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docs(troubleshooting): add operator failure-mode checklist

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Add docs/troubleshooting.md covering the common failure modes the spec
implies, grounded in the actual control-plane code paths:

- Stuck Starting (PodNotReady / RconSecretUnavailable / RconNotReachable)
  and the deliberate absence of a Starting->Failed timeout.
- Failed reachable only via InvalidSpec on a malformed spec.storage.size,
  plus the stale status.endpoint=direct caveat after a failure.
- Routing via status.endpoint direct/fallback and the empty fallbackServer
  pitfall; wake 403/429/503 gate order.
- online-mode coupling and Velocity's offline-mode routing refusal.
- Cloudflare Access 401/403, nil-Keyfunc fail-closed, audience checks,
  the absence of an issuer check, and local-session gating.
- Internal service-token (FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN) rejection path.
- link/claim error codes, Kaniko build denials (SA-by-absence RBAC,
  default-deny egress, internal-registry push gate), and the registry
  DNS contract.
- Reaper backup-before-delete invariant and false-delete vectors.
- Unimplemented idle auto-stop, permanently-zero players.online, the
  inert CRD fields, and the always-survives world PVC behaviour.

Each item is labelled with its evidence grade (GO-TESTED / CODE-ONLY /
INTEGRATION-ONLY / INERT) so operators know what is verified versus
asserted.
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# Felis Troubleshooting Checklist
This file is the spec §28 #23 deliverable: a故障排查清单 (troubleshooting
checklist) for the failure modes the platform actually produces. Every symptom
below is traced to a concrete signal — a `status.conditions` reason, an HTTP
error code, a log string, or a manifest name — so an operator can map what they
see to the code path that emitted it.
## How to read this document
Each entry is **symptom → likely cause → where to look → fix**. Signals are
graded for how far the in-repo Go test suite proves the behaviour:
- **[GO-TESTED]** — a hermetic `*_test.go` exercises this exact path; the
string/code is asserted in CI.
- **[CODE-ONLY]** — the code path and string exist and are real, but no unit
test drives them (notably the Velocity Java plugin, which is not compiled or
tested in this repo).
- **[INTEGRATION-ONLY]** — the symptom is produced by the kubelet, kaniko,
containerd, Postgres, or the network, not by Felis Go code; you will see it in
`kubectl describe` / pod logs, never in `MinecraftServer.status`.
- **[INERT]** — the configuration field exists in the CRD but no controller
reads it. Tuning it does nothing. These are the highest-value traps and are
collected in §10.
The operator never invents the parent domain; routing identity is
`spec.subdomain` under the deployment zone. Examples below use
`<root-domain>` / `registry.<ns>.svc:<port>` placeholders rather than any
concrete host.
---
## 1. Server is stuck in `Starting` and never becomes `Running`
`MinecraftServer.status.phase` stays `Starting`. The single most important fact:
**the operator has no start timeout.** A start that never succeeds loops in
`Starting`, requeued every 5s, **forever** — it is never auto-escalated to
`Failed`. [GO-TESTED: `TestReconcileRunning_RconProbeFailureStaysStarting`
asserts the phase stays `Starting`.] Do **not** reach for
`spec.startup.timeoutSeconds` / `spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds` — both are
[INERT] (§10). A hung start must be diagnosed from pod state, not from
`MinecraftServer.status`.
First, read the condition reason:
```
kubectl get minecraftserver <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'
```
`markStarting` writes the same reason to both `Ready=False` and
`RconReached=False`. The reason is exactly one of:
| `status.conditions[].reason` | Meaning | Requeue |
|---|---|---|
| `PodNotReady` | Pod not TCP-ready yet (`status.readyReplicas < 1`) | 5s |
| `RconSecretUnavailable` | RCON secret missing or malformed | 10s |
| `RconNotReachable` | RCON dial/auth failed | 5s |
[GO-TESTED for the reason set.]
### 1a. `PodNotReady` — pod never goes ready
The operator cannot tell *why* the pod is not ready; **a broken image, an
unbound PVC, and a backend that simply has not finished booting all surface as
the identical `PodNotReady` signal.** [GO-TESTED that the reason is emitted;
[INTEGRATION-ONLY] for the underlying pod cause.] You must drop to the pod:
```
kubectl get pod -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>
kubectl describe pod <pod> # look at Events + container State
```
- **`ImagePullBackOff` / `ErrImagePull`** → `spec.image` is wrong, the tag does
not exist, or the registry is unreachable. `spec.image` is copied verbatim into
the container with **zero validation** by the operator. Fix the image
reference, or see §7 (registry reachability) and §6 (build push target).
