.T) {
w := do(mk(newFakeRepo()), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"000000"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
t.Run("expired code -> 400 invalid_code, not consumed", func(t *testing.T) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
// One second before the frozen test clock (time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)).
live(repo, "ex", otpCodeHash("424242"), time.Unix(1_699_999_999, 0), 0)
w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"424242"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if repo.otps["ex"].consumed {
t.Error("an expired code must not be consumed")
}
})
t.Run("wrong code -> 400 invalid_code, attempt charged, not consumed", func(t *testing.T) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
live(repo, "wr", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), 0)
w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"654321"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if repo.otps["wr"].attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("a wrong guess must cost one attempt, got %d", repo.otps["wr"].attempts)
}
if repo.otps["wr"].consumed {
t.Error("a wrong guess must not consume the code")
}
})
t.Run("exhausted code -> 429 otp_locked", func(t *testing.T) {
repo := newFakeRepo()
// Attempt budget already spent: even the correct code must be refused.
live(repo, "lk", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), otpMaxAttempts)
w := do(mk(repo), "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"123456"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_locked" {
t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_locked", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
}
// TestEmailOTPBruteForceLockout drives the lockout end-to-end through the handler:
// wrong guesses are charged one at a time until the budget is spent, after which
// even the correct code is refused with 429 — the brute-force ceiling in action.
func TestEmailOTPBruteForceLockout(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
repo := newFakeRepo()
mailer := &captureMailer{}
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
api.Mailer = mailer
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("start: code = %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
good := mailer.code
// Exhaust the budget with wrong guesses; each is a plain invalid_code.
for i := 0; i < otpMaxAttempts; i++ {
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"000000"}`, nil)
// "000000" could, with 1-in-a-million odds, equal the real code; guard that.
if good == "000000" {
t.Skip("astronomically unlucky code collision; rerun")
}
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("guess %d: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", i, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// Budget spent: the CORRECT code is now locked out, not accepted.
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+good+`"}`, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_locked" {
t.Fatalf("post-lockout correct code: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_locked", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestEmailOTPSupersede proves a re-request invalidates the prior code: only the
// newest live code for (user, purpose) can be redeemed, so an intercepted-then-
// reissued code cannot be used after the player asks again.
func TestEmailOTPSupersede(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
repo := newFakeRepo()
mailer := &captureMailer{}
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
api.Mailer = mailer
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
first := mailer.code
do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
second := mailer.code
if first == second {
t.Skip("rng produced identical codes; rerun")
}
// Only the second code survives.
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+first+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
t.Fatalf("superseded code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"`+second+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("current code: code = %d body %s, want 200", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestEmailOTPFaceSeparation enforces that both halves are web-only: they require a
// logged-in principal the internal (service-token) face never carries, so crossing
// the face boundary must 404, not silently work.
func TestEmailOTPFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
ih := api.InternalHandler()
if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("start on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
}
if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"123456"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("verify on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
}
}
// TestEmailOTPMailerError pins the delivery-failure path: a Mailer that errors
// surfaces as a 5xx (the code was persisted but never delivered), and the failure
// is NOT audited as a successful send.
func TestEmailOTPMailerError(t *testing.T) {
user := &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}
repo := newFakeRepo()
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: user}
api.Mailer = &captureMailer{err: errors.New("smtp down")}
eh := api.ExternalHandler()
w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil)
if w.Code < 500 {
t.Fatalf("mailer error: code = %d, want 5xx (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
for _, a := range repo.audits {
if a.Action == "account.email.otp_sent" {
t.Error("a failed delivery must not be audited as otp_sent")
}
}
}