fix(auth): enforce the verified-email uniqueness that email login assumes

The design has claimed since migration 0010 that at most one account can hold
a PROVEN email address, with ErrEmailTaken as the 409 a second verifier sees.
Neither half ever shipped: no migration created users_verified_email_unique,
and VerifyEmailOTP had no guard at all — the sentinel was defined but never
returned, so two accounts could both verify one address. The damage is not
cosmetic: the pre-session login resolves accounts BY verified email, so the
duplicate decided which identity a mailed sign-in code belonged to.

- Migration 0020 creates the partial unique index (lower(email) WHERE
  email_verified) the comments have been citing — the database-level backstop.
- VerifyEmailOTP now refuses the take-over with ErrEmailTaken BEFORE consuming
  the code (the address, not the code, is the problem), charges no attempt,
  and maps a lost cross-user race (unique violation) to the same answer.
- The verify handler answers 409 email_taken instead of a generic 500.

Covered by the pgint suite (sequential double-verify refused with the code
still live, a direct duplicate write still loses to the index, the refused
account can still prove its own address) and a hermetic 409 case.
This commit is contained in:
Lemon-miaow committed 2026-09-23 03:19:35 +08:00
1 parent 2a55a0d265
commit b6ef27cd2d
8 files changed
+120 -7

No files matched your search

+9 -3
View File
@@ -187,9 +187,11 @@ type emailOTPVerifyRequest struct {
// handleEmailOTPVerify redeems a code for the caller (spec §B2, external app face).
// Outcomes mirror the link-verify shape: an invalid/expired/mismatched code → 400
// invalid_code, a locked code (too many wrong guesses) → 429 otp_locked, and on
// success the user's email is written and email_verified flips true. The verified
// address is echoed so the panel can render it.
// invalid_code, a locked code (too many wrong guesses) → 429 otp_locked, an address
// another account already proved → 409 email_taken (the code stays live — the
// address, not the code, is the problem), and on success the user's email is
// written and email_verified flips true. The verified address is echoed so the
// panel can render it.
func (a *API) handleEmailOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
var req emailOTPVerifyRequest
@@ -211,6 +213,10 @@ func (a *API) handleEmailOTPVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPInvalid):
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired"))
return
case errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken):
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "email_taken",
"that email is already verified on another account; sign in with it or use another address"))
return
case err != nil:
writeError(w, r, err)
return