- **PVC `Pending`** → `kubectl get pvc -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>`. A
nonexistent `spec.storage.storageClassName`, or a request larger than any class
can satisfy, leaves the PVC unbound. The operator does **not** error on this
(only a malformed *quantity* errors — §2); it waits in `Starting` indefinitely.
Fix the StorageClass name or capacity. [INTEGRATION-ONLY.]
- **Container crash-looping before the readiness port opens** → check container
logs; this is a backend/entrypoint problem, not a Felis problem.
### 1b. `RconSecretUnavailable` — RCON secret missing or malformed
The probe needs the RCON password from `spec.rcon.secretRef`. The message is the
verbatim error: [CODE-ONLY for these branches]
- `rcon.secretRef.name and .key are required when rcon is enabled` — you enabled
`spec.rcon.enabled` but left `secretRef.name` or `secretRef.key` empty.
- `secret "<name>" has no key "<key>"` — the Secret exists but lacks the named
key.
Fix: create the Secret with the referenced key, or correct `secretRef`. Verify:
```
kubectl get secret <secretRef.name> -o jsonpath='{.data.<key>}' | base64 -d | wc -c
```
### 1c. `RconNotReachable` — RCON dial or auth failed
The probe is a TCP connect **plus** RCON auth handshake, then immediate close —
**no command is ever run; a successful auth IS the entire readiness gate.** The
message is the verbatim dial error:
- `rcon: authentication failed` → the password in the Secret does not match the
backend's `rcon.password`. Reconcile the two. [GO-TESTED that this maps to
`RconNotReachable`.]
- `connection refused` / `i/o timeout` → the backend has not opened the RCON
port yet, RCON is disabled in `server.properties`, or `spec.rcon.port`
(default 25575) is wrong. [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live handshake.]
The per-probe timeout is a fixed 5s in code — it is **not** derived from
`spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds` ([INERT]).
---
## 2. Server is in `Failed`
There is exactly **one** path to `PhaseFailed`: `markFailed(server,
"InvalidSpec", err)`, reached only when the StatefulSet cannot be built. In
practice this means **a malformed `spec.storage.size`** (an unparseable resource
quantity), surfaced as:
```
invalid storage size "<value>": <parse error>
```
`status.conditions` will show `Ready=False` and `Provisioned=False`, both with
reason `InvalidSpec`. Fix the quantity (e.g. `10Gi`, not `10 GB`) and the server
leaves `Failed` on the next reconcile. [GO path is real; the specific branch is
[CODE-ONLY] — the reconciler test fixture uses a valid size.]
Two caveats when a server has been in `Failed`:
- A pod-not-ready or unreachable-RCON server is **never** `Failed`; it is
`Starting` (§1). If you see `Failed`, it is a spec problem, not a runtime one.
- `markFailed` does **not** reset `status.endpoint`. A server that fails after
having been `Running` keeps a stale `endpoint.mode=direct`. The proxy should
treat any non-`Running` phase as "do not route direct" rather than trusting a
lingering `direct` endpoint (§4).
---
## 3. Players can't join / get sent to the wrong place
Routing is driven by `status.endpoint`:
- `markRunningReady` is the **only** writer of `endpoint.mode=direct`
(`address=<game address>`), and only while `phase=Running` and RCON-ready.
- `markStarting`, `markStopping`, `markStopped` all write
`endpoint.mode=fallback`, `address=spec.fallbackServer`.
So the proxy should route `direct` **only** when `phase=Running`; otherwise it
gets a `fallback` endpoint. [GO-TESTED for the direct/fallback toggle via
`markRunningReady`/`markStopped`.]
Two pitfalls:
1. **`spec.fallbackServer` is empty** → the fallback endpoint `address` is `""`,
so during `Starting`/`Stopping`/`Stopped` the proxy has no lobby to park the
player in. Set `spec.fallbackServer` to a registered Velocity server name.
2. **Stale `direct` after `Failed`** → see §2; the proxy must not honour a
`direct` endpoint unless `phase=Running`.
### 3a. Wake-on-join is refused, slow, or rate-limited
When a player joins a stopped server, the proxy parks them in the fallback and
calls the internal wake API. The authorization gate order is **autostartPolicy →
per-server cooldown → global running cap**. Map the API result:
| HTTP | Code | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| `403` | `forbidden` | `autostartPolicy=allowlist` and UUID not allowlisted, or `ownerOnly` and caller is not owner | Add the UUID / claim the server / set `autostartPolicy=public` |
| `429` | (cooldown) | Wake retried within the 30s per-server `WakeCooldown` | Wait out the cooldown |
| `503` | `at_capacity` | Global `MaxRunningServers` cap reached | Stop another server or raise the cap |
[GO-TESTED: `handlers_internal_wake_test.go`, cooldown, running-cap shape.] The
operator's RCON probe — **not** the wake call — is the authoritative readiness
gate; the proxy polls `GET /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/status` every ~2s and
teleports when `ready=true`.
The Velocity-side consumption of these codes (`403` → "You're not allowed to
start «server»"; `429` → re-queue; other → "Couldn't start … Try again
shortly.") lives in the Java plugin and is **[CODE-ONLY]** — the codes it reacts
to are produced by the Go-tested `authorizeWakeByUUID` / cooldown limiter, so
grade the two halves separately.
---
## 4. Routing is disabled even though servers are up (online-mode coupling)
Wake/claim/allowlist semantics trust **Mojang-verified online-mode UUIDs**. If
the proxy runs `online-mode=false`, those identities are spoofable, so the
Velocity plugin **refuses to activate routing**:
```
Felis routing DISABLED: the proxy is in offline mode (online-mode=false).
Domain autostart and the allowlist trust Mojang-verified UUIDs; refusing to
route on spoofable identities. /link remains available. Set online-mode=true to
enable routing.
```
[CODE-ONLY — `FelisVelocityPlugin.onProxyInitialize`.] `/link` still works
(account binding does not depend on routing), but no domain autostart happens.
The summary line prints `routing: disabled (offline mode)` or
`(no root-domain set)`. Fix: set `online-mode=true` on the proxy, or configure
the root domain if the log says `no root-domain set`.
On the server side, `spec.autostartPolicy` and `spec.onlineMode` are documented
as only meaningful when the proxy enforces `online-mode=true`. Setting them does
not by itself make an offline proxy safe — the proxy guard is the enforcement
point.
---
## 5. Web panel returns 401 / 403 (Zero-Trust / Cloudflare Access)
The external face accepts either a Cloudflare Access JWT
(`Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` header) **or** a local session cookie. The error
envelope is always `{"error":{"code","message","request_id"}}`. [GO-TESTED.]
- **`401 unauthorized`** — not authenticated: no/invalid Access JWT and no valid
session. [GO-TESTED.]
- **`403 forbidden`** — authenticated but not permitted (e.g. a non-admin
principal hitting an admin route; `IsAdmin()` requires `role=admin` **and**
arrival via the admin Access audience/host). [GO-TESTED.]
### 5a. Every external request 401s on a fresh deploy
The Access verifier is wired **fail-closed**: `Keyfunc` (the JWKS key function)
is `nil` until deployment wiring supplies it. With a nil Keyfunc, **every** JWT
verification fails, and startup logs:
```
felis api: external face fails closed (Access JWKS key function not configured)
```
[INTEGRATION-ONLY — the live JWKS path is a deployment point.] This is intended:
the panel rejects all callers until JWKS is configured. Fix by wiring the
Access JWKS key function for `cfg.Auth.AccessJWTAud`.
### 5b. Token rejected with audience error
```
token audience does not include "<aud>"
```
The JWT's `aud` claim does not contain the configured `cfg.Auth.AccessJWTAud`
(or the admin audience for admin routes). [GO-TESTED.] Confirm the Access
application audience matches `cfg.Auth.AccessJWTAud`.
**Trust-model note for operators:** verification is **expiration-required +
audience + signing-key (JWKS)**. There is **no `iss` (issuer) check** anywhere in
the verifier. Trust rests entirely on the audience claim plus the JWKS signing
key. When documenting or auditing the trust boundary, do not assume issuer is
validated — it is not.
### 5c. Local-password login fails or is silently rejected
Local sessions use the `felis_session` cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax,
12h TTL, host-only). They are gated by the `local_auth_enabled` row in
`platform_settings`, read live per request and **fail-closed** (missing or
unparseable → treated as disabled). Symptoms:
- Cookie present but login rejected with `local auth disabled` → the
`local_auth_enabled` setting is false/absent. A present cookie under disabled
local-auth is **rejected outright**, not fallen through to the JWT path.
- `invalid session: …` → bad/forged session hash.
Fix: set `local_auth_enabled=true` in `platform_settings` if local password auth
is intended. [GO-TESTED for the session/QR-login logic.]
---
## 6. Internal API rejects Velocity / proxy callers (service-token)
The internal face (`--internal-addr :8081`, routes under
`/api/v1/internal/...`) is **never** Zero-Trust; it authenticates a single
service token via `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, compared in constant time.
- **All internal calls 401** → the token is unset or wrong. The API reads env
`FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN`. If unset, startup logs:
```
felis api: warning: FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN unset — internal face will reject all callers
```
and wires an empty token, which rejects **everyone** (no bypass). [GO-TESTED
for the constant-time compare / empty-token rejection.]
In-cluster, the token's source of truth is the Secret `felis-service-token`
(key `token`), injected as `FELIS_SERVICE_TOKEN` on the API Deployment. Fix:
```
kubectl get secret felis-service-token -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d
```
Ensure the proxy is configured with the identical value.
---
## 7. Account-link and claim API errors
Codes from `handlers_account.go` / `handlers_internal.go`. [GO-TESTED.]
| HTTP | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| `400` | `bad_request` | Missing `mc_uuid`, empty code, or invalid `auth_source` (must be `mojang`/`thirdparty`) |
| `400` | `invalid_code` | Link code unknown or expired (10-min TTL, 8-symbol code) |
| `409` | `already_linked` | That MC UUID is already linked to **another** user |
| `412` | `not_linked` | Claim/owner op by a caller with no verified account link |
| `403` | `quota_exceeded` | Claim would exceed the user's server quota |
| `409` | `already_claimed` | Atomic `UPDATE … WHERE owner_id IS NULL` affected 0 rows |
| `404` | `not_found` | Unknown server/resource |
Flow reminder: the **code is minted in-game** on the internal face
(`POST /api/v1/internal/account/link/code`, proves the UUID) and **verified on
the web** external face (`POST /api/v1/account/link/verify`, proves the user).
A `409 already_linked` rolls the transaction back and **preserves** the code so a
different user can still use it. The claim's race-safety is the single
conditional `UPDATE` under READ COMMITTED — `1` row → `200`, `0` rows → `409`.
The real SQL execution is [INTEGRATION-ONLY] (no sqlmock/dockertest in repo); the
handler logic is [GO-TESTED] via an in-memory fake repo.
---
## 8. Image build fails (Kaniko, spec §14/§16)
### 8a. Build push rejected at submission with `400`
Pre-build validation rejects any push target that is not the internal registry:
```
must target the internal registry "<registry.<ns>.svc:<port>>", not "<your-target>"
```
[GO-TESTED via the `validate` gate.] Fix the image reference to push to
`cfg.Registry.URL` (the internal registry — §9).
### 8b. Build Job's ServiceAccount can do nothing (RBAC "denial" by design)
The build/restore Job SAs (`felis-build`, `felis-restore`, namespace
`felis-build`) have **no Role and no RoleBinding anywhere** — isolation is the
*absence* of permissions (spec §16/§21). If you see the build SA denied a
namespaced API operation, **that is correct, not a misconfiguration.** [GO-TESTED
that the rendered manifests give these SAs no Role.] Do not "fix" it by granting
the build SA permissions.
### 8c. Build hangs then fails fetching base image / packages
The build namespace runs a default-deny egress NetworkPolicy
(`felis-build-egress`); the **only** allowed egress is the package-mirror CIDRs
from `--package-cidr`, which **defaults to none** (fail-closed, no internet).
[GO-TESTED for the netpol shape.] A kaniko run that hangs pulling a base image or
OS package from a non-allowlisted host is the egress policy doing its job — the
hang/failure text comes from kaniko/containerd and is [INTEGRATION-ONLY]. Fix:
add the mirror CIDR via `--package-cidr`, or pre-stage the base image in the
internal registry.
### 8d. Build reaches `Failed` phase
`reconcileBuilds` polls the Job; a Job reaching `Failed` is surfaced via
`writeBuildError` (JobPhase→Failed). [GO-TESTED for the mapping.] The underlying
cause — a kaniko build error or the **Trivy CRITICAL-CVE gate** failing the build
before push (spec §16) — is in the Job's pod logs and is [INTEGRATION-ONLY].
Inspect:
```
kubectl logs -n felis-build job/<build-job>
```
---
## 9. Registry push/pull failures (spec §15)
The in-cluster registry is Deployment/Service/PVC named `registry` in the
control namespace (or `--registry-namespace`):
- **Push/pull target (the exact string to match):**
`registry.<ns>.svc:<port>` (port from `--registry-port`, default `5000`;
e.g. `--felis-image registry.felis.svc:5000/felis:v1`). A *wrong* push URL is
caught at build time by the validate gate (§8a, `400`). An *unreachable*
registry at runtime (wrong DNS/port, PVC unbound, missing default StorageClass)
surfaces as kaniko push or kubelet pull errors — [INTEGRATION-ONLY], **not** a
Felis-emitted string.
- **Storage:** PVC is RWO, `10Gi`, mounted at `/var/lib/registry`, **no
`storageClassName`** → binds the cluster default class. If the cluster has no
default StorageClass the PVC stays `Pending` and the registry never starts.
- **Selector quirk worth knowing:** the registry Service selector is only
`name + component=registry` — it deliberately lacks the
`part-of=felis-control-plane` label, so the registry is *invisible* to the
RCON-peer NetworkPolicy selector. This is intended isolation, not a bug; do not
"fix" it by adding the label.
Registry manifest rendering is [GO-TESTED]; actual serving is
[CODE-ONLY/INTEGRATION-ONLY].
---
## 10. World reaper: false-deletes and skipped backups (spec §18)
The reaper is a **run-once daily CronJob batch**, not an operator controller. It
reaps a world only when `now - last_active_at > 15d` (`inactive_15d`); the 15-day
deadline is **hard-fixed in code** (only `warn_before` / `retention` /
`max_local_bytes` are configurable from `felis.toml [archive]`).
### The backup-before-delete invariant
The reap sequence (all [GO-TESTED] hermetically) preserves the world unless a
**confirmed, DB-recorded backup exists**:
1. `ensureCapacity` (only if `max_local_bytes > 0`) → store full ⇒ world
**preserved** (not deleted).
2. `Archiver.Archive` fails ⇒ world **preserved**, PVC untouched.
3. `InsertBackup` (DB) fails ⇒ the orphan archive is deleted, PVC **untouched**.
4. **Only then** `DeletePVC` → `ReleaseWorld` → `Stop` (cosmetic) → audit →
`felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total++`.
So a missing backup never results in a deleted world. [GO-TESTED:
`TestReapArchiveFailurePreservesWorld`,
`TestReapInsertBackupFailurePreservesWorld`, `TestReapIdleWorldFullSequence`.]
### Exemptions (world never reaped)
- `spec.reaperExempt=true` → skipped entirely (system servers). [GO-TESTED
`TestReapExemptServerNeverTouched`.]
- CRD missing → logs `reaper: CRD missing, skipping`, skipped.
- Idle `≤ 15d` → not yet eligible.
### Genuine false-delete risk vectors
- **Stale `last_active_at`.** The keep-alive is `RecordJoin`, called from the
internal `join-event` handler. **If join events are not delivered to the API,
the activity clock never resets** and an actively-played world becomes
reap-eligible after 15 days. Verify join events are flowing (§3a) — this is the
most important reaper check. [INTEGRATION-ONLY for the live Postgres write.]
- **Unowned servers are still reaped.** A server with `owner_id=""` gets **no
pre-deletion warning** (`maybeWarn` skips unowned), but is still reaped at 15d.
[GO-TESTED `TestReapUnownedServerStillReaped`.] Claim or exempt servers you
want to keep.
- `DeletePVC` is idempotent (missing PVC is not an error), so a re-run will not
fail on already-reaped worlds; and `Stop` failure is only logged, so a reaped
world's `MinecraftServer` may not be flipped to `Stopped`.
Only `TarLocal` (tar+gzip) archiving is implemented; VolumeSnapshot/Longhorn
backends return `not implemented in this build`. The live PVC delete / Postgres
store paths are [INTEGRATION-ONLY].
---
## 11. Idle auto-stop never fires; player count always shows 0
**Idle auto-stop is entirely unimplemented in the operator.** `spec.idle.*`
([INERT], §12) is read by no controller, and no idle controller is registered.
An empty `Running` server stays `Running`.
Relatedly, `status.players.online` is **permanently 0**: the only writer of
`status.players` zeroes it on stop, and the RCON prober only dials + closes — it
never runs `list`. Any panel reading `status.players.online` will always show
empty. Do not build alerting on it, and do not expect "empty server" automation.
Note the reaper's `last_active_at` (§10) is a *different* subsystem (Postgres
business layer, bumped by join events) — it keeps worlds alive against the
reaper, but it does **not** auto-stop empty running servers.
---
## 12. Inert configuration fields (highest-value traps)
These CRD fields exist and validate, but **no controller reads them.** Setting
them has **no effect**. Verified by grep: each appears only in the type
definition and its deepcopy, never in a controller.
| Field | What you might expect | Reality |
|---|---|---|
| `spec.startup.timeoutSeconds` | Start budget before `Failed` | **[INERT]** — no Starting→Failed timeout exists; a hung start loops forever (§1) |
| `spec.startup.readinessTimeoutSeconds` | First-probe budget | **[INERT]** — probe timeout is a fixed 5s in code |
| `spec.idle.autoStopEnabled` | Auto-stop empty servers | **[INERT]** — idle auto-stop unimplemented (§11) |
| `spec.idle.emptySecondsBeforeStop` | Empty grace period | **[INERT]** |
| `spec.storage.retainOnDelete` | Keep/drop PVC on delete | **[INERT]** — world PVCs **always** survive server deletion; only the reaper ever deletes a world PVC (§13) |
If a runbook tells someone to "tune `startup.timeoutSeconds`" for a hung start,
it is wrong — use `kubectl describe pod` (§1a) instead.
---
## 13. World PVC survives after I deleted the MinecraftServer
This is expected. The world PVC is a StatefulSet `VolumeClaimTemplate`. There is
**no `persistentVolumeClaimRetentionPolicy` and no finalizer** anywhere in the
operator. Deleting the `MinecraftServer` garbage-collects the StatefulSet, but
StatefulSet deletion does **not** cascade to its template PVCs, and nothing else
cleans them up. So the world PVC **always survives** server deletion, regardless
of `spec.storage.retainOnDelete` ([INERT], §12). The **only** code that deletes a
world PVC is the reaper, and only after a verified backup (§10). To reclaim a
world PVC manually:
```
kubectl get pvc -l app.kubernetes.io/name=<name>
kubectl delete pvc <pvc> # irreversible — the world is gone
```
---
## 14. Metrics for diagnosis (spec §23)
All four mandated metrics have real producers; scrape them when triaging:
- `felis_servers_total` — managed server count.
- `felis_start_duration_seconds` — histogram, observed once per start when
readiness is first reached (`ReadySignalAt − StartRequestedAt`). A start that
never completes (§1) contributes **nothing** here — absence of observations is
itself the signal that starts are hanging.
- `felis_image_build_failures_total` — increments on build Job failure (§8d).
- `felis_reaper_worlds_deleted_total` — increments only after a world PVC is
actually deleted post-backup (§10); a spike here means worlds crossed the 15d
idle line — cross-check that join events are flowing (§10 risk vectors).
---
## Quick reference: symptom → section
| Symptom | Section |
|---|---|
| Stuck `Starting`, never `Running` | §1 |
| `Starting` with `PodNotReady` (image? PVC? boot?) | §1a |
| RCON secret/auth/port errors | §1b, §1c |
| Phase `Failed` | §2 |
| Players land in lobby / wrong place | §3, §4 |
| Wake refused / rate-limited (403/429/503) | §3a |
| Routing disabled, offline-mode | §4 |
| Panel 401/403; fails-closed; audience error | §5 |
| Local password login rejected | §5c |
| Internal callers 401 (service token) | §6 |
| Link/claim 400/409/412/403/404 | §7 |
| Build push 400 / SA denied / egress hang / Failed | §8 |
| Registry push/pull unreachable | §9 |
| World deleted unexpectedly / backup skipped | §10 |
| Idle auto-stop not firing; player count 0 | §11 |
| A config field seems ignored | §12 |
| PVC left behind after delete | §13 |
| Which metric to scrape | §14 |